The security situation in Iraq was gravely deteriorating when Maliki took over. Sectarian violence was on the rise. According to UN reports at the time, an average of one hundred civilians were killed a day in Sunni-Shia confrontations that started to escalate after an attack at an important Shia religious site, Al-Askari Mosque in the city of Samara, in February 2006. People began to speak about the possibility of a countrywide civil war.
In an attempt to restore security, Maliki announced a national reconciliation plan in June. The plan included steps to rein in militias and to open dialogue with rebels. But violence continued, raising concerns that the plan was not achieving its objectives. The Iraq Study Group, an American bipartisan panel established by Congress in March 2002 to assess the situation in Iraq, said in a report in December that the situation in Iraq was “grave and deteriorating.”
In the beginning, I got a lot of positive reports about Maliki from the Shia and Sunni tribal sheikhs, in part because he took on the Iranian-supported militias. But over time, the reports became more mixed, with some in Iraq and the region arguing that he started to become more sectarian, supporting Shia over Sunni communities and refusing to spend government money in Sunni provinces. He took over at a terrible time, when Iraq was racked by sectarian strife and multifaceted violence. It is to Maliki’s credit that the country started to stabilize during his premiership.
As things slowly began to improve in Iraq, with levels of violence subsiding, many Iraqis began to ask why Arabs were not coming to talk to them and why no Arab leaders were visiting Baghdad. And the truth is, it was not all that easy to do. Though some other Arab leaders did want to reach out to Iraq, they did not want to appear in front of their people to be in cahoots with the Americans. Even now, when Iraqis are running the country, the government still bears the stigma of being seen as American-led. People use this to attack Arab leaders who are perceived to be too close to Iraq.
In December 2006, Saddam Hussein was executed. A widely circulated amateur video of the execution showed men crowding around the gallows chanting, “Muqtada! Muqtada! Muqtada!” as the noose was placed around Saddam’s neck. They were referring to Muqtada al-Sadr, the firebrand Shia cleric who leads the powerful Al Mahdi Army and who is believed to be an ally of Iran and Hezbollah. Arabs have, in the main, a common language and culture, so one image on satellite television can impact the whole region. In a flash, the mood in the Arab world changed. Saddam’s execution was seen not just as an act inspired by the West against an Arab dictator. Many Sunnis around the region saw it as an act of revenge by Iran and Shia groups allied with it. The implications of this perspective were serious. Following Saddam’s death, violence in Iraq took a new course, degenerating into Sunni-Shia tit-for-tat assassinations. Militias roamed the streets. It was widely felt that a dangerous divide between Shia and Sunni was threatening to spread across the region. The legitimacy of Hezbollah leader Nasrallah and others like him linked to Iran was diminished as a result. Many now saw them as proxies, working for Iran against the interests of the Arabs. The mask had slipped.
I tried to explain to the Bush administration, and in particular to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, that the mood of the region had changed and the moderates were back on top. Moderate Arab leaders could now band together and be more vocal—from the end of the Lebanon war in the summer until Saddam’s execution, all of us had just been keeping our mouths shut and our heads down.
I said, now that we have regained momentum, empower us to push the peace process forward. But I do not think the message got through. The Bush administration’s new priority was democracy promotion, and it had its hands full trying to stem the wave of violence in Iraq.
The Iranians lost some ground when Maliki took on the Iranian-backed militias in a series of confrontations and arrest campaigns, which eventually forced Muqtada al-Sadr to leave the country in February 2007. The security situation started to improve after that due to a combination of an increase in U.S. troops in Iraq and the efforts of the Awakening Councils, launched by Sunni tribes who took up the fight against Al Qaeda in their areas. Over time, however, Iranian-backed groups rebuilt their strength. I think Iraq’s Arab neighbors bear some responsibility for this. The best way to guard against further Iranian interference in Iraq is for Arab countries to step in and support Iraq’s new government as it gets onto its feet. If not, a vacuum will result and the Iranians will come back and restore the influence they briefly lost. Iran is offering sizable amounts of money to different sectarian groups inside Iraq, and is inviting children, both Sunni and Shia, in need of medical attention or a better education to Iran. They have opened up all of their borders and are trying to put Iraq under their sphere of influence. The turbulent security situation inside Iraq made it difficult for Arab countries to set up diplomatic missions in Baghdad and strengthen their relations with Iraq. But the fact is that Arab engagement with Iraq is essential for consolidating it against Iranian government expansionism and ambitions for hegemony.
