Authors: Geoffrey Roberts
The Soviet change of heart was prompted by two separate and distinct developments. First, signs that Nagy was preparing to withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact and declare the country a neutral state (which on November 1 he did). Second, the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt on October 29 aimed at regaining control of the Suez Canal. Egypt was a Soviet ally and as Khrushchev told the Presidium on October 31: “If we leave Hungary it will encourage the American, British and French imperialists. They will see weakness on our part and go on the offensive.⦠To Egypt they will then add Hungary.”
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At the next meeting of the Presidium, on November 1, there was a discussion of whether the second military intervention should go ahead. Zhukov was adamant that decisive action was necessary: “Remove all the rotten elements. Disarm the counterrevolution. Everything must be brought to order.”
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The Soviet military intervention of November 4, 1956, was as
bloody as it was decisive. Code-named Whirlwind, it was directed by Konev, with units in Hungary supplemented by forces from the neighboring Carpathian Military District, from Romania, and from the Odessa Military District. A total of seventeen divisions took part in combined tank, infantry, and air actions designed to quash the rebellion in Budapest and other urban areas. The fighting was particularly fierce in Budapest, where the insurgents fought back with barricades, small arms, and Molotov cocktails. The Soviets suffered more than 2,000 casualties, including nearly 700 dead. Civilian and insurgent casualties numbered 25,000 (including 5,000 dead). Another 200,000 Hungarians fled into Austria, notwithstanding Soviet efforts to keep the border closed.
Zhukov provided the Presidium with regular progress reports on the action in Budapest.
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Within a few days order had been restored and a new Soviet-supported government headed by Janos Kadar was installed. After the uprising thousands of Hungarians were arrested and hundreds later executed, Imre Nagy most prominently. Zhukov gave no indication he had any doubts about the brutal suppression of the popular uprising in Hungary. For Zhukov and all the Soviet leaders, it was not only in Hungary that communist power and the socialist system was at stake. They all feared a domino effect of popular uprisings against communist rule that would destabilize the whole eastern blocâthreatening the buffer zone between Germany and the USSR, which the Soviets were determined to maintain at all costs.
Zhukov's status in the leadership was enhanced considerably by his decisive role in the Hungarian crisis. On his sixtieth birthday in December 1956 he was awarded his fourth Order of Lenin, his picture published on the front page of Soviet newspapers together with birthday greetings from both the party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers.
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In January and February 1957 Zhukov went on a highly publicized tour of India and Burmaâa follow-up to a similar tour by Khrushchev and Bulganin in NovemberâDecember 1955âaimed at consolidating Soviet relations with the two recently independent states. The tour was a great success and Zhukov was warmly received. In India Zhukov was photographed riding an elephant and one wonders if he thought of Hannibal and his famous victory over the Romans at
Cannaeâthe battle most often compared to Khalkhin-Gol. When Zhukov returned home the Soviets released a color documentary film entitled
The Friendship Visit of Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov to India and Burma
.
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While in India Zhukov gave a speech at a military staff college on February 5, 1957, in which he addressed the question of nuclear war:
Will nuclear and thermonuclear weapons be used in the event of war between coalitions of the great powers? Yes, undoubtedly, since the introduction of these weapons into the armed forces has gone too far and have already made their influence felt on organisation, tactics and operational-strategic doctrine.⦠We think that as long as atomic and thermonuclear weapons remain in countries' arsenals they will have no little significance for ground, sea and air forces. In the postwar construction of our armed forces we proceeded from the fact that victory in a future war can only be achieved by the unified force of all types of arms and armed forces and their coordinated use in war.
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In March 1957 Zhukov went to East Berlin to sign a defense agreement with the East German government. While there he delivered a speech to senior troop commanders of Soviet forces in East Germany. The mission of Soviet forces in Germany was in the event of a NATO attack to hold up the advance of western forces and to buy time for second-echelon Warsaw Pact forces to move forward. But Zhukov made it clear he did not necessarily intend to wait for NATO to attack. As soon as it became apparent that NATO intended to launch an attack the Soviets would implement a preemptive strike aimed at reaching the English Channel within two days. In other words, the Soviets intended to pursue the kind of preemptive strategy that they had considered but failed to implement in summer 1941 when they waited for the Germans to attack. A leaked version of the speech concocted by the Soviets for disinformation purposes reported Zhukov as saying that Soviet strategy was counteroffensive rather than preemptive and that nuclear rather than conventional weapons would be employed from the outbreak of war.
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The aim of this dissimulation was
both to mislead NATO about Soviet intentions and to deter a western attack with the threat of an immediate nuclear escalation.
The idea of launching a preemptive attack came up again at a military conference in Moscow in May 1957 attended by more than 200 of the most senior officers of the Soviet army, navy, and air force. In his speech Zhukov concentrated on the initial period of the war and reviewed the lessons of the armed forces' lack of preparedness in June 1941. He emphasized the importance of studying the enemy's plans and intentions:
The basic concept of our enemies is the maximum use of all forces and means during the initial period of the war on the basis of a sudden attack on command and control systems. It is therefore necessary to raise to a high and constant level of preparedness the air defences of the country, particularly in the spheres of radar and anti-rocket defence. Under all circumstances our armed forces must be prepared to deliver attacks by land, air and sea that would liquidate the enemy's attempt to deliver a disorganizing blow. Some sayâfor example Bagramyanâthat our strategy must be built around a system of anticipatory surprise preventative blows that aim to destroy the attack preparations of the enemy. About this we cannot talk openly.
Was this statement a signal to the audience that they should not discuss the preemptive strategy that was being devised? Or was it a warning that such talk would only encourage the enemy to strike preemptively? It is difficult to say and Zhukov may well have been of two minds.
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When he reported on the conference to the party leadership Zhukov highlighted the discussion of the initial period of the war but did not mention preemption. The conference had been a success, he said, but it had revealed that military theory had still not caught up with contemporary developments in military technology.
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During the Polish and Hungarian crises Khrushchev's dominance of the Presidium slipped as the other members began to assert their independence.
The main beneficiary of the return to a more collective leadership style was Molotov. He had been dismissed as foreign minister by Khrushchev in June 1956 but remained on the Presidium and in November 1956 was given the job of minister of state control with responsibility for ensuring that government decrees were enforced. He used this new position to challenge Khrushchev's authority on a range of domestic and foreign issues. Molotov was supported by Kaganovich and Malenkov and these three formed the core of a growing opposition to Khrushchev on the Presidium. Throughout these disputes Zhukov remained a staunch supporter of Khrushchev's. As he later recalled: “Personally, I thought that Khrushchev's line was more correct than that of Kaganovich and Molotov, who stuck to the old dogmas and did not want to change in accordance with the spirit of the times.”
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Khrushchev's power struggle with Molotov came to a head following a speech given by the Soviet leader in Leningrad in May 1957 in which he pledged that the USSR would overtake the United States in the production of meat, butter, and milk within a few short years. This entirely unrealistic target was announced by Khrushchev without consultation and asserted a style of decision-making that threatened to usurp the power and prerogatives of the Presidium. In short, the post-Stalin collective leadership was being subverted by the emergence of a new boss. This development was unwelcome to a majority of Presidium members, including Bulganin and Dmitry Shepilov, Molotov's short-lived successor as foreign minister (he had been replaced by Gromyko in February 1957). With a majority of full (voting) members of the Presidium on their side the Molotov group attempted a coup against Khrushchev.
On June 18 the conspirators lured Khrushchev to a meeting, supposedly of the Council of Ministers but which metamorphosed into an impromptu gathering of the Presidium. Khrushchev was not without his supporters and he managed to fend off the demand that he resign immediately as party leader. Zhukov and Mikoyan were his strongest backers. Indeed, before the meeting Zhukov had rebuffed an attempt by Malenkov to recruit him to the conspiracy. According to Zhukov, Khrushchev was confused and demoralized at the Presidium meeting and it was only his support that saved the day. “Georgy, you
have saved the position,” Zhukov recalled Khrushchev telling him, “only you could do it. I will never forget that.”
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With Zhukov's help Khrushchev arranged military transport for Central Committee members to fly to Moscow to demand the convening of a full Central Committee plenum. By day three of the Presidium meeting the Molotov groupâdubbed the “antiparty group” by their opponentsâwere forced to agree to a Central Committee meeting to decide on Khrushchev's leadership.
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The 200 or so members of the Central Committee had been elected at the 20th Party Congress and were overwhelmingly pro-Khrushchev. At the plenum from June 22 to 29 the members of the so-called antiparty group found themselves in a tiny minority and Zhukov was at the forefront of the attack on Molotov and his co-conspirators. The first speech at the plenum was made by Khrushchev's ideology chief, Mikhail Suslov, but the second came from Zhukov, who launched a ferocious attack on the antiparty group focused on their culpability for the crimes of the Stalin era. Zhukov revealed to the plenum that between February 27, 1937, and November 12, 1938, Stalin, Molotov, and Kaganovich had personally sanctioned 38,679 political executions. On one day aloneâNovember 12, 1938âStalin and Molotov signed death warrants for a list of 3,167 people. “I don't know whether they even read the list,” commented Zhukov. After giving more details of killings, Zhukov concluded: “I think it is necessary to discuss this question at the Plenum and to demand from Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov an explanation for their abuse of power.” Zhukov's intervention notwithstanding, the crimes of the Stalin era did not become a major theme of discussion, not least because it raised too many uncomfortable questions about Khrushchev's role in those events.
Zhukov did not speak again at the plenum but he did make numerous interjections, often working in tandem with Khrushchev to heckle the members of the antiparty group when they spoke. “Speak about the responsibility for the criminality, for the shootings,” he demanded of Kaganovich. “This is the most important question.” He seems to have taken particular pleasure at the discomfort of Bulganin, who had supported the antiparty group at the Presidium but now tried to explain away his actions. At one point during Bulganin's speech Zhukov began to interrogate him and told him not “to twist things around if
you want to be an honest man.” Reading the transcript of the plenum Zhukov comes across as someone who was enjoying himself.
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The result of the plenum was a foregone conclusion. Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich were stripped of their government posts and expelled from the Presidium and the Central Committee. Molotov was subsequently exiled to the ambassadorship of the People's Republic of Mongolia while Malenkov was sent to direct a power station in Kazakhstan and Kaganovich became manager of a potash factory in the Urals. Bulganin escaped with a censure but he was soon ousted as prime minister by Khrushchev, who took the post himself. The plenum was undoubtedly a great triumph for Khrushchev but Zhukov was the real star of the show. His reward was promotion to full membership of the Presidium.
While the struggle against the antiparty group was in progress another drama was being played out in Zhukov's personal life. At the age of sixty Zhukov had become a father once again. On June 19 Galina gave birth to their daughter, Maria. Zhukov was delighted and wrote to Galina wanting to know all about the new baby, promising to visit as soon as he could but that he was involved in a “terrible battle” and had not had much sleep for four days. However, Maria was sickâjaundiced and passive, Galina wrote to Zhukovâand both she and the doctors feared for her life. Zhukov was distraught and wrote to Galina on June 26: “I haven't slept all night since receiving your letter about the health of our daughter. How could this happen? I am very afraid for her.⦠I ask you to be strong and not to give in to fate.⦠Weakness never brings victory in the struggle.”
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Happily, baby Maria recovered and survived.
After the plenum the campaign against the antiparty group was broadened. A truncated version of the Central Committee resolution on the antiparty group was published in the press. Party meetings were convened to condemn Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich. On July 2 Zhukov addressed the party group based in the Ministry of Defense. In attendance were Antonov, Bagramyan, Vasilevsky, Konev, Meretskov, Rokossovsky, and other marshals and generals. Zhukov repeated what he had said at the plenum, focusing in particular on the role of the antiparty group in the mass repressions of the Stalin era. This time he highlighted Bulganin's “unseemly” role in the affair. According
to Zhukov, part of the plot was to hand control of the KGB over to Bulganin. At the Presidium meeting Bulganin had gone along with this conspiracy but when he saw the way the wind was blowing at the plenum he turned against the antiparty group.
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