Tears in the Darkness (67 page)

29
. Beck,
MacArthur and Wainwright, 66.

30
. Ibid., 67–68; Dooley, “Personal Record,” 45.

31
. Beck,
MacArthur and Wainwright,
40; Marshall, “Strategic Policy.”

32
. Roosevelt, Fireside Chats “On the Progress of the War,” February 23, 1942.

33
. James,
Years of MacArthur,
2: 125–41; Considine, “MacArthur the Magnificent,” February 23 and 24, 1942.

34
. Miller,
Bataan Uncensored,
193; Morton, interview with Sutherland.

35
. Waldrop,
MacArthur on War,
353–66; Considine, “MacArthur the Magnificent,” March 14, 1942.

36
. MacArthur, Radio Message to AGWAR, January 23, 1942; Lee,
They Call It Pacific,
252; Willoughby and Chamberlain,
MacArthur,
49; Huff,
My Fifteen Years with General MacArthur,
8.

37
. Beck,
MacArthur and Wainwright,
108; Huff,
My Fifteen Years with General MacArthur,
52–32; Wainwright,
General Wainwright's Story,
4. There are many versions of the story surrounding MacArthur's decision to abandon his command. The earliest versions come from the journalists Frazier Hunt and Clark Lee, fashioned from interviews with MacArthur. In his
Reminiscences
(140), MacArthur says he planned to resign his commission and join the troops in the trenches on Bataan. In fact there are no truly independent accounts of what the general said or was thinking after he received the order.

38
. MacArthur,
Reminiscences,
142–43; Huff,
My Fifteen Years with General MacArthur,
56.

39
. Chunn,
Of Rice and Men,
ii. The wallpaper paste simile was common in the interviews.

40
. We were unable to find either the first publication or provenance of this bit of doggerel, so popular on Bataan and later in literature about the battle. Most historians rely on Wainwright,
General Wainwright's Story,
54, for the lyrics. He states unequivocally that United Press correspondent Frank Hewlett wrote them, but Hewlett's daughter, Jean Hewlett, told us in an interview, “I have clear memories of my father saying that he did
not
create” the ditty. She reckoned he heard it in the field and “improved it a bit when he wrote it down.”

WHISKEY, WAGES, AND THE KINDNESS OF STRANGERS

1
. Judgment Roll 5516,
The United States oft America v. Ben Steele,
March 17, 1934, indictment.

CHAPTER SIX

1
. Toland, interview with Takushiro Hattori, one of the planners of the second offensive. Hattori says there were 16,000 troops in the 16th Division, 8,000 in the 65th Brigade, and 15,000 in the 4th Division.

2
. Takesada Shigeta, interviews and correspondence, 2000–2001.

3
. Hirohisa Murata, interview, 2000.

4
.
Handbook on Japanese Military Forces,
65; Hirohisa Murata, interview.

5
. Details about the experience of the Provisional Air Corps unit in Sector B March 29 through April 7, 1942, are drawn from interviews with Ben Steele and Q. P. Devore, and from Coleman,
Bataan and Beyond,
41–57.

6
. Brougher, “Battle of Bataan,” 4–5.

7
. Material on the second offensive is drawn from Chunn,
Of Rice and Men;
Babcock, “Philippine Campaign,” parts I and II; Mallonée,
Naked Flagpole;
Morton,
Fall of the Philippines;
Tisdelle, “Story of Bataan Collapse”; and Whitman,
Bataan.
The figure of fourteen rounds per minute comes from Toland, interview with Jesse Traywick.

8
. Profiles of the American Generals on Bataan; Whitman,
Bataan,
30–31, 169–71.

9
. Holt, “King of Bataan,” 3.

10
. Snow,
Signposts of Experience,
36.

11
. Jones, interview with Brigadier General Jones.

12
. Morton,
Fall of the Philippines,
405.

13
. Chunn,
Of Rice and Men,
1–3.

14
. Mallonée,
Naked Flagpole,
120.

15
. Morton,
Fall of the Philippines,
384, 431–32; Whitman,
Bataan,
491–92.

16
. Dooley, “Personal Record,” 133.

17
. Whitman,
Bataan,
512–13.

18
. Mallonée,
Naked Flagpole,
128.

