The Battle of Britain (4 page)

By the end of the month an exceptionally severe winter had the Continent in its grip. On December 10 the temperature fell to minus 26 degrees Fahrenheit (-32 degrees Centigrade) and on the 12th to minus 29. Air activity by both sides greatly diminished. It would be March before the Luftwaffe resumed large-scale operations.

Throughout the four months from the outbreak of war to the end of 1939, Coastal Command, which attracted the least attention from the press, had been going about its business over the Atlantic and the North Sea, achieving successes that indirectly contributed to the RAF's victory in the Battle of Britain. Oil, petrol and raw materials of every kind were as necessary to maintain Fighter Command's operational strength as were aircraft and pilots. Coastal Command constantly made reconnaissance sorties in search of enemy warships and, with the Royal Navy, protected merchant shipping bound for Britain and limited the depredations of the U-boats. In the first fortnight of the war the enemy sank 21 British merchant ships with a total tonnage of 122,843. During the two weeks ending October 9, 1939, only 5,809 tons of shipping were lost, and on November 14 it was announced that 3,070 ships had been convoyed with a loss of only seven.

General Gamelin, the French Commander-in-Chief, had been insisting that there should be an RAF chief responsible for both the AASF and the Air Component of the BEF. Accordingly, on January 9, 1940, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Barratt was appointed Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, British Air Forces in France. He made his HQ at Coulommiers, where the French Air Force C-in-C had his. Barratt, known as ‘Ugly', had adequate credentials. He served in France during the Great War and immediately before his new appointment was Principal RAF Liaison Officer with the French forces.

On January 16, Hitler postponed his advance through the Low Countries until the spring.

The scale of air fighting over France began to increase in March 1940. Most combats developed to the same pattern: British and French fighters patrolling above 20,000ft (6,010m), seeking German bombers escorted by fighters, the opposing fighters each striving to have the height advantage at the moment of interception.

Kain made his third kill, a Bf 109, on March 3, but his Hurricane was hit and he had to bale out. He got his fourth, another 109, on March 26, but his aircraft was set on fire. Despite this he destroyed one more 109 before baling out. His score of five qualified him as an ‘Ace', the first Allied pilot of this war to achieve this, and he was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross. He was now the most famous pilot in the RAF, as well-known to the public as ‘Sailor' Malan, Douglas Bader and Bob Stanford Tuck were destined to become.

Another Commonwealth pilot who had spectacular success in France was an Australian, Flying Officer Leslie Clisby of No. 1 Squadron. He opened his score with a Bf 110 on March 31. Flying Officer Newell ‘Fanny' Orton, who had been in No. 73 Squadron since 1937, also shot down a lot of Germans, starting with two Bf 109s on March 26.

In April the pace, like the weather, became warmer in patches interspersed with rain that hampered flying. Clisby bagged a Bf 109 on April 1 and another next day. Peter ‘Johnny' Walker, commanding A Flight of No. 1 Squadron, had joined the Service in 1935 and performed in the squadron aerobatic team at the Hendon Air Pageant in 1937. Having shot down a Bf 110 on March 29 he added a Bf 109 on April 20. Orton got a Ju 88 on April 8 and on the 21st a 109 and a 110. ‘Boy' Mould had accounted for a 110 on March 31, and on April 1 he shot down another. Sergeant Harold ‘Ginger' Paul of No. 743 Squadron made his first kill on April 21, a Bf 109. Flt Lt Peter Prosser Hanks, known by his second forename, commander of B Flight, No. 1 Squadron, another member of the aerobatic team, had sent a 110 down on March 31 and got an He 111 on April 20.

While the Allies awaited Hitler's spring offensive in Western Europe, Germany carried out a lightning invasion of Denmark and Norway on April 9. Two divisions under General Kaupitsch and an air force of some 500 combat aircraft, and nearly 600 transports, made the assault on both countries simultaneously. Both victims of the Nazis' latest aggression had
only token air forces that were given no time to make even a gesture in defence of their countries. The Danish Army numbered only 15,000. Resistance was pointless.

At 0530hrs the Ju 52 transports carrying paratroops took off, but the approaches to both Oslo and Stavanger were obscured by fog from sea level to 2,000ft (610m). Low-level flight was impossible, and from above cloud the aerodromes on which the paratroops were to drop and the aircraft to land could not be seen. The first objectives of the paratroops were the airfields at Aalborg East and Aalborg West in Denmark, and Oslo-Fornebu and Stavanger-Sola in Norway. The first two were attacked at 0700hrs. Twelve hours later Copenhagen had been taken and the conquest of Denmark completed.

