International Security: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions) (16 page)

This framing also paved the ground for a certain amount of political and strategic opportunism as among both neoconservatives and the religious right there was a clear understanding that if spun correctly the attacks could be used to advance ambitious domestic and foreign policy goals. At home,
for example, 9/11 became the grounds for attacks by neoconservatives and the religious right on liberalism and the apparent decline in traditional values. Infamously, for example, the high profile preacher Jerry Falwell proclaimed that by mocking God, pagans, abortionists, feminists, gays, and lesbians, ‘all of them who have tried to secularize America’, were in part responsible for 9/11, which for him was a form of divine retribution.

Regarding foreign policy the framing provided the grounds for activism and the flexing of American military muscle. In proclaiming ‘Either you are with us or you are for the terrorists’, the message was clear that, if necessary, the United States was prepared to act unilaterally and set aside established conventions of international law and the opinions of the broader international community. Particularly notable, however, was how Al-Qaeda’s actions were tied to an ‘axis of evil’ of ‘rogue states’ through raising the spectre of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction from them (see
Box 4
). Despite the lack of evidence of any such link the elision between terrorists and rogue states enabled the war on terror to be directed against regimes, like Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, with the overall goal being a systematic and militarily oriented policy of reshaping the Middle East to America’s political, economic, and strategic advantage. It was only in such a way that the 2003 Iraq War became possible. There were several ironies to this. One was that the focus on Iraq diverted attention from Afghanistan where links with international terrorism were more obvious, but where instead the campaign was under-resourced with ongoing negative consequences. Another was to turn Iraq into a rallying destination for jihadis set on attacking American soldiers.

The United States, however, was not alone in its opportunism. Once the 9/11 attacks had been attributed to terrorism other states quickly proclaimed their support of America and reframed their own conflicts with various groups as part of the same campaign against international terrorism. In Russia, for example, President Putin quickly declared his sympathy and support for America while simultaneously demanding that the West amend its formerly critical attitude to Russia’s fight with Chechen separatists—now labelled terrorists. Almost immediately Western criticisms of human rights abuses in Chechnya and support for claims of national self-determination dried up.

Becoming the target of a terrorist campaign of politically motivated violence obviously raises the question of how to
respond, and in this respect a broad range of options is available crossing the spectrum from passive to increasingly active, and legal to extra-judicial and exceptional measures.

One response, as Charles Townsend has noted, is to do nothing. As indicated by the statistics of deaths resulting from terrorism in comparison to those caused by various other factors highlighted earlier, devoting extensive time and resources to tackling terrorism might seem irrational. Moreover, given that terrorism relies on creating mass alarmism and disrupting established patterns of daily life, then refusing to succumb to this temptation can itself be seen as refusing to fall into the terrorist trap as outlined in Johannes Most’s propositions about how the terror process works. In practice, however, it can be psychologically difficult not to respond, while for governments doing nothing may well be politically untenable. In part, this is because acts of terror challenge the state’s monopoly on the use of force and therefore challenge the state’s authority and legitimacy by raising questions about its ability to protect its citizens. Indeed, terrorist acts can also be felt as embarrassing and shaming, thereby requiring actions to re-establish self-esteem and honour. For example, for many Americans 9/11 was felt as challenging the country’s hegemonic position and therefore required a stern response to reassert, to itself and others, that America remained pre-eminent. Likewise, embarrassed by their failure to identify or prevent the attack, the national intelligence agencies and broader national security establishment were also keen to restore their damaged reputations.

A second level of response, therefore, is to undertake protective measures designed to disrupt groups from carrying out further attacks. This may include enhancing surveillance, tightening security around airports and other key sites, but also redesigning the urban architecture through the positioning of anti-bomb bollards, for example. In this respect, there has also been an increased emphasis on making societies more resilient by
enhancing their ability to bounce back from a terrorist attack. At this level the assumption remains that terrorist attacks are still likely to happen.

A third level of response is to adopt measures designed to prevent terrorist attacks in the future. This can cover a wide range of possibilities. For example, it might entail addressing the perceived causes of terrorism to prevent people becoming radicalized in the first place. One common perception is that people living in conditions of instability and poverty are easy targets for extremists seeking recruits. One way of ‘draining the swamp’, therefore, has been to refocus development aid (see
Chapter 6
) on improving the conditions of those populations deemed vulnerable to radicalization, at home as well as abroad. While this often entails an emphasis on economic development, the West has also been prone to link this to elements of democracy promotion. Such approaches can therefore entail a strong ideological component by countering the ideas and identities of extremists with one’s own. However, aside from the fact that the link between poverty and extremism is far from established, approaches like democracy promotion can also provoke resentment and may sometimes be counter-productive. Another response designed to prevent future terrorist attacks is therefore to rethink one’s own policies, for example, by ending support for repressive regimes, or by engaging the ‘terrorists’ in dialogue—as in the Northern Ireland peace process—in order to seek a negotiated settlement, thereby recognizing that political problems may well require political solutions.

