Nelson (114 page)

Compton’s jolly boat dodged the French gunboats that tried to intercept him, and reached the Ponte Reale (Royal Bridge), but a swarm of angry French seamen gathered on the landing. The lieutenant got ashore and rushed off to find Brame, but his four men were ringed by raging adversaries threatening to seize the boat, and a pistol was said to have been fired. With difficulty the Genoese guards eventually intervened, dispersing the crowd with musketry and killing a French sailor before taking the Britons into protective custody and carrying one to hospital. In no great time inflamed Jacobins were rampaging about the town declaring they would murder any English they found, while French privateersmen gathered to board the British merchant ships in the harbour and seize or slaughter their crews. The alarmed authorities advised Brame to stay indoors and placed soldiers on the British ships at the mole. Drawbridges were lowered, sentinels strengthened and gates closed.

While Nelson extricated his vessels and prize from gun range of the batteries, and Brame dispatched the commodore’s protests to the secretary of state, the volcanic French minister, Faypoult, fired a furious missive at his hosts. He demanded reparations for the captured bombard, the sequestration of British merchantmen and property, including Nelson’s parley boats, and the closure of Genoa and all satellite ports to British ships. Genoa, in short, must now choose between France and Britain. While Faypoult also issued a proclamation urging the French in the city to be calm, he assured them of satisfaction, and his letter to the Genoese government contained implicit threats of civil disorder and armed invasion.

At about one-thirty, with guns still being fired and no response to his earlier message evident, Nelson sent a second boat into Genoa. The commodore challenged the authorities to interview the inhabitants and soldiers of St Pierre d’Arena under oath to learn the truth about the incident, and offered to speak to any Genoese officer sent
aboard the
Captain
. Lieutenant Peirson, the Italian-speaking army officer who had attached himself to the commodore’s following, proceeded bravely to the Fauxbourg of the River Bisagno with a flag of truce. He was not even allowed into the town, but was kept in a guardroom until he could be sent back to Nelson with the unwelcome news that Genoa would frame official answers to his protests. In the meantime the port was closed to British ships.
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The next day found Nelson hovering offshore, plainly shaken by the serious turn events had taken, and scribbling to Drake that his boats had been a mere hundred yards from the lanthorn battery when the French had opened fire. His pacific intent, he insisted, could not have been mistaken by the Genoese. On shore the situation was hopeless as well as fraught. In the afternoon of the 11th and again on the 12th Castiglione notified Brame that the port was closed to his nation and their property confiscated. Nelson had made an unprovoked attack on the French in St Pierre d’Arena, and invented the story of the deserters to cover his real intentions.

Nelson retrieved his last boat, but the first with Compton’s party had to be left behind when he sailed from Genoa on 14 September. Brame and Bird tried to pick up the pieces. They took charge of the impounded British boat, which the authorities surrendered to them in due course, and smuggled Compton out of town in disguise, carrying copies of Castiglione’s letters to the consul. Astonishingly, the three deserters who had provided the spark for the fracas also gave themselves up to Brame, ‘very sorry and penitent’, and begged him to intercede on their behalf. But on the central issues the consul made no progress. British property about the town, including four ships trapped at the mole and the embargoed oxen, became hostages to fortune, and the republic’s ports were closed to His Britannic Majesty’s subjects.
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Nelson absolved himself of blame, and put the matter simply: going about his lawful business, his boats had been attacked while under the protection of Genoa, and Genoa had taken the part of the aggressors and committed an act of war. His immediate instinct was to seize Genoese ships, and hold them until the republic gave satisfaction and reopened its ports. His friends rallied around. Elliot was inclined to believe the Russian minister at Genoa, who told him that the Genoese had already decided to break with Britain, and merely needed an excuse. As far as Elliot could see, ‘Commodore Nelson behaved with great moderation in refraining from returning the fire from Genoa, and in offering to surrender his prize to the Genoese’. Jervis also
approved of ‘every part’ of Nelson’s conduct, and railed that the existence of the French battery alone justified his capture of the bombard. For the moment, however, he advised Nelson to temporise with the Genoese in an effort to extricate British citizens and property. The only blame Sir John directed to the
Captain
fell upon Lieutenant John Davies, a recent recruit to the ship from whose watch the deserters had fled with the stolen boat. The mistake cost Davies a promotion to the
Victory
the following year.
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When the news reached Drake he exonerated Nelson, but understood that Genoa was a frightened pygmy between giants, in acute danger of being invaded by the French. News of the outbreak of war between Spain and Britain had also reached Italy in the first days of September, and further emphasised Albion’s growing isolation. It was obvious in Genoa that Britain would have to review its commitments in the Mediterranean, and that the Royal Navy might be withdrawn. Considering all of which, Drake felt that an extreme reaction to the attack on Nelson would achieve little except the alienation of Britain’s remaining friends in Genoa. He wrote to the republic offering to broker ‘an impartial discussion’ of the affair, involving parties from all sides, but his request that British property be first released as a gesture of good faith condemned the proposal from the start.
⁵⁴

