Saddam : His Rise and Fall (46 page)

From Saddam's point of view, his policies in the spring of 1991 were a great success. He had demonstrated that he was tactically astute; he had succeeded in putting down two major insurrections, and he had demonstrated to complacent Western leaders that he was still the undisputed leader of his country. It was in this confident frame of mind that Saddam set about dealing with the next challenge to his regime, the arrival in Iraq of teams of UN-sponsored weapons inspectors to dismantle his nonconventional weapons arsenal. In the immediate aftermath of Iraq's defeat, there was a clear consensus at the UN Security Council that the country should be prevented from launching similar acts of aggression in the future. Apart from passing a number of resolutions that required it to give formal recognition to the independent state of Kuwait and to pay massive war reparations, the UN ordered Saddam to open up all sites in Iraq for inspection by UN teams searching for evidence of its suspected programs of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons development. Once discovered, these would be destroyed, as would any remaining long-range surface-to-surface missiles. The punitive sanctions would be lifted only when the Security Council was satisfied that Iraq no longer possessed these capabilities, had allowed monitoring teams to be installed, and complied with the stipulations contained in the UN resolutions.

When the first UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission on Disarmament) team arrived to start work in May 1991, Saddam and his officials embarked upon a systematic campaign of obstruction and concealment so that, seven years later, when the UNSCOM teams finally departed, the UN was unable to ascertain the precise nature of Iraq's capacity for manufacturing and delivering chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. The very notion of teams of foreign nationals conducting intrusive investigations into the most sensitive aspects of Iraq's military industrial complex was, of course, anathema to Saddam and the Baath's ruling clique. The Iraqis had grudgingly agreed to the inspections in the immediate aftermath of the war only because Saddam wanted to give the impression of cooperating with the UN so that he could have a free hand to subdue the revolts in Kurdistan and southern Iraq.
But even though on the surface the Iraqis had agreed to comply with the weapons inspectors, the reality was very different.

In late April an emergency committee was set up under Tariq Aziz to decide how best to defy the UN, with orders from Saddam to save as much of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capability as possible.
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Saddam was determined not to declare any aspect of his nuclear weapons program, code-named PC-3, which he had successfully concealed from inspectors working for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for more than a decade. Saddam also ordered that no details of the biological weapons program should be revealed. The only nonconventional weapon that was to be disclosed was the chemical weapons program, as the UN already had evidence of its manufacture. Saddam authorized the disclosure of stocks of chemical agents and their delivery systems, but the extensive research and development facilities were to be hidden, as were stocks of Iraq's most advanced chemical weapons, VX, which were to be totally concealed from the inspection teams. The policy was clear; Saddam would go through the motions of disarmament, but would not disarm. Aziz's committee drew up a detailed list of what could and what could not be disclosed to the UN, and an emergency evacuation plan was drawn up to disperse all weapons-related material that was not to be handed over to the UN. The committee even went so far as to make preparations for dealing with the inspection teams, which included rearranging the layout of sensitive facilities to hide evidence of prohibited activity. Aziz ordered that elaborate exercises be conducted, complete with mock inspections, to train Iraqi officials in how to deal with the UN inspection teams. Finally on April 18, Iraq submitted its declaration to the UN outlining details of its nonconventional weapons programs.

Rolf Ekeus, the Swedish head of UNSCOM, was quick to spot the inconsistencies between the material contained in Aziz's declaration and the details of Iraq's nonconventional weapons infrastructure that had been compiled by American and British intelligence. Ekeus put Baghdad on notice that UNSCOM was conducting a comprehensive assessment of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities, and that on-site inspections would be conducted not only of Iraq's declared facilities, but of undeclared locations as well. Saddam was clearly unnerved by the uncompromising nature of Ekeus's response, and ordered that a new committee be formed, the Concealment Operations Committee, which was to be controlled by his second eldest son, Qusay.
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The appointment of Qusay to this key position did not go down well with Hussein Kamel al-Majid, Saddam's son-in-law, who, through his chairmanship of the Military Industrial Commission set up after the Iran-Iraq War to rearm Iraq, had spent billions of dollars enhancing Iraq's nonconventional weapons capability. Hussein Kamel was a cocky individual, whose arrogance and generally self-satisfied demeanor had alienated many key figures within the ruling elite. Furthermore he owed his rise to prominence to the patronage of Saddam's estranged wife Sajida, who had been alienated from Saddam since the death of her brother Adnan in a helicopter crash in 1989. In times of crisis Saddam turned to those he could trust, as he had demonstrated with the changes he had made in March to the Baath leadership and the military prior to launching the campaign to subdue the Kurds and the Shiites. With so much at stake, Saddam clearly felt more confident if he had his own flesh and blood in charge of protecting the precious nonconventional weapons arsenal than someone who was related to him only by marriage. Saddam's preference for Qusay over Hussein Kamel created much bitterness and would cause Saddam much heartache in the years to come.

Qusay's new committee met regularly at the Presidential Palace and discussed ways of ensuring sensitive material was hidden from the inspectors. At this juncture the Iraqis thought that the UN inspection program would last a few months, if not weeks. They expected to show the inspectors around the sites they had declared to the UN, most of which had been destroyed by Allied bombing during the war. The Iraqis based their expectations on their previous experience of dealing with the IAEA inspectors who had regularly inspected Iraq's nuclear research facilities without ever actually noticing that Iraq was developing nuclear weapons.

The UNSCOM inspectors proved to be far more conscientious in carrying out their duties. In June 1991 a team led by David Kay, the chief inspector, which was surveying Iraq's declared nuclear facilities, visited the Abu Ghraib military camp west of Baghdad. Although the Iraqis had admitted that part of the camp was used for nuclear research, another part of the camp had been commandeered by Qusay to conceal key equipment from Iraq's nuclear research program. In the course of inspecting the camp Kay discovered Iraqi soldiers attempting to move a number of huge electromagnetic isotope separators, known as Calutrons, which were being transported on heavy tractor trailers. When Kay tried to intervene, the Iraqi soldiers reacted by firing shots over his head. The Iraqis then drove the Calutrons
away to another location in full view of the inspectors, who filmed the entire proceedings.

The Abu Ghraib incident set the tone for Iraq's relations with the weapons inspectors for the next six years. After this embarrassment, Qusay's concealment committee ordered that all the key components of Iraq's nuclear weapons program be concealed at a network of Saddam's palaces and villas around Tikrit, which were not mentioned in Iraq's declared list of sites. Any material that was not regarded as essential was blown up by the Iraqis, who then informed the UN that they had unilaterally destroyed their nonconventional weapons, in the belief that the weapons inspectors would not return. Having already caught Saddam out once, the UNSCOM inspectors were not convinced. Kay returned to Baghdad and in mid-September his team arrived unannounced at the Iraqi nuclear headquarters in Baghdad, scaled the fence, and burst into the building. To their amazement they discovered millions of pages of documents detailing all of Iraq's nuclear weapons programs. Although Qusay's concealment committee had ordered that all the nuclear hardware be secured, they had forgotten about the documentation. Embarrassed Iraqi officials rushed to the compound, and a four-day standoff ensued, in which Kay's inspectors were virtually held captive in the parking lot.
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But the damage had been done, and the UNSCOM teams resolved to continue their inspections until they were convinced that Saddam had been completely disarmed.

The concealment committee reacted to this latest disaster by arranging to have the nuclear archive microfilmed and stored at the Ministry of Agriculture, which had previously played a prominent role in constructing Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs. But the inspectors were not to be deceived, and in July 1992 they raided the Ministry of Agriculture building. Saddam's security forces responded by organizing groups of civilians to attack the UN inspectors as they tried to carry out their mission. That was the last time the weapons inspectors came close to making a thorough examination of the complete nuclear weapons archive, which soon afterward was removed to a secret presidential compound near Tikrit.

