The 50 Worst Terrorist Attacks (38 page)

Many observers believed that BSO had intended to kill the diplomats before initiating the attack to recoup the prestige the organization had lost in the Bangkok operation on December 28, 1972.

The Sudanese raided the Khartoum office of the PLO and discovered many documents that linked Fatah and the PLO to the operation. Reporter Christopher Dobson learned that the PLO Khartoum office's chief, Fawaz Yassin, organized the attack; his deputy, Rizig Abu Gassan, led the team; and the No. 3 man, Karam from Fatah, drove the Land Rover. Documents seized included instructions for the raiders and a map of the embassy. Karam later confessed to Fatah complicity, and Gassan, who had made Fatah broadcasts over Sudanese radio, said at a magistrate's court preliminary hearing, “We are proud of what we have done.” Yassin was in Libya a few days prior to the attack. He met the seven BSO members at the airport when they arrived from Beirut and saw their luggage through customs. They had smuggled in five pistols, eight grenades, and Kalashnikovs. Yassin then flew to Libya a few hours before the raid and left instructions for the attack and the assassination of Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie and the West German and British ambassadors. Colonel Qadhafi refused a request for the return of Yassin and helped him to a People's Democratic Republic of Yemen sanctuary. The news media reported that the Black Septembrists had hoped to fly their American hostages to the United States, where they would assassinate them.

A Sudanese court of inquiry indicted the eight on five counts, including murder, but released two of them for lack of evidence in October 1973. A Khartoum court convicted them of murder on June 24, 1974, and sentenced them to life, but Sudanese president Gaafer el-Nimeiry
immediately commuted each sentence to seven years. He also announced that the group would be handed over to the PLO. They were flown to Cairo the next day. It appears that Egypt placed the group at the disposal of the PLO in November 1974.

Overview:
The previous year's barricade-and-hostage takeover in Khartoum gave other terrorists a model of how such an operation could yield tremendous publicity. Among the Latin American groups carefully taking notes was the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, FSLN), which eventually came to power in Nicaragua and then held on to power during clashes with the U.S.-backed Contras. The FSLN was named after Gen. Agusto Sandino, who had opposed the U.S. occupation of Nicaragua from 1927 to 1933 and who was shot on orders given by the father of the then Nicaraguan president, Anastasio Somoza.

Incident:
On December 27, 1974, nine FSLN members invaded the Managua suburban home of the former agricultural minister, Dr. José Castillo, who was hosting a party in honor of the U.S. ambassador Turner B. Shelton. Shelton had already left the party before the initial assault in which three guards and Castillo were killed and two others were injured. Among the 25 hostages were Alejandro Montiel Arguello, Nicaragua's foreign minister; Guillermo Sevilla-Sacasa, Nicaragua's ambassador to the United States; the Nicaraguan ambassador to the United Nations; the mayor of Managua; the local Esso manager; and Chile's ambassador to Nicaragua. The terrorists, wielding submachine guns, threatened to shoot one of their hostages every 12 hours if they were not paid $5 million. They also demanded that the government release 14 political prisoners, fly them with the prisoners to Havana, and broadcast a revolutionary communiqué, which took over an hour to read. After 61 hours of negotiations with the Archbishop of Managua and the Papal Nuncio acting as intermediaries, the government agreed to pay $1 million and release the prisoners, as well as broadcast the statement. The hostages were released at the airport as crowds cheered the terrorists, who flew with the intermediaries and the ambassadors of Spain and Mexico to Havana to ensure their safety. Mauricio Duarte Alvarez, who was suspected of planning the attack, was killed in Jinotepe on January 10, 1975. The government suspended all constitutional guarantees after the attack and created a special antiterrorist unit recruited from members of the U.S.-trained National Guard. The government claimed that the FSLN, which had been established in 1958 by Carlos Fonseca Amador, had received guerrilla training in Cuba and the Soviet Union.

Overview:
Attacks on U.S. diplomats had become commonplace by the mid-1970s. An even more prized target was Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials, particularly chiefs of station. Although CIA officials prided themselves on clandestine tradecraft, a leftist pastime became outing these officers, using techniques suggested by patron states and Philip Agee, a CIA defector. The leftist November 17 Organization, whose members avoided arrest for decades, set the terrorist bar even higher with the assassination of Chief of Station/Athens Richard S. Welch.

