Legio XVII: Battle of the Danube (30 page)

Caile responded, “That’s true and besides that, no one may come down the side valley and then it would take that much longer to reform the men and move over to the center valley.  As I see it, our two missions, to conduct an ambush and to attack the Teutons in the center valley, are equally important and equally dangerous.  We know that the force that comes down the center valley whether it’s only 10,000 Teutons or the whole garrison of 20,000 will pretty much take up the entire half mile clearing to deploy their force.  That means we should probably be prepared to enter the center valley on a half mile wide front.  I plan to use the same distance, half a mile, in planning my ambush because it would be too difficult changing formations in these woods.”

Vitulus’ Maneuver Tribune added, “You’re right sir!  Whether we conduct the ambush or attack the center, the dense woods are a major factor.  Since the trees are so thick, the distance between the files will have to be shortened otherwise the first Legionaries out of the woods will be by themselves until the others can get out.  Instead of the usual three feet separating each man, I think they should be as close as possible. I would also apply that to the rows stretching out the entire half mile (.8km) length of the wood line.  Once the men move out into the clearing, they can open up the distance between themselves to assume their 3x3 foot (.9x.9m) fighting boxes.”

Caile’s Maneuver Tribune said, “Since we will want to get as many men out of the woods as quickly as possible, I wouldn’t go with a triplex acies and if I did I certainly wouldn’t employ the normal separation between men and lines.  I think we should use a duplex acies.  Two long rows with files stacked closely behind each man would enable us to get the most men into the ambush site or the center clearing in the quickest manner possible.”

Vitulus smiled and said, “We could employ the duplex for the ambush, then turn the troop around, reform, march through the woods, and exit into the center valley in the same formation.  I like it.”

Caile said, “I think a half mile front to ambush the Teutons in the side valley is probably too wide, but we really don’t know what they will do or where they will do it.  Five thousand men under attack can bunch up pretty tight. It could work.

Vitulus said, “I think we should go practice the duplex while it’s still light.”

Vitulus’ Maneuver Tribune shook his head and looked disturbed.  He said, “I don’t mean to confuse our thinking, but, with all due respect, I would like to propose an alternative solution.”

This Tribune was one of the young Legionaries who rode to Cannae with Manius in 210 BC, six years after the Battle.  At the time, Manius was impressed with this young man for his ability to see the battle not as a mere historic site, but for what it meant to Rome and the thousands of young lives lost that dreadful day.

All eyes focused on the Tribune as he began to speak.  “If we put all our Legionaries on one side of the valley, I fear most of the Teutons will escape to the other side when we spring the ambush.  Then, because of the closely packed trees and our other mission, to attack the Teutons in the center valley, we will be unable to pursue them effectively.  In effect, the consequences of an escape means we could have thousands of armed and capable enemy forces roaming around the countryside.  They could attack our supply convoys and ambush isolated troops.  I believe we need to ensure we annihilate the entire force.”

“And how would you do that?” asked Caile, “Without splitting your forces?”  His question wasn’t hostile.  He had learned long ago to listen to subordinates and to keep an open mind.

The Tribune continued.  “I would place 250 archers on each side of the valley and tell them to each fire five arrows.  I would also place 2,000 Legionaries on each side of the valley in a duplex acies.  I would place the remaining 1,500 men in the woods closer to the center valley.  They would be prepared to delay any Teutons running from the battle in the center valley if it starts before we can conduct the ambush.  They could also be prepared to support the ambush, if necessary.  I believe that 25 hundred arrows fired at close range will kill or wound many, if not most of the Teutons.  The arrows will definitely force them to huddle in the center for protection.  The Legionaries coming out of the woods will throw their pila in a ripple effect and thereby not allow the Teutons to organize themselves or get a respite.  When the men make contact, I believe our enemy will be able to offer little resistance.  That is my proposal and its rationale.”

Vitulus was the first to speak.  “I see what you’re saying.  So, even though we would be splitting our force, the Teutons would be in no position to take advantage of it.  Sounds feasible to me.  Caile, what do you think?”  The Tribune held his breath.

Caile said, “I like your reasoning.  I think it could work.  After the ambush, we would need to form up rapidly and get over to the center valley as quickly as possible.  I’m concerned that the Suevi will break and run if they don’t see us attacking the Teuton flanks.  I’m satisfied, let’s do it the way the Tribune proposed.  And now, as Legate Vitulus said earlier, let’s go practice this.”

That evening, Calvus said, “Tomorrow at 3:00 A.M., I want the two Suevi Legion to march north up the 1 mile (1.6km) valley to the open field.  I want them to leave their shields and pila here and advance with only their swords.  Once they are on the field facing the Teutons, form them up two Legions abreast to appear as large a force as possible and slowly, but loudly advance on the garrison.”

“When you see that the Teutons are in battle array and moving towards you, slowly back up to the hill and move slowly down the valley into your fighting positions.  I don’t want them to see your shields or pila until they enter the trap.  Legio XVII and Legio V Etrusci will stay in place and prepare to ambush any Teuton columns that come down either valley.  If none come down and the fight has started in the center valley, return immediately and launch an assault on the Teuton flanks.”

“I want the cavalry to close off the three valleys as soon as possible and prevent any Teuton survivors from escaping.  Send some of your riders into the settlement and kill any Teutons you find.  I will be with the two Suevi Legions and remain on the hill to observe their progress.  If any Teutons surrender, we have orders to take them prisoner.”

“After the fight, our orders are to back track and join the Proconsul at Dietramszell.  I will rely on the cavalry to locate his Headquarters and guide us there.  Now gentlemen, tell me your plans to ambush any Teutons who come down the two side valleys.”

The two Legates explained the plan and Calvus approved it.

*******

Legate Justus and Legio XX spent the day of the 7th in the brush and trees along the river.  They ate their food cold.  Movement and noise were kept to a minimum.  The Legion continued their wait as the sun rose high in the sky.  Justus was beginning to wonder if Bethica had gotten lost or perhaps her force had been attacked.  His patience was wearing thin.  He said to Valerian, “I think we ought to pull back; this isn’t right.  Bethica should have attacked by now.  If 20,000 Teutons discover us, we will all be killed.  Let’s wade the stream and head south.”

Tribune Valerian tried to calm him by reminding him that this delay was foreseen.  “She has a greater distance to travel and had talked about moving at night.  She may be waiting to allow her men to recover.  Let’s wait today and talk about it again tomorrow morning.  The men know the danger and are being quiet.”  Justus agreed to wait one more day; then he was going to pull out the Legion, wade across the stream, and back track to Haag.

Eight June passed slowly.  At least the men rested, but cold food is never welcomed.  The mosquitoes were a bigger nightmare.  Many men dug up mud from the stream and covered themselves to stop their incessant biting.

Throughout the night, Justus’ behavior continued to deteriorate.  At the slightest sound, he would tell Valerian, “Double the guard, no triple the guard; they know we’re here; I think they’re forming to attack us; get the men up.”  Valerian managed to calm him during each outburst, but Justus was causing the troops within earshot to begin to worry.  When at last Justus fell asleep, Valerian signaled the Centurion in charge of the 10 man body guard and said, “Stay close; if I give you the signal, forcibly and quickly take him across the river and hold him out of sight.  Gag him if you have to, but keep him quiet.  Do not harm him and treat him with respect.  As soon as we initiate our attack against the garrison, send some men to find horses and a wagon.  Gather up enough food and take him back to Bad Tolz.”

Finally, early on the morning of the 9th, Legio XX could hear and see the two Suevi Legions arrayed for battle and taunting the Teutons to come out and fight.  Under cover of darkness, they had advanced to within one mile (1.6km) of the garrison without being seen and began to loudly announce their presence and intention to fight.

