One Man Against the World: The Tragedy of Richard Nixon (47 page)

“They particularly won’t believe me”: April 17, 1971, NWHT, Oval Office.

“the environment is not an issue that’s worth a damn to us”: Feb. 9, 1971, entry in
Haldeman Diaries
.

“in the long run … a catastrophe”: Shultz interview in Gerald S. Strober and Deborah Hart Strober,
Nixon: An Oral History of His Presidency
(New York: HarperCollins, 1994), p. 51.

“Nixon never trusted anybody”: Helms interview with Stanley I. Kutler, July 14, 1988, Box 15, Folder 16, Wisconsin Historical Archives, Madison, WI, cited by permission of Professor Kutler.

“When the president does it”: Nixon interview with Frost.

“it was ‘me against the world’”: Robert Finch interview, in Strober and Strober,
Nixon
, p. 49.

“He hears the train go by at night”: Nixon address accepting the presidential nomination at the Republican National Convention in Miami Beach, Florida, Aug. 8, 1968, Public Papers of Richard Nixon.

“He had a lemon ranch”: Richard Nixon, farewell address, White House, Aug. 9, 1974, Public Papers of Richard Nixon.

“The last thing my mother, a devout Quaker”: Richard Nixon,
Six Crises
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), p. 295.

“the zeal”: Hoover testimony, March 26, 1947, House Un-American Activities Committee, online at
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/
.

“my closest friend”: May 3, 1972, NWHT, White House.

“the security of the whole nation and the cause of free men”: Nixon,
Six Crises
, p. 37.

“The Hiss case brought me national fame”: Ibid., p. 69.

“even suggesting that the presidency itself could be stolen”: Ibid., p. 416.

“For sixteen years, ever since the Hiss case”: Live footage of Nixon’s “last press conference” is at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_RMSb-tS_OM
.

2: “This is treason”

“In those years in limbo”: Watts oral history, FAOH.

“When Mr. Nixon and I called on President Suharto”: Green oral history, FAOH.

“was bound to be crucified”: Doris Kearns Goodwin,
Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream
(New York: New American Library, 1977), p. 263.

“increasingly attracted”: Bui Diem with David Chanoff,
In the Jaws of History
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), pp. 237–44.

“He was in Washington when Castro took over”: Woods to Haldeman, Oct. 13, 1968, Nixon Library, Nixon Presidential Returned Materials Collection: White House Special Files.

“between three and five million dollars”: Woods to Nixon, “RE: Telephone call from Bob Hill—re Mexico,” Sept. 29, 1968, Nixon Library, Nixon Presidential Returned Materials Collection: White House Special Files.

“someone in Johnson’s innermost circle”: Richard Nixon,
RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), p. 326.

“I immediately decided” … “a cynical last-minute”: Ibid., p. 327.

“It appears Mr. Nixon will be elected”: Director, NSA, to [classified], “Thieu’s Views on Peace Talks and Bombing Halt,” partially declassified Dec. 17, 2010, LBJ Library.

“Nixon was playing the problem”: Rostow to Johnson, 6:00 a.m., Oct. 29, 1968, LBJ Library.

“He better keep Mrs. Chennault”: Oct. 31, 1968, LBJ Tapes, LBJ Library.

“South Vietnam is not a truck”: Thieu quoted in conversation between President Johnson and Robert McNamara, Nov. 1, 1968, Washington, DC,
FRUS
VII: Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972.

“The Republican nominee”: Oct. 31, 1968, LBJ Tapes, LBJ Library.

“It’s clear as day!”: Notes of meeting, Nov. 2, 1968, Washington, DC,
FRUS
VII: Vietnam.

“a message from her boss”: Rostow teletype to President Johnson, Nov. 2, 1968, LBJ Library.

“This is treason”: Nov. 2, 1968, LBJ Tapes, LBJ Library.

“The deal was cooked”: Habib oral history, FAOH.

“I do not believe”: Telephone conversation among President Johnson, Secretary of Defense Clifford, Secretary of State Rusk, and the president’s special assistant (Rostow), Nov. 4, 1968, 12:27 p.m.,
FRUS
VII: Vietnam
.

