Authors: Peter. Mair
It was only after 1989, however, that the pronounced variation in types of democracy was brought to the fore. The former first world category, now ever more loosely defined, was soon filled to overflowing, and it became increasingly obvious that not all democracies were alike. Larry Diamond (1996) and Fareed Zakaria (1997), for example, soon drew attention to the contrast between the fully fledged liberal democracies that had long been established in the west and the more limited ‘electoral’ or ‘illiberal’ democracies that were then emerging in the former second and third worlds. Other scholars spoke of variations such as populist democracy or delegative democracy. Towards the end of the twentieth century, in what had by then become a hugely expanded field of study, the tally of discriminations had risen to more than 500.
In short, while the political field had become free for democracy and the democrats, as Linz had suggested, democracy itself was becoming less easy to define: the edges had suddenly become less sharp, the boundaries less clear. In particular, it seemed that it was no longer enough to define democracy according to its basic procedures, especially if the emphasis in those procedures lay with the electoral process and with notions of popular democracy. That had always been the key to the Schumpeterian notion – in which democracy was defined as a system that required ‘free competition for a free vote’, and embodied ‘that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’ (Schumpeter, 1947: 271, 269).
Now it seemed that something more than elections was required, or perhaps even something different. Echoing the traditional Madisonian or constitutional approach to democracy, various theorists and influential commentators began to downgrade the importance or centrality of the popular vote, and placed the stress instead on the need for institutional pluralism and for more reasoned or even expert decision-making. ‘Elections are an important virtue of governance, but they are not the only virtue,’ argued Fareed Zakaria (1997: 23), later adding that ‘what we need in politics today is not more democracy but less’ (2003: 248). Or, as Philip Pettit noted when clarifying what was entailed by his influential conception of modern republicanism, ‘while democracy is certainly recognized as an important safeguard against governmental domination, it is never presented as the center-piece of the republican polity’ (Pettit, 1998: 303). In other words, although elections and other modes of popular democracy remain important to the definitions of late-twentieth-century democracy, they are no longer privileged as guarantors of legitimacy. Indeed, if anything, it now seems that the structures of power and decision-making sometimes need to be protected from the people, and from excessive ‘input’; that is, it seems necessary to create, in Everson’s words, ‘a sphere which is guarded … from disruptive redistributive goals’ and which ‘serves the goal of democracy by safeguarding the democratically set goals of the polity from the predatory inclinations of a transitory political elite.’
The European Union polity is probably pre-eminent among such spheres. To be sure, this is not a system that is wholly safeguarded from the inclinations – predatory
or other – of transient, or elected, political elites. But by comparison with the conventional national political systems of Europe, the scope it allows for organized, electorally mandated input is notoriously meagre. This is the case despite the fact that citizens seeking to exercise control in and over the EU have access to two overlapping channels of political influence, with two sets of delegates who may be mandated.
On the one hand, citizens seek to exert influence through their national parliaments and governments, and then, in a further step, through the Council of Ministers and the European Council. Less frequently, and less directly, they can also use this channel to influence appointments to the European Commission and other public offices at the EU level. On the other hand, and with more immediate effect, but less weight, citizens can seek representation through the European Parliament, and here too, although again indirectly, they can use this channel in order to exert a very limited influence on appointments to the European Commission. It was through this channel, for example, that the parties in the European Parliament forced the withdrawal of Rocco Buttiglione from the proposed new Commission, headed by José Manuel Barroso, in 2004. Although constitutionally quite separate from one another, these two channels nevertheless exhibit considerable overlap, and this occurs in two important ways. First, and increasingly, overlap occurs as a result of processes of co-decision (or ‘ordinary legislative procedure’), whereby issues and/or appointments are decided on the basis of input from both channels at the same time, from both the European Parliament and the national governments. Second, overlap also occurs because, in the main, it is usually the same actors or delegates that take on the role of intermediary in both channels. In other words, the same political parties, subject to control by
the same political leadership and by the same organized membership, compete in both channels. To be sure, the candidates and parliamentary leaderships that these parties nominate for election will usually differ from one channel to the next, and the labels under which they compete may also sometimes differ, since the campaign for the EU parliamentary elections may be organized under the aegis of trans-national Europarties. Whatever the label, however, and whoever the candidates, the key actors in both channels remain the national parties, and even within the European Parliament, the key principal for whom the MEPs act as agent is the national party leadership (see Hix, 2002).
As well as two channels of representation, there are also two dimensions of possible conflict and competition, having to do with the establishment and functioning of the EU polity and along which citizens and their representatives may be aligned. The first of these may be defined as that of ‘Europeanization’,
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a dimension that is bounded at one end by conflicts over the institutionalization of a distinctive European political system (see Cowles et al., 2000), and at the other end by conflicts over the penetration of European rules, directives and norms into the domestic sphere (see Featherstone and Radelli, 2003; Goetz and Hix, 2001). That is, at one end of this dimension there exists the potential for conflicts regarding the creation, consolidation and territorial reach of authoritative political institutions at the supranational European level, whereas at the other end the potential conflicts concern the extent to which local policies and practices become subject to standardizing European influences and constraints. Here also is located a more complex set of issues, encompassing not only conflicts over the very formal aspects of Europeanization,
including the
acquis communautaire
, but also disputes over the more or less binding side-agreements that are reached by some or all of the member states with one another, and even over the convergence and standardization of cultural practices and lifestyles. Each kind of conflict requires and is dependent upon the other. Were it not for the institutionalization of a European political system, there would be little to exert an ‘external’ impact on the domestic sphere; and in the absence of any penetration into the domestic sphere, the institutionalization of a supranational political system would be of little practical concern. It is in this sense that these two aspects of Europeanization – institutionalization and penetration – are part of a single dimension.
