Riding the Red Horse (41 page)

Mao caved in and said he would send “volunteers” to fight in Korea. For the time being, Chinese troops defended the area near the Manchurian border and avoided major clashes with the Americans. This permitted UN troops to inflict further punishment on the NKPA, as Mao desired, and kept the door open to a settlement without Sino-American conflict. Stalin was overjoyed to hear that at last, he could watch the Chinese and American tigers fight.

UN forces certainly could have stopped and gone over to the defensive at the narrow waist of North Korea (Anju to Hungnam or Songnim to Wonsan). This would put two-thirds of Korea under UN control and leave the northern third as a weak Communist buffer state. To advance successfully against numerically superior Chinese troops in prepared positions in the North Korean mountains in wintertime would, at minimum, require major reinforcements and strikes on mainland China, especially Manchuria. Truman knew that major Chinese forces were in North Korea, with even more massive forces just across the river in Manchuria. Nevertheless, he elected to advance without reinforcing his troops and while prohibiting strikes on mainland China. Most histories of the war describe this as an intelligence failure, assuming the Americans did not believe China would attack even though China repeatedly conveyed this intention in no uncertain terms. A better explanation is that Truman wanted China to attack.

As Truman intended, the Chinese attack and the resulting two-year stalemate enabled the United States to rearm to the level necessary to achieve military superiority over the USSR, to organize a global anti-Communist alliance, and to build strong forward positions in Eurasia. Stalin achieved what he desired. China and the United States fought while he stood aside. He fed the Chinese fuel, supplies, and equipment to ensure that the conflict continued for as long as possible. China, Mongolia, and North Korea remained isolated and dependent on the USSR, providing the Soviets with an optimum security position in the Far East. Mao got a conflict that he did not want, and paid a terrible price in casualties to achieve the consolation prize of increased Chinese influence in North Korea. China remained estranged from the United States for twenty years.

The favorable Soviet situation in Asia did not long outlast Stalin’s death in 1953. At that time, the USSR controlled the pace of China’s economic modernization and gained great political leverage over its rival by supplying technology and raw materials. In the mid-1950s, Mao decided to break free from Soviet domination. His “Great Leap Forward” sought to industrialize China and thus acquire the resources needed to achieve political independence. A pro-Soviet group within the Chinese leadership opposed this policy and for over ten years struggled bitterly with Mao for control of the CCP.
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Vietnam in Soviet Strategy

Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev, hoped to keep China under his thumb. To pressure the Chinese, he isolated them politically within the world Communist movement and cut Soviet assistance. The Great Leap Forward created considerable turmoil, including the deadliest famine in history. Withdrawal of Soviet aid brought the economy to the brink of collapse. Khrushchev exerted further pressure through reactivation of the conflict in Indochina. He hoped that this would provoke America to send troops to Indochina and thus create a threat to China analogous to the UN advance into North Korea in late 1950. Ideally, China and America would again go to war. If they did not, Khrushchev believed that the American threat would still strengthen the pro-Soviet group in the Chinese leadership.

Strategic weapons development provided an additional incentive to embroil the United States in Indochina. In 1957, the Soviets tested their first-generation ICBM, the SS-5. This missile used the same launcher that put Sputnik, the first satellite, into orbit. The United States did not yet have an ICBM, but relied on bombers for nuclear delivery. Missile power thus gave Khrushchev a political advantage. The problem was that the SS-5 was unsuitable for operational use. As it could not be stored in a silo ready for instant launch, it was vulnerable to an American first strike. In late 1958, Khrushchev decided not to deploy the SS-5 in large numbers, but to wait for the second-generation missile that would be ready in 1962. Until then, he would bluff the Americans with boasts of massive SS-5 production. He hoped that U.S. intervention in Indochina would absorb military resources that otherwise could be used to equal and then exceed the Soviets in missile power.

