Read Terror in the Balkans Online
Authors: Ben Shepherd
Tags: #History, #Europe, #Military, #World War II, #Science & Math, #Earth Sciences, #Geography, #Regional
of thirty-six dead, between mid-January and mid-February. The con-
trast does need qualifying. For one thing, the 718th’s troops still seem to
have been killing large numbers of civilians; as before, the very relative
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nature of their “restraint” needs keeping fi rmly in mind. Furthermore, if
they still were not killing as many civilians as the 369th, this was partly
because they had less opportunity; the “Partisan” dead they recorded
were killed in the course not of major mobile operations, but of smaller-
scale operations and general security duties. Even so, some of the con-
trast is surely due to the greater restraint the 718th exercised. For though
the 369th and 718th suffered comparable losses during these periods, the
369th killed at least four times as many “Partisans” as the 718th.
Most strikingly, unlike the 369th, the 718th stood ready, immediately
after White I and its follow-up operation, to exchange prisoners with the
Partisans. There had been sporadic contact between Germans and Parti-
sans from as early as spring 1942. The fi rst signifi cant prisoner exchange
had taken place in Posusje, between Livno and Mostar, in September of
that year. It is unclear who made the fi rst move on that occasion; that it
was Tito is suggested by reports from the Partisans, who, perhaps seek-
ing a basis for prisoner negotiations with the Germans, were treating
their German prisoners well at this particular time.46
One reason why a number of senior German offi cers stood ready to
negotiate such exchanges was that they now believed Partisans should
be granted the status of proper combatants. Major General Benig-
nus Dippold, commander of the 717th Infantry Division, appeared to
express admiration for the Partisans’ fi ghting qualities when he declared
that “one must view the enemy as poorly-equipped troops, but not as
bandits.”47 There was undoubtedly a pragmatic motivation behind such
professions of gallantry. Recognizing that they were facing a genuine
military opponent, more astute offi cers realized that according the Par-
tisans proper combatant status made it more likely that both sides would
give quarter when taking prisoners. But this was still a profound about-
face from the German military’s usual view of insurgents. Some senior
fi gures, at least, were forming a saner perception of the challenge their
forces were facing.48 Yet there is no sign that the 369th Infantry Division
was contemplating similar measures at this time.49
Even higher command was reining in its subordinates to some extent.
Although Croatia Command had on January 12 issued extremely harsh
guidelines, the same directive also forbade attacks on women and chil-
dren. This was a clear contrast with Hitler’s order of December 16,
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227
1942.50 But much of the impetus, particularly for the 718th, came from
divisional command. That the 369th and the 718th Infantry Divisions
diverged so hugely on this score was down to three reasons.
It has already been established that a poor-quality unit, facing a hardy,
dangerous opponent in a harsh environment, was more likely to feel
vexed by its situation, and behave more ferociously in order to ease its
frustration and reassure its superiors. The further down the command
chain such a unit was, the sharper its experience of battle, and the more
vicious its likely response. Given the poor quality of the 369th’s units, it
would have been surprising if such a brutalizing malaise had
not
infected
its divisional command.
If Croatia Command’s reports are to be believed, the 717th Infantry
Division, despite having been offi cially upgraded to light division status,
was even weaker than the 369th when it went in to Operation White I.51
Yet the 369th gave ample cause for concern. A brace of reports issued
during January and February 1943 testifi es to its parlous manpower.
On January 23, for instance, General Neidholt reported that “through
borrowing and requisitioning the troops have acquired a huge amount
of baggage. They make for an extremely unmilitary looking picture on
the roads . . . (T)he troops are completely out of control.”52 Through-
out February the situation grew worse: “(troops and non-commissioned
offi cers) lie about uninterested on the trucks and give no salute. . . . The
morale reports show that a large number of the Croatian troops are just
fellow travellers without any understanding of the necessity of the bat-
tle against the Partisans.”53 Desertion became endemic.54 The 369th’s
situation was not helped during White I by the fact that the Luftwaffe
provided most of its assistance to other formations participating in the
operation, particularly the Prinz Eugen Division, and not to the 369th.55
In August 1943 the 369th’s intelligence section fi nally snapped out of
its dejection over the troops’ condition, and articulated some reasons
for it. It identifi ed problems born of national character; of the country’s
political and economic conditions; and of the ways in which the troops
were led, used, and treated. On the last of these scores, it maintained that
the troops’ morale was worst in units where German personnel were less
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terror in the balk ans
numerous. But it also maintained that, once the rot to morale had hit in,
no amount of harsh German army discipline could arrest it.56
But perhaps the single main reason why the troops’ performance was
so affl icted was that the 369th was too slow to recognize and counter
the symptoms of worsening morale. The fact that General Neidholt’s
prior career had been less than dazzling may indicate that here was a
commander with an uncertain grip on the discipline and morale of his
division. Certainly, there was nothing intrinsic in a Croatian legionnaire
division’s makeup that made poor morale inevitable, at least in early
1943. For as will shortly be seen, poor morale was a pitfall the 373d Infan-
try Division, the 369th’s sister legionnaire formation, managed to avoid.
Whatever the reason, troops of such poor quality were clearly unable
to fi ght a counterinsurgency campaign successfully. The frustration both
the division and its troops doubtless felt can only have intensifi ed when
the White operations failed to achieve their objectives. Tito had had
advance warning of White I ten days before the operation even started.
