Sir Walter Raleigh: In Life & Legend (6 page)

Ralegh Joined Lord Grey, who was marching to Smerwick with 600 foot and 200 horse, awaiting a larger force under the Earl of Ormond and ships under Admiral Winter. In the extended second edition of Ralph Holinshed's Chronicles (1587) the editor, John Hooker, recounts a story about Ralegh's conduct on the march. Knowing that after an army left camp in the morning, Irish foot soldiers had a habit of looting what they could find, Ralegh stayed behind at a camp near Tralee with his company and prepared an ambush. As he expected, some Irishmen appeared, one of them carrying a bundle of'withies', or willow branches. Ralegh asked him what they were for, to which the man unwisely replied that they would be used 'to hang up English churls'. 'Is it so (quothe the capteine) well they shall now serve for an Irish kerne', and hanged him with one of his own withies. Hooker was an Exeter man, and Ralegh the most likely source of his story.
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Winter's ships reached Smerwick on 5 November and eight culverins were landed from them. On 7 November Grey opened the bombardment. Three days later a white flag was shown from the fort; a parley was requested and granted, and an Italian camp-master appeared. Grey asked who they were and who had sent them, and was told that they were mostly Italians, with some Spaniards and a few Irish, and that they had been sent by the Pope. On 11 November the garrison commander, Colonel Sebastiano di San Giuseppi, came out with about a dozen officers and asked to be allowed to leave the fort after laying down their arms. Grey, according to his own account, refused to make any promises and insisted on unconditional surrender, on the grounds that the invaders were not commissioned by a sovereign power and the Pope's authority was invalid. They were not therefore protected by the law of arms: 'at my handes', wrote Grey, 'no condition of composition they were to expecte, other then that simply they should render me the forte, and yield theyr selves to my will for lyfe or death.' The Colonel clung to Grey's knees and begged to be allowed to spend that night in the fort and then 'all should be putt in my handes'. This was allowed and next morning 'trayling their ensignes rolled up', the Colonel came out with ten or twelve officers, who handed over the fort and their lives. Grey sent in some officers to supervise the surrender of the soldiers' arms and the guarding of munitions and victuals. 'Then', writes Grey, 'putt I in certeyne bandes, who straight fell to execution.' This task was said by Hooker to have been supervised by Ralegh and one Captain Humfrey Mackworth. Except for the officers, who were allowed to live for the sake of their ransoms, all the mercenaries were slaughtered by the sword. Their interpreter, Oliver Plunket, and a few other Irishmen were hanged after having their legs broken. Some pregnant women were also killed, apparently on the grounds that they must have had intercourse with the enemy, although there can scarcely have been enough time for that to have become apparent.
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 The dead have now been given a moving and handsome memorial in the form of a limestone slab carved by the sculptor Cliodhna Cussen, bearing the heads of decapitated men. At the back is a simple inscription in Irish: In remembrance, Dun an Oir, November 1580.
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Edmund Spenser, present at the negotiations, but not of course free from prejudice, reported that the Lord Deputy had specifically told the Italian Colonel that 'they could not justly plead either custom of war or law of nations, for that they were not any lawful enemies'.
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 San Giuseppi's account of events is not very different from Grey's and Spenser's. He writes that after a few days suffering under the English bombardment, the officers held a council and resolved to treat for terms. Grey replied that terms would only be granted 'at his discretion'. The Colonel claimed that he would let himself be cut into pieces before surrendering, but in the event he gave in, blaming his Irish allies for giving no help and criticizing his own troops, who, he said, were Biscay men, 'the most useless for soldiering that ever I saw'.
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Grey's reputation as a man of honour was badly tarnished. Graja fides, the faith of Grey became a synonym for perfidy in Ireland. Several accounts, among them the despatch of Bernadino de Mendoza, Spanish ambassador in London, to Philip II insisted that Grey had, in fact, promised the garrison life if they surrendered. Others put the blame on Oliver Plunket, the interpreter, who, they said, deliberately mistranslated the exchange in order to persuade San Giuseppi against surrender.
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 Much is obscure about these events. Why did the garrison surrender so quickly after only four days bombardment? After all, reinforcements were expected and might well have arrived shortly. Why did San Giuseppi accept that Grey had offered no quarter, and having done so, why did he lay down arms with no attempt at resistance? The surrender may have been the result of thirst as much as military considerations. The Colonel and the officers may - this is speculation - have had a secret promise from Grey that their lives would be spared for ransom. The negotiations, after all, took place through an interpreter in English, Italian and Spanish at a moment of tension and confusion. This hardly made for clarity. Queen Elizabeth is said by Camden to have disapproved of the massacre, but there is no contemporary evidence for this. The only criticism she made at the time was that the officers, the principals at the scene, should not have got away with their lives when the lower ranks suffered death, and more to the point, the decision should have been hers to make, not Grey's.

