Authors: Richard Tongue
This was far from being the death of Gemini as a lunar-landing vehicle. In 1962, while the discussion over the method of landing on the moon was taking place, a series of studies were commissioned on the best methods of reaching the moon at a realistic cost within the deadline imposed by President Kennedy; as part of a 'Direct Apollo' study, the idea of using Gemini to land on the moon was resurrected.
Rather than employing any form of rendezvous, this would have used a Saturn booster to land a modified Gemini capsule on the moon itself, equipped with a landing stage to permit it to drop two astronauts onto the moon. (To get a good idea of what this configuration would have looked like, the Robert Altman movie
Countdown
uses a similar design for its 'Pilgrim' lander.) This design was never more than an in-house design study, but it proved that such a concept was feasible given the capacities of the Gemini system.
Two years would pass before the idea of using Gemini for lunar applications returned. By 1964, Gemini was beginning its series of missions, and already proving a popular spacecraft. While in Mercury the astronaut was barely more than a passenger, despite some attempts to provide a measure of control, Gemini by contrast was
flown
, and was already proving itself capable of complicated manoeuvres; it was well on the way to becoming a proven spacecraft.
This was not the case with Apollo. Apollo was facing a series of delays, and plans to fly on the Saturn I booster had been cancelled, leaving an extended gap before any missions could be flown. For at least two years, only Gemini would be available for manned missions, and some discussions over the possibility of sending Gemini to the moon resumed. McDonnell began an extended study of the concept, despite Wernher Von Braun suggesting that the only reason for a Gemini to be sent around the moon would be, “a possible project to salvage this country's prestige if the manned lunar goal proves impossible.”
The conclusion was that such a flight was certainly within the limits of possibility. The designs for a 14-day Gemini were suitable with some modifications; the key problem would be the heat shield, which would require significant strengthening to cope with the increased translunar velocities. The profile suggested that a Saturn IB launcher with a hydrogen third-stage would be required for a single-launch flight to the moon. Other options were suggested; a Titan III launcher could be used to place the lunar Gemini into orbit, and another launcher could place a vehicle such as the Centaur in position to boost the Gemini into the translunar trajectory. The possibility of using on-orbit refuelling was also suggested – two Titan III launchers would be used, the first to fly the Gemini, the other to provide the additional fuel required.
Realistically, a dual-launch option would have been required; the whole point of the study was due to delays to the Apollo, and they were partly caused by delays to the Saturn family of launchers. The Titan had the virtue of being available for flight (though admittedly it could have led to conflicts with the Air Force, whose launcher it was). The 1964 plans for a translunar Gemini were essentially the same as the plans outlined in 1961; the basic design philosophies had not changed.
N
either had the reason for the original rejection. Von Braun's reaction was typical of the attitudes within NASA. Apollo was the prestige project, and although Gemini was ongoing, Apollo was where the majority of attention and funding was focused; the prestige of the agency was certainly still tied up with Apollo, and so once again, the idea of a lunar project was stillborn.
There was still one last resurgence of the Lunar Gemini proposal, in 1965. This would use the codename, 'Large Earth Orbit' to camouflage an attempt to have a lunar flyby mission authorised. While in training for Gemini 5, astronaut Pete Conrad learned of the original lunar proposals for Gemini, and attempted to have them reinstated for a later Gemini mission he hoped to fly, utilising the Gemini-Centaur combination. The request got as far as Congress, and some interest was evinced in that body for such a flight, leading to inquiries of NASA management.
As a response to the proposal, NASA Administrator James Webb wrote to influential Congressmen Olin Teague, the chairman of the NASA oversight committee, stating that, “if additional funds were available, I believe that it would be in the national interest to use those on the Apollo program.” He even conceded that it was possible that the Soviet Union would reach the moon first on a flyby mission, but was still extremely reluctant to use an alternate program that might beat Apollo.
As with all the other lunar Gemini proposals, this one was dropped in order to avoid any distractions from Apollo; the only remnant was the high-altitude flight, taking Gemini 11 – commanded by Pete Conrad – to a new record altitude; he managed to sell NASA on this mission with the benefits of higher-altitude photography than had been possible before by manned craft.
While there were no serious proposals for sending the Gemini spacecraft to the moon after 1965, a few more in-house studies did take place; there was some discussion of using the Gemini spacecraft as a potential landing vehicle to provide a rescue capability for a stranded Apollo lander. Similar studies suggested the use of the Gemini capsule in a logistic role. Both faltered on the illogic of developing two lunar landing systems when by then, the Apollo landing system was well-developed.
The studies commissioned between 1961-65 did prove definitively that a Lunar Gemini project was feasible. The reality of the situation was that those who rejected the plan were quite correct – it would have adversely affected the work taking place on Apollo. If a cheaper lunar alternative existed, especially one that promised to get America to the moon earlier than the more expensive Apollo, then enormous pressure would have been imposed on the NASA Administration to adopt the plan.
Obviously, the effect on NASA during the 1960s would have been extremely wide-ranging. While Apollo would not necessarily have been cancelled – its more advanced capabilities being obvious – it would certainly have experienced considerable delay, intended instead as a longer-term replacement for the Gemini. Running two lunar programs in parallel would have proven extremely difficult; even with the required funding, the trained and experienced manpower for both programs would have been difficult to obtain. One more likely casualty would have been the Saturn V; nothing larger than the Saturn IB would have been required for the Lunar Gemini program, and the only perceived mission for the Saturn V was the lunar flight.
The Gemini flights could have been divided into two stages. The first stage would have appeared similar to the flights as planned; it is highly unlikely that the abbreviated Gemini program could have accomplished all the needed goals, so the longer program would have been required. These first flights would have needed to satisfy the same requirements for rendezvous and docking, as well as proving the durational flights. It can be assumed that these flights would have flown between 1965-66.