From 1946 to 1954, the French fought to retain their colony in Indochina, where the Communists under Ho Chi Minh sought independence. After Communist forces surrounded and destroyed a French garrison at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, France abandoned the struggle. The Geneva Accords divided the colony into four nations: North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. China preferred a divided Indochina and a divided Korea because small, weak states on her border were more easily dominated than large, united ones. North and South Vietnam had only a short common border, but North Vietnamese troops could easily infiltrate South Vietnam via Laos and Cambodia.

In mid-1959, with Moscow’s approval, the North Vietnamese improved the supply route through Laos and Cambodia later known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Hanoi then increased support to her guerrilla minions. In Laos, the Pathet Lao strengthened their control over the border provinces through which the Ho Chi Minh Trail passed. In South Vietnam, the Viet Cong initiated a terrorist campaign. The American response was restrained. President Eisenhower unsuccessfully tried to neutralize Laos under UN supervision.

In December 1960, Soviet aircraft began an eighteen-month airlift from Hanoi into Laos. These aircraft sent a large number of trucks, tanks, and artillery pieces to Laos to support Pathet Lao operations. This highly public escalation and the apparent imminence of Communist victory increased the pressure for a response from the United States. The Soviets believed, at this time, that the Americans would soon invade Cuba to eliminate Fidel Castro’s regime. Moscow viewed escalation in Laos as a way to divert American attention from the Caribbean. The Soviets were astonished when President Kennedy permitted the defeat of the Cuban exile force at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. Khrushchev suspected Kennedy would return to finish the job with American troops, and thus kept threatening Berlin until October 1961.

Kennedy considered sending American troops into Laos in early 1961. He was deterred by the weakness of his conventional forces, the logistical and operational difficulties of fighting in mountainous, landlocked Laos, and the prospect of confrontation with China. Instead he opted to strengthen the military capabilities of Thailand and South Vietnam. Meanwhile, he pushed for the neutralization of Laos, obtaining formal agreement to this effect in July 1962 from the USSR and North Vietnam, among others. The Soviets reduced their overt presence in Indochina by turning their cargo aircraft over to the North Vietnamese.

The American “successes” in neutralizing Laos and stabilizing South Vietnam in 1961– 1962 were only temporary and superficial. Few appreciated that the Soviets had achieved their objective; they had seemingly disengaged from the region while inducing America to make a commitment to South Vietnam. This set the stage for future Sino-American confrontation. Stability in Laos and South Vietnam depended on the USSR and China not increasing their support for North Vietnam, and Hanoi had to respect the neutrality of Laos. This restraint could and did change. The Soviets reduced their shipments to Hanoi in 1961 and 1962, but this was in keeping with their overall strategy. They knew that if Hanoi did too well, then America would write off South Vietnam as a lost cause. Khrushchev needed the Americans to believe their advisory effort was working so that their commitment to South Vietnam would increase. A temporary lull in the fighting achieved this objective.

By mid-1963, the Americans thought they were winning in Vietnam. The Soviets then stepped up weapons deliveries at levels designed to cause alarm without making the situation seem hopeless. As the Soviets expected, increased Viet Cong aggression caused the Kennedy administration to escalate rather than have its previous optimistic pronouncements invalidated. Kennedy became convinced that South Vietnam’s President, Ngo Dinh Diem, was an obstacle to victory. He thus sanctioned the military coup that overthrew and killed Diem in November 1963. Three weeks later, Kennedy himself was assassinated.

The Chinese were anxious to avoid American intervention in Vietnam. They calculated that a Viet Cong surge in the aftermath of the coup would persuade America to wash its hands of South Vietnam. Chinese weapons, especially recoilless rifles and AK-47s, enabled the Viet Cong to launch a “general offensive” in December 1963 that included strong attacks on provincial capitals. The Soviets, fearing exactly what China wished to achieve—American withdrawal—publicly urged restraint on Hanoi and cut back their military aid.