After his account of the massacre, Hooker reported on more of Ralegh's exploits in a degree of detail which can only have come from Ralegh himself. In February 1581 Ralegh told Walsingham of an encounter with John FitzEdmund FitzGerald, Seneschal of Imokilly, a leading associate of the Geraldines. In doing so he remarked that 'the manner of myne own behovior I leve to the report of others'.
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 Hooker obliged him in this six years later, with a judiciously expanded account of the incident in his extension to Holinshed's Chronicles. The Seneschal, Hooker tells us, had planned to ambush Ralegh at Ballinacorra Ford between Youghal and Cork, on his way back from a meeting in Dublin, when the latter had with him only three horsemen and four shot, against sixty foot soldiers and fourteen horsemen with the Seneschal. After Ralegh had crossed the ford, one of his men, Henry Moyle, fell from his horse and called for help; Ralegh rode back and rescued him, only to see him fall from his horse again. Once again, Ralegh came to the rescue, and then stood his ground, waiting for the rest of his troop to catch up. Although the odds were twenty to one in his favour, the Seneschal did not dare to attack him.
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Shortly after this, at a meeting with the Earl of Ormond, Governor of Cork, Ralegh - never one to let well alone - accused the Seneschal of cowardice. One of the latter's men said that although he had been cowardly at the time, he would not be so again. Even so, when a challenge was issued by Ralegh's men, it was again refused by the 'rebels'. At the end of the summer, however, when Ralegh was at Cork, he heard that David Barry, of Barryscourt, near Cork, was nearby with a large company. Ralegh once more issued a challenge, which was declined. Later on, however, seeing a company of foot soldiers, he charged them with six horsemen. They resisted; Ralegh's own horse was badly wounded, and he himself was put into some danger. Eventually, he overcame his enemies, several 'rebels' were killed and two taken prisoner to Cork.

Hooker's final story involved the capture of Lord Roche of Bally, whose castle lay twenty miles or so from Cork. Ralegh was ordered to bring Roche to the town for questioning about his supposed dealings with the enemy. The Seneschal and David Barry laid a trap for him, arranging to ambush him on his way to Roche's castle. Ralegh was made aware of this, but 'by devices and means...by little and little' got into the castle with all his men, ordering each of them 'to come into the hall with his peece well prepared with two bullets'. When Roche saw this he was 'amazed and stricken at the hart with feare', but played for time and courteously invited Ralegh to have dinner with him. Ralegh accepted and told Roche that he must come to Cork that night. Under threat of force Roche gave in and was marched through a dire and tempestuous night to the city. 'The dark night, which was cumbersome to themselves, was a shadow to shrowd them from their enimies', says Hooker. According to him, the citizens of Cork were astonished and admiring at this outcome, having supposed that Ralegh could never have escaped.
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Hooker could not have given Ralegh a better press in his account of Irish affairs in these years. He is presented as a prime player in the 'pacification' of Ireland rather than one among several fighting captains of the English companies; and he thus secured a form of immortality for his daring in the most widely read chronicle of the time.

However, more important than these tales of 'derring-do' are Ralegh's personal projects in Ireland and his ideas about the government of the country. For younger sons like Walter, Ireland was an opportunity state, and a captaincy in Elizabeth's army was a promising route to benefiting from its opportunities. The army was more like a collection of franchises than a unified body with a single command structure. There were no intermediate commands between the head of the state - Lord Deputy or Lord justice - and individual captains, who thus had a great deal of independence: they were well placed to secure posts in the local administration or the lordships of rebels.
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 Ralegh's eye lighted particularly on the lands of the Barry family, whose head,Viscount Barrymore, was imprisoned in Dublin Castle under suspicion of treason. On Barrymore's death in gaol in April 1581, his heir David Fitzjames Barry went into rebellion, and was duly proclaimed traitor in May. This was Ralegh's chance: he secured from Grey a promise of the Keepership of Barryscourt, just east of Cork, and of the Great Island in Cork Harbour.
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 According to his own account in a letter to Walsingham, he forbore to take possession of the castle until the arrival of the Earl of Ormond, not wanting to encroach on the latter's authority as Lord General of Munster. He suspected, rightly as it turned out, that Ormond was determined that the lands of rebels should go to 'loyal Irish' and not to English swordsmen.

