International Security: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions) (4 page)

In contrast critical approaches offer a more dynamic view of the international security environment and pose a fundamental challenge to traditional approaches to security and to realism/neorealism in particular. Critical approaches are so called because they operate with a more critical understanding of the relationship between theory and practice. Unlike traditional approaches, which see good theory as describing the world ‘out there’, critical approaches see theories as potentially constituting our experience of the world. In this respect, insofar as realist accounts of human nature, and neorealist accounts of the logic of international anarchy, influence the views of analysts and policy makers, they also have the potential to become self-fulfilling prophecies. For critics this is problematic since realism/neorealism typically does not capture the totality of social life and the diverse nature of human relations. As such, there is nothing inevitable about the effects of international anarchy on state behaviour. For example, an anarchy of friends is likely to differ considerably from one comprised of enemies.

This emphasis on the constitutive nature of theory has led theorists operating in the critical tradition down various avenues, but two are worth noting in particular. First has been a concern with the politics and power of language in framing how security is understood in different contexts. Instead of trying to identify what security really ‘is’, the argument here is that we should focus on analysing how it is variously represented and spoken about and with what implications. The traditionalist emphasis on the objective nature of threats is therefore replaced with exposing how all claims about security, and the identification and nature of particular threats, are inherently political. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the language of security is the language of political priority and we should therefore be cognizant of what gets done when it is used. In other words, to what extent does the language of security establish the political priority attached to different issues? To what extent does it justify the adoption of exceptional measures, such as the use of armed force, the suspension of habeas corpus, the diversion of core resources? Similarly, whose interests do different security articulations benefit, and whose are undermined, and to what extent are claims about security constitutive of our sense of identity? Put differently, to what extent is it that identifying our enemies helps us crystallize our own sense of identity?

Second, as a result of viewing the content of security as a matter of political debate, rather than objective fact, critical approaches have also been central in pushing alternative security agendas that are viewed as more normatively progressive. In part, this has entailed a concerted move to shift the emphasis away from the state to prioritizing other things, in particular the security of people and humanity at large. From this perspective debates about international security should focus much more explicitly on questions of distribution and justice and on finding solutions that work to everyone’s benefit, instead of viewing security as part of a zero-sum game. Linked to this, emphasis has also been placed on creating space for those marginalized and excluded in
traditional security discourses to articulate their own security concerns. For example, feminist scholars have demonstrated how mainstream debates about security typically have little to say about the disproportionate levels of violence and subordination endured by women in comparison to men in most societies. They have also highlighted how debates about international security are heavily gendered in their tendency to depict international politics in highly aggressive masculine terms as a realm of competition and violence in which values of cooperation, caring, humility, and responsibility are luxuries or need not apply. In sum, through their critiques critical approaches are therefore generally more optimistic about the potential for normatively progressive change that might escape the strictures of anarchy described by realism/neorealism. However, as will become evident, promoting such changes can be difficult, while agreeing on what needs to be done can be even more so.

So today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons … Make no mistake. As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective [nuclear] arsenal.

(President Barack Obama, Czech Republic, 5 April 2009)

President Obama appears conflicted. Speaking in Prague shortly following his inauguration as President of the United States he declared the existence of nuclear weapons, each individually capable of killing tens of thousands of people, the Cold War’s most dangerous legacy. His speech marked a bold start to an initiative, not only to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but to begin to decommission them, the ultimate goal being a world of zero. In this vein the USA has pledged to further reduce the size of its nuclear arsenal, to enhance global nuclear oversight and monitoring mechanisms, and to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). And yet, so long as these weapons exist elsewhere he reserved the right for the USA to also maintain its own nuclear deterrent. Little wonder, therefore, that he went on to suggest that a world of zero nuclear weapons was unlikely in his lifetime.

The United Kingdom appears similarly conflicted. Despite endorsing its international legal commitments to promote nuclear non-proliferation as an NPT signatory, it has still decided to renew its submarine-based Trident nuclear deterrent. In a White Paper published in 2006, Prime Minister Tony Blair noted that while no major countries currently threaten the UK some of those countries still retain large nuclear arsenals and are even modernizing them. Given that ‘We cannot predict the way the world will look in 30 or 50 years time’, and given that no present recognized nuclear weapons state has declared an intention to unilaterally renounce its nuclear weapons unless all other nuclear weapons states do likewise, the White Paper argues that prudence dictates the United Kingdom should also continue to possess the ultimate deterrent.

Such tensions between expressed desires for nuclear disarmament and the unwillingness to act unilaterally could make one pessimistic about the possibilities for reaching the proclaimed target of zero. Underlying this issue, however, is a bigger question about the nature of international order and the possibilities for change and transformation. Prime Minister Blair’s concern, that since the future is unknown we should therefore prepare for the worst, depicts an international environment characterized by uncertainty and fear. This is the unchanging realist/neorealist world of international anarchy, where war remains a constant possibility and where states can only rely on themselves for survival. Others, however, are more optimistic about the prospects for change and suggest war is not inevitable, and by extension that nuclear disarmament might be possible through the establishment of different mechanisms of international security governance. In International Relations the difference between these positions reflects different views concerning the significance and effects of one of realism’s/neorealism’s core principles: the security dilemma.

