Pearl Harbor (15 page)

The report also observed that the regular Secret Service force included “only four men in the South Grounds to take care of any situation which might arise after an alarm has been given and until assistance arrives.” These men were “the first and only line of defense outside the White House on the South Grounds.” Between 1937 and 1940, twenty people had climbed the White House fence. None had meant any harm to the president, and all were quickly apprehended. The Secret Service speculated about what could happen if someone who intended to kill the president had jumped the fence and then “sneaked from tree to bush . . . until he was within throwing distance of the White House with a grenade or a bottle of nitro glycerine.” The report had recommended the strategic positioning of four police posts along the fence that surrounded the White House. These outposts would allow the guards to view people as they approached the grounds and to catch them before they could navigate the fence. The report also called for the hiring of 15 additional officers to staff the booths.
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Most of these recommendations were considered too expensive and impractical—until the attack on Pearl Harbor. Almost immediately, Chief Wilson dramatically increased the number of agents assigned to protecting FDR. “My greatest fear,” he reflected later, “was that a Nazi undercover agent or saboteur might be willing to sacrifice his own life if he could assassinate our President. I immediately decided to intensify to a high degree the protection extended to him.” A detail of army soldiers was assigned to guard the outer ring along the perimeter. Sentries with machine guns were placed on the roof of the White House and surrounding buildings. Washington police officers formed the second line of defense inside the fence. The beefed-up Secret Service formed an airtight seal around FDR.
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In a long memorandum written on December 11, 1941, Mike Reilly spelled out the changes initiated in presidential protection after
Pearl Harbor. Prior to December 8, Reilly wrote, there had been between 17 and 22 White House policemen and 4 to 6 agents assigned to the White House. “Since December 8th on each tour of duty, there have been 22 to 28 White House Policemen, 20 Metropolitan Policemen or 20 Uniformed Secret Service Guards; two Metropolitan Detective Sergeants and from 8 to 15 Secret Service Agents.” In addition, a “squad of four soldiers in an Army reconnaissance car equipped with two 50 caliber machine guns” patrolled the avenues around the White House. It was decided that at least 119 “protective personnel” would be on duty at the White House at all times.
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Wilson made sure that no potential assassin could gain entry to the grounds. By Sunday night, temporary sentry gates were set up to channel visitors to the grounds. According to Reilly, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing prepared “a radically changed design” of the White House identification card. Everyone who entered the White House was now forced to show identification. Even Cordell Hull, who regularly shuttled back and forth between the White House and the State Department, was now required to show his credentials. For the first time, reporters were photographed, fingerprinted, and issued passes, which they were forced to show every time they entered the grounds. Only cars carrying officials with appointments with the president were permitted on the White House grounds.
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The Secret Service also worried about the threat of an air attack. Reilly assigned a detail of firemen between the Treasury Building and the White House who could respond in the event of a fire caused by an incendiary bomb. He insisted on a complete “blackout” of the White House grounds, fearing that the bright lights would make for an easy target for enemy bombers. He provided all agents with flashlights equipped with blue bulbs. At the same time, he sent Henrietta Nesbitt, head of housekeeping, to purchase black cloth to block light from the windows. The president's residence on the second floor was equipped first, followed by the lower floors and then the offices. When the first set of blackout curtains was not thick enough, Nesbitt purchased a second layer. Her staff covered
every window, including those in the basement. Skylights and bathroom windows were painted black. The staff also dimmed the lights around the White House to make it a less inviting target and placed a ban on picture taking that evening. “We're not going to have the White House lit up tonight. Absolutely no pictures of the cabinet,” said Early.
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Guards issued everyone in the White House a gas mask, including Roosevelt. “Gas masks were provided and fitted for the Boss,” recalled Tully, “and for every other individual in the White House.” According to Wilson, the president's mask “was tied to his wheel chair so that it would be ready for immediate use at all times.” The president refused to test his mask. “He felt it would look silly,” recalled Merriman Smith. According to Smith, press secretary Early did not want the public to know about the gas masks, perhaps fearing that it would raise fears of a possible Japanese attack using poison gas.
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The Secret Service also worried about homemade bombs. Prior to the attacks, the guards had sent all packages received at the White House to the mail room, where they were examined for bombs. In its 1940 report, the Secret Service had pointed out that the president's office, “while on the floor above, is on the same side of the building, and not more than 35 feet east of the mail room.” They had recommended using an outside facility to examine the mail.
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The Secret Service got its wish after December 7. The White House established a mail and package room a few blocks away, where all packages had to be cleared before being sent to the executive mansion. Every package sent to the president was first tested for a timing device by an instrument called a detector, which amplified the sound of a clock. If no obvious problems were discovered, the package would be X-rayed. If the guards saw anything suspicious, they would soak the package in oil, which, in Reilly's words, “gums up the machinery.” The agents would then place the oil-soaked package in a bomb carrier, where it would be detonated at a safe location outside the city.

