Stalin's General (35 page)

Sergeant Beyrle's story gained worldwide attention in 1994 on the fiftieth anniversary of D-Day when at a ceremony in the White House President Bill Clinton and President Boris Yeltsin of Russia both presented him with medals. Beyrle died in 2004—four years before his son John was appointed United States ambassador to Russia. In an interview in Moscow in April 2011 Ambassador Beyrle stated that as far as he was concerned “Zhukov had helped save his father's life.”
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Zhukov's eye remained on Berlin and at the end of March he submitted to the General Staff a plan with two variants for renewing the attack on the German capital: first, an expansion of the existing bridgehead west of the Oder in the Kustrin area; second, the establishment of a new bridgehead north of Kustrin and south of Schwedt, while also strengthening a small bridgehead at Frankfurt-on-Oder.
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Zhukov traveled to Moscow to discuss his plans with the General Staff but his proposals were about to be overtaken by events.

On March 31 Stalin received a message from General Eisenhower, the western commander-in-chief, detailing Anglo-American strategic plans. Eisenhower told Stalin his immediate objective was to destroy German forces defending the Ruhr. He would then head for Erfurt, Dresden, and Leipzig and link up with Soviet forces in this area. It was possible, too, that western forces would conduct a secondary advance toward Regensburg-Linz, with the aim of foiling German plans to establish a last redoubt in the south. Eisenhower concluded by asking Stalin for information about Soviet plans.
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Eisenhower's message was delivered to Stalin in his office that evening by Averell Harriman, the American ambassador. After Harriman left, Stalin was joined by Zhukov, Antonov, and Shtemenko, who stayed for an hour or so.
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Presumably, Stalin discussed the contents of Eisenhower's message. Stalin replied to Eisenhower the next day to say that western and Soviet strategic plans coincided. He agreed that Soviet and western forces should link up in the Erfurt-Leipzig-Dresden area and said his High Command thought their main thrust of attack would be in that direction. The German capital, Stalin stated, “has lost its former strategic significance so the Soviet Supreme Command is thinking of setting aside only secondary forces for Berlin.” The main Soviet attack, Stalin informed Eisenhower, would begin in the second half of May.
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Stalin's reply later became a matter of controversy when it was suggested that he had deliberately misled Eisenhower about Soviet intentions in relation to Berlin. It is possible, however, that Stalin meant what he said at the time but later changed his mind. The clue to what might have prompted such a change is provided by Konev's memoirs. On April 2 Konev joined Zhukov, Antonov, and Shtemenko for a two-hour meeting in Stalin's office. According to Konev, Shtemenko read out a telegram, evidently from a Soviet intelligence source, stating that the British and Americans were preparing an operation to take Berlin before the Red Army. Stalin then turned to Konev and Zhukov and asked them: “Well, then, who is going to take Berlin, we or the Allies?” “It is we who will be taking Berlin,” replied Konev, “and we shall take it before the Allies.”
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On the following day, Antonov, Konev, Shtemenko, and Zhukov returned to Stalin's office for a shorter meeting.
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That same day Stalin signed directives to Zhukov and Konev ordering that Berlin be captured as soon as possible. Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front was to launch an offensive to capture Berlin and to reach the Elbe River (the agreed Soviet-western military demarcation line in Germany) within twelve to fifteen days of the launch of the operation. Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front was to rout the Germans south of Berlin and advance to Dresden within ten to twelve days and then consider an attack on Leipzig. The demarcation line between the 1st Belorussian and the 1st Ukrainian was fixed at Lübben about forty miles southeast of Berlin,
effective from April 15—an indication that the dual offensive was to commence on April 16.

The plan meant Zhukov would strike directly toward the German capital and envelop the city from the north, while Konev's forces were to surround the city from the south. A supporting role would be played by Rokossovsky's 2nd Belorussian Front opening an offensive toward Berlin on April 20 to protect Zhukov's right flank from a northern counterattack by the Germans.
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(See
Map 25
: The Berlin Operation, April 1945
.) The rapid preparation signaled Stalin's determination to seize Berlin before his western allies. Weather permitting, he could be confident of success, albeit at the cost of the lives of many Soviet soldiers who might otherwise have survived the war.

In his memoirs Shtemenko suggested Stalin manipulated the demarcation line between the 1st Belorussian and the 1st Ukrainian Fronts to create a race to Berlin between Zhukov and Konev. According to Shtemenko the original demarcation line was much further south and was changed by Stalin when Konev protested that he should be given a chance to deploy his forces closer to Berlin. Later, Stalin supposedly told Shtemenko and the General Staff: “Whoever reaches Berlin first, let him take it.”
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Shtemenko's story is probably a little overdramatic but it is not difficult to imagine Stalin manipulating the rivalry between Zhukov and Konev to ensure Berlin was taken as quickly as possible.

According to Konev the change in the boundary between the 1st Belorussian and the 1st Ukrainian Fronts was Stalin's idea, not his. “Was this demarcation line at Lübben,” wondered Konev, “an implicit call for competition between the Fronts? I cannot deny the possibility. At any rate, it is not to be excluded.”
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Zhukov, however, emphatically denied Shtemenko's story and insisted that 1st Belorussian alone was tasked to take Berlin, with Konev's 1st Ukrainian playing an auxiliary role only if needed.
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Berlin was a formidable target, notwithstanding the battering the city had taken during the previous five years. Between 1940 and 1945 the British RAF dropped more than 60,000 tons of bombs on Berlin, killing 200,000 people and destroying up to 75 percent of buildings in the center of the city. A great number of the city's inhabitants were homeless. Before the war the population of Berlin was nearly 4.5 million.
By early 1945 the population was little more than three million, including 120,000 children and some two million women. The city was bursting with refugees from the east, with the remnants of foreign volunteers in SS divisions that had fought on the Eastern Front, and with hundreds of thousands of slave laborers conscripted by the Germans to work in their war factories.

The city's defenses extended to a depth of thirty miles and were organized in three defensive zones, which bristled with machine gun nests, bunkers, and strongpoints, concealed trench systems, antitank ditches, artillery, and tanks and antitank guns. Forward zones were riddled with minefields and many areas were flooded to slow the Soviet advance. Huge flak towers containing Berlin's antiaircraft defenses were adapted to take part in the coming land battle. A million German troops supported by 1,500 tanks and assault guns and nearly 10,000 mortars and artillery pieces defended the city and its approaches. The German plan was to conduct a fighting retreat from zone to zone and, if possible, prevent a Soviet breakthrough into or around Berlin. By 1945 the Germans had been on the defensive for more than two years and had become adept at fighting retreats.

In truth, the German defenders were a motley bunch of understrength and undersupplied units containing a good number of young boys and old men conscripted for the final fight with the Soviets. Nevertheless, the Germans inflicted a high number of casualties on the Red Army, proportionally more than it had suffered in any campaign since the disastrous early months of the war.
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Why did the Germans fight on when it was evident to even the most fanatical Nazi that the only outcome could be catastrophic defeat? The short answer is that they feared Soviet retaliation more than defeat. As the Red Army advanced through eastern Germany Nazi propagandists regaled the population with stories of Soviet atrocities against German civilians as well as soldiers. Though exaggerated, some of the stories were true and were confirmed by German refugees from the east. The Germans also hoped that if they fought on, something might turn up—the western allies would reach Berlin first, Stalin would fall out with Churchill and Roosevelt, or Hitler's much vaunted secret super-weapons would materialize and turn the tide of the war.

In the limited time available Zhukov prepared as thoroughly as he could for the challenge of taking the biggest and most heavily defended urban target the Red Army had ever confronted. He assembled a force of 77 rifle divisions supported by 3,155 tanks and self-propelled guns, 14,628 artillery pieces and mortars, and 1,531 rocket launchers. Forty ferry crossings and twenty-five bridges were constructed across the Oder. Zhukov's engineers built models of the city center and preparations were made for street fighting on the scale of Stalingrad. On the eve of the main attack a reconnaissance force was conducted to draw enemy fire and to probe for weaknesses in the Germans' defenses.

The main operational problem Zhukov faced was how to break out of the Kustrin bridgehead. This would entail seizing the Seelow Heights—a 100- to 200-foot sandy ridge with steep slopes. Heavily defended by the Germans, the Heights dominated the surrounding countryside, which was marshy and in places waterlogged because of the spring thaw. Zhukov decided on a frontal assault by his field armies, followed by an exploitation of the breakthrough by two tank armies that would then encircle Berlin north and south. To catch the enemy by surprise Zhukov decided on a night attack preceded by a short but intensive artillery barrage. The attack began at 3:00
A.M
. on April 16, 1945, with more than a million shells fired at enemy positions. At 3:30
A.M
., Zhukov switched on 140 searchlights that illuminated the battlefield with light equivalent to 100,000 million candles. “It was a striking picture,” Zhukov recalled, “and I remember having seen nothing like it during my whole life.” Dramatic though it was, some of Zhukov's generals were not so sure about the effectiveness of this tactic, pointing out later that the searchlights blinded Soviet troops as well as the Germans. Also controversial in retrospect was Zhukov's decision to commit his tank armies to battle just a few hours after the opening attack. He did this to support the faltering assault of his field armies on the Seelow Heights. But the Kustrin bridgehead was a small and congested area and the tanks clogged the roads and further hampered the advance of the infantry. It took Zhukov nearly three days to take the Heights.

Captain Anatoly Mereshko of the 8th Guards Army recalled Zhukov's frustration at this turn of events: “Zhukov was angry and used
clipped, hard-toned phrases, each one accompanied by a threat. I was to find the XXIX Infantry Corps commander, and tell him to organize the storming of the Seelow Heights by 3:00
P.M
. or he would be demoted and lose his Hero of the Soviet Union award. Further threats were made against the commanders of the 47th and 82nd Guards Divisions. The order was duly delivered but its recipients all made the same point. Our reconnaissance had belatedly discovered that the main German position was on the reverse side of the Seelow Heights, and this had not been suppressed by our artillery barrage.”
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While Zhukov was bogged down in the Kustrin bridgehead, Konev stormed ahead. According to Konev, during the evening of April 17 he had a conversation with Stalin that led to a Stavka directive ordering his tank armies to break into Berlin from the south.
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This spurred even greater efforts from Zhukov to break through the Seelow Heights. On April 18 he ordered his commanders to personally inspect forward units and determine what was holding up the advance. Officers who showed themselves “incapable of carrying out assignments” or “displayed lack of resolution” faced immediate dismissal.
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This was vintage Zhukov.

Zhukov's troops eventually broke through and by April 20 his artillery was in position to open fire directly on Berlin. But the race with Konev to be the first to break into the city was still on. That evening both issued instructions to their tank commanders ordering them to penetrate the outskirts of Berlin by the following day. Zhukov's order specified that as soon as the mission was accomplished the news would be transmitted not only to Stalin but also to the press. As John Erickson has commented: “This order left nothing to the imagination. Zhukov intended to be the first into Berlin and not only Stalin but the world's press would know it.”
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In the event the suburbs of Berlin were penetrated simultaneously by troops from both 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian.