Ostkrieg (24 page)

Nor could the declining motor transport capacity be made good by the rail system. The Germans failed to capture large quantities of Soviet locomotives and rolling stock and, thus, faced the time-consuming, labor-intensive task of relaying rail network to German gauge. Even this proved more difficult than expected, however, since the Soviet rail beds were normally so weak and the rails so lacking in load-carrying capacity that only light model German engines could be used to pull freight cars. In addition, because of inadequate investment in the railroad between the wars, German locomotives and rolling stock were limited in number and already considerably overstrained. Increased wear and tear and
inevitable breakdowns thus further reduced the efficiency of the Reichsbahn. Because of time pressures as well as constraints on personnel and materials for a thorough reconstruction of the railway network, necessary repair work was limited to a few main lines. Inevitably, bottlenecks resulted as the transportation system often became hopelessly jammed. As a consequence, adequate supply of the three army groups became impossible. By late July, Army Group Center needed twenty-five trains a day to meet its needs but often received as few as eight and never more than fifteen, while Army Group South secured on average only fourteen of the necessary twenty-four trains daily. Army Group North enjoyed a relatively better situation as it had shorter distances to cover, the rail network in the Baltic states was better, and the capture of Baltic ports eased the strain on land transport. Even here, however, the attack on Leningrad in July had to be postponed for supply reasons on seven occasions. By the time the supply difficulties were resolved and the attack resumed in early August, the Soviets had gained valuable time to build defenses.
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The constraints on the transportation system also forced difficult choices. The incessant Soviet counterattacks had caused German troops to consume huge quantities of ammunition. When priority was given to ammunition trains, however, drastic reductions in the supply of fuel and rations were necessary, which limited the mobility of German units and forced troops to live off the land. By mid-July, the unprecedented problems of supplying a rapidly advancing army over great distances in a country with poor infrastructure with the necessary equipment, ammunition, fuel, and supplies to maintain a simultaneous offensive on three fronts had nearly broken the German supply organization. The original assumption—that the Eastern Army could be adequately supplied only to the Dnieper line—had proven accurate. In the absence of the anticipated Soviet collapse, the Germans now faced the prospect of creating a new supply chain that reflected the changed situation. Failing this, they had hardly any likelihood of being able to provide the troops with the supplies they needed for large-scale operations beyond the Dnieper. In the summer of 1941, time, distance, and the very primitive nature of its transportation system was helping ensure the Soviet Union's survival as a state.
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Barely a month into the war, then, the German army leadership was forced to recognize that the Red Army had survived the best the Wehrmacht could throw at it and that, not only had it not been beaten, but its resistance was also growing in intensity. This realization took hold during the Battle of Smolensk, which had originally been intended as
the culmination of the initial phase of Barbarossa but now took place within the context of deliberations among Hitler and the OKH about the future axis of German advance. If Soviet actions at Smolensk did not cause a full reappraisal of German policy, they certainly contributed to a palpable sense of crisis in the second half of July. More importantly, they confronted the OKH, once the initial assumptions of Barbarossa had proved false, with the necessity of improvising its way to victory. However, each gamble on encirclement, however successful it might be in defeating Soviet forces in its sector, also promoted the exhaustion of German forces before they could accomplish the general defeat of the Red Army, a vicious cycle that was eroding the strength of the Wehrmacht.