19
. The account of the action in Sector B and the events involving the Provisional Air Corps Regiment from April 7 through April 9 are drawn from Coleman,
Bataan and Beyond,
41–57; Whitman,
Bataan,
528–31; and interviews with Q. P. Devore and Ben Steele.

20
. Wainwright,
General Wainright's Story,
79, 82.

21
. Judge Advocate General,
Basic Field Manual,
67.

22
. Toland, interview with James R. N. Weaver.

23
. Collier, Notebooks, book 4, 2.

24
. The scene, including King's speech, ibid., 2–6.

25
. King, “General King's Own Story,” 6.

26
. Ryotaro Nishimura, interview, 2000.

27
. There are many versions of the meeting at the agricultural station in Lamao, all based on the observations of King's aide, Major Achille C. Tisdelle. Major Tisdelle's handwritten diary offers none of the detail found in Louis Morton's two versions of the event, one in his official U.S. Army history,
Fall of the Philippines,
and the other, “Bataan Diary of Major Achille C. Tisdelle.” Morton cites the “diary” as his source for both but says “the original” was in Tisdelle's possession. It is possible that Morton was given a composite account or that Tisdelle used his handwritten diary to reconstitute the scenes in a memoirlike diary immediately after the war. Files at the army's Military History Institute in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, contained typed accounts of Tisdelle's experience and these accounts support Morton's version,
though their provenance is unclear. Since there was no reconciling the obvious discrepancies, we used those portions of the story that were either verified or tangentially supported by King's and Tisdelle's testimony in
USA v. Homma,
as well as John Toland's handwritten notes of his interviews with the two men. King's final thoughts in the section come from “General King's Own Story,” 6.

CHAPTER SEVEN

1
. Durdin, “All Captives Slain,” 1.

2
. Brown Davidson, interview, 2000.

3
. Humphrey O'Leary, interview, 2000.

4
. Comments that follow are from interviews with Jinzaburo Chaki, Tozo Takeuchi, and Tasuku Yamanari, 2000.

5
. John Emerick, interviews, 1998–1999.

6
. FitzPatrick,
Hike into the Sun,
56.

7
. Dyess,
Dyess Story,
68.

8
. Ibid., 70. Dyess gets this story from someone else, whom he does not identify. Other accounts, those less detailed, confirm the incident.

9
. Coox, “Effectiveness of the Japanese Military,” 39.

10
. Richard Gordon, interview, 1999.

11
. Stewart,
Give Us This Day,
68–70.

12
. Hunt,
Behind Japanese Lines,
29.

13
. Goldblith,
Appetite for Life,
54.

14
. Gordon, interview, 1999.

15
. Gautier,
I Came Back from Bataan,
72.

16
. Levering,
Horror Trek,
63.

17
. O'Leary, interview, 1999.

18
. Tenney
My Hitch in Hell,
48. Other men mentioned this incident in interviews and had a slightly different version of the quotation offered by Tenney.

19
. Dyess,
Dyess Story,
75.

20
. Zoeth Skinner, interviews, 1999, 2005.

21
. Dyess,
Dyess Story,
76.

22
. Mallonée,
Naked Flagpole,
149.

23
. Tenney,
My Hitch in Hell,
53–58.

24
. Thomas,
As I Remember,
151.

25
. Aquino, Statement to John Toland, 3.

26
. Smith, Affidavit/Statement.

27
. Dyess,
Dyess Story,
79; Cave,
Beyond Courage,
173; Gordon, interview.

28
. Levering,
Horror Trek,
65.

29
. Gordon, interview, 1999.

30
. Stewart,
Give Us This Day,
72.

31
. John Olson, interview, 1999.

32
. Stewart,
Give Us This Day,
73.

33
. Thomas,
As I Remember,
147.

34
. FitzPatrick,
Hike into the Sun,
62.

35
. Sneddon,
Zero Ward,
25.

36
. Davidson, interview, 2000; Irwin Scott, interview, 2005; Coleman,
Bataan and Beyond,
72; Hunt,
Behind Japanese Lines,
52.

37
. Hunt,
Behind Japanese Lines,
32.

38
. Gautier,
I Came Back from Bataan,
76.

39
. Grashio,
Return to Freedom,
39.

40
. Cave,
Beyond Courage,
172.