This single dimension of Europeanization offers a close parallel to the territorial dimension specified by Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967: 6–26) in their now-classic analysis of the development of national cleavage structures. At one end of the territorial dimension can be found those conflicts that involve local opposition ‘to encroachments of the aspiring or the dominant national elites and their bureaucracies’ (1967: 10); the European case is local opposition to interference from Brussels. At the other end are located conflicts that concern ‘the control, the organization, the goals, and the policy options of the system as a whole … [often reflecting] differences in conceptions of nationhood, over domestic priorities and over external strategies’, and these, when translated to the European level, would be equivalent to the current divisions about the desired shape, depth and territorial extension of the European integration process.
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The original Lipset–Rokkan schema also specified a functional dimension that cut across the territorial. At one end of this dimension were grouped
various interest-specific conflicts over the allocation of resources. These conflicts were seen as pragmatic in nature and as capable of being solved ‘through rational bargaining and the establishment of universalistic rules of allocation’. At the other end were grouped the more ideological oppositions, in which the conflict was not about particular gains or losses but instead concerned ‘conceptions of moral right and … the interpretation of history and human destiny’ (1967: 11). This dimension too can be translated on to the European level. It does not involve Europe or Europeanization as such, whether specified in terms of institutionalization or penetration, but rather takes Europe as a given and divides instead along strictly functional lines, be these interest-specific or ideological. Conflicts that occur along this dimension take no position on the question of the EU as a polity, but are more concerned with the allocation of resources within whatever version of Europe happens to exist at the time.
Thus, there are two dimensions of competition involved here, one concerning the shape and reach of the increasingly institutionalized EU political system, the other concerning policy areas in which there is already an established EU competence, but in which there are disagreements about approach and priorities. Two dimensions and, as outlined above, two channels of representation: one working through European elections and the European Parliament, an institution which has an increasingly important voice and authority in the policy-making process, and hence on the outputs of the EU, but only a limited say over the constitutional structures or even over the appointment of the political executive; the other working through national elections and national parliaments and governments, that is, within the arena that has exclusive authority over constitutional questions. In principle, it should
be possible to match the dimensions and the channels to one another, and, at least at first sight, it seems also obvious how they fit together. As far as opposition on the Europeanization dimension is concerned, for example, and especially opposition to the institutionalization of Europe, the competences of the various institutions are such that one would expect this to be channelled through the national route. It is here, and only here, that the relevant authority lies. As far as opposition on the functional dimension is concerned, on the other hand, while this might also be channelled through the national route, since some of the relevant authority is also located here, the expectation would be that this should mainly be directed towards the European channel, and through the European Parliament, since it is along this dimension that the main competences seem to lie. To be effective, therefore, representation via the national channel is best invoked for opposition along the dimension of Europeanization, whereas representation via the European channel is best invoked for opposition along the functional dimension (see also Thomassen and Schmitt, 1999: 258–60).
However, the real-world patterns of contestation tell quite a different story (see Mair, 2000). That is, when we look at the debates and programmes in each of the channels, we tend to find opposition regarding the institutionalization of Europe being voiced within the European channel, where no relevant competence lies; whereas opposition along the functional dimension is usually expressed in the national channel, even though authority on this dimension is shared with the European channel. The result is simple. The choices in both channels become increasingly irrelevant to the outputs of the system, and the behaviour and preferences of citizens constitute virtually no formal constraint on, or mandate for, the relevant policy-makers. Decisions can be taken
by political elites with more or less a free hand. What we see, therefore, is the absence of effective representation in the European Union political system, in that, as with the various versions of late-twentieth-century democracy noted above, the citizens lack ultimate control (see also Thaa, 2001). Despite the seeming availability of channels of access, the scope for meaningful input and hence for effective electoral accountability is exceptionally limited. It is in this sense that Europe appears to have been constructed as a protected sphere, safe from the demands of voters and their representatives.
How can we account for this evident evasion of conventional procedures for popular control? In the short run, the answer, at least in principle, is very simple, and especially so when viewed from a supply-side theory of political competition: the system is driven by the choices made by party and political leaders when they contest elections, and by the strategies they adopt – in both access channels. That is, and again with few exceptions, political leaders dealing with Europe choose to contest elections on issues in which those elections cannot prove decisive, and to exclude those issues on which the elections can prove decisive.
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They prefer to talk about the institutionalization of Europe when competing in elections to the European parliament, where
it is largely irrelevant, and they prefer not to raise such questions when competing in national elections, where it matters. By organizing political competition in this way, these political leaders free themselves from any possible restraints imposed by external and binding mandates.
The result is a remarkable under-politicization of the Europeanization dimension (see also van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004). There may well be a potential for conflict over Europe – over its reach, its form and its sheer size – but, at least as yet, the parties that contest elections, particularly at national level, have seemed to want to leave this in the shadows. The preference appears to have been that Europe not be contested – at least within the mainstream. Cees van der Eijk and Mark Franklin (2004: 47) liken this situation to ‘the sleeping giant’, arguing that the European issue is now ‘ripe for politicization’ and suggesting that ‘it is only a matter of time before policy entrepreneurs … seize the opportunity … to differentiate themselves from other parties in EU terms’. Indeed, it may be that we are now seeing signs of precisely this shift, and that questions of Europeanization are now beginning to more heavily assert themselves more forcefully in the various national electoral arenas.