GEOINT INTELLIGENCE
MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURES INTELLIGENCE
OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE
SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
COVERT ACTION
INFORMATION OPERATIONS
CURRENT NEWS ARTICLES
INTELLIGENCE REFORM OF 1996
•
www.access.gpo.gov/int/report.html
(Report of the Aspin-Brown Commission: “Report of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community”)
BUSINESS (COMPETITIVE) INTELLIGENCE
•
www.scip.org
(Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals)
•
www.pcic.net
(Professional Connections in the Intelligence Community)
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
SPECIAL REPORTS
PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS
•
www.iafie.org
(International Association for Intelligence Education)
•
www.afcea.com
(Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association)
APPENDIX 2
MAJOR INTELLIGENCE REVIEWS OR PROPOSALS
This appendix, which lists some of the most important reviews or proposals for change in the intelligence community, is based on a 1996 Congressional Research Service report,
Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization, 1949-1996,
by Richard A. Best Jr. The synopses offer insight into the major concepts that have been put forth over the years. However, they do not capture the many proposals made by individuals.
Eberstadt Report, 1945.
Laid the basic groundwork for what became the National Security Act of 1947, creating the National Security Council (NSC), a de jure director of central intelligence (DCI), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Also created a unified defense structure, as opposed to separate War and Navy Departments.
First Hoover Commission, 1949.
Raised concerns about the lack of coordination among the CIA, the military, and the State Department, resulting in duplication and some biased estimates. Urged a more central role for the CIA in national intelligence.
Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, 1949.
Recommended that the DCI concentrate on community-wide issues, with a subordinate running day-to-day CIA operations.
Doolittle Report. 1954.
Urged more effective espionage, counterespionage, and covert action to deal with the Soviet threat and noted the need for technical intelligence to overcome impediments to human intelligence (HUMINT) in the Soviet bloc.
Taylor Commission, 1961.
Offered an assessment of the Bay of Pigs invasion that criticized all agencies involved, the planning and concept of the operation, and the plausibility of deniability. Made recommendations regarding future planning and coordination for covert action.
Kirkpatrick Report, 1961.
Was an internal CIA review of the Bay of Pigs, which also criticized the operation’s planners.
Schlesinger Report, 1971.
Questioned the increased size and cost of the intelligence community in contrast with little apparent improvement in analysis; the cost of duplicative collection systems; and insufficient planning for future resource allocations. Recommended strengthening the role of the DCI in these areas.
Murphy Commission (Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy), 1975.
Raised the issue of the DCI’s responsibility versus authority but did not recommend increasing the DCI’s line authority to agencies beyond the CIA. Argued for the DCI to spend more time on community-wide issues, delegating CIA’s management to a deputy.
Rockefeller Commission (Commission on CIA Activities within the United States), 1975.
Formed in the wake of revelations about improper or illegal CIA activities (the “family jewels” report); focused largely on proposals to prevent a recurrence and to direct
CIA
attention solely on foreign intelligence activities.
Church Committee (Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities), 1976.
Prompted by the “family jewels” revelations. Recommended legislative charters for all intelligence agencies, spelling out roles and prohibited activities. Also recommended statutory recognition of the DCI’s role as principal foreign intelligence adviser, with authority to establish national intelligence requirements, the intelligence budget, and guidance for intelligence operations. Recommended that national intelligence budget be appropriated to the DCI, not to agency directors. Recommended banning assassinations.
Pike Committee (House Select Committee on Intelligence), 1976.
Was I louse counterpart to the Church Committee. Presented recommendations not in a final approved release but as leaked to the
Village Voice
newspaper. Recommended separating the DCI from the CIA to focus on community-wide issues; a ban on assassinations in peacetime: greater congressional oversight of covert action; charter legislation for the National Security Agency; publication of the overall intelligence budget figure; and abolition of the Defense Intelligence Agency, with its functions divided between the Defense Department and CIA.
Tower Commission
(Report of the President’s Special Review Board),
1987.
Formed after initial revelations about the Iran-contra affair. Recommended improvements in the structure and functioning of the NSC staff, more precise procedures for the restricted consideration of covert action, and a Joint Intelligence Committee in Congress. Raised concerns about the influence of policy makers on the intelligence process.
Boren-McCurdy, 1993.
Presented recommendations of the chairs of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees (David L. Boren, D-Okla., and Dave McCurdy, D-Okla., respectively), including creation of a director of national intelligence (DNI), with budgetary programming authority across the intelligence community; two deputy DNIS, one for analysis and estimates and one for intelligence community issues; a separate director of the CIA, subordinate to the DNI; and consolidation of analytical elements under a deputy DNI.
Aspin-Brown Commission (Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community),1996.
Studied the future of the intelligence community after the cold war. Said the intelligence community needed to function more as a true community, overcoming agency barriers. Recommended a closer tie between intelligence and policy to improve direction of roles, collection, and analysis; a second deputy DCI for the intelligence community; a fixed six-year term for the deputy DCI responsible for the CIA; realignment of the intelligence budget under discipline managers reporting to the DCI; and transfer of Defense Humint Service’s clandestine recruitment role to the CIA Directorate of Operations.
IC21: The Intelligence Community in the Twenty-first Century,
1996.
Study by the staff of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, contemporaneous with Aspin-Brown. Sought to create a more corporate intelligence community, with the DCI acting as a chief executive officer. Recommendations included DCI concurrence in the secretary of defense’s appointments of National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) defense agencies; increased DCI programmatic control over NFIP agency budgets and personnel; creation of a second deputy DCI for community management; consolidation and rationalization of certain management and infrastructure functions across the intelligence community; creation of a Technical Collection Agency to manage signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, and measurement and signatures intelligence; and creation of an intelligence community reserve.