Saddam : His Rise and Fall (20 page)

Saddam's emergence as the driving force behind Bakr's regime still owed much to the support and encouragement he received from his president and
fellow Tikriti, and Saddam was aware that he should not underestimate either Bakr's popularity or power. By the 1970s Bakr was well into his fifties, and appeared to be content with fulfilling a patriarchal role. As one of the last surviving members of the Free Officers responsible for overthrowing the monarchy in 1958, he enjoyed considerable support throughout the country. Not by nature an assertive individual, Bakr carried out the ceremonial functions of his office while allowing Saddam a free hand in consolidating the regime's position and eliminating its enemies. It has also been suggested that, from an early stage in the Baathist government, Bakr did not enjoy the best of health. As early as 1971 he was hospitalized for what was reported in the Iraqi media as a “slight indisposition.” This might be one explanation why Saddam, who enjoyed robust health, acquired far greater powers than are normally invested in a deputy, so that he was soon able to put himself in a position where his services were indispensable to Bakr. This, of course, was precisely the role Khairallah Tulfah, Saddam's uncle, had envisaged when he encouraged Bakr to take on his nephew in the 1960s. By appointing a deputy twenty years younger than himself, Bakr had calculated that he would have many years in power before the issue of the succession arose. But with the benefit of hindsight it appears that from the early 1970s Saddam's sole game plan was to seize the presidency at the earliest available opportunity. If Bakr allowed Saddam more independence of action than most deputies receive, that is not to suggest that he was unaware of Saddam's intrigues, or of the reasoning that lay behind them. Bakr was fully apprised of the infrastructure of institutionalized terror that had been constructed under his auspices by Saddam, and personally condoned the use of violence—including the barbarity of the Palace of the End—against the regime's enemies. And as Saddam cut a swathe through the ranks of his political rivals, it gradually became apparent to the Iraqi public that the country was being governed by a dual leadership consisting of Bakr and Saddam; these were the men who made the important decisions, more often than not at Saddam's instigation. Even if he had his eye on the presidency, at this point in his career Saddam remained careful not to overstep the mark in his relations with Bakr. In a speech broadcast on Iraqi radio in late 1971, for example, he went out of his way to deny suggestions that he had usurped Bakr's position. “I know there are some who claim that Saddam Hussein is the number one man in Iraq,” he said, “but we have a President who exercises his constitutional powers. In our view he is the number one man and, even more, we consider him the father and the leader.”
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The period that followed oil nationalization was crucial to Iraq's future development, and Saddam resolved to be fully involved in every aspect of the Baath Party's master plan to modernize the country. The Baath now enjoyed popular, and widespread, support throughout the country. The Iraqi people at large believed that for the first time in their history they had a government that was neither a monarchy nor a military junta, but one that was genuinely concerned with improving their lot. Saddam and the Baath were more confident. Saddam had quashed most of his rivals, and the Baath had neutralized most of its political enemies. Saddam's position as head of the security infrastructure was also greatly assisted by a secret deal he had struck with Yuri Andropov, head of the Soviet KGB intelligence operation, to improve the quality of Iraq's surveillance techniques.

From the moment it had seized power in 1968 the Baath had attempted to fulfill its promise for a more equal redistribution of the country's wealth, but its efforts had been constrained by the limited oil revenues. Even after nationalization all departmental budgets were severely curtailed to enable them to cope with the anticipated backlash from the West. The quadrupling of OPEC oil prices that occurred in the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, however, finally provided the Iraqi authorities with the opportunity they had been waiting for, allowing them to reap the rewards of the newly liberated oil wealth.

Saddam the nation builder was chairman of all the key committees and was personally responsible for the Baathists' ambitious plan to modernize the country. He more than anyone was aware that the key to improving his own popularity and that of the Baath Party would be how the new oil wealth was apportioned. By 1980, Iraq's oil revenues would be worth $26 billion compared with a figure of $476 million shortly after the Baath seized power,
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and this phenomenal rise in the government's revenues was entirely due to Saddam's nationalization of the oil industry. In 1968 oil provided about 22 percent of national income; by 1980 this had risen to 50 percent. This enabled the government to fund the massive redevelopment program that had been promised by numerous regimes, but had never been accomplished. The Baath's restructuring of the economy, however, was to be conducted in a totalitarian fashion. The party set itself three main goals: (1) the elimination of an upper, and even middle, class of wealth and privilege and a more equal distribution of income and services; (2) the establishment of a socialist econ
omy, with government ownership of national resources and the means of production; and (3) diversification of the economy, allowing Iraq as much economic independence as possible.