As with the Polish invasion, writers about this operation habitually state that the Norwegian Air Force, which comprised about 100 aeroplanes, nearly all fighters and reconnaissance types, was obliterated on the ground before it could put up a fight. That is not true either. While the Ju 52s were trying to land at Fornebu, Oberleutant Hansen, commanding I/ZG76 (Bf 110s), was giving them fighter cover. At 0838hrs his eight 110s were attacked out of the sun by nine Norwegian Gloster Gladiators, which shot down two of them.

The German landings by air and sea went ahead despite delays caused by weather, in the face of a brave defence by the Norwegian Army, Navy and what was left of the Air Force after the swift capture of the airfields. The Luftwaffe occupied the airfields and provided all the forms of air support essential for success in modern warfare. The fighting spread throughout the country.

Both Britain and France sent expeditionary forces but, to quote the archives, ‘With regard to air forces it was decided that none should accompany the expedition in the first instance.' Critics have always deplored this as indicative of the backwardness of military thinking in Britain and France. Admittedly, the General Staffs in both countries were still imbued with out-dated notions about the use of air power, but one wonders where their critics suppose the aircraft could have come from? Neither the RAF nor l'Armée de l'Air could spare an adequate number of fighters from home defence. The French bombers were too poor in performance, bombload and armament to be effective or to protect themselves. From the first day of this campaign RAF Bomber and Coastal Commands were doing the best they could by sparing aircraft from other tasks to reconnoitre
the Norwegian coast, to sow mines and to bomb. Even long-range Blenheim fighters were sent all the way to hunt enemy aircraft in the region of Stavanger and Bergen. Bombing raids were carried out against the two German-occupied airfields at Aalborg, Denmark.

On April 15, Britain's 24th Guards Brigade arrived at Harstad. Next day, 146 Brigade landed at Namsos. On the 18th, 148 Brigade landed at Andalsnes and part of the 5th Demi-Brigade Chasseurs Alpins landed at Namsos.

On April 21, No. 263 (Gladiator) Squadron sailed for Norway in the aircraft carrier HMS
Glorious
. None of its 18 pilots had ever done a deck landing or take-off, so Fleet Air Arm pilots flew the 18 Gladiators on board for them. At 1700hrs on April 24, 50 miles (80km) to seaward of Trondheim, the RAF pilots flew them off, each flight of nine led by a naval Skua two-seater, which carried a navigator, to guide them in the threatening weather. By 1900hrs all the fighters had landed on the frozen Lake Lesjaskog. During the night the carburettors and controls of the aircraft froze. The only way to warm an engine was to run it, which was done with some aircraft in readiness for dawn. The ground crews were not at full strength, so pilots had to share in guarding the aircraft.

At 0445hrs on the 25th two Gladiators took off on patrol and shot down an He 115. At 0745hrs the Luftwaffe began dive-bombing and strafing the lake. By 1230hrs bombs had destroyed eight Gladiators, four of which had not even flown. At 1305hrs bombs destroyed four aircraft and wounded three pilots. All day, aircraft took off whenever they could, harassed by bombers. There were several combats and two He 111s were destroyed. By the evening, 11 Gladiators had been burned out and two, beyond repair, were set alight. The squadron moved to Setnesmoen. On the 26th only three Gladiators were left. Next day there was none. The squadron had flown 49 sorties and made 37 attacks against enemy aircraft. Six victories were confirmed by the finding of wreckage, and eight claims remained unconfirmed. On April 28 the squadron personnel embarked in a cargo vessel and arrived in England on May 1.

On May 20 the re-formed No. 263 Squadron flew their new Gladiators off the aircraft carrier HMS
Furious
, 100 miles (160km) from Bardufoss, led by two Fleet Air Arm torpedo/reconnaissance Swordfish. In low cloud and mist, two fighters crashed, killing one pilot and severely injuring the other. On the 21st the squadron flew 40 standing patrols. On the 22nd it
flew 54 sorties. One pilot was killed in action against He 111s. An airfield had been prepared at Bodø with shelters and underground accommodation. On May 26 three Gladiators began operating from there.