Hitler himself expressed the dilemma well, complaining to Halder on 26 July, “You cannot beat the Russians with operational successes . . . because they simply do not know when they are defeated.” Although Halder admitted that Hitler's observation had some merit, he noted, presciently as it turned out, that the Führer's prescription, to destroy them bit by bit in small encircling actions, would simply let the enemy dictate German actions as well as reduce the tempo of operations to a pace that would not allow success. Beginning at Smolensk, the Ostheer found itself drawn increasingly into a series of operations that ended in victories but that taxed its already strained logistics system to the limit, eroded irreplaceable combat strength, and gave the Soviets time both to call up new levies of manpower and to organize their remaining economic potential. The dogged Soviet resistance, moreover, had begun to have a noticeable effect on German civilian morale, always a crucial concern to the Nazi leadership. Already by 24 July Goebbels had noted his surprise at the failure of the Soviet state to collapse and concerns about the progress of the war. “Without a doubt our situation at the moment is tense,” he admitted. He then complained, “In the eastern campaign we have not had so many symbolic victories to record, as in the previous year in the western campaign, that can ignite the . . . excitement of the people. . . . The mood in Germany has grown more serious. One is gradually becoming aware that the eastern campaign is no stroll to Moscow. . . . Maintaining domestic morale is made noticeably more difficult by the lack of special reports [announcing victories]. In the western campaign we had something new almost every day. . . . Now people must wait and wait. . . . That results in a certain weariness.” “It is clear,” the propaganda minister acknowledged on the last day of July, “that we have underestimated Bolshevism.” At Smolensk, the Red Army in fact forced German plans for a
Blitzfeldzug
(lightning campaign) of rapid annihilation to give
way to a recognition that the war, if not yet one of attrition, would likely require a second campaign in 1942.
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Even as many German infantry units were still engaged in fierce fighting to reduce pockets of encircled Soviet troops at Minsk and others lacked the motorized transport to keep pace with the panzer divisions, Hoth's and Guderian's Panzergruppen struck along both sides of the Minsk-Smolensk highway in early July with the intent of converging east of Smolensk to spring yet another giant trap. Presumably, following this success, the way to Moscow would be clear. The Germans largely ignored any difficulties raised by the potential gap between the infantry and the armored formations since they assumed that the Soviets no longer possessed sufficient forces to form a coherent defense. By 5 July, however, it was clear that the enemy was deploying new armies, and, by 7 July, vigorous Soviet counterattacks had stalled both armored groups. While Hitler's 8 July order seemed to give precedence to the drive toward Moscow, it also subtly undermined the momentum of the central thrust since, after reaching the areas assigned them northeast and southeast of Smolensk, the two armored groups were to be kept available for deployment either to the north or to the south. Although this prevented Hoth and Guderian from closing the trap, for the moment Halder seemed unconcerned as he assumed that Soviet forces were finished. On 9 July, in fact, he noted the favorable situation at Kiev and the possibility of seizing the city in a surprise thrust, while three days later he commented, remarkably in view of his later bitter argument with Hitler, “I am by no means advocating an eastward race of the two armored groups. It is quite clear to me that Hoth might have to swing northward with a considerable body of his group . . . and that Guderian might have to swing southward to encircle the new enemy appearing on his southern wing.”
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What Halder thought would largely be a mopping-up operation, however, was turning into something else entirely as the Soviets scrambled furiously to bring new forces into play. Clinging to the doctrine of an active defense in order to blunt the enemy attack and regain the initiative, the Stavka in early July ordered a series of counterattacks near Smolensk in order to slow German momentum, gain time to mobilize Soviet resources and build defenses, and ensnare the enemy in a series of costly tactical engagements. In the race to assemble forces, the Soviets enjoyed the advantage. While the Germans neared the limits of their logistic abilities, Smolensk, as a key rail and transportation hub, enabled the Soviet High Command to feed fresh forces into the area in a timely manner. Thus, although Hoth had, despite stiff resistance, seized Vitebsk on 9 July and Guderian the next day threw units across the Dnieper both
north and south of Mogilev, the supply system to Army Group Center was already beginning to display an advanced case of sclerosis. In addition, a serious gap had opened between the German infantry and the mechanized divisions, while large Soviet forces in the Pripet Marshes posed an increasing danger both for the stretched German supply lines and for the flanks of Army Groups Center and South. These exposed flanks were a persistent cause of concern, especially to Hitler, influencing both decisionmaking and subsequent actions.
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By 10 July, the Soviet leadership had also begun to recover from the initial paralyzing shock of the German invasion and had regained control over its battlefield units. The Stavka, in fact, now planned an ambitious series of coordinated counterattacks that would not only halt the German advance but also allow them to encircle exposed enemy forces. Furious attacks on Hoth, to the north, on 6 July had succeeded in blunting his assault and forcing him to divert units in a northeasterly direction. On 13 July, it was the turn of Guderian's forces to absorb the Soviet blow as they were the target of a fierce attack from the area around Gomel. Forays from the enemy bridgeheads at Orsha and Mogilev accompanied this assault, and, although the Germans successfully fought off the Soviets, Guderian was forced to change the direction of advance of some of his units. As ferocious Soviet attacks continued over the next few days, the Germans began to realize that, because of the diversion of panzer units to the north and south, they lacked the combat power to close the pocket east of Smolensk. They also recognized that the Soviets had now consciously begun to use encircled forces as a means to tie down German units, inhibit their freedom of action, and disrupt the pace of the enemy advance.
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With their infantry units trailing far behind, the Germans had little choice but to throw the armored divisions into a furious attempt to close the Smolensk pocket. In ten days of savage fighting between 10 and 20 July, however, the Germans failed to close the hole east of Smolensk or prevent the timely withdrawal of strong enemy forces. The struggle was, marveled one Landser, “madness, total madness. They fought like wild animals—and died as such.” Bock simply noted in his diary, “Hell was let loose.” The fierce Russian attacks of 13–16 July, dubbed the “Timoshenko Offensive” by Guderian, also led the Germans to rethink their assumptions about the second phase of the campaign. Substantial Soviet combat power still confronted Army Group Center, a recognition that sparked a crisis mood in the OKH. After noting the difficulties and slow pace of progress of Army Group South, Halder on 20 July admitted of the central front: “The costly battles involving some groups of our
armored forces, in which the infantry divisions arriving from the west can take a hand only slowly, together with loss of time due to bad roads which restrict movement and the weariness of the troops marching and fighting without a break, have put a damper on all higher HQ. Its most visible expression is the severe depression into which [Brauchitsch] has been plunged.” The next day, Bock grudgingly acknowledged the effect of the Soviet pressure on the Germans, “a quite remarkable success for such a badly battered opponent!” Two days later, as large numbers of Soviet troops fought their way out, he complained, “We have still not succeeded in closing the hole at the east end of the Smolensk pocket.”
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After ten days of fighting, the Germans desperately needed to regroup, reorient, and concentrate their scattered armored formations in order to continue the advance against an enemy that clearly had not been destroyed. The Soviets, however, refused to grant a respite. Instead, on 20 July, Stalin telephoned Marshal Timoshenko to inform him that the time had come for a Soviet counteroffensive that would regain the initiative. The plan, as envisioned by the Stavka, entailed three simultaneous blows from the south directed at Smolensk, with the aim of cutting off both German pincers east of the city and transforming the would-be encirclers into the encircled. Although the Soviets hoped with this attack to orchestrate a major turnabout in the war, because of command and control problems the counteroffensive that began on 21 July unfolded in a piecemeal fashion. Nonetheless, over the next few days, the Soviets did achieve some successes, most notably in delaying the closing of the Smolensk pocket until 27 July. The relentless Soviet counterstrokes—“astonishing for an opponent who is so beaten,” Bock admitted on 26 July; “they must have unbelievable masses of materiel”—also put intense pressure on the seriously overextended German panzer units. Even though these attacks ultimately failed owing to poor coordination, the Russians continued to resist through August in intense fighting that resulted in frightful casualties to both sides. The Battle of Smolensk thus came to a close with neither side having achieved a decisive result. Despite their repeated, fierce assaults, the Soviets failed to destroy the main forces of Army Group Center, which crossed the Dnieper on a broad front and advanced some 100–150 miles to the east. However, having had to repel these vigorous enemy attacks, it had been so weakened that a direct thrust on Moscow was out of the question until the precarious supply situation had been remedied. As one Landser noted perceptively, “The faces of the youngsters exude the same image as First World War veterans. . . . Despite the pleasure at sudden Russian withdrawals, one notes this change in the faces of the soldiers.”
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