Stalin's General (11 page)

A particularly thorny problem in Soviet-Japanese relations was the border between Mongolia and Manchuria. The People's Republic of Mongolia, formerly the Chinese province of Outer Mongolia, was founded as a Soviet client state in 1924. When the Japanese occupied Manchuria border disputes between Mongolia and the Manchukuo government began to accumulate. As these disputes escalated Moscow signed the Soviet-Mongolian mutual assistance treaty of March 1936, signaling its firm intention to defend Mongolia against Japanese encroachments.

The most serious incident to occur before the Khalkhin-Gol battle of 1939 was a division-strength clash in 1938 between the Soviet Far Eastern Army and the Kwantung Army at Lake Khasan on the border between Korea, Manchuria, and the USSR. After some heavy fighting the Japanese backed away from further confrontation and accepted the Soviet demarcation of the border. That the Japanese would retreat in the face of a determined stand against them was not lost on the Soviet leadership.

Despite the overall success of the Soviets there were some question marks hanging over the Red Army's performance during the Lake Khasan battle. Following an investigation the Far Eastern Army was disbanded in September 1938, its place taken by two separate army groups. The Soviets also decided to establish the 57th Special Corps specifically to be deployed in Mongolia.

The dispute at Khalkhin-Gol concerned the border between Manchuria and Mongolia. Did the frontier run along the Khalkhin-Gol River as the Japanese asserted, or was the border located somewhat east of the river as the Mongolians claimed? Given that the dispute concerned the ownership of a few square miles of inhospitable and sparsely populated terrain, it was not intrinsically important to either the Soviets or the Japanese. But the troubled history of Soviet-Japanese relations in China magnified its importance. At stake was the power relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union in the Far East and the question of who was likely to prevail in the event of a broader military conflict between the two states.

Zhukov arrived at the Tamtsak-Bulak HQ of the 57th Corps shortly after receiving his orders from Voroshilov on May 24. By May 30 he and his inspection team had submitted a report to Voroshilov on an “exceptionally disorganized battle” with the Japanese that had taken place east of the Khalkhin-Gol River on May 28 and 29—a fight that had resulted in Soviet casualties of seventy-one dead, eighty wounded, and thirty-three missing. The disorganization of the battle, reported Zhukov, was the result of poor tactics, ill-conceived battle management, and a failure to calculate and anticipate enemy maneuvers.
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On June 3 Zhukov wrote to Voroshilov that among the corps command staff only Kushchev, the chief of staff, was doing good work. As to Feklenko: “as a Bolshevik and a person, he is good and undoubtedly committed to the cause of the party and he tries hard, but fundamentally he is badly organised and insufficiently purposeful. A fuller appraisal of Feklenko can only be given after further study of him.”
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Also in Mongolia was the deputy chief of the Red Air Force, Y. V. Smushkevich, sent to Khalkhin-Gol with reinforcements for the air battle with the Japanese. He knew Zhukov quite well from his own time in the Belorussian Military District. On June 8 Smushkevich wrote to Voroshilov: “I have come to the conclusion that the Corps Command and Feklenko personally have failed.… Without doubt, the Corps Command was not prepared or badly prepared for battle.… Zhukov is now imposing some order. In my view it would be advisable to retain him as Corps Commander for a while.” Voroshilov replied to Smushkevich the same day, agreeing with his analysis of the situation and informing him that Feklenko would be replaced.
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Zhukov was appointed commander of the 57th Corps on June 12, 1939.

Zhukov threw himself into his new command with characteristic vigor and determination. One of his first actions was to propose the establishment of a system of intelligence based on agent infiltration, aerial reconnaissance, and prisoner interrogation. Without such a system, Zhukov cabled Voroshilov on June 16, “we do not have a full and clear view of the enemy.” Another Zhukov initiative was improved training and preparation for the forthcoming battle with the Japanese, especially the restoration of military discipline in the 57th Corps.
Battle did resume in July when the Japanese tried to dislodge the Soviets from their positions east of the Khalkhin-Gol River and to establish their own bridgehead on the west bank. During the course of fierce fighting the Red Army suffered heavy casualties. From May 16 to July 25 the 57th Corps suffered more than 5,000 casualties, mostly during the July battles. Not surprisingly, Zhukov's emphasis on discipline became even more pronounced and orders were issued that commanders and commissars would be held personally responsible for their units' conduct during battle. If they failed to carry out orders, they would be brought before military tribunals and severely punished. On July 13 Zhukov issued a decree announcing that two soldiers had been shot for cowardice. The decree, which was distributed to all soldiers in the 57th Corps, concluded with the peroration: “To us, the sons of a 170-million-strong nation, has fallen the high honour of defending the toiling masses of the People's Republic of Mongolia from the despicable invaders.… I call upon you to show courage, manliness, audacity, braveness and heroism. Death to despicable cowards and traitors!”
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In the middle of the July battle there occurred an episode that was to have significant personal consequences for Zhukov. Deputy Defense Commissar G. I. Kulik, who was in overall charge of Soviet artillery, had arrived at Khalkhin-Gol on an inspection tour. On July 13 he ordered Zhukov to withdraw the bulk of Soviet forces east of the river to the west bank. Zhukov—as always a model of discipline—began to implement the order but when the General Staff in Moscow saw his situation reports and found out what was happening they ordered him to desist. In a conversation with Boris Shaposhnikov, the chief of the General Staff, on July 14 Zhukov explained that he was acting in accordance with Kulik's orders but that he would stop the withdrawal if so ordered. Strict instructions to that effect were cabled to Zhukov by Voroshilov that same day. Meanwhile, Kulik appealed to Moscow to support his decision but was given short shrift by Voroshilov, who ordered him not to meddle in the affairs of the 57th Corps.
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This incident informed an important organizational decision made in Moscow. Hitherto the 57th Corps had been formally subordinate to a Front Group of all Soviet forces in Siberia and the Far East established
on July 5, 1939, and commanded by G. M. Shtern. On July 19 the 57th Corps was reorganized into the 1st Army Group and given operational independence from Shtern's Front Group. This peculiar arrangement was designed to ensure Zhukov could act without interference except for instructions coming directly from the General Staff in Moscow. It seems that Voroshilov and Shaposhnikov wanted to avoid a possible repetition of the Kulik incident during the upcoming battle. The command picture was completed on July 31 when Zhukov was formally promoted from Komdiv (divisional commander) to Komkor (corps commander)—the equivalent of a general in a western army.

Shtern's Front Group continued to be involved in planning and preparations for the battle at Khalkhin-Gol and on July 27 Shtern sent Zhukov a directive asking him to submit by July 31 proposals for the destruction of the Japanese forces and their expulsion from Mongolian territory. Although Zhukov did not take credit in his memoirs for formulating the plan for the offensive of August 1939, he certainly gave the impression that he and his staff were central to its preparation—a plausible claim since he was the front-line commander and had been given operational independence by Moscow. But it was Shtern who submitted the draft plan to Moscow on August 10 and it was Shtern's chief of staff, M. A. Bogdanov, who drew up the plans for the extensive preparations for the battle.
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Zhukov may have been the executor of the battle plan but he was not its only architect.

