Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World (15 page)

On November 28, 1941, Husseini met with Ribbentrop in Berlin.70 He stressed that "the Arabs were naturally friends of Germany because both were fighting three common foes: the English, the Jews, and Bolshevism. It had been a great deed on the part of Germany to have proceeded against these three enemies. The Arabs hoped that Germany would also help them in their fight on these three fronts. They thought that victory in this battle was important not only for the Arabs, but also for their own people." Husseini continued that the Arabs were prepared to "do everything" to help, including sabotage and insurrection as well as creation of a fighting force, an "Arab Legion," to fight with Axis forces. The Arabs in Palestine "were on the best of terms with the centers of the Moslem faith" and would try to influence Muslims in India and Indian prisoners of war to rally to the Axis cause .71 He also again asked that the Axis issue a declaration in support of Arab independence without delay. Ribbentrop acknowledged Husseini's comment about "the three common foes of the Arabs and the German people," declared that Russia was "as good as beaten and the political power of Bolshevism was almost broken;' and assured Husseini that "as a sworn enemy of the Jews, Germany understood the troubles of the Arabs in this field." Further, "the war against England was another bond uniting the Axis and the Arabs." Yet, as the setback in Iraq indicated, it was necessary to proceed "very cautiously and prudently." Ribbentrop did not think that the time for a declaration had arrived. It needed to be "made at the proper time." Now it was "better to wait until the guns did the talking." Given the German advance into the Soviet Union and the Caucasus, the Black Sea would become a German base of operations "in the near future." When the Germans "had advanced to the areas of the Near East, that would be the right moment for the declara- tion."72 Husseini urged an immediate declaration to counter English appeals to Arabs but again Ribbentrop demurred. Ribbentrop pointed to all the "trouble" the Arabs had with Jews and doubted that the Arabs would ally with Britain after "all the English had done to them." Husseini replied that although anti-British sentiment was strong among Palestinian Arabs, unnamed "others" thought differently. Ribbentrop persisted that a declaration now would be harmful "particularly since it was not a question of years but could be only a matter of months before intervention in the Near East was possible." He also didn't want to place German sympathizers in the Arab world at risk of being suppressed by the English.73 German diplomats also urged caution out of a desire not to antagonize Italy and France, both of which had intentions toward the Arabs that conflicted with complete independence. The exchange illustrated the connections between the course of the war in Europe and political events in the Middle East. The Mufti repeatedly emphasized that realization of Arab aspirations was inseparable from the military success of the Axis powers, and especially that of Nazi Germany.

Later on the same day, Husseini had his scheduled meeting with Hitler in the company of the Foreign Minister, as well as Fritz Grobba.74 A photo of the meeting appeared in the German and world press and on German propaganda materials in the Middle East. Hitler now personally experienced what the memos of his diplomats had previously indicated, namely, that Husseini was a true comrade in arms and ideological soul mate. Unlike Hitler's German, Austrian, and European collaborators and allies, Husseini's journey toward agreement with Hitler began in non-European traditions. His hatred of Jews, Communists, the British, and the Americans began in radical Arab nationalism and militant Islam but also drew on ideologies of the European far right. The meeting between them on November 28,1941, was not a clash of civilizations but a meeting of hearts and minds, and a convergence from different starting points.

Husseini told Hitler that the Fiihrer was "admired by the entire Arab world." He thanked him for the sympathy he had shown to the Arab and especially the Palestinian cause. He was convinced that Germany would win the war and that as a result the Arab cause would prosper. As he had with Ribbentrop, Husseini said that "the Arabs were Germany's natural friends because they had the same enemies as had Germany, namely, the English, the Jews, and the Communists." Speaking for the Arabs, he said that they "were therefore prepared to cooperate with Germany with all their hearts and stood ready to participate in the war, not only negatively by the commission of acts of sabotage and the instigation of revolutions, but also positively by the formation of an Arab Legion," that is, a force fighting with the German armies. The Arabs could be useful allies both because of their geographical location and "because of the suffering inflicted upon them by the English and the Jews." They also had "close relations with all the Moslem nationals, of which they could make use in behalf of the common cause." An Arab Legion composed of prisoners of war from Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco was feasible. "The Arab world" was convinced that Germany would win the war "not only because the Reich possessed a large army, brave soldiers, and military leaders of genius, but also because the Almighty could never award the victory to an unjust cause." In their struggle for independence and for the unity of Palestine, Syria, and Iraq, the Arabs had the fullest confidence in the Fiihrer and looked to his help to sooth the "wound which had been inflicted upon them by the enemies of Germany." Husseini then mentioned a previous German statement (of April 8, 1941) recognizing Arab aspirations for independence and freedom and supporting "the elimination of the Jewish national home." A public declaration of that nature "would be very useful for its propagandistic effect on the Arab peoples at this moment. It would rouse the Arabs from their momentary lethargy... give them new courage," and facilitate Husseini's secret efforts to organize an Arab revolt, which he would unleash "at the right moment and only strike upon an order from Berlin .1175