“These messages started” … “And it is a sordid story”: Nov. 8, 1969, LBJ Tapes, LBJ Library. The bitterness lingered through Inauguration Day, January 20, 1969. LBJ’s administrative aide James R. Jones, later the American ambassador to Mexico, watched it firsthand. LBJ said that Nixon was “a son of a bitch, but he’s the only son of a bitch we have as President, so we have to support him. He never trusted Nixon but he wanted him to succeed. Johnson had an enormous sense of the history of the presidency and the night before the inauguration I remember he admonished all of us… He said: ‘This plane, the United States, has only one pilot. When we go through rough weather, if everybody on the plane starts trying to take the controls and beating the pilot over the head, that plane is going to crash.’” On inauguration morning, the presidential limousine waited at the White House for the drive to the swearing-in at the Capitol Building. “Johnson and Nixon in the back seat,” Jones remembers. “All the way up there, Nixon, all he wanted to talk about was losing Texas and how he didn’t intend to lose Texas in ’72.”

“We were tapped”: Nixon to Haldeman, June 28, 1972, NWHT, Old Executive Office Building.

“he had sent two secret emissaries”: CIA Saigon station, “President Thieu’s Comments on Peace Talks,” Nov. 18, 1968, LBJ Library.

“The ‘X’ Files”: Memorandum for the record, W. W. Rostow, May 14, 1973, LBJ Library.

3: “He was surrounded by enemies”

Inauguration Day: Huston oral history, Nixon Library.

“I really need”: July 1, 1971, NWHT, Oval Office.

“This country is going so far right you won’t even recognize it”: This remarkable statement by Attorney General Mitchell was reported by Kandy Stroud of
Women’s Wear Daily
as “overheard” during a 1970 cocktail party at the Women’s National Press Club. It was part of a long and evidently tape-recorded rant against students, professors, and the New Left shortly after the May 1970 killings of four students by National Guardsmen at Kent State University.

“Attorneys General seldom directed Mr. Hoover”: Nixon testimony,
U.S. v. Felt
, Oct. 29, 1980, United States District Court for the Southern District, New York.

“I had a strong intuition about Henry Kissinger”: Nixon,
RN
, p. 341.

“It was a bizarre way”: Rodman oral history, FAOH.

“There was an absolute conviction”: Haldeman oral history, Strober and Strober,
Nixon
, p. 183.

“the greatest military man I had ever met”: Alexander M. Haig Jr. Oral History Interview, Nov. 30, 2007, Nixon Library.

“I had clearly crossed the line for the first time”: John W. Dean, keynote address, “Presidential Powers: An American Debate,” April 25, 2006, Center on Law and Security, New York University School of Law.

“convinced that Nixon’s drinking could cost him any chance of a return to public life”: John Ehrlichman,
Witness to Power: The Nixon Years
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), pp. 37–38.

“house detective”: Ehrlichman, “Transcription of Tape-Recorded Interview,” White House, Dec. 17, 1971, Nixon Library.

“From the first time he ran for office”: Ehrlichman interview recorded by CNN in 1988, transcript at
www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-16/ehrlichman4.html
.

4: “He will let them know who is boss around here”

“to understand … these were horrible decisions”: Haldeman oral history; Strober and Strober,
Nixon
, p. 181.

“Sedov said”: Kissinger, memorandum of conversation, Washington, Jan. 2, 1969,
FRUS
XII: Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970. NSC Files: Contacts with the Soviets Prior to Jan. 20, 1969. Kissinger and Sedov met at the Pierre Hotel, headquarters for the Nixon transition team.

“Our lines of communication”: Nixon inaugural address, Jan. 20, 1969, Public Papers of President Richard M. Nixon. Nixon’s handwritten notes from meetings held January 20 and 21 include the following. Of domestic and international issues, including China, he wrote in part, “Chinese Communists: Short range—no change. Long range—we do not want 800,000,000 living in angry isolation. We want contact” (Box 1, President’s Handwriting File, January 1969, Administrative Files, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum).

“In the second week of the administration”: Haig oral history, Nixon Library, Nov. 30, 2007.

“This will be a great symbol”: Vietnam, Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, Jan. 25, 1969, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC.

“To preclude … military actions”: Haig to Kissinger, Washington, March 2, 1969, “Memorandum from Secretary Laird Enclosing Preliminary Draft of Potential Military Actions re Vietnam,”
FRUS
XXXIV: National Security Policy, 1969–1972. The memo describes the war plans developed by the Joint Chiefs in response to Kissinger’s request on January 27, including the nuclear option.

“What is the most effective way to bring the war to a conclusion?”: Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, Jan. 25, 1969, Washington,
FRUS
VI: Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970.

“Mr. Kissinger questioned”: Minutes of the 303/40 Committee Meeting, Feb. 12, 1969,
FRUS
VI: Vietnam. The 303 meetings, later known as the 40 meetings, were where Kissinger and high-ranking intelligence, military, diplomatic, and national security officials made decision on CIA covert operations.

