Operation Garbo (27 page)

T
he aim of Operation
FORTITUDE
, the cover plan for the
invasion
of occupied Europe in June 1944, was to convince the enemy that the landings on the Normandy beaches were a feint and that the main attack would be made in the Pas-de-Calais region. Largely thanks to the code breakers at Bletchley and the efforts of the British Security Service, MI5, there were no genuine German spies in England to betray our intentions. In fact, the only Abwehr sources at large were those who were the double-cross agents operating under the control of MI5’s B1(a) section, headed by Colonel T. A. Robertson. He and his team provided us with a ready-made channel for passing our fictitious story to the German high command.

The deception staff at SHAEF, under Colonel Noel Wild and known as Ops B, was divided into two sections. One, under Colonel Jervis Read, dealing with physical deception, such as camouflage, and the other, generally known as the special means section, for which I was responsible, dealing with all forms of controlled leakages. Events proved that the only consistently effective conduit for passing false information to the enemy was that provided by the double agents, and it was to feed this channel that, within the overall framework, a succession of special means plans were prepared and put into operation, each being designed to meet changes in the situation. There was at all times a close liaison with Colonel David Strangeways, who was in charge of deception at 21 Army Group, largely to ensure that there should be no conflict between the cover plan and the operation itself.

When the implementation of
FORTITUDE
first began, an MI5 officer from B1(a) was seconded to us to help in the task of passing the story to the enemy through double agents. It must be explained here that every double-cross agent had a case officer who looked after his affairs generally and, as there was a strict rule that there should be no direct contact between the SHAEF deception staff and the agents themselves, it was invariably the case officer who visited our office at Norfolk House to receive the information that was to be conveyed through his agent, and then made sure that the message was passed correctly.

From the start, it was thought likely that
GARBO
would provide one of our best channels. Unlike many of the other double-cross agents,
GARBO
’s sympathies had lain all along with the Allied cause.
GARBO
’s status was amply confirmed by an examination of the German intelligence reports for the year 1944, made after the war had ended. Because of his high
standing
with his Abwehr masters, much of the burden of
communicating
the
FORTITUDE
plan fell to
GARBO
and his case officer, Tommy Harris. German faith in him hardly faltered, even after the beachhead in Normandy had been well established. The post-war analysis demonstrated that, during the period of the
FORTITUDE
campaign, no less than sixty-two of his messages were quoted in the German high command’s intelligence summaries.

As the date for the invasion drew near, General Eisenhower was asked when the all-important message might be
transmitted
which would specifically affirm that the Allied attack in Normandy was merely a feint and that the main assault was destined for the Pas-de-Calais. This part of the cover plan had been supported by an apparent concentration of troops in south-east England. Eisenhower replied, at any time after the first landings had taken place.

Because of his reliability and his standing with the enemy,
GARBO
was chosen for this task, but his case officer insisted on a three-day delay before sending the message. He pointed out that if the Germans could be persuaded to recall troops who
were already on the move, there would be little chance of them changing their minds again. Accordingly,
GARBO
’s crucial text was not sent until D+3, when Berlin had already authorised the immediate transfer of forces to the west.

Within hours of the D-Day forces coming ashore, certain German armoured and infantry divisions received orders to move from the Pas-de-Calais to spearhead a German
counter-attack
in Normandy. But at 0730 hours on the morning of 10 June, the day after
GARBO
’s wireless transmission, Field Marshal von Rundstedt issued a countermanding order recalling these troops to the Pas-de-Calais, and there they remained. Indeed, there were more German forces in that region at the end of June than there had been on D-Day.

When the war ended I decided to find out whether
GARBO
’s message had contributed to the issue of the countermanding order. It was important that no time should be lost since, with the war crimes trial approaching, delay might result in some of our best witnesses being no longer with us.

I sought and obtained permission to interview von Rundstedt and his chief of staff, General Blumentritt, who were then being held in a prisoner-of-war camp near Bridgend in Wales. I took with me my brother Cuthbert (who has since died), who had worked with us in SHAEF and had a better command of the German language than me.