Hitler's reply was more interesting than Husseini may have anticipated because it included his first hint that he intended to extend the Final Solution of the Jewish Question in Europe to Jews living outside the Continent. He said that Germany stood for uncompromising war against the Jews. That naturally included active opposition to the Jewish national home in Palestine. Hitler made it clear to Husseini that his private views matched his public pronouncements:

Germany was at the present time engaged in a life and death struggle with two citadels of Jewish power: Great Britain and Soviet Russia. Theoretically there was a difference between England's capitalism and Russia's communism; actually, however, the Jews in both countries were pursuing a common goal. This was the decisive struggle; on the political plane, it presented itself in the main as a conflict between Germany and England, but ideologically it was a battle between National Socialism and the Jews. It went without saying that Germany would furnish positive and practical aid to the Arabs involved in the same struggle, because platonic promises were useless in a war for survival or destruction in which the Jews were able to mobilize all of England's power for their ends.

Hence, Hitler continued, "the Mufti could not but be aware, however, that the outcome of the struggle going on at present [in Europe] would also decide the fate of the Arab world."76

Hitler approved issuing the kind of declaration requested by Husseini but not in November 1941. As Germany was now fighting in the Caucasus, he did not want to antagonize the French with a declaration about Syrian independence which would be seen as an effort to break up France's colonial empire. But Hitler then made a striking promise to Husseini, "enjoining him to lock it in the uttermost depths of his heart." He promised to "carry on the battle to the total destruction of the Judeo-Communist empire in Europe." German armies fighting on the Eastern Front at some moment in this struggle would "reach the southern exit" from the Caucasus. At that point, Hitler would "give the Arab world the assurance that its hour of liberation had arrived. Germany's objective would then be solely the destruction of the Jewish element residing in the Arab sphere under the protection of British power. In that hour, the Mufti would be the most authoritative spokesman of the Arab world. It would then be his task to set off the Arab operation which he had secretly prepared. When that time had come, Germany could also be indifferent to French reaction to such a declaration.""

In short, Hitler told Husseini that should his armies succeed in defeating the armed forces of the Soviet Union and thereafter move south from the Caucasus, the policy of "destruction of the Jewish element" would extend to Jews living in Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, and Transjordan. During the summer and fall months of 1941, there was a great deal of discussion at the top levels of the Nazi regime that pointed to the elaboration of a Europe-wide plan to murder the Jews.78 Hitler's comments to Husseini on November 28, 1941, indicate that given the opportunity, he wanted to extend the Final Solution outside Europe. Doing so was, in his mind, the logical corollary to the idea that an international Jewish conspiracy was waging war against the Third Reich. If so, then the counterattack, that is, the Final Solution, should be no less international. The battles in the Caucasus in fall 1941 and later in North Africa were thus significant events not only in the history of World War II but in the history of the Holocaust as well. Their outcome would determine whether the more than 700,000 Jews living in the Middle East and North Africa would also fall victim to a Final Solution no longer limited to Europe. Nazi Germany's Arabic-language propaganda was thus both a counterpart to conventional military strategy in World War II and an incitement to wage a "war" against the civilian, Jewish population of the Middle East and North Africa comparable to the one taking place in Europe.