On one occasion, a few weeks after December 7, the X-ray revealed a solid black mass surrounded by wires. In the middle was an object
that looked like a stick of dynamite. It had come from England in a diplomatic pouch, but no one in the British Embassy had any knowledge of it. The Secret Service decided the safest step would be to carry the package out of the city, dig a hole, and blow it up. After the destruction, they peered in to the hole and were surprised to discover that the potential bomb was a stack of a dozen records sent to FDR by Winston Churchill.
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Also in the 1940 report, the Secret Service had suggested that old furniture and other unnecessary articles, along with combustible materials such as paint and carpets, be removed from the White House to prevent fires. The agents pointed out that the White House's internal structure was composed largely of wood, making it a potential firetrap. Given FDR's affection for his comfortable furniture, it is no surprise that the recommendation was never implemented. After Pearl Harbor, the Secret Service instead had to settle for placing a bucket of sand and a shovel in every room to help put out fires.
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I
t wasn't just the phalanx of additional guards that transformed the White House the evening after the Pearl Harbor attacks. The interior was transformed dramatically as well, as an army of engineers, electricians, and technicians descended on the White House. Engineers installed an emergency backup power plant to supply current in the event of a power failure. Interestingly, FDR's bedroom and the Oval Study, and not the Oval Office, were the only rooms hooked into the emergency system. Apparently, the decision was made to protect the rooms where FDR spent most of his time.

The communications system was also upgraded: Technicians installed a more elaborate phone system that would connect the White House switchboard with the U.S. Park Police and the army reserve stationed in the Treasury Building. All of the major offices in the White House were now tied into the switchboard, and new call boxes were installed at key points around the White House grounds. The army signal
corps loaned the Secret Service two-way radio units. “These units,” Reilly noted, “will provide two-way communication between all sentry posts and from each sentry post to a central station either at the White House or at any place the President may be.”

In addition, the outside of the White House was fortified. That night, construction teams installed temporary barriers at each of the entrances to the White House to prevent a car or truck from crashing the gates. They would soon be replaced with permanent barriers, designed, in Reilly's words, to be able to stop a “7-ton truck traveling at 40 miles per hour for a distance of three city blocks.” He noted that agents installed a device “to guard against the presence of radium which may be used in an attempt to injure the President.”
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By Sunday evening, Washington had been transformed into an armed fortress. Machine-gun-carrying guards surrounded the White House and Munitions Building. The entire city's police force was also called to duty. All leaves and vacations were canceled. The police were issued specific orders to “pay special attention to all bridges, power stations, pumping stations and public utilities, to prevent acts of sabotage or interference with normal operations, to be especially alert for any suspicious persons loitering in or about such places.” Hundreds of armed guards stood watch around bridges, power stations, and other vulnerable areas. Thirty-eight police officers were assigned to guard the city's water supply.
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T
he added security failed to satisfy Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, whose agency oversaw the Secret Service.

Morgenthau, a tall, ungainly man who spoke with a high-pitched voice, was deeply suspicious and nervous on the best of days. Two reporters described him as “a born worrier and inclined to be suspicious.” His dour demeanor and slow speech earned him the nickname “Henry the Morgue.”

The attack on Pearl Harbor seemed to put Morgenthau over the edge. He could not understand how the Japanese could have pulled
off such a surprise attack. The navy “is supposed to be on the alert,” he complained to aides that evening, “and how this thing could have happened—all the explanations I have heard just don't make sense, and Stimson says they don't make sense to him either.”
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Morgenthau worried about every possibility in the hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor. On the afternoon of December 7, when the Treasury secretary met with the Secret Service to discuss the new protective measures for the president, Mike Reilly recalled Morgenthau peering out of the White House windows, looking for Japanese airplanes. Since he lived in downtown Washington, Morgenthau worried about his family's safety in the event of a Japanese attack. On Sunday afternoon, he called a local drapery shop and insisted that his house be equipped with blackout curtains within twenty-four hours.
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On Sunday evening at 6:35 p.m., Morgenthau met in his office with Chief Wilson and Assistant Secretary Herbert E. Gaston to discuss the additional steps that had been taken to protect the president. As usual, Morgenthau had a secretary taking notes. Wilson assured his boss that the White House guard had been doubled and additional guards had been added to the protection force. But Morgenthau was not satisfied. “Do you think,” he asked, “we ought to have soldiers around the White House?” Wilson delicately dismissed the idea. “Well, personally we have got 80 first class men over there and we have 20 high class agents who are up on their toes, and I think they can handle the situation in pretty good shape.” Morgenthau was not convinced and asked what security procedures the Wilson administration had used during the First World War. When told that army soldiers had patrolled the White House, Morgenthau quickly supported the idea. “That's what I would like,” he declared. The Japanese had already taken the government by surprise, he noted. “How do you know what trick they might pull from within?” Morgenthau made clear that he wanted one hundred soldiers carrying machine guns and patrolling the White House at all times.

In order to expand protection, Morgenthau needed FDR's permission. It would be a tough sell, especially since the president had already
made clear earlier that afternoon that he did not want armed guards patrolling the White House. At 6:40 p.m., Roosevelt came on the line, and Morgenthau pressed the issue of soldiers. Once again, Roosevelt demurred. Although he understood the need for added security, he still worried about turning the White House into an armed fortress. “As long as you have one about every hundred feet around the fence, it's all right,” he instructed Morgenthau. FDR also stated that he wanted to “block off both Executive Avenues” and recommended placing “barricades between the White House and the treasury and also on the one [block] between the White House and State Department.”
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Perhaps upset that the president did not grant his request for army patrols, Morgenthau decided to conduct his own inspection of White House security that evening. He was shocked by what he found. “I just made an inspection . . . and in the whole rear of the White House only three men,” he complained to the Secret Service. And the agents hardly seemed trained to handle an emergency. “I asked one man to take out his gun. He started tugging away . . . and after about two minutes got the gun out.” The inspection provided Morgenthau with little assurance that the Secret Service was capable of protecting the president. “Anybody could take a five ton truck with 20 men and they could take the White House without any trouble.”
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