Relentless Strike : The Secret History of Joint Special Operations Command (9781466876224) (17 page)

Although the planning cell's Delta and Team 6 representatives had thus far taken the lead in proposing operational concepts, Dailey's putdown of DiTomasso had a predictable effect. “Tom essentially after that, I don't want to say shut down, but [his attitude was], ‘Okay, why don't you just tell me what you want and that's what we'll do,'” said a planning cell member. “And kind of from that point forward, Dailey did end up driving that train on the target sets.”

Several factors drove Dailey's preference for big, highly synchronized operations. One was that the command had been moving in that direction for many years. With Dailey, “that's what you're going to get, because that's the way JSOC had been through the '90s,” said the planning cell member. “And to be fair to JSOC, if you train to these big, complex ones, it makes the smaller ones easier to do.”

Another was Dailey's aviation background. Military aviation culture is “to mitigate risk on every level, because any aircraft accident is a significant emotional event,” said a TF Brown officer. “Most of us that are aviators are pretty process-oriented, because that's the way you get to success: through some very significant level of detailed planning, not double-checked but triple-checked,” said another TF Brown officer who knew Dailey well. “That's kind of beat into you from the time you start in the 160th.”

Dailey's perceived risk aversion would only have been exacerbated by a third factor: the JSOC intelligence analysts' wildly exaggerated estimates of the enemy threat in Afghanistan. Again and again in the weeks after 9/11, intelligence briefings focused on implausible worst-case scenarios, rather than what some of the best troops in the world might reasonably expect to face from a poorly equipped rabble.
28

But the fourth factor behind Dailey's insistence on making JSOC's first missions such elaborate affairs was perhaps the most important: pressure from Franks, Rumsfeld, and Bush for a mission that would send a message not only to the Taliban and Al Qaeda but also to the American public that the United States could reach out and put troops anywhere it wanted in Afghanistan. This appealed to Dailey, who was particularly fond of influence, deception, and psychological operations. Together such missions fell under the rubric of information operations, or IO.
29

Planning continued even after a September 22 brief by the Ranger Regiment's intelligence officer that Goat might be empty and the plant might close. But as the plan became ever more complex and other targets presented themselves, the date for the raid kept slipping to the right. It was now slated for October 12. (Another factor behind the frequent postponements was a desire to conduct the air assault on as dark a night as possible. By shifting the date closer to mid-October, the planners were ensuring JSOC's first mission in Afghanistan would take place under a cloak of darkness.)

The Ranger intelligence briefing was part of another rock drill Dailey attended that gave an indication of the difference in scale between DiTomasso's original proposal and the sort of plan the JSOC commander preferred. The latest version of the plan to assault a target most observers thought was empty would require a minimum of about 160 ground troops and twenty-four aircraft.
30

But the clock was ticking for the fertilizer factory mission. During a video-teleconference the previous evening, Dailey told the planners to think about possible targets in southern Afghanistan. Three days later, the planners learned Central Command was considering five targets for JSOC. While the factory remained first on the list, three of the others were in southern Afghanistan. JSOC's focus was shifting south. Another September 24 announcement explained why: the command no longer planned to locate its intermediate staging base in Central Asia. The requirement for missions to be completed during the course of a single night remained, but two new staging options meant the assault forces would be coming from the south, not the north.
31

*   *   *

With the United States still negotiating with Afghanistan's Central Asian neighbors for use of their air bases, Pakistan unlikely to allow large numbers of U.S. troops into its restive tribal areas adjacent to Afghanistan, and Rumsfeld impatient to put boots on the ground in Afghanistan, Tommy Franks had been working on other options. “We needed to stage SOF [special operations forces], particularly the elite SMU troopers of the Joint Special Operations Command, close enough to strike al Qaeda in their mountain redoubt in southeast Afghanistan,” he wrote in his autobiography. “And we needed to stage them soon.”
32

The solution came to Franks as he studied a map of the region projected onto a screen in his headquarters' “war room.” He returned to his office and called Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark on a secure line. “Vern, we're going to need an aircraft carrier for some unusual duty,” he told the Navy officer.
33
On September 27 the
Kitty Hawk,
a Yokosuka, Japan–based carrier, was conducting sea trials and exercises in the Philippine Sea when it was alerted for Operation River City—its role in JSOC's war in Afghanistan. After dispensing with most of its aircraft in order to clear space for JSOC forces, the carrier sailed for the northern Arabian Sea.
34
Positioning the
Kitty Hawk
there would allow JSOC to get to and from targets in southern Afghanistan within one night by crossing over the deserts of southwestern Pakistan and southern Afghanistan
,
thereby avoiding the risky flights over 10,000-foot mountains that an attack on the Taliban heartland from Central Asia would have necessitated.
35

Operating from a carrier was nothing new for JSOC, which had used the
America
during 1994's operation to remove Haiti's military junta. More recently, about six months before September 11 during a JRX centered in Qatar, JSOC had put forces on a flattop that then sailed up the Persian Gulf before launching a helicopter attack on a target in Kuwait. Flying off carriers was standard operational procedure for TF Brown, which trained for such missions about once a year. JSOC called a carrier used thus an afloat forward staging base.
36

But not even a carrier could accommodate the massive operations center JSOC hauled around the world, nor could a flight deck handle all the fixed and rotary wing aircraft the command was preparing to deploy. For those, Franks had another location in mind, one that was 700 miles from Afghanistan, but which had a special resonance for JSOC: Masirah Island off the coast of Oman in the Arabian Sea.

It was from Masirah that on April 24, 1980, a Delta assault force launched on three Combat Talons en route to the landing site in Iran named Desert One. That mission had ended in fiery disaster. But anguished memories aside, Masirah retained the advantages that had made it an attractive base for Operation Eagle Claw: a runway capable of handling large Air Force transport aircraft, relative proximity to the combat zone, and total seclusion.

Following September 11, Central Command, which, like U.S. Special Operations Command, was located at MacDill, had worked to gain access to Masirah for the war in Afghanistan.
37
By September 20, Oman's ruler, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id, had given permission to stage special operations troops and aircraft there, including AC-130 gunships.
38

Word that JSOC might have both Masirah and a carrier available from which to launch attacks had reached the planners September 18, but with no confirmation they had continued to assume any missions would originate in Central Asia.
39
News that the attacks would be launched from the south spelled the beginning of the end for the plan to assault Objective Goat. Years later, nobody could remember exactly when JSOC stopped planning to hit the factory; they were just glad that it did. “As people asked questions, it just didn't pass scrutiny,” said Hall. “Of course, it turned out to be a fertilizer factory.”

*   *   *

During this period a potential mission arose that in retrospect seems bizarre but which JSOC took very seriously. U.S. intelligence sources reported that bin Laden had left Afghanistan and made his way to Southern Africa. The intelligence was specific enough that Delta's A Squadron spent several days planning an operation based upon it, before being told to stand down when the intelligence didn't pan out.
40
“That sidetracked us briefly,” said a Delta source.

*   *   *

A couple of days after returning from Budapest, Jim Reese, the AFO operations officer, left JSOC headquarters for a run. He returned to find Dailey and Holland, who was visiting from MacDill, waiting for him. Dailey told him to go home, pack some civilian suits, and fly up to Washington. There he was to visit the Pentagon to receive guidance before driving to Langley, Virginia, and reporting to Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet. Reese was to be JSOC's point man at the CIA.
41

Reese was perfect for the job. “He brings people together,” said a Delta operator who'd worked with him for years. Delta officers nicknamed him
“
Serpico” due to his resemblance to the Al Pacino character in the movie of the same name, while NCOs called him “Hollywood,” often shortened to “The 'Wood,” on account of his good looks and gregariousness. But he was also operationally savvy and possessed infectious self-confidence.
42

Reese flew up early the week of Monday, September 17, and went straight to the Pentagon, where he met with Rumsfeld's deputy, Paul Wolfowitz. “Are you the Delta guy?” Wolfowitz asked. “Yes sir,” Reese replied. “Go report to George Tenet,” Wolfowitz said. “Bridge the gap between DoD and the CIA.”

