Stalin’s refusal was probably not a major factor in the Polish debacle. In 1920, when the reasons for the Red Army’s defeat were dissected, most of the blame was laid on the commanders of the Western Front in charge of the invasion of Warsaw. But Stalin’s willful behavior may be why he was recalled from the front just a few days after the incident with the First Cavalry Army. He left for Moscow and never returned to military action. The laurels for victory over Wrangel that soon followed were placed on other heads.
The return to the capital was hardly triumphant. On top of his failure to achieve a decisive victory either in Lvov or against Wrangel, Stalin’s refusal to carry out an order could be seen as a major factor in the Warsaw defeat. It may have been fear that he would be cast as a scapegoat, together with hurt feelings, that led him to launch a characteristic preemptive attack. On 25 August 1920, when events in Poland were clearly turning catastrophic for the Red Army, he submitted a memorandum to the Politburo calling for the creation of military reserves. On the surface, this memorandum—calling for a troop increase, expanded military production, and the formation of new units—was fully in keeping with the priorities that had dominated Bolshevik policy throughout the Civil War. But its real importance lies in one sentence: “The latest successes of the Poles have disclosed a fundamental defect of our armies, namely, the lack of effective fighting reserves.”
35
This was Stalin’s attempt to place responsibility for the defeat on the shoulders of the army’s main leadership. He attributed great significance to this memorandum and insisted on a response. On 29 August 1920 he again wrote to his Politburo colleagues: “I am drawing the attention of the Central Committee to the urgency of the matter of the republic’s military reserves that I raised … and which as of now (29 August) has yet to be dealt with.”
36
Trotsky ultimately provided a condescending explanation of the situation and proposed creating a procurement council, on which he invited Stalin to serve. It was a clever move to invite Stalin to take on the thankless job of keeping the army of their impoverished country well supplied, and Stalin seems to have been enraged by Trotsky’s response. On 30 August he sent three memoranda to the Politburo, all aimed at Trotsky. In one, he characterized Trotsky’s response to his previous memorandum as a “runaround” and demanded that the Central Committee keep a closer watch over the military—in other words, over Trotsky.
37
In a second brief but categorical note, he responded to Trotsky’s proposal that he join the procurement council: “I hereby state that I cannot and, consequently, will not work on Trotsky’s planned procurement council.”
38
To top off these hostile pronouncements, he made a risky move. He proposed creating a commission “to investigate the circumstances of our July offensive and August retreat on the Western Front.”
39
Given the context of his accusations of negligence in regard to reserves, this was a clear declaration of war against Trotsky. Was Stalin aware that he was indirectly attacking Lenin as well since Lenin had been at the forefront of those urging the Polish adventure? If, in the heat of emotion, he did not immediately realize this, he certainly was informed of it soon enough.
The next day, on 1 September, a decisive showdown took place at a Politburo meeting. The main parties to the conflict—Stalin, Trotsky, and their arbitrator, Lenin—were all present. The mood was somber. Much of the meeting was spent discussing the humiliating peace with Poland. Stalin’s military reserves proposal was taken up toward the end and essentially rejected. The resolution adopted recognized “Trotsky’s statement that the military is taking measures in the spirit of Stalin’s proposals.”
40
In other words, steps were being taken and Stalin’s advice on the matter was no longer required. A special council on supplying the army was chaired by Trotsky and did not include Stalin, whose refusal to serve was taken with infuriating literalness. Equally insulting was the rejection of Stalin’s call for an investigation into the reasons for defeat in Poland. Lenin adamantly opposed this idea.
To the great regret of historians, no detailed stenographic record was kept of this Politburo meeting (or of many other important meetings). The only documentation is a laconic record of resolutions, a poor indicator of the passions that no doubt flared, either openly or within the hearts of the participants. Stalin resigned his military duties. His resignation was accepted, depriving him of his membership in the Military Revolutionary Council. Trotsky’s authority and rights were confirmed, and he was assigned to inspect the Western Front.