Incident:
On December 23, 1975, three gunmen assassinated Welch, the Athens CIA chief of station, in Palaion Psyhiko as he and his wife returned home after a Christmas party at the home of U.S. ambassador Jack B. Kubisch. His wife was not injured. Welch's name, along with that of other U.S. Embassy employees, had been published on November 25, 1975, in the
Athens Daily News
, which claimed that his position of special assistant to the ambassador and first secretary at the embassy was a cover for his CIA position. On December 28, 1975, an advertisement was placed in Athens by the Organization of November 17 claiming responsibility. On December 15, 1976, Evanghelos Mallios, who was claimed in reports to be one of the most brutal torturers in the former Greek regime, was assassinated outside his home. Ballistics tests found that the .45 caliber gun was the same one used to kill Welch.

On December 8, 2003, a special Athens tribunal convicted the leader, chief gunman, and 13 other 17 November members for killings and attacks that began with the Welch assassination. The group's leader, Frenchborn Alexandros Giotopoulos, was sentenced on December 17, 2003, to 21 life terms and 25 years. Hit man Dimitris Koufodinas was sentenced to 13 life terms and 25 years.

Overview:
Terrorist attacks within the United States were a fairly rare occurrence in the 1970s, confined to comparatively simple bombings and the occasional take-me-to-Cuba hijacking. A mix of leftist radicals, right wingers, and other idiosyncratic groups accounted for the bulk of the attacks. The most prominent religious-based attack during this period was the multiple barricade-and-hostage operation conducted by a heretofore little-known African American Muslim sect, which held sieges in three Washington, D.C., locations. The case was also notable for its heavy media coverage, to the dismay of the police. Authorities through
the decades have complained about media coverage issues, noting that many terrorist groups seek publicity and that the media plays into their hands.

Incidents:
On March 9, 1977, in the first of three coordinated barricadeand-hostage operations, seven Hanafi Muslims took over the B'nai B'rith national headquarters in northwest Washington, D.C. The group was led by the sect's spiritual leader, Khalifa Hamaas Abdul Khaalis, 54, who was born Ernest Timothy McGee. At around 11:00
A.M.
, the group drove a rental truck to the building and brought in rifles, handguns, machetes, long knives, and a crossbow. One hundred-forty people were initially trapped inside the building, but 35 escaped, were freed during a police sweep of the building, or were released because of illness during negotiations. A total of 105 hostages were released 39 hours later at the end of the siege. While it appeared that the group was hoping to seize the organization's high-ranking officials, most of the B'nai B'rith leaders were attending a luncheon at the Shoreham Americana Hotel in honor of Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin.

The hostages initially were treated roughly—some pistol-whipped— by the Hanafis. Shortly after the takeover, five of the seriously wounded hostages were allowed to leave the building.

Khaalis's manipulation of the media was well orchestrated. Reporters from newspapers and radio stations throughout the United States, as well as from Mexico, France, and Australia, called, but Khaalis would not always speak with them. Despite the heavy press coverage, the phone appeared to be Khaalis's only source of information. However, it appeared that the radios were monitored in another siege location and that operational information was relayed to the B'nai B'rith headquarters, which appeared to be the command center for the three operations.

The second attack occurred at noon, when three Hanafi Muslims took over the Islamic Center at 2551 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, in Washington, D.C. The terrorists were armed with two rifles, a shotgun, a pistol, knives, and machetes and went to the office of the director of the center, Dr. Mohammad Abdul Rauf, who was taken hostage along with 10 others. Among the hostages were five Egyptian Center employees, three Americans, the tour guide, a Bangladeshi, and a Colombian. The Turkish Embassy reported that the caretaker, Davaz Mustapha, and his son were also held. The attackers were masters of dramatic effects. They threatened to kill a Colombian student and held guns to his head; however, they were willing to negotiate for the release of ill hostages. Several hostages later pointed out that an all-news radio station was constantly playing.

The final Hanafi siege began at 2:30
P.M.
at the Washington, D.C., City Council offices in the District Building at 14th and E Streets, NW. Two men parked a Diamond taxi outside the 14th Street entrance, left the emergency lights flickering, and went past the unguarded entrance and
up to the stairs. One man carried a shotgun, the other a machete. At the top of the five flights of stairs, the gunmen mistakenly turned left, away from the mayor's office they had come to seize. Besides the mayor, it appeared that the attackers were seeking city council member Arrington Dixon, who had sponsored a council-passed resolution favorable to the Nation of Islam (Black Muslims), the Hanafi rival. After firing a shotgun and hitting several people, they moved down the corridor to the offices of council chairman Sterling Tucker and herded their hostages inside. Mayor Washington and other staff members locked themselves in their offices. Washington managed to leave the building under heavy escort at around 6:00
P.M.
during the first night of the siege. A shotgun blast killed Maurice Williams, of WHUR radio, and a building guard. One pellet hit city council member Marion S. Barry, Jr., who would later become mayor.

Although many news agencies cooperated with police, the degree of responsibility shown by many varied greatly. WMAL-TV's news director said he felt no need to honor a police request not to broadcast that some city employees had barricaded themselves in the District Building unknown to the raiders. WTOP radio broadcast unconfirmed reports that a group of motorcyclists “who might be Hanafi Muslims” were heading for the Grammercy Hotel. It was later learned that the motorcyclists were official escorts for the diplomats engaged in the negotiations. WTTG aired a 40-second segment of the proscribed
Messenger
film on the first day of the siege. Police complained that interviews with hostages were tying up needed phone lines to the hostage sites and Hanafi headquarters. Press treatment of the incident led U.S. UN ambassador Andrew Young to suggest press curbs for such episodes. Whenever station WMAL broadcast that food had been brought to the B'nai B'rith building, one of the gunmen would appear a short time later to pick it up. This led police to deduce that the raiders were monitoring radio reports.

All of the hostages were released on March 11, 1977, with Khaalis and the three terrorists at the Islamic Center released on their own recognizance. Khaalis's freedom was short-lived, ending in his arrest on March 31, 1977.

The government charged each defendant with 24 counts of armed kidnapping. With the exception of Khaalis, the jury convicted each of eight counts of kidnapping that arose from the episodes in which they participated, acquitting them of the attacks in which they were not present. They were also acquitted of conspiracy. Abdul Muzikir, Abdul Nuh, and Khaalis were convicted of murder in the second degree and assault with intent to kill. On September 6, 1977, Abdul Adam received 44–132 years; Abdul Latif received 36–108 years; Abdul Shaheed received 36–108 years; Abdul Salaam received 40–120 years; Abdul Hamid received 36–108 years; and Abdul Razzaq received 40–120 years. Hamaas Kaalis received 41–123 years for the B'nai Brith attack. Abdul Rahman and Abdul Rahim received 28–84 years, and Abdul Qawee received
24–72 years for the Islamic Center attack. Abdul Nuh received 58 years to life and Abdul Muzikir received 78 years to life for the District Building attack.

Overview:
By the mid-1970s, the West German Red Army Faction (RAF), commonly referred to as the Baader-Meinhof Group after its leaders Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof, had become prominent among Western European leftist terrorists. The roots of the RAF and other like-minded leftist violence-prone revolutionaries—such as the Swiss Petra Kraus Group, Italian Red Brigades, French Direct Action, leftist members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, and British Angry Brigade—could be traced to the leftist riots of 1968 throughout Western Europe and the United States. The groups conducted joint training operations, often with the support and sometimes hosting of various Palestinian leftist terrorists, and reached out to radicals such as Illich Ramirez Sanchez (alias Carlos), who provided his operational services on a freelance basis. The Baader-Meinhof Group specialized in assassinations of major industrialists, government leaders, and military commanders, along with the occasional bombing and bank robbery to keep the coffers filled. The late 1970s saw most of their major leaders in jail, with their release demanded frequently by skyjackers and other hostage-takers. The issue of their incarceration came to a head during the RAF kidnapping of West German industrialist Hanns-Martin Schleyer. German unwillingness to release the group's members led to several of the prominent prisoners taking their own lives, a new wrinkle on the RAF's “propaganda of the deed.” Their suicides—characterized by many supporters as actually conducted by prison guards—were followed by a bombing campaign. The RAF went through several other mini-generations and splintering before the last of its prominent members renounced terrorism years later.