No. 46 (Hurricane) Squadron had been sent to join No. 263. On May 26 the new arrivals took off in their Hurricanes from HMS
Glorious
, to attempt a landing on the Skånland airstrip where a wire mesh runway had been laid. Ten landed but sank four inches (10cm) through the soft ground, and two pitched onto their noses. The remaining eight were diverted to Bardufoss. Next day another Hurricane stood on its nose at Skånland, so the remaining seven also moved to Bardufoss.

In bad weather and under heavy bombing, the two squadrons slogged on until June 7. By then 263 had flown 389 sorties over 12 days, been in combat 69 times and claimed 26 successes. No. 46 had also operated on 12 days to take part in 26 fights and claim 11 kills and eight probables. No. 263 landed their remaining eight Gladiators on
Glorious
during June 7. No. 46, none of whom had yet attempted a deck landing, followed with their 10 Hurricanes.

On June 8 the German battle cruiser
Scharnhorst
sank
Glorious
with 1,474 of her ship's company and 41 officers and men of the RAF. Only two of the pilots who had fought so bravely and endured so much hardship in Norway survived.

This brief campaign contributed nothing that directly was of any help to Fighter Command in the Battle of Britain. On the contrary, it deprived the RAF of 30 experienced fighter pilots and 36 aircraft. The operating conditions bore no resemblance to those in the coming Battle. Altogether, it was an entirely wasteful venture except for one significant indirect influence it had on the Battle of Britain, in Britain's favour. Luftwaffe losses were 79 bombers and 68 Ju 52 transport aircraft. Among the Luftwaffe crews lost were several that were experts at blind bombing by radio beam. Training replacements greatly delayed introduction of this highly effective technique to night bombing against British industry and seaports, and cities such as London, Coventry and Liverpool, where the prime target, though denied by Germany, was the civilian population.

While this brief and hopeless campaign was being waged, the Blitzkrieg had burst upon Holland and Belgium as the first move in Germany's long-awaited attack on France. The most important weeks of the whole prelude
to the Battle of Britain were imminent. L'Armée de l'Air has always maintained that the Battle of Britain really began in May 1940, and that it has never been given due credit for the part it played in Fighter Command's victory six months later by the damage the French inflicted on Luftwaffe aircraft and air crews in May and June.

The delay in making the assault had not been caused by the weather alone. On January 10 a Luftwaffe major flying from Münster to Bonn with the detailed operational plan for the attack was blown off course in bad weather and force-landed in Belgium. The Belgians handed the documents to the Allies and Germany had to make a new plan.

At dawn on May 10 the Luftwaffe struck. Ignoring the Maginot Line, the Germans simply went around its northern end. In addition to the brilliant use of aircraft and armour in cooperation they exploited their other new technique, the spearhead of paratroops and airborne infantry, both carried in Ju 52s. The first targets in Holland were its capital, The Hague, its main port, Rotterdam, the military airfields, and the bridges across the Rhine at Dordrecht and Moerdijk, which had to be kept intact for the advancing ground forces. In Belgium, the objectives were the two Albert Canal bridges, and Fort Eben Emael on the frontier. Paratroop engineers landed on the fort and blew up the anti-aircraft guns and artillery emplacements, with a new high explosive and equipment carried in another innovation, towed gliders. The garrison held out for 24 hours.

With 136 divisions, the Germans were outnumbered by the 149 divisions of the BEF, the French, Belgians and Dutch. But their air force was bigger than the four opposing ones combined, their tactics were dazzling and their High Command was cleverer than those of Britain and France. They also had the supreme advantage of unity, whereas communication in every respect between the British and French ground and air commands was poor. The German tanks were concentrated in armoured divisions, which gave them maximum effectiveness. The British were similarly organised, but had not sent any armour to France. The powerful French tank force was mostly fragmented in support of the infantry.

The Luftwaffe had at its disposal 860 Bf 109s, 350 Bf 110s, 380 dive bombers, 1,300 long-range bombers, 300 long-range recce aircraft, 340 short-range recce aircraft, 475 Ju 52 transports and 45 gliders.

The British Air Forces in France had seen little change since their arrival. In the Air Component, Nos. 607 and 615 Squadrons were
converting from Gladiators to Hurricanes. The AASF had gained two Blenheim squadrons in place of two Battle squadrons and on the afternoon of May 10 was joined by No. 501 (Hurricane) