Shake Hands With the Devil (72 page)

When news of the French intervention was broadcast in Rwanda, the
RPF
, as I had feared, retaliated against my Franco-African officers from Togo, Senegal, Mali and Congo. They were robbed, insulted and roughed up to the point where I had to confine them to camp. I negotiated their withdrawal from the mission area for their own safety and informed New York of my decision. On June 21, I said farewell to these magnificent Franco-African officers, who had served the mission well since the previous November. Being the only francophones in the mission, they had had to conduct most of the tasks in the
RGF
sector and had been exposed to more than their fair share of danger. Some of their comrades had been killed and others wounded. Most of them had fallen ill at least once, and they had witnessed scenes that would haunt them
for the rest of their lives. But they had all stayed on through the frustrations and dangers, and it was an emotional farewell.

Because of the risks of altercations with the
RPF
in the rear areas where the troops were less disciplined than in the front lines, I tasked Henry to personally lead the convoy to Uganda. Tiko, wanting to be with his
UNMO
s to the last, went as well. About a dozen kilometres outside Kigali, they were turned back by the
RPF
and brought to the airfield. Under the eyes of Frank Kamenzi, who did not intervene,
RPF
soldiers proceeded to conduct a complete “customs” inspection of each one of the forty-two men. Their belongings were thrown about, and their electronic equipment—radios, tape recorders and the like—were confiscated. The inspection lasted about an hour. When it was over, they were told to pick their stuff up off the runway and get back on the buses, and then they were sent on their way. This humiliation, which they endured after so many months of putting their lives on the line to help Rwandans, created such anger in them that Henry was concerned they might take matters into their own hands with every delay at the checkpoints. When I protested their treatment to the
RPF
, I was told that it was entirely normal that the occupying force would search anyone attempting to leave the country since, they claimed, there had been considerable looting in the past.

The departure of the Franco-Africans stripped me of most of my French-speaking staff officers. For the third time in the short history of this mission, I had to rebuild my headquarters from the bottom up, all the while continuing with operations. The weight and the complexity, the sheer urgency, of demands related to the coming mobilization of
UNAMIR
2 hit us right in the face, swamping us in the organizational details of how to secure resources, logistics, infrastructure, training, the Entebbe theatre reception and logistics base, the troop carriers, the rations and the water we would need. I sent a message to the
DPKO
that I was bringing in forty-eight
UNMO
s from Nairobi to replace the departed officers.

The Canadians stepped into the breach to become the sole French speakers in my headquarters, but their effectiveness was somewhat limited by the fact that all Canadians were under attack on hate radio, because of me and because of Canada's initiative to launch the full-scale human rights
investigation into the Rwandan war. In my note to the
DPKO
about bringing in the new
UNMO
s, I warned that “
FC
will be forced to move [the Canadian] contingent out also, if situation does not improve. At this time
FC
is about to restrict their movement to
RPF
territory only.” I concluded: “This Mission will not be able to sustain its rhythm of activities, let alone see any increase of work. . . . 
FC
cannot make this point more
emphatically
.” In those days after the announcement of Opération Turquoise, I came very close to saying, “Pull us out, we capitulate, we can't go on.” My soldiers were being tested under conditions that never would occur in a standard peacekeeping operation, and they survived circumstances we wouldn't even have wanted to read about. Serving with them, I was a constant witness to extraordinary displays of commitment, determination and raw courage.

On June 21 the
RPF
's New York office issued a press release and a letter to the new president of the Security Council, Salim Bin Mohammed Al-Khussaiby. If the council approved the French mission, the
RPF
requested that it should “simultaneously authorize the withdrawal of the existing contingent of
UNAMIR
. The Rwandese Patriotic Front is concerned that its personnel may not always be in a position to make a dear distinction between
UNAMIR
and other foreign forces in the event of an escalation of hostilities. We have, regrettably, come to the conclusion that it is necessary that
UNAMIR
personnel be withdrawn to safety, at least on a temporary basis.” The powers-that-be ignored the
RPF
position and carried on. The next day, the
UN
Security Council approved Resolution 929, which provided France with a chapter-seven mandate to assemble a coalition and intervene in Rwanda. The
OAU
initially opposed the intervention but, under pressure from the Franco-African states, changed its mind. At the vote, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Brazil and China had abstained. The council tied its approval of Opération Turquoise to two conditions: the mission was limited to sixty days, and the secretariat had to make every effort to get
UNAMIR
2 deployed by then. From his refuge in Belgium, Prime Minister Designate Faustin Twagiramungu issued a public statement condemning the French intervention, but then added that since the French
were
going in, he hoped that they would attempt to achieve the ends outlined for
UNAMIR
2.

That night I got a code cable from the
DPKO
giving me some very limited guidance. The French had promised to avoid the conflict lines between the
RGF
and
RPF
. The cable read, “We don't expect the French to propose a presence in Kigali, but if they do please inform us immediately and we shall try to persuade them, given
RPF
sensitivities and other problems such a presence may cause.” To me it looked like the French were still thinking about coming into Kigali, and I imagined what it would be like if French paratroopers landed here. I had to get our withdrawal plans finalized. Reading between the lines of the code cable, with its reiteration that I should sit tight in Kigali, I saw that the
DPKO
was under enormous pressure from nations with troops already serving in
UNAMIR
, and that the recent casualties we'd suffered must have been making it even harder to come up with enough troops for the new deployment. (In the cable, Maurice Baril also asked me in a very diplomatic way to curb the enthusiasm of my media liaison officer, who in his attempt to respect the transparency I had mandated with the media, was causing problems with both the
RPF
and the
RGF
by much too accurately describing the ebbs and flows of the front lines.)

