Authors: Alan Maki
Later, after I had reached the Plaza Hotel, I went up to
the roof and watched the continual mortar and aircraft-dropped para flares float softly to the ground. Some oscillated wildly and several descended in a clockwise fashion similar to a parachutist circling his ground target. Occasionally, red tracers streaked upward on various tangents, leaving their phosphorous traces behind as they continued their parabolic trajectory back to the war-torn jungles and rice paddies below. Welcome back to Vietnam, I thought.
The next day, Dai Uy Fletcher and I reported to the SpecWar offices, located within the NavForV (Naval Forces Vietnam) building and compound. I had first met Lieutenant Fletcher the previous August when I was returning to CONUS after my LDNN (the South Vietnamese equivalent to SEALs) advisory tour. Dai Uy was a member of UDT-13 then, and we were riding a Navy CH-46 helo from Clark Air Force Base near Manila to Cubi Point Naval Air Station located at Subic Bay, Philippines.
I knew November Platoon was in good hands (I say sarcastically) when it was brought to my attention that Lieutenant Commander Worthington, better known to the graduates of UDT Training Class 36 as “Lord George Worthingstone,” was the operations officer, and that Lieutenant Van Heertum’s primary responsibility was the rewriting of Staff, UDT/SEAL, and MST/BSU (Mobile Support Team/Boat Support Unit) personnel award submissions. When I reflected on my experiences and encounters with Lieutenant Van Heertum during my last three tours in ’Nam, I realized that Dai Uy and November Platoon would have to be very careful about covering our back end and accept the fact that most of our platoon awards submitted to staff would be downgraded or filed in a trash can.
While Dai Uy was being briefed by Commander Del Guidice (SpecWar Detachment CO), I spent most of the
morning with Lieutenant Commander M., who was the SpecWar intelligence officer. Some of the information he gave me was very disturbing.
“Unfortunately, it won’t be long before your platoon and all other SEAL platoons will be forbidden to target VCI [Viet Cong Infrastructure],” Mr. M. stated with disgust. “I spent several hours trying to convince the CO the other day that SEAL platoons should not generally target VC sapper units or chase guerrilla mortar tubes hither and yon. I also explained to him that there were well-trained Vietnamese infantry divisions with units available for such conventional tasks,” Mr. M. recounted as he raised his hands in frustration. “I carefully explained to him that SEAL platoons should be guardedly utilized for unconventional tasks; i.e., Bright Light operations”—code name for U.S. POW rescue—“pilot rescue missions, and the capturing of high-level VCI/NVA that are listed on the Phuong Huang committee’s blacklist in conjunction with Vietnamese units and/or agencies.”
“I assume you’re about to hit me with the punch line,” I interjected with a sinking feeling in my stomach.
“Yes!” the lieutenant commander said, filled with frustration. “With that, he ran me out of his office.… However, Admiral Salzer, whose office is located downstairs, has apparently made this decision. Whether it was a unilateral or bilateral decision, I don’t know.”
After lunch, Dai Uy and I spent the afternoon with Mr. M. and discussed November Platoon’s basic agenda and modus operandi within Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa provinces and our sources of intelligence information. Afterward, Lieutenant Commander M. issued us NILO (Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer) ID and travel cards that authorized us to travel anywhere without restriction.
Finally, on the morning of May thirtieth, Dai Uy and I departed Saigon and headed west on highway QL-4 for
Dong Tam. Originally, the Dong Tam operations base was constructed in ’66 for the 2nd Brigade and later the 3rd Brigade of the U.S. Army 9th Infantry Division (Old Reliable) that was home-based at Fort Lewis, Washington. The 2nd and 3rd brigades remained at the operations base until late ’69 or early ’70 when they turned it over to the ARVN 7th Infantry Division. SEAL Team 1’s Victor Platoon barracks was located within the Vietnamese navy compound. Between the Vietnamese compound and the My Tho River was the U.S. Navy’s compound, which consisted of admin spaces, barracks, clubs, and the PBR repair shops, docks, and boats. I had lived in the same two-story open barracks in July and August 1970, as an adviser to the Vietnamese SEALs, with Tu Uy Son’s LDNN Platoon and SEAL 2’s 5th Platoon.
