Ostkrieg (9 page)

The key question to be answered regarding Hitler's decision for war with the Soviet Union is not so much why he chose to attack the Soviet Union—Lebensraum in the east, after all, formed the linchpin of his ideology—as why he chose to attack when he did. Why risk a two-front war at a time when the pact with the Soviet Union had essentially made Germany blockade proof? Why not dispose of Great Britain first, leaving his rear secured for any future action against Russia? And why the seeming urgency in the last week of July, after the failure of his peace overture, to come to a decision? Certainly, his underlying motivation, as it had been since the mid-1920s, was ideological. His entire program depended on securing living space in the east and dealing a death blow to the Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy allegedly threatening Germany's existence. A successful attack on the Soviet Union would not only destroy the power of the Jews but also procure for Germany the resources necessary ultimately to challenge the United States for world supremacy. Additionally, a Nazi-dominated Europe would allow Hitler the utopian opportunity to create a racially purified empire and solve the Jewish question for all time.

Originally, Hitler had expected to accomplish this task with Britain as an ally, but, even though British obstinacy forced him to make a detour through Western Europe, he retained a consistent focus on the
east. As numerous conversations with Goebbels illustrated, Soviet actions in Poland and in the Winter War against Finland confirmed his racist hatreds, contempt, and determination to prevent the spread of the “Jewish virus” into Western Europe. When in a January 1940 letter Mussolini chastised him for losing sight of his anti-Bolshevik mission, Hitler replied that “only a bitter compulsion” had caused him to cooperate “with this country.” The pact with Russia, Hitler reminded the
duce
, was merely a tactical and economic necessity until he had safeguarded his rear in the west. For the rest, “Germany and Russia were two [alien] worlds.” Indeed, since late October 1939, Hitler had made no secret of his intention to turn German forces eastward. Above all, he was preoccupied with his two great tasks: achieving space for the German nation and the final confrontation with Bolshevism. Within days of the armistice with France, Hitler told his Wehrmacht adjutant, Colonel Schmundt, and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop that he was playing “with the idea of leading a war against Russia.”
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The ten days from the failure of his peace offer to the end of July 1940 appear to have been the crucial period during which Hitler conceived the idea of an actual attack on the Soviet Union, with a number of nonideological considerations influencing him. Interestingly, it was not Hitler but Halder who apparently first began to think in concrete terms of action against the Soviet Union. At the end of June, the army chief of staff had been briefed by State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker on the political situation and Hitler's increasing focus on the east. Halder was a close disciple of his predecessor, General Ludwig Beck, and shared his mentor's staunch anti-Bolshevism and fear that the Nazi-Soviet Pact had opened the way for increased Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Soviet troop movements and pressure on the Baltic states and Rumania evidently caused alarm in army leaders, even as Hitler momentarily regarded them as nothing more than irritations. The ink was barely dry on the armistice with France when, on 30 June, without direct instructions from Hitler, Halder ordered his staff to study the possibility of a campaign against Russia. Increasingly, too, he saw a connection between British obstinacy and the problem of Russia, with the latter being the key to the attitude of the former.
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In view of the Red Army's assertiveness in Eastern Europe, Halder saw the need for “striking power in the east” and, thus, ordered German units transferred to new staging areas in Poland. On 3 July, he requested an examination of the “requirements of a military intervention which will compel Russia to recognize Germany's dominant position in Europe.” At this point, he envisaged a limited preventive strike
that would reduce the Soviet Union to a second-rate power and secure for Germany much of the same territory conquered in World War I: the Baltic states, Ukraine, and White Russia. Halder's actions sprang not only from his own anti-Bolshevism and fear that Stalin meant to exploit German preoccupation in the west but also from his assessment that London's attitude rested on hopes in Russia. British obstinacy raised the distinct possibility of a protracted war of attrition and the alarming threat of a repetition of the enemy coalition of 1917. A blow against the Soviet Union would presumably end London's hopes of continuing the war and alleviate German concerns.
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Hitler evidently had not yet come to such definitive conclusions. In June, he still expected to reap the fruits of his great military victory over France, including a peace that would leave Germany dominant on the Continent. His anticipation of a global settlement with the British can be seen in his decision in mid-June to disband thirty-nine divisions and reduce the army to its peacetime strength, which would release some 500,000 men for the armaments industry. He also accorded both the Luftwaffe and the navy priority in armaments production, which hardly indicated any intention to launch an immediate war against Russia. Once again, it was Halder who seemed to have his eyes turned to the east. Given the reduced role for the army in the west, on 25 June Halder ordered his staff to study the restructuring of the army with the goal of creating highly mobile “special defense groups” to counter any possible Soviet moves in the Balkans or threats to the important Rumanian oil fields. As thoughts turned to a preventive strike, these mobile forces became the spearheads for a German offensive operation. Ironically, on the same day Halder ordered his study, Hitler had remarked optimistically, “The war in the west has ended . . . and I shall come, in the shortest possible time, to an understanding with England. There still remains the conflict with the east. That, however, is a task which throws up worldwide problems. . . . One might perhaps tackle it in ten years' time. . . . Now we have our hands full digesting and consolidating what we have obtained in Europe.”
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At the end of June, then, Hitler seems not yet to have turned his eyes firmly toward the east.