41
Lenin clearly took Trotsky’s side. On 20 September a Central Committee plenum adopted a decision to send Stalin “on long-term assignment to the Caucasus.” He was given the job of “settling relations with highlanders” and “bringing order … to policy in the Caucasus and East [Soviet Asia].”
42
Perhaps this was an honorable exile, or perhaps it was a new and important assignment. In any case, several days later, at the ninth conference of the Russian Communist Party, a public confrontation took place between Stalin on one side and Lenin and Trotsky on the other. The recriminations over the Polish war that had been roiling in the Politburo erupted into public view.
At the conference, Lenin and Trotsky both spoke out against the charges Stalin had leveled against the commanders of the Western Front and, essentially, the entire Red Army command. Lenin took personal responsibility for a large share of the strategic miscalculations and rejected Stalin’s call for an investigation. Trotsky made snide references to Stalin’s optimistic anticipation of victory in Poland and his assurances that he would take Lvov.
43
On 23 September, a deeply offended Stalin submitted a statement to the conference’s presidium. He categorically denied Trotsky’s and Lenin’s accusations. He reiterated his charge that the commanders of the Western Front were responsible for the defeat in Poland (a jab at Trotsky) and claimed that he, Stalin, had always advocated prudence and caution. “Comrade Lenin evidently is being merciful toward the command, but I think what is needed is mercy for the cause, not the command,” he concluded caustically.
44
With the benefit of currently available documents, we can state with certainty that Stalin was lying about his past advocacy of caution. Lenin nevertheless did not challenge him, probably because Stalin’s calls for decisiveness and world revolution suited his interests. Ultimately, all their fates hung on the success of their common endeavor, so they preferred to put this unpleasant chapter of defeat behind them as quickly as possible. In his call for an investigation into mistakes, Stalin looked like a dissident. Furthermore, everyone knew that he was as guilty as anyone. But as in the past, he escaped this episode generally unscathed. He left for the Caucasus, but several weeks later, in late November 1920, he returned to Moscow. Stalin’s conflicts with his colleagues during these years were turning into a habit. It was not a new habit, but it was becoming more pronounced and deeply rooted. His behavior reflected the objective fact that the party was plagued by conflict spawned by principled differences and personal ambitions. This circumstance inevitably led to the formation of cliques. Stalin’s was comprised of veterans of Tsaritsyn, members of the First Cavalry Army, and Transcaucasians who enjoyed Stalin’s patronage and support. Other Soviet leaders were also assembling followers. The seeds of future clashes and power struggles were being sown.
The Bolsheviks’ first experience running the country came in a time of war. This factor shaped both their practical approach to governing and their philosophy. Experiences acquired in Tsaritsyn and Petrograd reinforced Stalin’s intuitive mistrust of “bourgeois specialists” and his fear of conspiracies. Grain requisitions in the south and the organization of a labor army in Ukraine gave him experience using strong-arm tactics to steer the economy.
45
The Civil War accustomed the Bolsheviks to blood and ruthlessness. Atrocities lost their horror.
GENERAL SECRETARY
The Bolsheviks emerged from the Civil War as winners. But explaining to the exhausted country, or even to themselves, what they had been fighting for was no simple matter. The dream of world revolution appeared to be just that, and Lenin’s idea that socialism would be immediately introduced in Russia proved catastrophically utopian, just as his opponents had warned. Attempts to abolish the market system and replace it with direct exchange under total governmental control only furthered economic collapse. Famine and devastation sparked massive anti-government protests. Huge areas were engulfed by peasant revolts. The unrest spread to cities, including such Bolshevik strongholds as Moscow and Petrograd. The rebellion by sailors of the Kronstadt garrison outside Petrograd became a symbol of the failures of the Bolshevik policy of militarized socialism. When this bastion of the 1917 revolution took up arms, “Kronstadt” became a highly fraught political watchword.
