2
(10.5
9
5c)
for he is the great captain and teacher of the whole of that charming tragic company:
The conception of Homer as a “tragedian,” reiterated below at 10.598d, 10.605c, and 10.607a, is novel but it is anticipated by the discussion of the different forms of poetic
mimesis
(that is, simple narration, direct imitation, and the mixture of narration and direct imitation) at 3.392d. Epic poems fall into the “mixed” category because they directly present speeches by figures such as Achilles and Agamemnon, and thus they can be considered kindred to tragedy, which is purely imitative. Socrates’ characterization of Homer as a tragedian may also be intended to draw attention to the general influence of epic poetry on Athenian drama in the classical period.
3
(10.595c)
Can you tell me what imitation is? for I really do not know:
Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge about the nature of “imitation” is noteworthy, given the detailed discussion of poetic mimesis in book 3. Nonetheless, it is consistent with his cautious professions of ignorance about the idea of the good and dialectic in books 6 and 7, and it is perhaps well motivated at this moment, since the theory of the ideas is about to become the basis for his argument against poetry’s ability to convey useful, “truthful” information.
4
(10.596b)
But there are only two ideas or forms of them—one the idea of a bed, the other of a table:
If all phenomenal objects owe their existence in the world of “becoming” to their “participation” in the ideas, which exist in the world of “being,” the positing of “ideas” of “bed” and “table” makes sense, and it plainly suits Socrates’ purposes at this point. It is debatable, however, whether Plato would have considered these ideas worthy of extended investigation, especially when compared with such ideas as those of justice, moderation, courage, and beauty, as well as the idea of the good.
5
( 10.597a)
At any rate, he replied, philosophers would say that he was not speaking the truth:
Literally, “he would not seem [to say true things] to those who occupy themselves with arguments such as these.” Socrates apparently means that people who investigate “being” (that is, philosophers) would not admit that a physical bed made by a craftsman “exists,” since it is only part of the world of “becoming.”
6
(10.597e)
And the tragic poet is an imitator, and, therefore, like all other imitators, he is thrice removed from the king and from the truth?:
As at 9.587c-d, Socrates counts inclusively. “The king” in this sentence is god, the maker of the ideal bed. Compare 6.509d, where the idea of the good is said to be a “ruling power” (literally, “to be king”) over the realm of intelligible objects. Despite this coincidence in language, it is not safe to assume that the idea of the good is identifiable with “god.”
7
(10.598d-e)
And so, when we hear persons saying that the tragedians, and Homer ... know all the arts and all things human, virtue as well as vice... we ought to consider whether here also there may not be a similar illusion:
Such knowledge of “all things human” is, in effect, what Polemarchus claims for Simonides at 1.331d. Compare Adeimantus’ liberal quotations from poetry at 2.363a-366a, and the purported claims of the “eulogists of Homer” at 10.606e.
8
(10.599b)
Then ... we must put a question to Homer:
The point that poets have no true knowledge of their subject matter is made, in somewhat different terms, in
Ion
533e-535a, where Socrates suggests to the rhapsode Ion that divine inspiration, and not expert knowledge
(technê),
is what enables artists like Homer to create poetry.
9
(10.600a)
But, if Homer never did any public service, was he privately a guide or teacher of any?:
In Gorgias 515a-b, Socrates poses an analogous question to the ambitious politician Callicles.
10
(10.600b)
Creophylus, the companion of Homer :
Some sources call Creophylus Homer’s
hetairos
(that is, “friend,” “companion,” also “disciple”), while others claim that he was a son-in-law. The name Creophylus “makes us laugh” because, as it is apparently derived from the words for “meat”
(kreas)
and “race” or “tribe”
(phylon),
it can be interpreted as meaning something like “made from meat” (hence Jowett’s interpolation, “that child of flesh”). The story about Creophylus’ disregard for Homer does not appear in other sources.
11
(10.600c)
can you imagine... that he would not have had many followers, and been honored and loved by them?:
In Gorgias 519c-d, Socrates similarly asserts that, if students mistreat their instructor (that is, a Sophist or rhetorician like Gorgias), the fault lies with the instructor and exposes his failure as an educator.