41
. Dyess,
Dyess Story,
77; Ashton,
And Somebody Gives a Damn!
201.

42
. Davidson, interview, 2000.

43
. Monaghan,
Under the Red Sun,
109.

44
. A. C. Drake, Affidavit/Statement, 95; Alabado,
Bataan,
54; Agoncillo,
Fateful Years,
212.

45
. Skinner, interview, 2005.

46
. J. Baldassarre, Affidavit/Statement, 37.

47
. In late March 1942, five Imperial Army officers met to draw up a plan to deal with POWs. From intelligence reports, they expected some 40,000 captives, and since the army's plan of attack anticipated a three-week campaign on Bataan, the five planners thought they would have until April 20 to get everything ready to receive the prisoners. When the plan was done, the officers—Major General Yoshikata Kawane, commander of the Luzon Line of Communication Unit (transportation and supply); Colonel Toshimitsu Takatsu, Kawane's chief of staff; Major Moriya Wada, a staff officer; Major Hisashi Sekiguchi from the Medical Department; and an officer from a well-digging unit—reviewed the details with Major General Takeji Wachi, the 14th Army chief of staff. Wachi, in turn, took the scheme to Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma for final approval. The plan was simple: Filipino and American soldiers would be collected together at various spots between Mariveles and Cabcaben at the tip of the peninsula, assembled in marching formations on the Old National Road, then walked north to the railhead at San Fernando—from the town of Mariveles, a hike of exactly sixty-six miles. At the San Fernando train station, the prisoners would be put in boxcars and hauled north twenty-five miles to the town of Capas. At Capas they would detrain and march another seven miles to Camp O'Donnell, a former Philippine Army training base in Pampanga Province that would be converted to hold prisoners of war. On the first part of the march—from Mariveles to Balanga—the prisoners would be guarded by soldiers from the various units that had taken part in the final offensive, combat and support troops from frontline units. At Balanga, rear-echelon troops under the command of General Kawane, men from the 61st Line of Communication Dispatch Unit (service), would take over as guards for the rest of the trek. Kawane was told he could carry the prisoners in trucks—if he could find them. The Imperial Army had some 240 trucks in its inventory. It also had captured an unknown number of vehicles from the American Army. (Perhaps a thousand to fifteen hundred allied vehicles were in running condition at the time of surrender; it
is anyone's guess.) The Imperial Army used all available transport to move its own men and supplies south on Bataan to stage for the upcoming invasion of Corregidor. The plan also called for the army's Sanitation Unit to set up field hospitals in Balanga. The army's chief of administration was ordered to dispatch cooks and trucks with food and cooking supplies to Bataan and to set up feeding stations. The first station would be at Balanga, then, moving north, at Orani, Lubao, and, finally, San Fernando. The prisoners would eat what Imperial troops ate: rice and whatever else happened to be available at the time. On April 2, seven days before surrender, staff aides told Colonel Takatsu and Major Wada that the preparations to receive, quarter, and feed the prisoners were still incomplete. The two officers told their subordinates to “put in their best effort and further their preparation.” On April 9, the day General King sent a white flag forward, Major Wada asked for an update on the preparations and was told little had changed since April 2. Meanwhile, Wada and the others discovered that they would have to move and feed some 76,000 POWs, almost twice the number they had expected. What is more, there were some 25,000 Filipino refugees in the battle zone as well, and they too would have to be relocated. The officers quickly concluded that motor transport would be impossible. General Kawane decided to move them on foot and assigned a unit of some 300 men from the 61st Line of Communication Unit, under the command of First Lieutenant Toshio Omura, to guide the prisoners as they marched north from Balanga to the railhead at San Fernando. The formations would cover some twelve to fifteen miles a day. The only surety was water; there were plenty of artesian wells along the route of the march so the prisoners would be able to slake their thirst.
USA v. Homma,
2463–64, 2581–82, 2666–74, 2686–89, 3076–79; Wada, Affidavit/Statement, 1–6; Wada, interview, 2000; Yoshikata Kawane, Affidavit/Statement, 1–5; Falk,
Bataan,
35–42; Falk, “Bataan Death March,” 28–46; Homma, “Statement on the Charge,” 1–11; Bateman, interview with Achille Tisdelle, 12; Uji, Affidavit/Statement, 1–3.