Justus said to Valerian, “Sound the horns, get the men up; it’s time to attack.”

Valerian said, “Sir, our orders are to wait until the Teutons leave the settlement and are actually attacking the Suevi before advancing into the garrison.  We probably have an hour or so before we should attack.”

Justus backed off and said, “We can wait a while longer, but get the men ready.”

*******

On 6 June, two days after Expedition Headquarters arrived at Dietramszell, three Briefers from Rome were led to Manius’ tent.  He had been expecting them and was eager to hear what they had to report.  After they were served wine and had something to eat, Manius congratulated them for their timely arrival and asked about their long 533 mile (857.7km) trip.

The briefers were happy to talk about their adventure.  The Alps were new to them as was Innsbruck.  When they finished telling Manius about their trip, Manius briefed them on the status of his forces.  He knew that whatever he said would find its way back to Rome.  He used a map and pointer.  He discussed the route the Legions took to get to Bad Tolz, the difficult trip over the mountains, the death of Silvius, and the vigorous training of the last six months.  He described the composition of the two attacking forces and mentioned the two Leaders’ Recon undertaken by Calvus and Bethica.  Manius concluded by describing the two attacks that were about to happen at Augsburg and Landshut.

The Briefers thanked Manius for such a detailed report.  The Centurion said he would write it up this evening and ensure Army Headquarters was informed.  The three men then took turns briefing Manius about the status of the war with Hannibal in Italy, the political situation in Rome, diplomatic initiatives, the stalemate with Philip V of Macedon, and Scipio’s most recent victory in Spain.

The Centurion continued, “Three things of note have happened in Spain. First, Scipio defeated a large force of mixed Carthaginians and Celtiberians at Ilipa.  Yes, I know, the Celtiberians also fight for us.  They are mercenaries.  I will come back to Scipio’s tactics in that battle. Second, some of Scipio’s Legions mutinied over lack of pay.  It happened by the Sucro River.  Scipio got them promptly paid and then just as promptly executed the leaders of the mutiny.  Third, one of Scipio’s Generals, Gaius Lucius Marcius Septimus scored a decisive victory at the mouth of the Guadalquivir River in southern Spain.  Scipio sent him on a raid to surprise the Carthaginian General Hannon who was recruiting the locals for his Army.  Each side was about equal with 7,000 men and 700 cavalry.  Gaius defeated Hannon.”

“Scipio employed a tactic at Ilipa that you may find interesting.  Hasdrubal Gisco, with an Army of about 50,000 infantrymen, 4,500 cavalry, and 32 war elephants decided to fight Scipio in southern Spain.  Scipio had 45,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry.  The actual numbers may vary, but this is what we’re hearing at this point.  The two camps faced each other across a large dusty plain.  When Hasdrubal would form up his men as if he were going to attack, Scipio would bring his men out of their camp to face them.  Scipio always put his Legions in the center and the weaker Celtiberians Auxiliaries on each flank with his cavalry.  Every day for three days, the two sides would face each other across the field.  Hasdrubal put his trusted Carthaginians in the center to match the Legions in Scipio’s center and his weaker Celtiberians on the flanks, the same as Scipio.”

“On the fourth day, Scipio got his men up before dawn, fed them, and lined them up in the dark.  This time, he put his Celtiberians in the center and Legions on the two flanks.  He then advanced on the Carthaginian camp taking them by surprise.  They didn’t have time to eat.  They barely got their equipment.  The two sides were close.  Scipio sent out his skirmishers to maintain the ruse that he was about to attack.  He actually was delaying to weaken the Carthaginians.  After a few hours in the sun on empty bellies, the Carthaginians were ready.  Scipio advanced his Legions on the flanks against Hasdrubal’s weaker Celtiberians, but kept his center in place to pin the Carthaginian center.  Hasdrubal noticed that the Legions were no longer in the center, but it was too late for him to change his disposition.”