What changed the Führer's mind? Clearly, the failure of the peace offer played a role, as did growing concerns about Russian and American actions. On 21 July, apparently clinging to the illusory hope that a peace party in Britain would even now alter Churchill's course, Hitler still wavered on what to do, according to notes in Halder's diary: “No clear picture on what is happening in Britain. Preparations for a decision by arms must be completed as quickly as possible. The Führer will
not let the military-political initiative go out of his hand. As soon as situation becomes clear, political and diplomatic procedures will take its place.” Hitler, however, understood that the situation was not likely to clear anytime soon. A cross-Channel attack seemed “very hazardous to the Führer. On that account invasion is to be undertaken only if no other way is left to bring terms with Britain.” Why, however, did England hold out? To Hitler, the answer seemed obvious: “Hope for a change in America. . . . Puts hope in Russia. . . . Create trouble in the Balkans through Russia, to cut us off from our fuel source.” Nor did he doubt that the Soviet dictator hoped for a prolonged war in the west: “Stalin is flirting with Britain to keep her in the war and tie us down, with a view to gain time and take what he wants. . . . He has an interest in not letting Germany get too strong.”
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But what could be done, especially since Hitler had declared the prerequisites for Operation Sea Lion, the invasion of Great Britain, to be absolute command of the air and sea, both of which had to be achieved by the beginning of September? Since this appeared doubtful at best, how was Britain to be subdued? Frankly, Hitler had no good answer. He pondered forming “a solid political front, Spain, Italy, Russia,” against it, then seemed to put his hopes once again on the Luftwaffe and the navy: “air assaults and submarine warfare . . . smash enemy fighter strength . . . combined with intensified submarine warfare.” He also speculated on promoting opposition to Churchill by encouraging an English peace party thought to be forming around David Lloyd George and the Duke of Windsor. Only lastly was mention made of the possibility of “tackling the Russian problem” in the autumn, as Brauchitsch outlined for Hitler the hastily conceived army plan:

Object: To crush Russian army or at least take as much Russian territory as is necessary to bar enemy air raids on Berlin and Silesian industries. . . .

Political aims: Ukrainian state; federation of Baltic states; White Russia. . . .

Strength required: Eighty to one hundred divisions. Russia has fifty to seventy-five good divisions. If we attack Russia this fall, pressure of air war on Britain will be relieved. United States could supply both Britain and Russia.

Operations: What operational objective could be attained . . . ?

Protect Berlin and Silesian industrial area. Protection of Rumanian oil fields.