When asked why the order had been issued recalling the reinforcements then on their way from the Pas-de-Calais, they both, without hesitation, answered that it had been issued on instructions from the OKW, the supreme command of the German armed forces. It was therefore arranged that my brother should interview field marshals Keitel and Jodl, who were by then awaiting trial at Nuremberg. In the meantime, I was able to find, among captured enemy documents that had been brought to London,
GARBO
’s message of 9 June. This my brother took with him. On 18 April 1946 I received the
following
letter from him, which I quote in full:

Not surprisingly,
GARBO
’s code name can now be found in virtually every manual on the subject of strategic deception, and his achievements have been well documented in books such as J. C. Masterman’s
The Double Cross System in the War of 1939–1945
. But although I had worked with
GARBO
, via MI5’s intermediaries, throughout the latter part of the war, I never discovered his real identity and did not actually meet him in person until May 1984, when he suddenly emerged from his self-imposed obscurity abroad. A few days before the fortieth anniversary of the D-Day landings I was invited to attend a private reception at the Special Forces Club in London where
GARBO
, who was introduced to me by his real name, Juan Pujol, was reunited with his surviving wartime MI5 colleagues. None had seen him in the intervening years. It was an emotional gathering, and one I shall never forget.

From the early information about this character, it would have appeared that he was a rather accommodating individual who, taking advantage of his position in a trans-continental airline company, was prepared to facilitate the sending of correspondence to Portugal without passing through Censorship, pretending he thought he could justify his conscience by the knowledge that the writers were political refugees, while increasing his income by so doing.

Though he was never definitely identified with
SMITH JONES
, the person who received the incoming correspondence for
GARBO
(and presumably the other characters in England whom the courier was facilitating) the Germans nevertheless frequently referred to him as ‘
THE COURIER SMITH
’.

It was not advisable that the Germans should believe that the courier carried the correspondence to and from Portugal
personally
, lest they requested that he should be put in contact with them. Therefore, we took pains to impress upon them that though he did at one time make the journey as a member of the plane’s crew, he later made use of various friends of his who were members of the crew to cooperate in this and the other business of smuggling.

It is a fact that the crews of planes became notorious through the press for engaging in smuggling, and though these activities were mostly confined to the smuggling of watches purchased in Portugal for sale in England, it was reasonable that the Germans should imagine that they engaged in other traffic.

As time went on, the courier developed into a very sinister
character
who, it became apparent, was trafficking in the sale in Portugal of Bank of England notes, the proceeds of robberies in the UK, which were exchanged in Lisbon for other Bank of England notes which, when brought into circulation in the UK, were no longer traceable to the robberies.

It subsequently became apparent that in order to engage in this very dangerous business the courier made use of a number of rather well placed British subjects in Portugal, one of whom at least was in direct contact with a person either employed by, or used as, an outside agent by SIS.

By means which were never disclosed, the courier came to discover that one of the cover addresses to which
GARBO
had been writing in Lisbon was a German cover address that had become the subject of investigations by the British in Lisbon.

With this valuable information in his possession, and realising that
GARBO
was therefore a German agent and not a refugee, he decided to blackmail him. We informed the Germans of this situation. They reacted to it as if it had been news of good fortune rather than bad and promptly authorised
GARBO
to pay the courier the sum of
£
2,000, which he was demanding far his silence, pointing out to
GARBO
that once he had accepted this blackmail money he would be entirely in
GARBO
’s power.

Though the courier could never be induced to supply the Germans with military information against his country he did, in the interests of his self-protection, produce valuable counter-espionage
information
for
GARBO
, which enabled him to escape the vigilance of the British Security Service when, towards the last stages of the case, the Germans were made to realise that the British had become aware of his activities and identity.

The first piece of genuine information supplied by
GARBO
after his arrival in the UK, which was a report on the rocket batteries in Hyde Park, was attributed to this contact. He was quoted as a source at infrequent intervals throughout the case and was primarily
instrumental
in serving as a build-up for
GARBO
.

This character has certainly been the most important of
GARBO
’s contacts. He was represented as having been increasingly indiscreet as his confidence and his liking for
GARBO
grew.
GARBO
firstly worked as a part-time employee in the ministry on J(3)’s recommendation, and a great deal of important deception material that was passed over shortly after D-Day was attributed to this source.
MCCANN
was told in confidence about
GARBO
’s activities and informed that one of the notional characters in the
GARBO
case had been built up around him.

This character was created primarily with the object of building him up as a source for deception material. It was planned that this source should eventually provide
GARBO
with ‘STOP’ and ‘RELEASE’ notices issued to press censors. Thus, by indicating a complete press ‘STOP’ on all mention of a certain area, the enemy would be expected to deduce that the area indicated was likely to be a target area for operations.

To implement this plan, the Germans were told that the censor had introduced himself to
GARBO
in the ministry and, after they had become acquainted, he disclosed to
GARBO
that he was extremely left wing and had been passing certain secret information to the British Communist Party. It happened that at this time the press had raised the question of certain secret information having been passed to Mr [‘Manny’] Shinwell [MP] by someone, unidentified, employed by the Ministry of Information, and questions were raised in the House. The censor, therefore, assumed the role of the source of these leakages and told
GARBO
that he was now lying low since the question had been given so much publicity. He offered to assist the Spanish ‘Reds’ in a similar capacity if
GARBO
would act as his cut out.

Although the character was built up on these lines, it was not found necessary to use him in any serious role to implement the cover story for
OVERLORD
, so that after March 1944 the censor was allowed to fade out of the picture.

This character was mainly created as build-up for
GARBO
and it was proposed that she should play an important role in the final deception story. We built her up by passing over relatively high-grade, general information, attributed to her indiscretions.

Domestically, she was represented as having fallen in love with
GARBO
.

GARBO
was authorised by the Germans to spend money on her as lavishly as he wished in the hope that he could extract more valuable information from her. She supplied
GARBO
with information about the Moscow Conference in 1943, attributing her source to a colleague who had attended the conference as secretary to the Chief of the British Military Mission.

She was given as the source for a certain amount of high-grade chicken food
1
about the movements of important British Service chiefs. She was used to implement
PLAN BODYGUARD
.

In the spring of 1944 the Germans were very much on edge and apprehensive about the possibility of an imminent attack, and J(5) was used until early May to reassure them that there was no possibility of an immediate invasion. Although at that date this information should have served her as a good build-up, it did not in fact do so as the Germans, in reply, warned
GARBO
that he should not place too much confidence in her word, as it was common practice in government offices to mislead the subordinate personnel lest they should, through knowledge of the true facts, cause a leakage through indiscretion.

She was, however, used again immediately after D Day to support the build-up of the notional FUSAG, by confirming that there were seventy-five divisions in the UK prior to the Normandy landing, whereas there were in fact less than fifty.

This character was then allowed to fade out of the scene, on the assumption that
GARBO
did not think it prudent to continue to forward her information in view of the warning which he received from the Germans.

This character was the first to be created by
GARBO
while he was still in Portugal. Though he lived in Newport, the majority of his reports were on the counties of Devon and Cornwall. He was alleged to remain, throughout his career, a rather colourless individual who worked regularly but without great zeal, presumably picking up information, mostly about airfields and military camps, which he came by in the course of his commercial travels.

He was eventually given secret ink and a cover address in Lisbon, to which he corresponded directly, receiving his questionnaires and replies through
GARBO
. The writing was done by a member of this office.

In view of the fact that there was no one in the office to whom we could delegate the work of writing who had fluent Portuguese, it was decided to make him write in French. The Germans were given the excuse that although a Portuguese he had fluent French. Since there were a lot of Belgians and Frenchmen in the area where he was living, we said that to write in French would serve as perfect cover should one of his letters be detected by the British Censor, since they would undoubtedly look for the author among these nationals and be unlikely to suspect a Portuguese.

This agent was sent to Northern Ireland with commercial cover, in place of another agent who had originally been intended to be sent there. He was one of the principal sources used in support of Operation
STARKEY
, during which period he covered the area of Southampton.

We realised that though he was required on that operation, his
presence
in south-west England would be undesirable during Operation
OVERLORD
, as he would see too much in this part of England. It was, therefore, decided to have one of his letters supposedly discovered in censorship during the time of Operation
STARKEY
, with the result that several Belgians were detained in the Southampton area and all non-residents, including the agent, ordered to leave.