Confirmation of his suspicions eventually led Ralegh into a passionate attack upon Ormond, who had, he said, achieved nothing during his two years in this post. In fact, he claimed, 'there ar at this instant a thowsand traytors more then ther were the first day'. Why, he asked, was the good service of Sir Humphrey Gilbert not considered? He had ended a serious rebellion with only a third of the troops now in Ireland, and the Irish were more frightened of him than of anyone else. Ralegh finished his letter with an unconvincing protest of humility, claiming that he only wanted to serve the Queen and would willingly surrender his commission and obey her without pay. He followed this with a request that he be allowed to keep Barryscourt and the Great Island." In May he returned to his attack on Ormond, who had, he wrote, failed in any way to curb the villainies of the Barrys. The defences of the Island had been spoiled and decayed, allowing the 'traitors' to receive the supplies they needed.
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 Ralegh was prepared to repair it and defend it for the Queen, but had been told that Ormond intended to hand it over to another when he had done so. Rather contradicting his earlier offer to serve without pay, he ended with a proposal to levy another 100 men from the country around.
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In August 1581, after only a year in Ireland, Ralegh wrote to Leicester complaining that the Earl had forgotten him, but that he would still serve hint 'as any man you may cummande'. Were it not that Grey was a follower of Leicester he would disdain his place 'as miche as to keap sheepe'.
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 His cousin Antony Denny had similarly complained about service in Irish bogs, describing them to Walsingham as better suited to mastiffs than brave gentlemen desiring honour.
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 While Irish service was attractive to many who hoped only for a modest revenue, it was less so for those with greater pretensions, like Ralegh and Denny, who looked to the Court for higher honours and rewards.

Following the success at Smerwick, Elizabeth's government sensed victory and sought to economize. A total of 3,300 men were withdrawn from the English forces. In December 1581 Ralegh was sent to London to carry dispatches from Ireland, and on New Year's Day 1582 Burghley informed Grey that the Queen was determined to reduce the cost of garrisons. He mentioned also that Ralegh had advised the Queen against laying the cost of 200 soldiers on Ormond's tenants.
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 Ralegh must have suggested more than this, for ten days later Grey wrote a furious letter to Burghley, complaining that Ralegh's plan might seem 'plausible' to the Queen and lead her to think that he himself had not looked carefully into the matter. In fact, he wrote, he had discussed Ralegh's plan with the Council in Dublin, which saw many 'inconveniences and impossibilities in the accomplishment therof'.
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 By the spring, Grey's personal relations with Ralegh had further deteriorated. 'For myne owne parte I must be playne', he wrote to Walsingham, 'I nether lyke his carriage nor company.'
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 One can understand why. Ralegh, a recent arrival in Ireland, had links with the Court and was evidently ready to exploit them. He was arrogant, ambitious, brave and intelligent. Understandably and probably correctly, Grey suspected intrigue at Court, and, although Elizabeth insisted that she objected only to the cost of his proposed garrisons, he was not reassured and left Ireland in the summer of 1582.

Compared with Grey's proposals for ever more severe terror and an extensive system of garrisons, Ralegh sought a more pacific approach, based upon the support of Irish warlords, including Ormond. It is not clear why Ralegh turned to Ormond: possibly growing hostility between Grey and himself led him to look to the other major power-broker in Munster; possibly he was guided by the ties of Court faction in London. Recognizing that the Queen objected to the high cost of Grey's proposed garrisons, Ralegh suggested that men who had sided with Desmond from fear of the Earl's retribution, could be enticed to the English cause with pardons and offers of secure tenures for their properties. It was essential, he argued, that no hope of pardon be offered to Desmond himself, since otherwise it would be impossible to detach his adherents. Once that was done, Ireland could be held by a reduced number of garrisons. But, he warned, soldiers must be paid properly, for without that they would oppress the people with taxes and pillage, driving them again into rebellion.
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 Initially the reduction of garrisons led to the recruitment of more men to the rebel cause, but within a year the Crown's policy was gaining ground. John of Desmond had already been captured and killed in January 1582 and in the following year the Earl himself was caught on the run and murdered. The rebellion was at an end and the ground had been cleared, literally, for planting English settlers. In the longer term the problem of ruling Ireland remained acute, but given a Queen and a Lord Treasurer determined to rule on the cheap, Ralegh's solution was probably sensible.
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 Furthermore, his preference for quiet diplomacy rather than a purely military solution reveals a surprising side to his character. He was not averse to violence and cannot be called a patient man; yet here he was thoughtful and pragmatic, contrasting sharply with his friend Spenser, a Protestant ideologue who favoured all-out conquest.
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