The second series of flights would have used an upgraded Gemini model, referenced in the planning documents as 'Gemini L'. This would have had a strengthened heat shield, and probably an improved computer to allow for navigation across the translunar void. The original study called for two launches, the second sending the Centaur stage into orbit as a booster, but the other option – using a Saturn IB to send the complex around the moon in a single launch – was also realistic. Given the conflicting Air Force requirements for the Titan, and the advanced development work on the Saturn IB, it seems likely that the latter option would have been employed; 1967 could have seen American astronauts flying around the moon, probably at least twice. A lunar orbital mission could have followed early in the following year, a requirement before a landing mission could have taken place.
As for the landing on the moon, the 1961 plan called for the creation of a 'stripped-down' landing craft. The Apollo LM was redesigned constantly in order to save weight; a Gemini LM would have had to be even lighter, little more than a skeleton with a propulsion system attached to it. It is probable that it would have been an 'open' lander, something along the lines of the Surveyor, with no pressurised cabin. This would have provided a magnificent view for the astronaut as he descended to the moon, but there would have been very little margin of error as he descended, and his stay time would have been considerably reduced.
Chamberlin's original proposal called for the lunar landing to take place on Gemini 16; this seems extremely unlikely; in Apollo, there were two lunar module test flights, one in Earth orbit and one in Lunar orbit. Unless some sort of a rush requirement was evident, it seems likely that this would have been repeated on Gemini – so Gemini 16 and Gemini 17 would have been the test flights, with Gemini 18 the actual landing on the Moon – or possibly even a later flight, had problems occurred on the two dry runs.
It seems doubtful that much time would have been saved in reaching the moon. The first lunar flyby was likely in 1967, and an orbit in 1968 would definitely been a practical proposition, but in the Apollo program, a key delay was the development of the LM, which stretched late into 1968; the first testing flights did not take place until 1969. The 'Gemini LM' would in many ways have been an even more difficult engineering proposition; reduced weight would not have meant reduced complexity, quite the reverse. Perhaps six months
might
have been shaved off the development program – which would have seen the first man walk on the moon in January 1969, perhaps December 1968 – in the launch window that was occupied by Apollo 8.
An inevitable question is who, in this rotation, would have been the first man to land on the moon. One
candidate would have been Gus Grissom; in Apollo, Deke Slayton pushed him as the first man on the moon, and had Apollo 1 flown, it was almost certain that he would have rotated to command that lunar landing – and he flew the first Gemini flight, and had a significant role in its design; some of the astronauts referred to it as the 'Gusmobile'. It is almost impossible to predict crew assignments with any accuracy – the Gemini assignments were partly designed to provide training for Apollo, and with no Apollo program, this schedule would have been changed.
As for the astronaut corps in general; there would probably have been changes. Group III would certainly have been selected, and the pressure to admit scientists to the astronaut corps would have continued, so the Group IV scientist-astronauts would also likely been selected. Group V, however, would have been less likely to be selected – there would have been no need for nineteen new astronauts with far fewer flight assignments, only two astronauts per mission. It would have been hard to conceive Group VI, the second batch of scientist-astronauts, being selected, though the seventh Group – astronauts that had been selected for the USAF manned orbiting laboratory – would probably still have been transferred over, though some of them may have thought more carefully about accepting. Given that they were all trained for Gemini operations, they would have been strong candidates.
If Gemini 18 was successful, it seems less likely that there would have been as many repeats. The capability of the proposed LM was marginal at best; without a cabin, stay time would have been limited to the life support potential of the astronaut's spacesuit, and this would almost certainly have meant only a couple of hours on the surface. Further, the ability to return samples from the surface would have been far
reduced
. The capacity to perform useful scientific work would have been far inferior to Apollo. A landing would likely have seen the astronaut plant a flag on the surface, and deploy a series of surface experiments, then taking a few samples of the lunar surface from the immediate vicinity of his craft; he would then have returned to the Gemini waiting in orbit.
This author suspects that while there
would
have been a couple of repeats – Gemini 19 and Gemini 20, perhaps – that would have represented the conclusion of the Gemini moon program. Simply put, there was nowhere else to go with it. No capacity to increase the payload returned from the moon, no capacity to extend stay time, no capacity to include more equipment. The balance of probabilities is that the last American on the moon would have left the surface in 1969.
Where from there? Well, Apollo had the Apollo Applications project, follow-on missions utilizing the same hardware, and there was a similar suite of 'Gemini Applications' designed as follow-on missions. Gemini shined in Earth orbit; it was never really intended or designed for translunar operations, but it had great potential for development for operations nearer home, and at a reduced cost to the Apollo – no expensive Saturn IB booster, a Titan III would have done just as well, and those were being produced on an assembly-line basis.
One objective that was seriously considered for the Gemini program was satellite retrieval, specifically of a Pegasus satellite. This was of key interest, not only because it allowed for the retrieval of long-term experiments in space, or the possibility of repair of key satellites, but also for potential military applications. The USAF had always expressed a keen interest in Gemini; at one point Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara actually offered them control of the entire program, and they were planning to use the capsule in association with the military Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) – the potential to examine Soviet satellites, or retrieve instrumentation from American spy satellites, would have been tempting.
Flying the Gemini in a one-man configuration was also examined, with the goal of carrying a larger scientific payload. This could either consist of a telescope for astronomical observation, or equipment for Earth observations, and could have been extended-duration missions focused on one tight objective; it is possible to consider 'Gemini Observatories' launched to monitor expected astronomic events, such as comets.