The idea of the security dilemma suggests that in conditions of international anarchy, where states are ultimately dependent upon themselves for survival, states are necessarily prone to suspicion and worst case scenarios. The security dilemma is characterized by a situation whereby a state, fearful for its security, begins arming itself. Although for the state in question armament may be a purely defensive measure, this may appear unclear to other states who may interpret it as threatening, even despite—or perhaps precisely because—of proclamations otherwise. Indeed, armaments procured for defence can usually also be deployed offensively. Fearful that their own security is being undermined these states may respond in kind, in turn legitimizing the first state’s concerns but requiring a further response later on. In this way a spiral of insecurity can develop, with war looming in the background as an ever present possibility.

The development and proliferation of nuclear weapons during the Cold War provides a good example of how the security dilemma can produce spirals of insecurity and arms races, with proliferation taking two forms. First, following the United States’ development and use of atomic weapons against Japan in 1945 a process of ‘horizontal proliferation’ between states began. Thus, perceiving the United States’ new weapon as a major security challenge the Soviet Union responded with their first test of an atomic bomb in 1949. This raised fears in Western Europe. Sceptical of American assurances that its nuclear deterrent would also be used to guarantee its allies’ security Britain developed its own bomb in 1952, with France following in 1960. Similarly, feeling threatened by both the USA and a deteriorating relationship with the Soviet Union, China tested a nuclear bomb in 1964. This threatened India, which felt impelled to respond, with Pakistan following on behind. Horizontal proliferation, however, was accompanied by ‘vertical proliferation’ as both the USA and the Soviet Union raced to gain parity/superiority over the numbers and types of nuclear weapons they possessed. Come the 1980s around 70,000 nuclear weapons were in existence, the vast majority in the USA and the Soviet Union (
Figure 1
).

At one level the fact that this represented enough firepower to destroy humankind several times over can appear the height of human folly. However, it also indicates how the security dilemma exists as a state of mind, a matter of perception of the nature of the security environment, rather than a simple question of absolute numbers. There are, though, contending explanations regarding what factors might contribute to the fear and mistrust central to the development and endurance of security dilemmas. For realists the security dilemma is the inevitable consequence of the anarchic structure of the international system, which they see as forcing states into competitive strategic mindsets. In contrast critical approaches to security, which emphasize the constructed nature of security environments, suggest that
alarmist zero-sum thinking is not inevitable but a self-fulfilling outcome of the tendency of political and military elites to unthinkingly accept realist worldviews, one element of which is often an emphasis on calculating relative military capabilities (e.g. numbers of tanks, planes, boats, missiles, and nuclear bombs). Coupled with this the secrecy which typically surrounds national security issues can easily foster suspicion and enhance uncertainty amongst others.

Finally, questions of identity may also be important. Multiple studies suggest that identifying threatening enemies is often central to crystallizing a sense of purpose, community, and identity. As such, the enemy may even be something to be cherished and cultivated. The Cold War provided an excellent example of this insofar as the conflict produced a clear sense of purpose and direction around the ideas of ‘East’ and ‘West’. Indeed, with its end, and with the enemy defeated, the question arose of what the West’s purpose, role, and identity was in the new context. For some the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 provided an answer, with fundamentalist Islam assigned the role of the West’s new constitutive other—an idea crystallized in proclamations of the so-called ‘clash of civilizations’. However, it is also important to note that once enemy images take hold they can become self-reinforcing, such that all actions (and non-actions) of the enemy become implicitly suspect. Such was the case with Saddam Hussein’s relations with the West throughout the 1990s until 2003.

The security dilemma raises the question of whether the mistrust, fear, and uncertainties inherent within it are insurmountable. Realists/neorealists suggest they are. This is because, for them, their negative view of human nature and their belief in the self-help competitive logic of international anarchy militates against longer-term cooperation between states. So, while states
may build temporary alliances in response to specific threats they must always be concerned about how the material benefits of cooperation are spread and that this will not disadvantage them later. For example, following the Cold War’s end realists widely predicted that, with the Soviet Union vanquished, Europe would revert to the traditional competition and power balancing that had characterized much of the continent’s history, with France, Germany, the UK, and so forth, again viewing each other as potential aggressors. The reason, they argued, was that in the absence of a common enemy the glue that previously bound together the Western security alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was gone.

NATO, of course, has not broken up, indeed its membership and scope of operations has expanded significantly, and has developed into what some people see as a good example of a security community (discussed shortly). For realists, however, the break-up of NATO remains a matter of time and at some point Europe will revert to type, as directed by the dictates of the logic of international anarchy.