The presence of the Panzerarmee in North Africa made it easier for German agents to spread Nazi propaganda with Arabic-language leaflets. An intelligence unit was attached to Rommel's army and commanded by Konstantin Alexander Freiheer von Neurath, the son of Konstantin von Neurath, Germany's foreign minister from 1932 to 1938. The younger von Neurath participated in writing and distributing propaganda material. His career illustrates the salience of aristocratic background and nationalist views in the German Foreign Ministry. From 1924 to 1927, he worked as an honorary attache with his father in the German embassy in Rome. In 1928, he received his law degree (cum laude) from the University of Greifswald, and then spent four years (192731) as an employee of the major electrical firm Allgemeine Elektrizitat Gesellschaft (AEG). He joined the Nazi Party on October 1,1934. He entered the Foreign Ministry in 1931 and served in the German Embassy in Brussels from 1936 to 1940. From 1941 to 1943, he was a liaison officer (Verbindunsmann) from the Foreign Ministry to the Africa Corps (1941-42) and Rommel's Panzerarmee (1942-43) in North Africa. Von Neurath worked closely with his assistant, the Orientalist Dr. Hans Alexander Winkler (1900-1945).79 Winkler wrote a doctorate (1925) and Habilitation (1928; the second advanced degree required for promotion to the rank of professor in German universities) in the history of religion and Oriental studies at the University of Tubingen, where he was a teacher and researcher at the Oriental Institute. From 1922 to 1928 he was also a member of the German Communist Party (KPD). His membership in the KPD led to his firing from the university in September 1933. Winkler, however, was able to work on archeological expeditions in Egypt in the 1930s. In 1936 he published Agyptische Volkskunde (Egyptian Folklore) and received recognition from the international scholarly community of Orientalists. In 1939 he joined the Nazi Party, entered the Foreign Ministry, and served as the cultural attache in the German Embassy in Tehran. In 1941 and 1942, until he was wounded, he served with von Neurath in the Africa Corps, where he was able to place his knowledge of the Arab world and Islam in the service of the German war ef- fort.80 Von Neurath handled communications with the Foreign Ministry in Berlin and with military officers in the Panzerarmee in North Africa, while Winkler appears to have had the major responsibility for writing and translating leaflets that would appeal to Arabs and Muslims.

On November 20,1941, von Neurath sent the Foreign Ministry in Berlin a draft of a leaflet entitled "War and Starvation," suggesting it be distributed in North Africa. The text was probably written by Winkler. Its purpose was to challenge the view that National Socialist anti-Jewish policy entailed an "antiSemitic" hatred and contempt for non-Jewish Semites. Its first paragraph mimicked the themes of British political warfare: the war in Europe had been "unleashed by Nazi race hatred, which regards everything that is not German or Germanic as inferior and animal-like and treats it accordingly." Although Hitler's war machine had overrun many countries, hope for resistance lay with Russia, which had formed an alliance with Britain "in order to stop the flood of barbaric Nazism." If Germany were to win this battle, "it would not only mis treat Europe. First it would oppress the Oriental peoples! The Germans still regard the Europeans as their neighbors with whom they want to remain in good standing and as human partners. However, woe to the Oriental people if they should come under the Nazis' thumb. The Germans would treat them as born slaves, according to the incredible German madness of anti-Semitism which Hitler, Himmler, and Rosenberg swear by. 1181

The leaflet then abruptly changed tone.

Arabs, can anyone who speaks to you in this way be anything other than a Jew, one who lies and turns the facts on their heads? What is he doing other than in his moment of danger to hide behind you even though you have nothing in common with him regarding religion, morals, and traditions? All that he has in common with you is what he as a parasite has taken from you!

However, listen to how he really behaves!

Germany was fed up with its many Jews who sat like maggots in meat as professors, lawyers, artists, doctors, and not least as industrialists and salesmen. Since 1933, the Fiihrer turned things around. Of course he didn't do so with brute force as the Jew expected he would. Rather he did it in the honest, honorable, and German way, through laws that laid down the role that the aliens could have in the nation. Now they are crying: Oy veh! And many have moved abroad where it is supposed to be "better" for them, in London and New York. There they agitated until they had their war. And now they are trying to bring not only Europe but the whole world into the mess. With the help of others they want "revenge" for the "injustice" that took place when a free people defended itself in its struggle for survival.