“I believe it is absolutely urgent”: Memorandum from President Nixon to Kissinger, Washington, Feb. 1, 1969, Washington, DC, in Box 64, Vietnam Subject Files, Reappraisal of Vietnam Commitment, vol. 1, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, National Archives, Washington, DC.

“The question that arises”: Laird to Nixon, March 13, 1969, “SUBJECT: Trip to Vietnam and CINCPAC,” March 5–12, 1969,
FRUS
VI: Vietnam.

“lobbing a few shells into Saigon”: Kissinger to Nixon, March 10, 1969, “SUBJECT: Dobrynin–Rogers Conversation on the Paris Negotiations,”
FRUS
VI: Vietnam.

“so secret … entire new world”: Feb. 24, 1969 (Brussels), entry in
Haldeman Diaries
.

“In order to set the stage”: Kissinger to Nixon, “Consideration of B-52 Options Against COSVN Headquarters,” Feb. 19, 1969, Top Secret, declassified 2006,
FRUS
VI: Vietnam.

“an extraordinary amount of detailed planning”: Oakley oral history, FAOH. Nixon’s obsession with detail was everyday life at the White House. The scripting of the presidency was a daily burden, part of the immense pressure Nixon imposed on himself and his inner circle. He would stop in the midst of deliberations over the war to demand that soup and salads be banned from White House dinners. His highest-ranking staffers took orders in the Oval Office about “whether or not the curtains were closed or open, the arrangement of state gifts, whether they should be on that side of the room or this side of the room,” his aide Alexander Butterfield said; before every ceremonial occasion at the White House, the president needed to know “whether the military would be to the right or the left, which uniforms would be worn by the White House police, whether the Secret Service would salute during ‘The Star-Spangled Banner’ and sing”—and this level of preoccupation applied to “all Presidential activities.”

“Must convince them”: Notes by President Nixon of a meeting, Paris, March 2, 1969,
FRUS
VI: Vietnam.

“We are not going to double-cross you”: Telegram from the embassy in France to the Department of State, Paris, March 2, 1969, memorandum of conversation among the president, Vice President Ky, Ambassador Lam, the secretary of state, Ambassador Lodge, Ambassador Walsh, and Dr. Kissinger,
FRUS
VI: Vietnam.

“Hit them”: March 8, 1969, Kissinger Telephone Conversations.

“Our military effort”: Kissinger to Nixon, March 8, 1969, “SUBJECT: Reflections on De-escalation,”
FRUS
VI: Vietnam.

“The President ordered”: Memorandum for the record, March 15, 1969, “SUBJECT: March 16 Rocket Attack on Saigon,” Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, National Archives, Washington, DC.

5: “The center cannot hold”

Abrams was “seeking permission”: Surprisingly, this important story languished for six weeks until the
New York Times
followed up on it. “Although President Nixon became concerned over these two stories and the threat they posed to secrecy … Nixon need not have worried,” a declassified U.S. Air Force history of the Vietnam War reflected. “Possibly put off the track by the lack of reaction from military leaders and civilian authorities, the press failed to pursue the matter. As it turned out, more than four years elapsed from the first Menu bombing in 1969 until Maj. Hal Knight, a former Air Force officer, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1973 that, while serving at a Combat Skyspot radar site, he had destroyed records of strikes in Cambodia and substituted reports of attacks on cover targets in South Vietnam.” Bernard C. Nalty,
Air War over South Vietnam 1968–1975
, Air Force History and Museums Program (Washington, DC: U.S. Air Force, 2000), pp. 127–32.

“the ultimate weapon”: Nixon deposition
,
recorded in San Clemente, CA, Jan. 15, 1976,
Halperin v. Kissinger
, U.S. District Court, Washington, DC. Nixon gave this deposition in connection with the White House wiretaps. Kissinger finally settled the case in 1991, when he wrote an apology to his former aide Halperin, whom he had selected as a wiretap target in 1969.

“Here he was in this room with J. Edgar Hoover”: Rodman oral history, FAOH.

“destroy whoever did this”: Hoover memorandum of conversation with Kissinger, May 9, 1969, FBI.

“gossip and bullshitting”: Feb. 28, 1973, NWHT.

tapping was within the realm: The taps were clearly illegal. The prevailing law, the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, dealt specifically with the issue. While prohibiting all wiretapping and electronic surveillance by persons other than law enforcement authorities (and even then, under strict rules), it stated that “nothing … shall limit the constitutional power of the President … to protect the nation against
actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power
, to obtain
foreign intelligence information
deemed essential to the security of the United States or to protect national security information against
foreign intelligence activities
.” I have emphasized the passages with the word
foreign
. Nothing in that law allowed the wiretapping of Americans who were not foreign spies.