We pulled up to the SEAL barracks about 1700 hours as most of the Victor Platoon guys were heading for the chow hall. They had all been busy cleaning equipment and packing their gear for their return to SEAL team and the beautiful Silver Strand of San Diego County. Victor Platoon personnel was as follows: 1st Squad: LT Roger Clapp (OIC), EN1 Bill Doyle, PT2 Michael Jerry Walsh, GMG3 Marshall Daugherty, GMG3 Barry Schreckengost, EN3 Donald Barnes; 2nd Squad: LT(jg) Jim Young (AOIC), BMC Bruce Russell, HM1 Terril Bryant, EM2 Frank Richard, ANT3 Elwood Shoemaker, RM2 Tipton Ammen, and BT3 Shawn Cymbal.
Lieutenant Clapp (OIC) and Lieutenant (jg) Young (AOIC) were anxious to talk to Dai Uy and get all of the latest scuttlebutt from the Strand and Saigon, while Chief Russel, Doc Bryant, Mike Walsh, and I decided to converse over a couple of beers at the platoon’s makeshift bar in the front end of the barracks. After several beers each, Mike Walsh recounted what happened in early March when X-ray Platoon was ambushed for the third and final
time. The end result was that Lieutenant Collins was killed, Lou DiCroce received a severe head wound, and everyone else was wounded to one degree or another. We didn’t stop talking until 2200, when I turned in.
Lieutenants Clapp and Fletcher spent the next couple of days traveling to the districts of Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa provinces saying “soo-long” and “howdy” to the province chiefs, PSAs (Province Senior Advisers), district chiefs and the U.S. Army DSAs (District Senior Advisers), and ARVN 7th Infantry Division’s U.S. Army advisers, among others.
Doc Bryant took me to My Tho and dropped me off at the Embassy House. I was sorry to find out that John T. and Ian S. had returned to CONUS and were relieved by Al S. and Jake B. However, Al and Jake were very receptive and appeared inclined to help November Platoon as needed. I went to the 525 house and was delighted to find that Larry hadn’t returned to CONUS yet. We had been visiting for a short while when Lieutenant John W., who was the NILO for this area, stopped by. After the introductions, John became very interested in November Platoon and Dai Uy Fletcher. He began by asking a few questions about Dai Uy’s operational goals. I was amused at his straightforward elicitation and impressed by his credentials. He was a graduate of the much respected Fort Holabird intelligence collection and tradecraft school. In that light, John was surprisingly open, and later told me that Mr. Bai, who worked for the Embassy House, was an MSS (Vietnamese Military Security Service) penetrant within the PSB (Police Special Branch) and OSA (Company—office of the Special Assistant to the Ambassador).
I shook my head, saying, “Well, there’s no doubt that Mr. Bai has natural placement and access within the Embassy House. In ’69 when I was a PRU adviser here, I
had perceived that Bai was highly trusted and probably used as an agent handler.”
Lieutenant W. didn’t respond to my leading statement about Bai being an agent handler. However, he did go on to tell about CIA officer John T.’s past clandestine meetings with a province-level VCI late at night before his return to the States. Apparently, their rendezvous took place in the middle of the My Tho River, in a sampan. No wonder John wanted a stubby Uzi submachine gun that would conveniently fit snugly into his attaché case! I thought.
Later that afternoon, Doc Bryant and I stopped by the PRU office to see my PRU friends of ’69 and ’70 once again. I was very eager to visit with my very good friend Sao Lam, who, I had heard, was still the deputy PRU chief and a continuing thorn in Province Chief Colonel Dao’s side. Unfortunately, Sao Lam wasn’t there. I left word with Hung, my old interpreter, that I was back in-country again and that I was looking forward to sharing a bottle of American whiskey with my old friend. Afterward, Doc and I returned to Dong Tam in time for supper at the Navy mess.
I was beginning to really like Doc Bryant. He was an amiable fellow, clean-cut in appearance, about six feet tall and approximately 180 pounds. Doc was a very good worker, innovative, conscientious in all that he did, and always ready to go the extra mile. Lieutenant Commander M. and Lieutenant Clapp had encouraged Doc to establish and run a bilateral intelligence net with a supposedly ex-Hoi Chanh (alias Oscar), who lived across the street from the Chieu Hoi Center, as his principal agent. Doc and the platoon interpreter were the agent handlers. Oscar, in turn, notified Doc, through the interpreter, when he knew of a motivated Hoi Chanh that had timely, firsthand information of a good target, and, more important, was willing
and available to guide Victor Platoon to the target. With the information from Doc and Oscar, Victor Platoon was successful in capturing several VCI and weapons caches. I was sorry that I wouldn’t have the opportunity to operate with Doc Bryant—he was fast becoming my friend.
