Sex, Culture, and Justice: The Limits of Choice (35 page)

nity.’’
10
Thus the first strategy, the appeal to social practices, has been deployed. The second, autonomy, comes in next. Raz argues that ‘‘the social forms characterizing contemporary liberal states reflect the per- vasiveness of autonomy and that success in the goals these forms make available requires the effective exercise of autonomy.’’
11
Finally, Raz argues that autonomy requires value pluralism. In order to be autono- mous, one must have a range of valuable options to choose from. These options must not be in a clear, objective hierarchy, for then there would be no place for meaningful individual autonomous choice; individuals would simply have to adopt the best option. Instead, for autonomy to be meaningful, value pluralism must hold: different options must be equally, or incommensurably, valuable.
12

This, then, is the basic structure of Raz’s theory. The most relevant parts of it are the appeal to autonomy and the appeal to social practices, or what McCabe calls the social forms thesis.
13
The social forms thesis states that an individual can have a comprehensive goal of the sort that is required for second-order autonomous choice ‘‘only if it is based on existing social forms, i.e. on forms of behavior which are in fact widely practiced in the society.’’ And since ‘‘success in one’s comprehensive goals is among the most important elements of one’s well-being,’’ it follows that ‘‘a person’s well-being depends to a large extent on success in
socially defined and determined
pursuits and activities.’’
14

The problem at this stage is how we should understand the force of the social forms thesis. At one extreme, it could merely be the weak and trivial claim that individuals cannot invent comprehensive goals from nothing and with no social background. They cannot develop the necessary skills for living, or invent meaningful ways of life, without an upbringing in some sort of society. A baby abandoned on a desert island and kept alive by machines cannot develop the comprehensive goals necessary for well-being. As a trivial claim, this is probably true but certainly uninteresting, and it seems unlikely that this is Raz’s intention. At the other extreme lies the claim that we cannot access the comprehensive goals necessary for well-being unless we accept spe-

10. Ibid., 498.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., 500.

1. Ibid., 497ff. Raz outlines the social forms thesis on pages 307–13 of
   Morality of Free- dom,
   and again in his essay on multiculturalism in
   Ethics and the Public Domain.
   

2. Raz,
   Morality of Freedom
   , 308–9; emphasis added.
   

cific, developed, and particular cultural ways of life in their entirety: a claim that seems to prevent any exercise of autonomy whatsoever and seems as unlikely as its opposite. Between these unappealing extremes lies a wide range of complex alternatives that do have textual support.

Consider, for example, the following passage:

A comprehensive goal may be based on a social form in being a simple instance of it [such as an] ordinary conventional mar- riage. . . . [But m]any marriages, perhaps all, are not that con- ventional. They are based on a shared perception of a social form while deviating from it in some respects. They are devia- tions on a common theme, and they can typically be that be- cause the social form itself recognizes the existence of varia- tions, or even their importance. A couple may evolve an ‘‘open’’ marriage even though this form is unknown to their society. But an open marriage is a relation combining elements of a conventional marriage and of a sexual pursuit which is kept free of emotional involvement. It is a combination of elements of two socially recognizable forms. The thesis that comprehen- sive goals are inevitably based on socially existing forms is meant to be consistent with experimentation, and with varia- tions on a common theme and the like. It is no more possible to delimit in advance the range of deviations which still count as based on a social form than it is to delimit the possible relations between the literal and metaphorical use of an expres- sion.
15

In this passage, three alternatives can be discerned. According to the first, deviations in social forms are allowed if, perhaps only if, the social form itself allows for them. This option is expressed in Raz’s claim that unconventional marriages can exist ‘‘because the social form itself recognizes the existence of variations.’’ The second option is that devia- tions from a social form are possible if they are drawn from other recognized social forms (but not if they come from elsewhere, perhaps from individual experimentation). This option is expressed in Raz’s claims that open marriage is possible because it is ‘‘a combination of elements of two socially recognizable forms.’’ The third option is that

15. Ibid.
,
309.

deviations from social forms are allowed according to the autonomous choice of the individual concerned: she is free to pick and choose, to innovate, and to corrupt existing forms at will. This option might be supported by Raz’s claim that the social forms thesis is compatible with ‘‘experimentation,’’ and that it is not possible ‘‘to delimit in advance the range of deviations which still count as based on a social form.’’

It is, of course, possible to endorse all three options: to state that deviations from social forms are allowed or possible in any of the three ways. But such a position leaves little left of the social forms thesis except the trivial claim that humans need social interaction. As well as being trivial, this claim will not do the necessary work of justifying autonomy in relation to its connection with the social forms of liberal societies. If social forms are nothing more than some basic social con- text, there is no reason to protect or even notice the fact that liberal social contexts include autonomy. Indeed, this problem arises even if we adopt only the third option: that individuals may autonomously deviate from social forms as they please. If individual deviation from social forms is possible, then we have the principle of autonomy stated as a prior value, not as one dependent on the social forms of liberal societies. For individuals’ ability to deviate from the social forms de- pends not on anything emanating from the social forms but from the value of deviation, of autonomy, itself.

We are left, then, with the first and second options: deviations may occur if, perhaps only if, the social form in question allows for them, or the idea that deviations may occur if they are drawn from alternative social forms. To take the second option first, the question that arises is whether these alternative social forms may be drawn from societies other than our own, a question that Raz raises but does not answer. McCabe argues that while it is in fact possible for individuals to draw on social forms from outside their own societies, this possibility ulti- mately undermines the social forms thesis and Raz’s defense of auton- omy. As McCabe puts it: ‘‘If individuals can pursue goals connected to the social forms of groups and cultures to which they do not belong, this undermines the connection, central to Raz’s case for the special importance of autonomy in liberal societies, between social forms and the distinct character of one’s own society.’’
16
There would be no reason to think that people living in liberal societies need autonomy, that they

1. McCabe, ‘‘Joseph Raz and the Contextual Argument,’’ 510.
   

   can succeed in comprehensive goals only via autonomy, or that the perfectionist defense of autonomy is based on its contextual, social value in liberal societies rather than on some more controversial ac- count of the universal value of autonomy. In other words, if Raz is to accept that deviation in social forms can take place using forms from alternative cultures, his perfectionist defense of autonomy will have to be more far-reaching and universalist than he seems to want.
   17
   

   The remaining option, then, is that deviation from social forms is permitted only when the social forms themselves allow for that devia- tion. This understanding is compatible with Raz’s claim that autonomy is an important part of the social forms of liberal societies. Because liberal social forms contain within themselves the requirement that they be followed autonomously, it follows that one cannot succeed in a liberal society without being autonomous. Hence Raz writes: ‘‘Since we live in a society whose social forms are to a considerable extent based on individual choice, and since our options are limited by what is available in our society, we can prosper in it only if we can be suc- cessfully autonomous.’’
   18
   

   We are now in a position to consider how Raz would respond to the case of Eva the nun. In the light of the quotation just given, it seems that Raz must reject the possibility of succeeding as a nun in a liberal society unless one can do so autonomously. In other words, Eva can successfully fulfill the comprehensive goal of being a nun within a liberal society
   only if
   she does so with full first-order autonomy, criti- cally evaluating convent rules and rejecting those she finds wanting, such as the mail surveillance. However, this conclusion contradicts the conclusion that we reached concerning the possibility of deviation from social forms: that such deviation is acceptable only if the social form itself permits it. In other words, the existence of social forms that do not permit autonomous deviations (such as convent life) cause prob- lems when they are found within liberal societies. The specific social form of convent life forbids first-order autonomy, whereas the broader social form of the liberal society requires it. The dictates of one social
   

2. See ibid., 494–95. McCabe considers the question of whether Raz holds a contextual view of autonomy, according to which autonomy is valuable only in certain social contexts, or a transcendent view, according to which autonomy is valuable for all people and places, and writes: ‘‘Raz’s apparent slippage between autonomy’s transcendent and contextual value can be maddening’’ (494 n. 3).
   

3. Raz,
   Morality of Freedom,
   394.
   

form will have to be abandoned: either the liberal requirement that individuals are autonomous will have to be abandoned in favor of the convent requirement that individuals are not, or the convent require- ment that individuals are obedient will have to be abandoned in favor of the liberal requirement of autonomy. Either option is controversial. One way out of this dilemma is to attempt to retain
both
liberal autonomy
and
convent life by using the transformation approach out- lined earlier and suggested by Wall: asserting that the second-order autonomous choice of a way of life
entails
first-order autonomy regard- ing the components of that way of life. This strategy would enable Raz to maintain the social forms thesis as regards both liberal societies and convent life. The social form of the convent requires obedience, so Eva must be obedient and allow her letters to be read. However, the social form of the liberal society requires autonomy, so Eva must allow them to be read autonomously. Her second-order choice to be a nun must become the first-order choice to submit to surveillance. Raz’s discus- sion of the concept of loyalty lends support to the idea that he supports

this strategy.

Loyalty

In order to maintain the social forms thesis concerning both liberal and convent life, Raz introduces the concept of
loyalty
as crucial to autonomy. This concept allows him to assimilate first- and second- order autonomy. For Raz, autonomy does not depend on the ability to change one’s mind about one’s way of life, or on the likelihood that one will do so by a continuing reassessment of ends. Raz advocates commitment to a way of life once it has been chosen. He argues that autonomy requires what he terms integrity or loyalty, stating: ‘‘To be autonomous one must identify with one’s choices, and one must be loyal to them.’’
19
Raz describes loyalty as follows: ‘‘Our projects and relationships depend on the form they acquire through social conven- tions. This means, as we saw, that they depend on complex patterns of expectations, on the symbolic significance of various actions, and in general on remaining loyal, within the recognized limits set for impro- visation and change, to their basic shape. Failure to do so is failure to

19. Ibid., 382.

succeed, or even to engage, in the pursuits one has set oneself to make the content of one’s life.’’
20
On the one hand, Raz makes further refer- ence to the social forms thesis: the social formation of preferences and the social meanings of practices. It is only within certain contexts that certain projects make sense and certain character traits are developed. But, on the other hand, the passage implies that there is no need to pay close attention to the nature of those social meanings, and priori- tize those which are emancipatory over those which are oppressive. Rather than using our autonomy to question the practices recom- mended to us by our culture, the passage implies that we must protect our autonomy by adhering to those practices, remaining loyal to them. If we do not, we fail both to ‘‘succeed’’ and, in consequence, to be autonomous.

This is a counterintuitive approach. Autonomy implies that we do not commit unquestioningly to the social meanings presented to us. Rather, we should question those meanings and practices, and reject those which we find wanting. We should reject some social meanings and practices because we find them normatively unacceptable, others simply because we discover, in the course of adhering to them, that they are not best suited to us.

In order to allow for this possibility, Raz is quick to explain that the liberal nature of society means that loyalty is not required of everyone. It is required only of those who have chosen a social form that de- mands loyalty. In other words, as we have already seen, deviations from social forms are allowed if and only if the social form in question allows for them:

Here another warning may be in place against thinking that the previous remarks embrace a rigid, planned life, lacking spontaneity and hostile to the possibility of changing one’s mind and dropping the pursuit to embrace another. Nothing is further from the truth. While some pursuits, e.g. various forms of monastic life, involve complete advance commitment to a very regimented and routine style of living, most are not of this kind. . . . An autonomous person is free to choose pur- suits which are more short-term, less comprehensive in na-