A fourth level of response, however, is to actively go after the perpetrators of terrorist attacks, either in acts of retaliation and annihilation, or of prevention. Again, a range of responses are possible. For example, profiling techniques may be adopted to identify potential terrorists. Since 9/11, however, the success of profiling has been limited. For example, in 2008 a leaked briefing note from the UK’s MI5 intelligence service admitted that
traditionally assumed markers of risk (like social alienation, poverty, youthfulness, migrant, single, strength of religious belief, mental health …) appeared largely irrelevant as indicators of who might be at risk of radicalization and violent extremism. Other measures, however, might include using enhanced police powers (e.g. stop and search powers) or the passing of new legislation enabling enhanced levels of surveillance or the preventive detention of suspects. At the extra-judicial level it might include sanctioning targeted assassinations, as in the case of Osama Bin Laden, the use of extraordinary renditions, torture, and networks of secret detainment facilities. Finally, it might include military strikes and even declaring war on states deemed to be harbouring or supporting the activities of groups using terrorist tactics.

Since 2001 Western states have increasingly responded to the perceived terrorist threat by extending police powers, enhancing surveillance activities, passing legislation enabling the detention of suspects without charge—and in the UK restricting the freedoms of those suspected but not convicted of suspicious activities through the use of control orders—as well as engaging in covert operations, torture, and extra-judicial killings. For the defenders of such measures the rebalancing of the relationship between security and liberty/human rights is necessary to counter a real and present danger. For critics, however, the use of increasingly illiberal practices in the name of protecting liberty is worrying. As the human rights lawyer Conor Gearty has argued, such measures are justified by invoking ‘the lesser evil argument’, that small harms may be justified to prevent larger harms. Such an argument, however, relativizes the value of liberty and human rights and begs the question of where you draw the line, the worry being that small infringements can easily spill over into larger ones. As Walter Lacqueur argues, the question is therefore whether ‘a democratic society [can] subdue terrorism without surrendering the values central to the system’. Democratic states
therefore need to be mindful about the unintended and unforeseen consequences that can result from the deployment of illiberal and often illegal measures.

One effect of the war on terror declared after 9/11, for example, was that American society became increasingly subject to a range of disciplining practices that served to suffocate dissenting voices. In a context officially described as one of good versus evil, in which you were either for us or for the terrorists, any form of dissent was easily subject to criticisms of appeasing terrorism, as unpatriotic, even verging on traitorous. The result was a significant threat to fundamental principles of free speech, as in a climate of fear and anger society itself quickly began to undertake disciplining practices of self-censorship of its own accord. For example, when the Dixie Chicks, a country and western band, criticized the war on terror they ended up receiving death threats and having their music banned from hundreds of radio stations.

Indeed, states have actively encouraged vigilance and suspicion amongst citizens, not least by encouraging them to report on the activities and behaviour of people which they perceive as unusual or suspicious. The UK, for example, established the Confidential Anti-Terrorist Hotline and ran an ‘If you suspect it, report it’ advertising campaign (see
Figure 9
) helpfully suggesting what people might look out for. This included people watching CCTV cameras, using cameras suspiciously, buying chemicals, hiring a van or a lock up, someone with vague travel plans, and much more. A similar hotline set up in Australia in 2003 received 2,600 calls within two weeks. Indeed, particular groups of workers, like teachers, university lecturers, and social and community workers, have also been given responsibilities for reporting on suspicious behaviour and identifying those deemed at risk of radicalization.

For critics the danger is not only one of turning large segments of society into agents of national security, but that society in general becomes characterized by suspicion and surveillance and where anyone deemed different is at risk of being singled out. As Judith Butler has argued, in environments of generalized suspicion people’s prejudices (e.g. racial, ethnic, religious) are very likely to influence their judgements. Moreover, in this process understandings of what constitutes a terrorist threat have also expanded. The focus is no longer on simply preventing violent acts of terrorism, but identifying and policing particular beliefs and expressions of dissent deemed as being extremist on the grounds, as Robert Mueller, the Director of the FBI, put it in 2002, that there is a ‘continuum between those who would express dissent and those who would do a terrorist act’. We might ask, however, what constitutes an extremist belief, who decides, and what, if anything, can or should be done about it. Such questions are fundamentally political and were evident in early drafts of the 2009 version of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy which reportedly included support for armed resistance anywhere in the world, support for Sharia law, and a belief that gay sex is sinful as extremist beliefs. Ultimately these were omitted, presumably in recognition that it threatened to brand literally millions of British citizens as potential terrorists who should presumably be closely watched. However, given the centrality of freedom to liberal societies, such attempts to set the boundaries of what constitutes acceptable beliefs on a range of moral and political issues is, for critics, disturbing. It also suggests Walter Lacqueur might be right, that in trying to subdue terrorism democratic societies may well be in danger of surrendering the very values that underpin them.