On the morning of June first, I went to the Embassy House to talk with Jake B. while Dai Uy, Lieutenant Clapp, and Son, the interpreter, went to Ham Long and Truc Giang districts in Kien Hoa province. I explained to Jake that we needed to get a few BIs (background investigation) run on several potential agents who had natural placement and access to very lucrative targets. Jake was only too glad to take care of our BIs and also stated he could run a BI on any Vietnamese without MSS or PSB awareness. I explained to him that Dai Uy, Lieutenant W., and I had thought this would be the best approach to getting BIs of potential agents and would protect us from inadvertently employing double or dual agents. Dai Uy and I eventually discovered that it was virtually impossible to establish and maintain a truly unilateral intelligence information net in Vietnam.
Again, I heard from a second source that Mr. Bai was an MSS double agent. He and Colonel Dao, the province chief, had determined that Bai would work covertly for MSS as a penetrant within the PSB (Police Special Branch) of the National Police, and the Embassy House. Overtly, Bai’s loyalty lay with the National Police, PSB, and the Company, in that order. His wife, also, conveniently worked in the Embassy House’s document interpretation office. Bai obediently passed all information received from his sources within the Embassy House to National Police Chief Muoi and Chief Hue of the PSB, and, secretly, to Dao and MSS. Evidently this served as a way for Colonel Dao and MSS to monitor all that PSB and the Company were trying to accomplish clandestinely.
Vietnam, it seemed, had hidden agendas in every nook and cranny. It was no wonder that Sao Lam, as deputy PRU chief, was always a thorn in the side of Colonel Dao.
The next day, June second, Dai Uy, PO3 Wood, Hoan—our interpreter—and I drove to Sam Giang subsector at Vinh Kim village, where we met Capt. Dave Campbell, the DIOCC adviser. The captain had previously told Dai Uy about a Hoa Hao hamlet (Vietnamese for village) chief by the name of Ba To who hated the VC. His small hamlet had been established in the midst of a VC-controlled area of undeveloped brush and jungle. We had planned to visit Ba To’s village until Campbell told us that it was located approximately two and one half miles from a Regional Force outpost at the end of a road.
While we were debating whether we should hike to Ba To’s village without a radio, Captain Campbell commented, “Two nights ago elements of 261B Main Force Infantry Battalion, the 267B Sapper MF Battalion, and 269B Infantry Battalion of Dong Thap One Regiment overran and destroyed the outpost where you’ll have to leave your jeep before your hike to Ba To’s village.”
I looked at Dai Uy and he looked at me, then both of us started laughing. “Well, Lieutenant, I think it’s time to call in the dogs, piss on the fire, and head for the house,” I suggested.
“Sound wisdom, Smitty. Load up boys. We’ll return another day with better provisions,” Dai Uy said, chuckling.
After Dai Uy had dropped off Wood and Hoan at Dong Tam, we went to My Tho to visit NILO John W. and OSA Jake B. at the Embassy House. We soon found out that John, Jake, and 525 Larry had been very worried about our future operations. In the past, SEAL platoons had inadvertently greased several of 525’s turnarounds and defection-in-place agents. John, Jake, and Larry complained
that it took years and millions of dollars to develop unilateral intel info nets within targeted areas.
John led off with their pitch: “Jake and I will work out an agreement with PSB whereby they will furnish you with all the targets that your platoon could possibly want as long as you go on combined operations with three or four PSB agents and their guide. They’ll also legalize any complications as to any inadvertent killing of legal, card-carrying VCI. What do you think?”
“I’m still listening,” Dai Uy said, grinning from ear to ear.
Jake spoke up and said, “We’ve received many reports and documents that the Communist high command are creating special district, mang, village, and hamlet political indoctrination committees to undermine the GVN’s [Government Vietnam] pacification program and cause an upset this fall during the South Vietnamese national elections.” We nodded as Jake continued, “There are approximately seventy of these VC committees in Dinh Tuong province. If you guys and PSB can eliminate fifteen of them between now and the elections, we’ll be able to confuse their supporters, weaken their power base, destroy their image, and neutralize their objectives.”
Dai Uy finally stood up, saying, “I accept your proposal. Let’s shake on it!”
“Damn!” I exclaimed. “It would be downright un-American not to accept y’all’s offer.”
John and Jake were delighted and so were we. I think we all breathed a sigh of relief.
June third found Dai Uy and me in Binh Thuy visiting HAL-3’s executive officer, Lieutenant Commander White. Dai Uy requested that we be granted permission to utilize the new “Black Bomb,” the CBU-55B (Cluster Bomb Unit fuel/air bomb), on a future mission to create a helicopter LZ in a double- or triple-canopy jungle and
neutralize enemy-held bunker complexes. White seemed interested and stated that he would do everything that he could to support us.