While Saddam concentrated his energies on finding ways to defy the UNSCOM inspectors, the Iraqi people were destitute and starving. The UN sanctions meant that Iraq was unable to sell its oil to earn foreign currency and was therefore severely limited in what it could import. Fertilizers, agricultural machinery, pesticides, and chemicals that might have a dual use, as
well as parts for Iraq's ruined electricity and water purification systems, were all forbidden. As a consequence, disease and malnutrition were soon widespread, causing infant mortality rates to rise to levels not seen in Iraq for more than forty years. Food prices rose by 2000 percent within a year of the Kuwait invasion, and the devastation of the economy meant that previously affluent middle-class Baghdadis were reduced to penury.

The suffering of the Iraqi people, however, made little impression on the country's leader. In 1992 the UN responded to the mounting hardship suffered by ordinary Iraqis by offering the Iraqi government the opportunity to sell $1.6 billion worth of oil to pay for food and medicine. This was rejected by Saddam, who took exception to the UN's insistence that it control the funds, and that 30 percent of the profits would be deducted to pay for war reparations. For the next four years Saddam continued to block similar offers, preferring to let the Iraqi people suffer rather than allow any constraints to be imposed on the office of the presidency. It was not until 1996 that he finally agreed to accept the terms of UN Security Resolution 986, which allowed Iraq to sell $2 billion worth of oil every six months for the purchase of essential supplies.

Although the coalition Allies had been unwilling to back the Kurdish and Shiite rebellions, there was nevertheless a strong desire to see Saddam overthrown. In May 1991, when Saddam had successfully crushed the rebellions in the north and south and had reestablished himself at the strongman of Baghdad, President Bush signed a formal “finding” that authorized the CIA to mount a covert operation to “create the conditions for the removal of Saddam Hussein from power.” Had the finding been signed a few months earlier, the CIA might have stood some chance of success. But by the time Bush finally came to the conclusion that Saddam must be removed from power, the Iraqi leader had been able successfully to strengthen his power base.

Frank Anderson, the recipient of the “finding” and head of the CIA's Near East Division at the Directorate of Operations, later commented: “We didn't have a single mechanism or combination of mechanisms with which I could create a plan to get rid of Saddam at that time.”
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Bush's finding seemed to echo an aphorism coined by Richard Helms, a former CIA director: “Covert action is frequently a substitute for a policy.” Bush himself conceded that a key opportunity to overthrow Saddam in the immediate aftermath of Operation Desert Storm had probably been lost. Evidence had emerged that a group of senior Iraqi officers had planned a coup against Saddam shortly
after the war, but were deterred from taking action because of the rebellions in the north and south.
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Interviewed on American television in 1994, Bush commented: “I did have a strong feeling that the Iraqi military, having been led to such a crushing defeat by Saddam, would rise up and rid themselves of him. We were concerned that the uprisings would sidetrack the overthrow of Saddam by causing the Iraqi military to rally round him to prevent the breakup of the country. That may have been what actually happened.”
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From the autumn of 1991 onward the American and British intelligence services explored various options for removing Saddam. The first priority was to find a person or group who would present an acceptable alternative to him. To this end the CIA made an approach to Saddam's half brother Barzan, who was still living in exile in Geneva,
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an unlikely candidate in view of his previous activities as head of the Iraqi Mukhabarat and his personal involvement in the executions of fellow Baathists that took place after Saddam assumed the presidency in 1979 (see Chapter Seven). The next significant initiative was undertaken in June 1992 when, under CIA auspices, an estimated forty Iraqi opposition groups, including the Kurds, were brought together in Vienna to form a new organization called the Iraqi National Congress (INC), which committed itself to Saddam's overthrow. The publicly declared aim of the INC was to create a democratic Iraq with a government that would represent all races and creeds. The INC was little more than a propaganda vehicle, and most of its more realistic members were well aware that Saddam would not easily be dislodged. The INC was funded almost exclusively by the CIA, to the tune of $23 million in its first year alone.