Reflecting on the crisis on the
Captain
, Commodore Nelson developed his own and more vigorous scheme to repair the damage. The blow had undoubtedly been a severe one, costing the navy yet another major source of succour and supply. It was fortunate for Nelson that the
Captain
herself had escaped unscathed, and taken aboard necessary supplies of water, beef, onions and lemons before the fight in St Pierre d’Arena. When the British ship
Sardine
approached the harbour on 20 September she was fired upon and driven away. But Nelson was not yet convinced that the matter was irreversible. Underestimating the impact of more than two years of French successes in that quarter, he was sure that Genoa would restore its relations with Britain if it could. If the cost of angering Britain was brought home, the Genoese might yet atone for their behaviour.
⁵⁵

He knew what he would do. Now the British held Elba, the small Genoese island of Capraia had become the most threatening bridge between Leghorn and Corsica. Elliot had long worried about the French privateers and traders that packed its neutral havens, and suspected the islanders of anti-British sentiment. Until the previous November it had refused to admit a British consul or agent, although
the French Directory had their man there. Nelson had declined to move against Capraia, especially as Britain’s relations with Genoa had been so tense, but now . . .
⁵⁶

There was no time to refer to the admiral. In a conference in Bastia on 15 September, Elliot authorised the seizure of Capraia and issued orders to his armed forces. Nelson embarked detachments of the 51st Regiment and Corsican volunteers under Major Logan on the
Captain
,
La Minerve
, the
Gorgon
store ship,
Vanneau
brig and
Rose
cutter, and after a slow voyage brought them to their destination on the evening of 17 September.
⁵⁷

Capraia’s defences were known to be ‘very strong’, but Elliot and Nelson believed that the Genoese had grown complacent and reduced the number of guns and men in the garrison. However, a plan to disembark on the southwestern part of the island was abandoned after heavy musketry revealed regular defenders strongly posted on the top of a high hill above the landing place. Logan withdrew his boats, and after consulting Nelson probed for an alternative. He eventually ordered his soldiers to land and storm the hill and a tower from the north. The boats pulled inshore. Ahead went rowing boats, manned mainly by sturdy seamen; behind, on towropes, the rest of the boats with the soldiers sitting with their arms. Even here they were greeted by musket fire, and several of the Corsican volunteers panicked as their boats came within enemy range. Some jumped into the sea, and others cut their towropes and rowed furiously out of range, from which safe distance they ‘boldly put about’ to return an entirely ineffective musketry of their own. Nevertheless, the landings continued and at seven in the evening Nelson himself went ashore in his barge. As a commodore, his business was to command from the ships, but he believed in showing men that he was willing to share their dangers and to set an example in moments of difficulty.
⁵⁸