Clearly, the main theme at this conference was how to proceed against Great Britain, with discussion only belatedly turning to military action against Russia. Significantly, however, the earlier notion of a spoiling action seemed to have expanded; even if what was presented to Hitler was not the blueprint for a war of extermination, it was hardly a “limited war,” given territorial aims reminiscent of those obtained by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that would both secure vital raw materials for the Reich and force Russia to acknowledge German hegemony.
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At this 21 July conference, then, the alternatives available at the moment—the invasion of Britain or an attack on the Soviet Union—were both raised and discussed. Hitler, however, doubted that either operation could succeed. He pointed out the great risk of failure of a cross-Channel assault, noting that it was “not just a river crossing, but the crossing of a sea dominated by the enemy,” and responded to the proposal of an autumn attack on Russia with skeptical questions. Shortly after the conference, in fact, Jodl and Keitel had to admit that time, space, and weather factors rendered an autumn attack “totally impracticable.” Ironically, Halder, too, had succumbed to doubts. The latest estimates of Soviet strength proved far higher than expected, while Italian difficulties in North Africa signaled a possible drain on German resources. As a result, Halder now put greater emphasis on knocking Britain out of the war before plunging ahead in the east. Indeed, on 30 July, he and Brauchitsch agreed that it would be better to remain “on terms of friendship with Russia” and concentrate instead on attacking British positions in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.
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In reality, Hitler faced an impasse, unable to end the war against England, and fretting as the military-political initiative slipped away. Moreover, considerations of possible Russian and American actions, and the threat they posed to Germany, increasingly preoccupied the Führer: Great Britain had to be gotten out of the war in order to prevent the United States and Russia from entering. The intensifying American support for England, and its surging military potential, introduced a crucial time factor into Hitler's calculations: if he was to realize his goal of Lebensraum in the east, he needed to do so quickly. In mid-May, even as German panzers raced to the sea, President Roosevelt had put before Congress a proposal, swiftly approved, for an enormous expansion of American military power; the result would be that by 1941 the United States, while still neutral, produced virtually as much war materiel
as either Great Britain or Germany. Nor were the Germans unaware against whom this military might was ultimately to be directed. From the summer of 1940, Goebbels stepped up anti-American propaganda, with a sharp focus on the alleged Jewish dominance in Washington and the determination of the Jewish conspiracy to exterminate the German nation. Significantly, on the same day that Hitler delivered his peace offer, Roosevelt was nominated for a third term at the Democratic Party's convention in Chicago. This was “a blow to Hitler,” William Shirer noted, “which the Wilhelmstrasse scarcely hid. . . . Hitler fears Roosevelt. He is just beginning to comprehend that Roosevelt's support of Great Britain is one of the prime reasons why the British decline to accept his kind of peace. . . . [To the Germans] Roosevelt is the father of English illusions about the war.”
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To Hitler, however, it was no illusion; Britain would go on as long as Roosevelt provided it with massive material aid. Measures such as the destroyers-for-bases deal in September 1940, which seemed to confirm the creation of an Anglo-American coalition, and Lend-Lease in March 1941, which the German leadership regarded as a virtual declaration of war, simply confirmed Hitler in his determination to solve his strategic problem before American power irretrievably tipped the scales against Germany.
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Hitler now faced a decision. The United States would not be ready for active military intervention until 1942; Germany thus had a brief window of opportunity that had to be seized if it was to secure the resources necessary for the looming confrontation with America. In 1940, Germany stood at the height of its military strength vis-à-vis its enemies and for the near term possessed virtual freedom from the reality of a two-front war, so, if Hitler meant to realize his goal of Lebensraum in the east, the time for action was at hand.

Economic pressures also contributed to Hitler's sense of urgency, in addition to reinforcing his notions of the absolute necessity of securing living space in Eastern Europe. The situation in the summer of 1940, in fact, resembled that of 1914–1918, when Germany was defeated because of deficiencies in raw materials and foodstuffs. Starvation as yet was not a problem, but, by the fall of 1940, grain stockpiles would be exhausted. Although Germany had derived short-term economic advantages from the alliance with the Soviet Union, the occupation of Western Europe and the threat of a drawn-out war meant that Russia's willingness to supply food and raw materials was crucial. Increasingly, too, the Germans expected that Moscow would exact a high price for such deliveries, certainly highly valued industrial and military goods, perhaps even hegemony in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. For his part, Stalin, in line
with his notion that a protracted war of attrition between the capitalist powers would benefit the Soviet Union, had always intended to derive the greater advantage from the economic relationship with Germany, both to promote Soviet expansive aims and to force the Germans to provide vital goods and technology. The Germans got a first glimpse of Stalin's willingness to use his new leverage six weeks before the start of the offensive in the west, when the Soviet Union temporarily suspended vital oil and grain deliveries. Although the situation had been quickly resolved, Germany now found itself in a far greater measure of economic dependence on the Soviet Union than anticipated, a dependence that was likely to increase the longer the war continued.
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