By far the most important aspect of the Red Army's preparations for the August offensive was the buildup of Soviet forces at Khalkhin-Gol. By the eve of the offensive the 1st Army Group included the 57th and 82nd Rifle Divisions and the 36th Motorized Rifle Division; the 6th and 8th Mongolian Cavalry Divisions; the 7th and 8th Mechanized Brigades and the 5th Machine Gun Brigade; and the 6th and 11th Tank Brigades. In all Zhukov had thirty-five rifle battalions and twenty cavalry squadrons at his disposal. In his attack on the Japanese Zhukov was able to deploy 57,000 troops, more than 500 artillery pieces, nearly 900 tanks and armored cars, and 500 planes.
Ranged against him were twenty-five Japanese battalions and seventeen squadrons, a total of 75,000 troops with artillery and aircraft numbers equivalent to those of the Soviet, but far fewer tanks and armored cars than Zhukov could deploy.
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To assemble, supply, and ready such a sizable force was a huge logistical task. The terrain was inhospitable, the roads poor, and the nearest railhead 400 miles away. According to Zhukov a round-trip to the railhead took five days and the Soviets had to use some 5,000 trucks to ship in 18,000 tons of artillery ammunition; 6,500 tons of aircraft ammunition; 15,000 tons of fuel and lubricants; 7,500 tons of solid fuel, 4,000 tons of food; 4,000 tons of other supplies.
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Great attention was given to concealing Soviet offensive intentions and preparations from the Japanese—what the Soviets called
maskirovka
. Movements of supplies and troops were concealed and assault forces were deployed for attack only at the last possible moment. False radio traffic was used to indicate the Red Army was digging in for defense, not preparing an attack. A handbook entitled
What the Soviet Soldier Must Know in Defense
was distributed to troops and deliberately leaked to the Japanese. Training was carried out in secret and draft planning document distribution was restricted to the top command. A single typist was used to type out the operational directives and combat orders.
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Zhukov also kept the Japanese guessing by continuing to launch local attacks against enemy positions. These tricks, this exercise in
maskirovka
, worked. The Kwantung Army had no idea a major Soviet attack was being prepared and when Zhukov's offensive began he achieved complete operational surprise—a major factor in the immediate and stunning success of the operation.

Zhukov issued his general directive to the 1st Army Group on the Khalkhin-Gol offensive on August 17.
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The attack was to begin on August 20; its aim, stated the directive, was to encircle and destroy Japanese forces on Mongolian territory east of the Khalkhin-Gol River. For this purpose Zhukov divided his forces into three groups. The Southern Group, which constituted Zhukov's right wing, was to deliver the main blow and was to cross the Khalkhin-Gol and head toward Nomonhan, with the aim of encircling Japanese forces north of the Khailastyn-Gol (a tributary of the Khalkhin-Gol). There it would link up with Zhukov's Central and Northern Groups and destroy
the encircled Japanese. The Northern Group's role was to attack the Japanese north flank at Fui Heights and to support the Central and Southern Groups' assault on enemy forces north of the Khailastyn-Gol. Most of Zhukov's armor and mechanized forces were deployed in the Northern and Southern Groups. The Central Group, consisting mainly of infantry, was to launch a frontal assault on Japanese positions north and south of the Khailastyn-Gol, in the latter case linking up with elements of the Southern Group in another encirclement maneuver. Zhukov's HQ was located at Hamar Daba in the central sector and immediately behind him was deployed a strong mobile reserve ready to exploit the success of the Northern and Southern Groups. (See
Map 1
: The Battle of Khalkhin-Gol, August 20–31, 1939
.)

The attack began in the early hours of Sunday morning, August 20, a day chosen, according to Zhukov, because many senior Japanese officers, not expecting a Soviet offensive, had taken Sunday leave. In his memoirs Zhukov recalled:

The operation went more or less as planned. Soviet tanks and motorized forces quickly overran Japanese infantry and artillery positions. Soviet air forces flew hundreds of sorties and dropped 86,000 kilograms of bombs. Soviet artillery pounded Japanese positions,
causing by far the greatest number of enemy casualties. There was a sticky moment on August 24 when the Japanese launched a counterattack aimed at breaking the Soviet ring surrounding their forces trapped north of the Khailastyn-Gol. But Zhukov responded by committing some of his reserves, including the 6th Tank Brigade, to parry the Japanese. After three days of intense fighting the Japanese counterattack petered out. On August 27 Zhukov issued a decree to the 1st Army Group announcing that the Japanese forces on Mongolian territory at Khalkhin-Gol had been surrounded and destroyed.
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The battle was not over yet, however, and between August 28 and 31 some tough pockets of Japanese resistance had to be liquidated.