12
(10.600c)
Protagoras of Abdera and Prodicus of Ceos:
Protagoras, from Abdera in Thrace, was one of the most prominent and successful “sophists” in Athens in the mid-fifth century B.C.E. See note 2 on 5.449d for the educational claim that Plato puts in Protagoras’ mouth in
Protagoras
318e-319a. If the “dramatic date” of
Republic
is meant to be 411 or 410 B.C.E., the reference to Protagoras in the present tense would be anachronistic. Prodicus, from the island Ceos, was another prominent and successful Sophist who was active in Athens during Socrates’ lifetime; in
Protagoras,
he and Protagoras are represented as staying in the home of the wealthy Athenian Callias.
13
(10.601c)
only the horseman who knows how to use them—he knows their right form:
The superior “knowledge” attributed in this passage to the per-Ison who uses a given object is not to be confused with the philosopher’s knowledge
(epistemê)
of the ideas.
14
(10.602b)
Imitation is only a kind of play or sport;
Compare
Phaedrus
274c-278e; also
Laws
3.685a, 4.712b, and 7.817a-d;
Republic
7.536b-c. As these and other passages suggest, Plato would have readily acknowledged that his own dialogues, qua “imitations,” are in the final analysis “play,” albeit an especially constructive type of “play.”
15
( 10.602d)
And the arts of measuring and numbering and weighing come to the rescue of the human understanding ... and the apparent greater or less... give way before calculation and measure and weight?:
Compare 7.522c-526c, especially 7.522e-524d.
16
(10.604e)
And does not... the rebellious principle ... furnish a great variety of materials for imitation? Whereas the wise and calm temperament ... is not easy to imitate or to appreciate when imitated, especially... when a promiscuous crowd is assembled in a theatre.... :
This concession that the sober behavior of upright, self-restrained figures does not make for “good theater” figures into a broad critique of the dynamics of public performance, whether in theatrical competitions or political assemblies or law courts, that takes shape in several Platonic dialogues.
Gorgias
501d-511a, for example, highlights how dramatists and politicians alike, as they compete for public favor, are obliged to “flatter” their audiences and cater to their tastes; compare what Socrates says about sophists in
Republic
6.493a-d. Plato’s dialogues themselves, we might imagine, offer alternatives to the unwholesome yet exciting exhibitions on the tragic stage, and they arguably live up to the standards Socrates establishes in this passage for imitations of “the wise and calm temperament.” Yet they were hardly intended for popular consumption by the “promiscuous crowd” and would thus bear out Socrates’ point that the “imitative poet who aims at being popular” is bound to prefer the easily imitated “passionate and fitful temper.”
17
( 10.605c-d)
the best of us... delight in giving way to sympathy, and are in raptures at the excellence of the poet who stirs our feelings most:
Socrates’ acknowledgment of the powerful appeal of “moving” passages in poetry resonates with his repeated professions of affection for Homer, and also looks ahead to his conclusion that “hymns to the gods and praises of famous men are the only poetry which ought to be admitted into our State” ( 10.607a). This is a far stricter provision for “censorship” than what was argued for, vis-à-vis the education of children in the guardian classes, in books 2 and 3, and reflects the emerging concern in
Republic’s
later books that adults, even when intelligent and well disciplined, can readily become “childish.”
18
(10.607a)
For if you go beyond this and allow the honeyed muse to enter, either in epic or lyric verse, not law and the reason of mankind, which by common consent have ever been deemed best, but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our State :
See note 2 on 3.391a and note 6 on 9.577a; also 6.505c.
19
(10.607b)
let us tell her that there is an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry; of which there are many proofs:
As far back as the archaic period, individuals such as Xenophanes criticized the representations of the gods in Homer. These men were themselves poets, but it is perhaps fair to identify in their works the beginnings of a “quarrel” between poetry and philosophy. On the other hand, it may be wise to take Socrates’ claim about the antiquity of the quarrel with a few grains of salt—since Xenophanes and his kind were not “philosophers” according to the standards developed in books 6 and 7 of
Republic
—and to construe what is said here as an effort to promote and justify the systematic critique of poetry and its cultural impact that Plato undertakes in his dialogues.