In 2008, I decided that it was important to show that Iraq was moving in the right direction and that the political situation was stabilizing. One practical step I could take was to visit Iraq. A very real problem was security, because neither the Iranians nor Al Qaeda in Iraq wanted me there. I would be the first Arab leader to visit Iraq since the invasion, and my visit would be a symbol that things in Iraq were beginning to return to normal.
News of my trip leaked out, and Al Qaeda in Iraq sent a hit squad to welcome me. We heard that they had smuggled in surface-to-air missiles and were planning to assassinate me. I postponed the trip and took action that showed the terrorists they were playing a dangerous game. Working with the Iraqis, we made sure we would have no more problems from that particular cell. Once the security problems had been resolved, I resumed plans for the visit.
On August 13, 2008, I flew with my brother Ali and a small Jordanian delegation east from Amman in a C-17 military transport aircraft, heading over the Jordanian desert and across the border into Iraq, a journey I had last made with my father. As we neared Baghdad, the crew began to strap on body armor and peered anxiously out of the windows to see if there was any missile signature. They did not offer us any armor, but luckily I was allowed to sit in the cockpit. As we approached the airport, the plane dove sharply to avoid missiles. This was part of the standard operating procedure for landing at Baghdad’s airport. Banking like a jet fighter, the bulky aircraft groaned as it hurtled toward the tarmac. As we landed, I thought back to my previous visits to Baghdad. Now I was returning—and Iraq was ruled by a very different government.
Once on the ground, we transferred to a helicopter and took off, flying low over the streets and buildings of Baghdad. I saw a puff of something white, which I then realized came from the helicopter next to us when it activated its flares and chaff systems designed to prevent missile lock-on. We swerved left, then continued on. Below, the sunlight glinted off what looked like lakes and ponds in the middle of the city. I did not remember these from previous trips and thought perhaps they were a new feature. As we flew closer I saw that they were cesspools festering in the streets. Baghdad once had been a jewel of the Middle East. It produced some of the finest scientists, engineers, and educators in our region. A grand nation of proud and capable people had been reduced to utter devastation. It was depressing to see the damage the city had suffered. All over the streets, every sixty yards were duck-and-dive shelters, bomb shelters that pedestrians could jump into to avoid mortar attacks.
When we arrived at the compound where I had been scheduled to meet Iraqi prime minister Nouri Al Maliki, things were quite confused, as we had not been able to publicize my arrival widely in advance, for security reasons. I was received by Maliki and he and I got along well. In a way, the substance of that meeting was less important than the fact that it took place in Baghdad.
As word of my arrival spread, more and more Iraqis began to arrive at the compound. We tried to meet with a number of other Iraqi officials, but the logistics proved problematic. They had not been told in advance that I was coming to Baghdad. They were therefore given late invitations to come to meet with a senior foreign visitor, but they had trouble reaching the location of this mystery guest because of long delays getting through checkpoints. We waited and waited for one senior parliamentarian, but he did not show up. The head of my security detail was uncomfortable with our party staying at one location too long. Finally he said, “Right, that’s it,” and we headed back to the airport. We were all subdued as we entered the aircraft. Our plane shot straight up, engines screaming, and we were slammed back into our seats. Once we were out of missile range, I glanced back out of the window.