Under these circumstances, Lenin, who had a well-developed instinct for political self-preservation, allowed his steadfast principles a generous bend. In 1921–1922, Leninist socialism was replaced by the Leninist NEP (New Economic Policy). Many aspects of the Soviet economy reverted to their state before the Bolshevik revolution. The lion’s share of the economy remained under state control, but certain market activities were allowed. The use of money was restored. Peasants were allowed to sell their produce after paying taxes to the state. Private small industry and trade were returned to private ownership (the entrepreneurs who ran small businesses were called “Nepmen”). Despised capitalism came to the Bolsheviks’ rescue, saving their country and their hold on power. Thanks to the NEP, the USSR came back from the brink of disaster in just a few years. But before the recovery could be felt, the horrific famine of 1921–1922, a direct outcome of the Civil War, took millions of lives.
Such was the backdrop to Stalin’s life during the lead-up to the death of his teacher, Lenin. The historical record does not offer evidence of any active involvement by Stalin in discussing or deciding key problems in the transition to the NEP. He followed the political course set by Lenin and was a loyal and true comrade. Lenin undoubtedly valued this loyalty. But after the Civil War, Stalin’s political prominence was hardly guaranteed. Simply being a member of the Politburo assured him a certain degree of power. But in the Soviet party-political system, the degree of power a leader actually exercised was directly tied to the influence of the government agency he headed. From this standpoint, Stalin was in danger of becoming a second-tier functionary.
The conclusion of the war found Stalin running two agencies: the nationalities commissariat and the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate. Neither had meaningful levers of power or more than limited lobbying potential. At a closed meeting, Stalin himself characterized the nationalities commissariat as serving a purely “agitation” purpose without any “administrative rights.”
46
He spent very little time at this agency. In November 1921 he submitted his resignation from it to the Politburo, but it was not accepted.
47
He did everything he could to abolish the commissariat, and in 1923 he finally succeeded. Even earlier, in 1922, he had managed to shed his duties with the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate. He exchanged these undesirable posts for one that was much more appealing: running the Central Committee apparat. This position moved him into the upper echelons of the leadership.
What brought about this turning point in Stalin’s political career was not only his talents and energy, but also a heated battle within the Soviet leadership. The central conflict was between Lenin and Trotsky, but smaller clashes reverberated all around them. Trotsky was the only top Bolshevik who could rightfully claim to be a leader in his own right, not just a follower of Lenin. His role was more that of a partner and ally in revolution, and he behaved accordingly, earning himself a following within the party. At the end of 1920, Lenin realized that a significant portion of party functionaries, including some within the Central Committee apparat, supported Trotsky. Lenin had to respond to this challenge to his primacy. At the Tenth Party Congress in early 1921, after intense maneuvering and considerable use of his authority, Lenin made sure that his followers received a majority of votes. This outcome determined who would be chosen to run the top party organizations, and many Trotsky followers were removed from their posts. Stalin was one of Lenin’s key allies in this struggle. Given Lenin’s declining health, such cooperation took on new importance. Beginning in mid-1921, he was increasingly plagued by symptoms of severe cerebral arteriosclerosis. Headaches, fatigue, episodes of paralysis, and impaired speech and cognition forced him to take extended vacations.
Lenin’s illness and clash with Trotsky, along with the reshuffling of party personnel, all helped Stalin play an increasingly important role in party affairs. In early 1922, this role was formalized when Stalin was appointed to the newly created post of general secretary of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)—TsK RKP(b). The job of the general secretary included overseeing the Central Committee apparat and its “leading structures”—the bureaucratic machine that carried out the will of the party. Two duties deserve particular mention: setting the agenda for Politburo meetings and deciding personnel matters. Countless mid-level functionaries now depended on Stalin for their careers.
For Stalin, the running of the party apparat was not a burden. His previous party experience and his personality made him well suited for this position. Later, even as dictator, Stalin seemed to enjoy routine bureaucratic work. Upon taking up the post of general secretary, he began to reorganize the work of the Politburo. On 31 August 1922 he announced at a Politburo meeting that certain institutions were tardy in submitting materials for consideration. A resolution was adopted to “not place any matter before the Politburo unless materials are submitted by four o’clock the previous day.”
48
A few weeks later, the rule became even stricter: the deadline was pushed back to noon.
49
Through these petty decisions Stalin was gradually, and with increasing confidence, shaping how the party apparat was run.