Kennedy still hoped to preserve the option to withdraw from Vietnam when he was killed. President Johnson did not wish to intensify the conflict in an election year, but when the situation deteriorated, he quickly rejected withdrawal. In January 1964, he approved a program of covert attacks and intelligence-gathering operations along the coast of North Vietnam known as Operation Plan (OPLAN) 34A. In these operations, South Vietnamese commandos attacked enemy coastal installations while American destroyers recorded North Vietnamese electronic transmissions. Such pinprick attacks would obviously accomplish little. Thus, in March 1964 the administration began planning strong American military action against North Vietnam, including air strikes.

In early 1964, the administration publicly and privately threatened to devastate North Vietnam if it did not desist. As the effort to embroil America in Vietnam was clearly succeeding, the Soviets switched from urging restraint on Hanoi to offering the military assistance needed to fight America. They highlighted the American threat to China and the value of Soviet military support. The situation on the ground continued to worsen in the summer. Johnson concluded that an “act of irreversible commitment” was needed to save South Vietnam. It was clear to all observers that the United States would soon make such a commitment. All that was needed was a pretext. In particular, the Americans needed an enemy attack so that the administration could brand Hanoi the aggressor and muster public support for war.

On August 2, the “Gulf of Tonkin Incident” provided that pretext. North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked an American destroyer that was conducting an OPLAN 34A intelligence patrol. Two destroyers conducting a night patrol two days later claimed that torpedo boats attacked again, though many doubt that this attack actually occurred. Johnson represented this as an unprovoked attack on American ships in international waters. At his request, Congress passed a resolution authorizing him “to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States” and “to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force” to assist South Vietnam. This was a de facto declaration of war. Politically, it justified the retaliatory air strikes on North Vietnam in August 1964, the introduction of combat troops into South Vietnam in 1965, and the air campaign against North Vietnam.

Many argue that the American destroyer patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin were a deliberate provocation intended to precipitate war with North Vietnam. As the administration was spoiling for a fight with Hanoi, this is a reasonable interpretation. The fact remains, however, that Hanoi could not have attacked American ships without Soviet-supplied weapons. Similarly, Hanoi simply could not have engaged in major combat operations in the South without Soviet-supplied weapons. Hanoi lacked the manufacturing capacity to do so. Moreover, Hanoi would not have attacked American destroyers without solid guarantees of Soviet support against retaliation. Nor would Hanoi have infiltrated the South or hit U.S. targets in South Vietnam, as it did several times in 1964, without such guarantees. If the Soviets wanted to stop the Americans from sending ground troops to Vietnam, they would have withheld their military and political support from Hanoi. As the Soviets wanted an increased American troop commitment, they provided this support.

Thus, the decisive but historically under-appreciated provocation in the Gulf of Tonkin was the Soviet one. Khrushchev had at last brought America and North Vietnam to blows. The victory was only partial, however. America employed airpower but had not yet deployed significant ground forces. This allowed Mao to argue that China was not yet threatened.

Immediately after the Tonkin Incident, North Vietnam and China endorsed a French proposal to convene a diplomatic conference to resolve the crisis. Clearly, North Vietnam and China hoped this conference would restrain the further use of American force. The Soviets, who did not wish to prevent America from using force in Indochina, rejected this initiative. Nor did the Soviets issue any threats or create any problems for the United States elsewhere in the world that might have inhibited the deployment of troops to Vietnam.

As large-scale war drew near, the Soviets confronted a logistical dilemma. They had two ways to deliver weapons to Hanoi – by sea or by land across China. They had only limited capacity to ship by sea. Ocean transport risked U.S. naval interdiction and an undesirable confrontation with America. The land route across China had enormous capacity and was immune to interdiction. Yet Mao did not want large shipments crossing Chinese territory. Such shipments would permit Hanoi to escalate the war, either bringing in the Americans or conquering the South, neither of which Mao wanted. After Tonkin, Mao denied transit rights to the USSR. Lacking this access, Khrushchev attempted to de-escalate rather than rely on the risky sea route. He announced a reduction in defense spending and in shipments to Vietnam. His colleagues promptly removed him from power. The new Soviet leaders, Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin, knew that the Chinese detested Khrushchev, and hoped his overthrow would remove the major obstacle to Soviet shipments across China.