20
( 10.608b)
for great is the issue at stake, greater than appears, whether a man is to be good or bad:
Literally, “for great is the contest....” See note 14 on 1.344e.
21
( 10.608c)
And yet no mention has been made of the greatest prizes and rewards which await virtue:
The challenge that Glaucon and Adeimantus set up for Socrates in book 2 (culminating at 2.367a-e) was to demonstrate that justice is intrinsically “profitable” and injustice “unprofitable,” regardless of external circumstances such as rewards or penalties. At this point, which marks the beginning of
Republic’s
final section, Socrates argues that his companions should return to him what was “borrowed in the argument” (10.612c)—that is, the recognition of and rewards given for justice by both human beings and gods, in this life and the next. The consideration of the rewards for justice and penalties for injustice in the hereafter, which are of far longer duration and far greater consequence than what is received while one is alive, motivate the discussion of the soul’s immortality that begins just below.
22
(10.608d)
Are you not aware, I said, that the soul of man is immortal and imperishable?:
In
Phaedo
and
Phaedrus,
Plato has Socrates contend that the soul is immortal, and that the death or destruction of the body does not entail the death or destruction of the soul. Whereas Socrates simply assumes that the soul is immortal in Gorgias 523a-b, he offers explanations, or “proofs,” of its immortality here and also in Phaedo 64a-107d and Phaedrus 245c-246a. The argument made below in 10.608d-611a—that is, that things can be destroyed only by their own particular “evil”
(kakon
in Greek) and that, since the soul is not destroyed by its evil (that is, injustice), it cannot be destroyed at all and is therefore immortal—differs from what is adduced in
Phaedo
and
Phaedrus,
and these differences suggest that Plato did not intend Socrates’ arguments to be construed as offering definitive answers. Rather, the reason-Iing presented here about everything having a particular “evil” seems to hark back to and reinforce the crucial assumptions introduced at 1.352d-354a that each thing, whether living or inanimate, has a single function, and that there is a unique “excellence” that enables this function to be performed well.
23
( 10.608d)
He looked at me in astonishment, and said: No, by heaven: And are you really prepared to maintain this?:
The notion that souls (psychai) somehow survived the body and were taken to the underworld (or, in special instances, to the Islands of the Blessed) was widely accepted, and it was central to both the Orphic and Pythagorean systems of belief. Socrates has already introduced the concept of the soul’s reincarnation at 6.498d. What surprises Glaucon at this moment is, perhaps, Socrates’ readiness to make a rational case for the immortality of the soul.
24
(10.611a-b)
But this we cannot believe.. any more than we can believe the soul... to be full of variety and difference and dissimilarity:
In
Phaedo
72b, Plato has Socrates use similar reasoning to establish that the living “come from the dead”—that is, by the process of reincarnation. The contention immediately below that the soul “cannot be compounded of many elements” also corresponds with
Phaedo
79d-80b, and the image of the soul as marred by communion with the body and other miseries resembles what Socrates asserts in
Phaedo
67a and 82e. For the need to contemplate the soul “in her original purity” (that is, apart from the body), see also Gorgias 524d-525a.
25
(10.612c)
Will you repay me, then, what you borrowed in the argument?:
See book 2, especially 2.361c and 2.367c-e, as well as note 21 on 10.608c. Socrates’ language may deliberately echo the terms in which he, Cephalus, and Polemarchus initially discussed justice at 1.331a-332c—that is, as the repayment of debts and the giving of what is “due.”
26
(10.613c)
And now you must allow me to repeat of the just the blessings which you were attributing to the fortunate unjust:
At 2.360e-362c, Glaucon imagines the lot of the “happy” unjust man, who literally gets away with murder, and that of the wrongly tormented “unhappy” just man; here Socrates reverses their situations.