Remembering the Baghdad I had seen twenty years ago, it was a shock to see it such a shattered mess. My brother Ali told me that the visit left him very depressed. “You too?” I said.
Over time, U.S. policy shifted and combat troops began to leave Iraq. A Status of Forces agreement was ratified by the Iraqi parliament in November 2009, providing for U.S. forces to leave Iraq by the end of 2011. This is a good objective, and I would be the first to say that all foreign troops should leave. But you do not want, as a result of too speedy a withdrawal, to create a political vacuum that a few years later somebody would have to come back and fix. If establishing a strong Iraqi government means withdrawing a little more slowly, that may be the best course. When you talk to those Iraqis who are in government, many will admit privately that they do not want a vacuum, so the withdrawal must be well planned to ensure that the security of Iraq does not suffer.
U.S. combat troops completed their withdrawal from Iraq on August 31, 2010, and President Obama announced the end of U.S. combat operations in Iraq. The security situation deteriorated soon after, as the Iraqi security forces moved in to fill the vacuum. About fifty thousand U.S. troops will remain in Iraq until the end of 2011 to train the Iraqi army and help it assume its responsibilities in securing the country. The hope is that Iraq will stabilize by then and the Iraqi army will be fully equipped to maintain security.
Chapter 26
A New Voice from America
I
n March 2007, in a rare honor for a foreign head of state, I was invited to address a joint session of the U.S. Congress. After careful thought, I knew that there was only one topic I could speak about: the urgent need for peace in the Middle East.
I said that throughout the region, the people of the Middle East were searching for a new beginning, and hoping for a future of prosperity and peace. We have seen the danger and destruction of violence, hatred, and injustice, but we have also seen what people can achieve when they are empowered, when they break down walls, when they commit to the future. And we know that peace between the Israelis and Palestinians would offer new possibilities for our region and the entire world. No Palestinian father should be helpless to feed his family and build a future for his sons and daughters. No Israeli mother should feel fear when her child boards a bus. We cannot afford for one more generation to grow up thinking that violence and conflict are the norm.
After my speech, many American friends came and asked me what they could do to help. Others were more skeptical. Some said, “What does this conflict have to do with us? Why should we get involved in a local struggle halfway around the world?”
I would like to say very clearly now what I told them: resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict is in the national interest of the United States, Europe, and the rest of the international community. The Palestinian issue is of paramount importance to more than a billion and a half Muslims across the world; as such, it truly is a global issue. Many men of violence use the Israeli occupation of Arab lands, especially East Jerusalem, as a rallying cry. They portray the West—and America in particular—as a blind supporter of Israel, and therefore hold “Satanic America” and its allies responsible for the injustice of the Israeli occupation. Terrorist organizations exploit the legitimate frustration of Muslims over the failure to end the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories to serve their illegitimate agendas and to generate support for their anti-American rhetoric and actions. It is imperative that we resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in order to deprive these extremists of one of their most potent appeals.
Al Qaeda feeds on the continuation of this conflict. The creation of a Palestinian state would significantly diminish its global appeal and would limit its reach, turning Al Qaeda into a localized threat restricted to certain conflict zones. For more than ten years, the United States, Britain, and their allies have been involved in two wars in the Muslim world. We will witness more violent conflicts that Al Qaeda will exploit to further its reach unless the Palestinians and Israelis find peace. The link may not seem obvious to Americans, but any Muslim will tell you that the injustice suffered by the Palestinian people is a festering sore that radicalizes and mobilizes young men throughout the Muslim world. Al Qaeda won’t disappear the moment a Palestinian state comes into being. But it will have a harder time finding new recruits and winning support for its criminal actions.
One of the most vital functions that the United States can play is to help its friends set aside their emotions to think in strategic terms. All too often in my region we are consumed with the latest injustice or act of violence and lose sight of the larger view. We sometimes need help to raise our eyes to the future, to consider where we want to be in ten, twenty, or thirty years, and to act in such a way as to make that vision a reality.