The commodore was back on the
Captain
at eleven for a few hours’ rest, but at four-thirty the following morning he accompanied the last of the assault force and several pieces of heavy artillery ashore. The scenes that followed were redolent of old days in Corsica, as Nelson and Spicer directed a party of sailors hauling protesting cannons up a steep gradient to threaten the Genoese garrison. Another key figure in the attack was Lieutenant Peirson, who Nelson had assigned to
Logan with a detachment of troops from the ships and the local rank of foot major. ‘I cannot say . . . how much I am obliged to Lt Pearson . . . who is now with me, and has been of the greatest service to me from the commencement of this expedition,’ Logan acknowledged.
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During the night a French privateer sheltering in the harbour of Capraia made its escape, but four others were trapped, two of them being set on fire by their own crews. Twenty-eight of their men became prisoners of war, although five later managed to escape, steal a boat and reach Leghorn. Some forty-nine merchant ships, including Genoese neutrals and prizes of the French, were also appropriated by the British, and at about six o’clock in the morning Nelson sent a summons to the garrison under a flag of truce. Following the pattern of his success at Porto Ferraio, Nelson linked moderate terms to the threat of overwhelming force. If they surrendered their fortress the garrison would receive every military honour, and a passage to Genoa with their arms and colours. Civil officials would be allowed to govern as before, the safety of private property ensured, and no financial penalties would be imposed. However, the public property of Genoa and the shipping would be inventoried and held pending a satisfactory settlement of outstanding difficulties, and everything French was to be seized as prize.
⁶⁰

Resistance was useless. The Genoese commandant, Agostino Aynolo, had only 133 regulars, and when he pleaded for time to consult his government, Nelson said he would withdraw his terms and launch an overwhelming attack. After a flurry of notes, and some going back and forth on the part of Lieutenant Peirson, the colours above the citadel came down at four o’clock and a British flag was raised. Nelson took charge of twenty-two serviceable Genoese guns, 204 muskets, and a quantity of military stores, and installed a small garrison. The task force returned to Bastia on 19 September, and the same day Nelson wrote a dispatch praising both services for their conduct during the operation.

Back off Leghorn, Nelson issued new orders to the captains of the
Diadem
,
Blanche
,
Lively
and
L’Eclair
. All Genoese vessels were to be detained. They were not to be regarded as permanent prizes, but bargaining counters in the dispute with Genoa, and their masters were to remain in charge of, and responsible for, their cargoes. Gradually the seizures came in, beginning it seems with the
Concepción
brig taken on 24 September and a polacre seized by the
Lively
. The unfortunate vessels were taken to Porto Ferraio, where Udny was instructed
to act as agent, ensuring ‘the good and humane treatment of the crews, who are in no way to be pillaged or evil treated’. The next move was to couple such detainees with the island of Capraia in a bid to release the British property in Genoa and normalise relations with the Italian republic.
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The capture of Capraia was a mixed blessing. It severely damaged French plans to infiltrate Corsica from Leghorn because the island was seen as a midway refuge for their boats. The elimination of that base made the French voyages to Corsica more perilous, and enthusiasm for the venture weakened. As far as Genoa was concerned, however, Nelson’s latest victory gained him no great advantage. Any impulse the republic felt to conciliate was overridden by fear of the French. On 4 October a note sent to Brame for delivery to London offered to release the British ships in Genoa only after compensation had been paid for the tartan seized in St Pierre d’Arena, and the issue of Capraia and the impounded Genoese vessels had been addressed. Unfortunately, Nelson’s stroke did not weaken the Gallic influence in Genoa, but strengthened it. Faypoult, the French minister in Genoa, was furious at the loss of Capraia. He had alerted the Genoese to its vulnerability after the fall of Porto Ferraio, and now fulminated about Genoa’s inability to defend her ports, threatening that French soldiers would take over the Italian forts and do the job themselves. Like some monstrous kraken, encircling an unfortunate victim ever more deeply in powerful and sinuous tentacles, revolutionary France bullied Genoa into fortifying her harbours and islands in the Gulf of Spezia to prevent the British from seizing them and thus securing another safe haven for their fleet.
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