Every project, whether building a new school or hospital, was subjected to Saddam's personal scrutiny, and all proposed expenditures had to be authorized by the Planning Board, of which Saddam was the chairman. Saddam signed contracts with the USSR to expand Iraq's oil industry. He signed contracts with the French to build huge turnkey factory complexes, equipped with everything from machinery and production equipment to pencils on the director's desk. He negotiated with the Brazilians to build railroads, with the Belgians to build a phosphate complex, and with the Yugoslavs, Bulgarians, Germans, and Japanese for high technology, labor and expertise. He built schools and a powerful radio and television network capable of broadcasting Baathist propaganda throughout the Arab world. He extended Iraq's electricity grid into the most remote areas of the countryside. All this activity led foreign observers to point to Iraq as one of the success stories of the Third World. Unlike Africa, where money was all too often spent on useless prestige projects, Saddam's vast nation-building master plan was actually improving the living standards of ordinary Iraqis.

Even with the new oil wealth coming onstream, Saddam demanded value for money. His favorite tactic was to have Western and Soviet companies bid against each other on contracts so that Iraq would get the best deal. Saddam called this policy “nonalignment,” and its main goal was to preserve independence of action. His experience with the Soviets had taught him the perils of being too dependent on one outlet. Saddam made sure that the influx of foreigners brought in to work on the various construction projects did not pollute the Baathist revolution. His security forces were instructed to ensure that “contaminating influences” did not come in contact with ordinary Iraqis. Foreign workers were followed, on occasion interrogated, and encouraged not to develop social contacts with Iraqi civilians. Foreign newspapers and magazines were confiscated and all foreign workers were required to apply for exit visas before they left the country, and the permits were sometimes withheld as a means of intimidation. Saddam explained his philosophy for dealing with foreign companies to a group of visiting Arab journalists in 1974. “We have no reservations about dealing with companies anywhere in the world, on a basis that guarantees the respect of our sovereignty and ensures both parties a legitimate profit. Our country has large-scale projects,
prodigious projects, and we have great ambitions. The idea that we might isolate ourselves from the world to live according to our own devices is foreign to us, and we refuse it categorically.”
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Most Iraqi technicians and officials involved in the various projects knew that Saddam relied heavily on his security apparatus to keep himself in power. Even so, they were still impressed by his ability to master even the most complicated brief. Salah al-Shaikhly, a first cousin of deposed foreign minister Abdul Karim al-Shaikhly, was a British-educated economist who worked as deputy director of planning for the Baath until he was obliged to flee the country in 1977. For seven years he attended weekly meetings chaired by Saddam and, despite the suffering Saddam has inflicted on his family, he has not wavered from his view that Saddam was a gifted administrator. “He could grasp an argument faster than many technicians,” he said. “He could ask questions that even those who had Ph.D.s could not answer. We could only assume that he spent a lot of time reading up on the briefs. But even so it was an impressive performance.” On those occasions that Saddam did not understand a point, he would ask for it to be repeated “for the benefit of the rest of the group who, like me, I am sure, would appreciate a little clarification.” The meetings were conducted in a businesslike manner and there was no hint of the menace that afflicted so many other areas of Iraqi life. “There was no sense of intimidation,” said Shaikhly. “It was only when people were clearly underperforming that it became a problem.”

The drive to modernize Iraq was undertaken strictly on terms laid down by Saddam. “Mr. Deputy” was under no illusions about the signficance of the potential riches that were about to change the country forever, nor did he underestimate the significance of Iraq's oil wealth to the outside world. “So long as we have oil we have power,” he was fond of telling his officials. “I want Iraq to have the last barrel of oil in the world. The longer we can make our oil last, the longer we will be recognized as a world power.” It was for this reason that he disdainfully dismissed the suggestion put forward by one of his senior advisers to develop the country's solar energy resources, a reasonable enough suggestion given the strength of the sun in Iraq's desert regions. “If we do this, oil will be redundant,” was Saddam's take on the proposal.