A Defense Department driver took Reese to CIA headquarters, where he arrived late in the afternoon still carrying his suitcases. Security guards then took him straight to a crowded conference room on the seventh floor, where Tenet's daily 5
P.M.
meeting with his senior staff was just starting. A man in his mid-sixties with steel-colored hair and an engaging smile sitting near the head of the table noticed Reese standing in the doorway looking lost. “Are you the Delta guy?” he said. “Yes sir, I am,” Reese replied. “Come up here, sit next to George,” said the man, pointing to a chair next to Tenet. The person welcoming Reese to the CIA was A. B. “Buzzy” Krongard, the Agency's number three, whose son was a SEAL officer.

Reese sat quietly as analysts briefed Tenet. His job was to facilitate the CIA's coordination and cooperation with special operations forces, as well as to help the Agency plan its campaign in Afghanistan. To help him, Reese immediately asked for and received Sam Stanley, his radio operator from the AFO cell, while the Army assigned him a military intelligence officer named Captain Kara Soules. The CIA put his tiny team in the Counterterrorist Center, or CTC, where they worked closely with the center's director, Cofer Black; Hank Crumpton, who Black had picked to run the war in Afghanistan; and Jose Rodriguez, the CTC chief of staff. All welcomed the military trio warmly, making sure they had full access to everything the Agency was doing.
43

The easy cooperation between Reese's team and the CTC personnel at Langley was at variance with the frustration Rumsfeld was expressing in the Pentagon over the military's need to wait for the CIA to blaze a trail with the Northern Alliance before sending in Special Forces teams. The defense secretary “later declared it inexcusable that the Defense Department couldn't use its numerous and costly forces until the CIA shook some hands,” according to Feith.
44
In his autobiography, Rumsfeld is careful to say his relations with Tenet were good,
45
but others said that warmth did not extend to the secretary's views of the CIA at large. Rumsfeld displayed “incredible impatience and disgust with the CIA,” said a senior member of the Joint Staff.

It irked Rumsfeld when Franks told him as late as October 15 that Special Forces teams were waiting for the CIA's okay to enter Afghanistan.
46
But the delays were actually down to the military chain of command. The CIA was more than ready to welcome the participation of JSOC and other special ops forces in the Afghanistan operation. As late as October 4, Gary Schroen, who led the first CIA team into Afghanistan, complained to Crumpton that he had “begged and pleaded with each of the commands—Delta, Special Forces, SEALs, Gray Fox—to send a team to join us,” to no avail.
47
(Gray Fox was the latest code name for the Army of Northern Virginia.)

JSOC's operators were likewise champing at the bit. While still in Budapest, Blaber had called “Phil,” who headed the CIA's Special Activities Division. Would Delta be able to send a couple of operators in with the Agency teams preparing to infil into Afghanistan, Phil asked. “Of course,” replied Blaber. “Count us in.”
48
(Blaber was no stranger to the challenges of planning for missions in Afghanistan. In 1998, as OST commander, he helped plan Delta's bin Laden capture mission.)
49

But at all levels of command above the operators, from Delta through JSOC, SOCOM, and CENTCOM, there was hesitation about whether and how to commit the military's most elite forces. “They were totally against us sending guys in with Schroen and crew [on the grounds it was] too risky,” said a Delta source involved in the discussions. To the operators' intense frustration, neither Central Command nor JSOC were keen to deploy forces into Afghanistan until combat search and rescue, or CSAR (“see-sar”), helicopters could be positioned close enough to come to their aid. “CENTCOM and JSOC were against anything without CSAR,” the Delta source said. “Meanwhile the CIA is sending into Afghanistan guys with an average age in their forties, most of whom with little to no military experience.”