Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (2 page)

Read Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy Online

Authors: Mark M. Lowenthal

Printed and bound in the United States of America

12 11 10 09 08 1 2 3 4 5

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Lowenthal, Mark M.

Intelligence : from secrets to policy / Mark M. Lowenthal.—4th ed. p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-87289-600-0 (pbk. : alk. paper)

1. Intelligence service—United States. 2. Intelligence service. 1. Title.

JK468.16L65 2009

327.1273—dc22 2008039013

For
Michael S. Freeman
1946-1999
Historian, Librarian, Friend

Preface

In years past, when academics who taught courses on intelligence got together, one of the first questions they asked one another was “What are you using for readings?” They asked because there was no standard text on intelligence. Available books were either general histories that did not suffice as course texts or academic discussions written largely for practitioners and aficionados, not for undergraduate or graduate students. Like many of my colleagues, I had long felt the need for an introductory text. I wrote the first edition of this book in 2000 to fill this gap in intelligence literature.

Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy
is not a how-to book: It will not turn readers into competent spies or even better analysts. Rather, it is designed to give readers a firm understanding of the role that intelligence plays in making national security policy and insight into its strengths and weaknesses. The main theme of the book is that intelligence serves and is subservient to policy and that it works best—analytically and operationally—when tied to clearly understood policy goals.

The book has a U.S.-centric bias. I am most familiar with the U.S. intelligence establishment, and it is the largest, richest, and most multifaceted intelligence enterprise in the world. At the same time, readers with interests beyond the United States should derive from this book a better understanding of many basic issues in intelligence collection, analysis, and covert action and of the relationship of intelligence to policy

This volume begins with a discussion of the definition of intelligence and a brief history and overview of the U.S. intelligence community. The core of the book is organized along the lines of the intelligence process as practiced by most intelligence enterprises: requirements, collection, analysis, dissemination, and policy. Each aspect is discussed in detail in terms of its role, strengths, and problems. The book’s structure allows the reader to understand the overall intelligence process and the specific issues encountered in each step of the process. The book examines covert action and counterintelligence in a similar vein. Three chapters explore the issues facing U.S. intelligence in terms of both nation states and transnational issues and the moral and ethical issues that arise in intelligence. The book also covers intelligence reform and foreign intelligence services.

Intelligence has grown primarily out of the course that I have taught for many years: The Role of Intelligence in U.S. Foreign Policy, at the School for International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, and Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, at the Zanvyl Krieger School of Arts and Sciences, the Johns Hopkins University As I tell my students, I provide neither a polemic against intelligence nor an apology for it. This volume takes the view that intelligence is a normal function of government: Sometimes it works well; sometimes it does not. Any intelligence service, including that of the United States, can rightly be the recipient of both praise and criticism. My goal is to raise important issues and to illuminate the debate over them, as well as to provide context for the debate. I leave it to professors and students to come to their own conclusions. As an introduction to the subject of intelligence, the book, I believe, takes the correct approach in not asking readers to agree with the author’s views.

As an introductory text, the book is not meant to be the last word on the subject. It is intended instead as a starting point for a serious academic exploration of the issues inherent in intelligence. Each chapter concludes with a list of readings recommended for a deeper examination of relevant issues. Additional bibliographic citations and Web sites are provided in Appendix 1. Appendix 2 lists some of the most important reviews and proposals for change in the intelligence community since 1945.

This is the fourth edition of
Intelligence.
The major changes in each edition reflect the changes that have confronted the intelligence community since 2000. The second edition added material about the September 11 attacks and the beginning of the war on terrorism. The third edition covered the investigations into the September 11 attacks, the Iraq weapons of mass destruction (WMD) estimate and its aftermath, and the creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the most substantial change in U.S. intelligence since 1947. This fourth edition reflects several new areas: the actual implementation of the DNI reforms and their successes and strains; the ongoing legal, operational, and ethical issues raised by the war against terrorism; the growth of such transnational issues such as WMD; and the growing politicization of intelligence in the United States, especially through the declassified use of national intelligence estimates (NIEs). Given the dynamic nature of intelligence, any textbook on the subject runs the risk of containing dated information. This may be an even greater problem here, given the fluid situation created by implementation of the new intelligence reform law and the international climate, which is very dynamic. This replicates the intelligence analyst’s dilemma of needing to produce finished intelligence during changing circumstances. The risk cannot be avoided. However, I am confident that most aspects of intelligence—and certainly the main issues discussed—are more general, more long-standing, and less susceptible to being outdated rapidly than the ever-changing character of intelligence might suggest.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Office of the DNI or any other U.S. government agency. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication of information or DNI endorsement of the author’s views. This material has been reviewed by the intelligence community to prevent the disclosure of classified information.

Several words of thanks are in order: first, to my wife, Cynthia, and our children—Sarah and Adam—who have supported my part-time academic career despite the missed dinners it means. Cynthia also reviewed the text incisively and provided me with much help and support throughout the production. Next, thanks go to three friends and colleagues—the late Sam Halpern, Loch Johnson, and Jennifer Sims—who reviewed early drafts and made substantial improvements. The following scholars also provided extremely helpful comments for the previous editions: William Green, California State University at San Bernadino; Patrick Morgan, University of California, Irvine; Donald Snow, University of Alabama; James D. Calder, University of Texas at San Antonio; and Robert Pringle, University of Kentucky. Richard Best of the Congressional Research Service helped me keep the bibliographic entries up to date. None of these individuals is responsible for any remaining flaws or any of the views expressed. I would also like to thank the reviewers for the fourth edition: L. Larry Boothe, Utah State University; Matthew Donald, Ohio State University; and John Syer, California State University, Sacramento. Moreover, I have been most fortunate to collaborate with the following editors at CQ Press: Charisse Kiino, Jerry Orvedahl, and Elizabeth Jones. Working with them has been most enjoyable. Thanks to the CIA for providing the “Star of David” photograph and to Space Imaging for supplying the series of overhead images of San Diego.

As I have in past editions, I continue to thank all of my colleagues across the intelligence community for all they have taught me and for their dedication to their work. Finally, thanks to all of my students over the years, whose comments and discussions have greatly enriched my courses and this book. Again, I am solely responsible for any shortcomings in this volume.

Mark M. Lowenthal

Reston, Virginia

Acronyms