In other areas Saddam was fascinated with science, and was determined to import the latest technologies to Iraq. Rather than follow the other oil-rich Gulf states, and simply import technology, Saddam wanted Iraq to become technologically self-sufficient. Saddam's enthusiasm was undoubtedly infec
tious, and the officials and scientists who were invited to participate in this new dawn in Iraq's development were inspired by Saddam's leadership. “We all thought it was marvelous,” recalled Shaikhly. “The good things outweighed the bad. We knew there was censorship and we knew unpleasant things happened if you fell foul of the security forces. But for those of us who were given the opportunity to rebuild the country, it was all tremendously exciting.” Saddam was always on the lookout for bright new talent. When he chaired meetings, he would sit attentively when a newcomer was invited to make a presentation. In these circumstances first impressions were crucial. Anyone who made a good first impression could look forward to quick promotion. “Saddam was essentially looking for young people with good qualifications who were intelligent and courageous,” said Shaikhly. “These were the people he wanted to help him modernize the country. As for loyalty, he took that for granted. After all, he had this extensive security apparatus watching everyone all the time. If anyone displayed the slightest hint of disloyalty, Saddam knew precisely how to deal with them.”
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On those occasions when someone annoyed Saddam he had a unique way of demonstrating his displeasure. The back of his left hand is marked by three small dotlike tattoos, the tribal markings of a Tikriti that he had carried since childhood. Saddam would simply wave his hand, displaying the tattoos in the direction of the offending official, signaling that he should leave at once. Later in Saddam's career, this gesture was taken as a sign for the security forces to arrest the unfortunate official, who would be taken away for interrogation, often never to be seen again.

Agrarian reform was one of the Baath's first priorities and the party initiated a widespread land redistribution scheme, breaking up the large landholdings and creating a network of small, self-sufficient farms that were required to participate in local cooperatives. No compensation was paid to the landowners. By 1976 more than 71 percent of state-owned land had been given to 222,000 new farmers who were provided with modern agricultural equipment while the number of farm cooperatives rose from 473 in 1968 to 1,852 in 1976. The egalitarian nature of the regime was reflected in education, an issue close to Saddam's heart, and student enrollment at educational establishments doubled at every level during the 1970s. Saddam's personal concern was to eradicate adult illiteracy.

In 1977, for example, when he was becoming frustrated by the inability of his various education proposals to bring down the level of adult illiteracy, he
declared a Day of Knowledge to persuade Iraqis to participate in nationwide courses in reading and writing. To make sure that there was full enrollment in the courses, Saddam threatened those who did not take up his offer with prison. The scheme was such a success that UNESCO gave Saddam the Kropeska Award for promoting its campaign to wipe out illiteracy worldwide.
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The country still depended heavily on oil revenues, and Saddam was also involved in the Baath Party's attempts to diversify the economy and make the country more self-sufficient. From 1975 onward, the government drew up investment budgets that aimed at developing the nucleus of heavy industries, such as coal oil and petrochemical facilities. Saddam's office was closely involved with the development of the $45 billion fertilizer, steel, and chemical plant at al-Zubair and a massive petrochemical complex at Basra. Saddam claimed credit for construction of a nationwide network of oil pipelines that provided the government with oil terminal outlets in Syria, Turkey, and Basra. As part of the government's development program, remote villages were connected to the electricity grid. The Baathists gave away free televisions and refrigerators to poor families, especially among the Shiite communities in the south of the country. As part of their policy of social liberalization, the Baathists were committed to the emancipation of women, and passed legislation ensuring equal pay and outlawing job discrimination on the basis of sex. A family law code, known as the Code of Personal Status, was revised, making polygamy more difficult to practice and allowing women to choose their own husbands, rather than having them chosen by their families, and to divorce. At a time when in neighboring Saudi Arabia women were not even allowed out on their own in public, Iraqi women were allowed to enroll in the military and the Popular Army.