And here was my superiors' attempt to improve my morale: “Nevertheless you are likely to face unanticipated problems and we shall depend on your good judgment to deal with them, along with the assurance that we always are available for consultation at any hour.”

The last paragraph of the code cable informed me that Booh-Booh's replacement, a Pakistani career diplomat named Shaharyar Khan, was “stopping in various capitals for consultations” at the request of Boutros-Ghali while on his way to
UNAMIR
.

By now French flags draped every street corner in the capital. “
Vive la France
” was heard more often in Kigali than it was in Paris.
RTLM
was continuing to tell the population that the French were on the way to join them to fight the
RPF
. It seemed to me that for every life that Opération Turquoise would save, it would cost at least another because of the resurgence of the genocide.

On June 22, the attitude of the
RPF
changed dramatically toward all of us. Hostility, rudeness, threats and direct attacks were the order of the day as the
RPF
accused us, as the representatives of the
UN
in
Rwanda, of co-operating with the
UN
-mandated French intervention. Kagame's position was that we should immediately withdraw because he could not guarantee our safety. It took several tries to arrange a meeting with him at which I explained the stated purpose of the French operation as loyally and directly as I could. I thought I persuaded him we were not part of some diabolical conspiracy to deny the
RPF
its victory or protect or promote genocide. Of course, I found out later that while the
RPF
publicly opposed the French intervention, privately it had reconciled itself to the French deployment while Kagame completed his campaign.
³
It is extremely Byzantine that two former enemies had closer coordination and co-operation and better information than I had from either of them.

I've spent much time since wondering why Kagame was happier to tolerate Opération Turquoise than a fully mandated
UNAMIR
2. I can only assume that since the intention of
UNAMIR
2 was to stop the genocide and establish protected sites that would keep the displaced millions from fleeing the
RPF
, I would have inevitably argued that the
RPF
's advance should not exacerbate the humanitarian crisis, and that we would step in to provide protection until the situation stabilized. He knew that I regarded that task as my primary objective. But Kagame wanted all of the country, not parts of it. I came to believe he didn't want the situation to stabilize until he had won.

Operating in a void of information, I had to guess how the French would enter Rwanda and how they would conduct their operations. I knew Burundi had denied French transit and that Uganda would do the same. Tanzania had no infrastructure in the west that the French could use. I had denied entrance through Kigali. I told New York that if the French were permitted to enter that way, I would resign my command; if French planes appeared at the airport, I'd shoot them down. I also shot my mouth off on the subject to the media. To a certain extent, I meant it: if French troops
landed in the middle of Kigali, it would set off a gigantic battle with the
RPF
and permit the
RGF
and the interim government to continue to function. I was assured by the
DPKO
that Kigali was out of the question.

That left only Zaire (today the Republic of Congo). Goma, at the northern end of Lake Kivu, had a modern airport that needed repair but could support the French. There was also an airfield at Bukavu at the southern end of the lake. I decided that if they went only through Goma and Gisenyi, just inside the Rwandan border, that would confirm that they were really coming in to support the
RGF
. If so, I could expect them to enter combat operations against the
RPF
, which by default would drive a direct reprisal against
UNAMIR
and force our withdrawal. However, if the French entered through Bukavu, across the border from Cyangugu, to the west of where the vast majority of persons at risk were congregating, then their motives might be solely humanitarian and we could continue our mission.

Even before the Security Council had taken its final decision on June 22, the French were already landing in Goma, which I found out through media reports on the morning of June 23. So much for the argument that the international community did not have the means to rapidly deploy
UNAMIR
2. On the same day, the
RPF
announced that it was not opposed to a French operation if it was confined to humanitarian aims. And with our Franco-Africans gone, hostility toward
UNAMIR
immediately subsided, and we again began to push our patrols out from Kigali. Unfortunately almost all of the Hutu population, driven by
RTLM
, the
RGF
and the Interahamwe, were now moving to the west. Even more tragically, as the population moved it was again subjected to Interahamwe roadblocks, where not only surviving Tutsis were killed but also those without identity cards. Even a suspected “cockroach” had to die.

On June 24 the French entered Rwanda in patrol strength and were reported in the media to be in Gisenyi in the north and Cyangugu in the south and pushing beyond those locations. I was sure that if the French got too close to the
RPF
, a firefight would ensue; I had to get to the French commander, General Jean-Claude Lafourcade, to confirm his intentions and exchange liaison officers with his force. I wasn't going to wait for him to come and see me.

I contacted New York to ask the
DPKO
to determine, through the French Mission staff, where the Turquoise headquarters was in the field and to secure a meeting for me with its commander. Again, the
DPKO
directed me to co-operate with the French, be patient and understand the
realpolitik
. I replied that I expected no good to come of Opération Turquoise. From my perspective it looked like a cynical exercise in furthering French self-interest at the expense of the ongoing genocide. I failed to get anything from my bosses but tepid promises to consider my views.

With the
RPF
apparently calmed down about the French presence, I briefed Henry on the need to get the civilian transfers going again and to arrange for the moving of
RGF
prisoners of war from the Red Cross and King Faisal hospitals. I also told him that we had to regain contact with the interim government to restart the ceasefire negotiations that had come crashing to a halt after the hostage-taking in our compound, and keep an eye on its relationship with the French. We also needed to liaise with the interim government wherever it was in order to keep up our humanitarian efforts; the aid groups, with their increasing burden of displaced people, needed a conduit to the shrinking
RGF
zones.