He used this window of opportunity to systematically destroy roads and
bridges in the region, and thus further hamper Axis attempts to encircle
his forces effectively.57
By early 1943, in contrast, the 718th Infantry Division’s troops were
of considerably better quality than the 369th’s. Of course, their equip-
ment and manpower were still beset by defi ciencies. In this they were no
different to their comrades in any of the core German army counterin-
surgency divisions in Yugoslavia.58 But like its fellow “seven-hundred-
number” divisions, the 718th had been converted into a light division
in early 1943. In February the 718th’s command described the division’s
fi ghting power as “extremely good given its current combat strength.”59
It had positive things to say about the division’s training, artillery, pio-
neer companies, and supply, and about the morale of its troops. It was
certainly overstating things when it described the division’s ability to
carry out its tasks as “limitless.”60 But, clearly, its fi ghting power was
considerably higher than the 369th’s. And just as poorer fi ghting power
probably helped make the 369th more ferocious, so did the 718th’s supe-
rior strength probably help make it less so.
But this is not the full explanation. For one thing, the 718th’s situation
was hardly comfortable either. Following a very brief pause in December,
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229
Serbia Command reported in January that the pressure from the Parti-
sans in the 718th’s area was now greater than in any other German divi-
sional area in the NDH. Even though White I brought it some respite,
then, it was starting from a low base.61 Moreover, the 718th Infantry
Division’s moderation had already been apparent—even though it was
very relative, took time to develop, and dimmed for a time during Opera-
tion Jajce—before it became a light division. And even the ferocity of the
718th’s troops during the Jajce operations was smoothed by divisional
command’s indifference, rather than driven by a conscious attempt to
incite it. In other words, a division of poorer fi ghting power was not nec-
essarily always going to deport itself more ruthlessly.
By the same token, divisions that enjoyed greater fi ghting power were not
necessarily going to act with more restraint. This becomes clear when
comparing the 369th Infantry Division with the 373d.
Between May and July 1943, the 373d’s fi rst three months in the NDH,
the quality of its troops was considerably superior to that of the 369th’s.
Granted, they suffered shortages in specialist clothing and artillery for
mountain warfare, pack animals, suitable trucks, and interpreters.62 But
troop discipline and morale in the 373d was signifi cantly higher. An
after-action report by the division’s pioneer battalion commented on the
men’s “excellent” combat performance and their willingness to fi ght to
the end.63 At the end of June divisional command itself was similarly
upbeat about the troops’ mood.64 And the 373d, it seems, had itself to
thank. It credited itself with spotting the danger signs of sinking troop
morale, and moving immediately to counter them: “a noticeable dete-
rioration in discipline . . . was countered with appropriate measures.
The troops’ self-confi dence has risen, particularly in comparison with
Croatian (Army) units.”65 Not only was the troops’ morale healthy, but
their numbers also. In March the operations section reported that the
division’s roster of 10,730 men was actually fi fty-six more than it was sup-
posed to have.66
Yet if the 373d’s approach to its men’s discipline and morale was more
rigorous than the 369th’s, its approach to counterinsurgency was no less
harsh than the 369th’s. For an operation the division launched in the
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terror in the balk ans
Cardaci region of southern Bosnia in early July, it directed that “suspect
persons are to be arrested. Those found with a weapon in their hands are
to be shot . . . Settlements which have aided the Partisans . . . are to be
razed to the ground. The bandits must be combated with ruthless harsh-
ness.”67 An order from mid-July, issued by the divisional commander
himself, Major General Emil Zellner, expressed the hope that “all units
under me or cooperating with me will continue to conduct themselves
with such ruthlessness against the Partisans in the cause of pacifying the
land . . . Our common struggle is against the disruption of order and the
Bolshevik-infected bandits!”68 Indeed, this directive contrasts not just
with those the 717th and 718th Infantry Divisions were producing at this
time, but even with those of the 369th. For ideological language as crude
as this, with all its talk of “Bolshevik infection,” is nowhere to be found
even in the 369th’s fi les during this period.69
Otherwise, though the condition of their troops was very different,
there was little difference in the pitiless attitudes of the divisional com-
mands of both the 369th and 373d. Whatever was hardening those atti-
tudes so intensely, then, it was more than just the condition of the troops.
Firstly, unlike the offi cers of the 717th and 718th Infantry Divisions, the
offi cers of the 369th and 373d Infantry Divisions were newcomers to the
NDH, to Bosnia, to the region’s labyrinthine interethnic relations, and to
counterinsurgency generally. This meant they had had no experience of
the complex reality on the ground. It also meant, by extension, that they
were less likely to see the need for a balanced, restrained, and insightful
approach, which engaged the population rather than terrorized it. Such,
after all, is the loathing with which regular forces have so often regarded
irregular forces, that the intricacies of cultivating a population caught
between Partisans and Germans were particularly likely to be lost on a
counterinsurgency unit that was “new to the game.” Granted, given the
interethnic mayhem besetting the region by this time, it is diffi cult to
conceive of how a relatively restrained approach might have succeeded
anyway. The point, however, is that some German army offi cers were
inclined to attempt something at least resembling such an approach,
while others were not.
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And there was greater chance of such an attempt coming from a unit,
such as the 718th Infantry Division, that had been stationed in one region
for a longer period.70 Following its experience of 1942, the 718th better
understood that it was the survival pressures civilians were facing, and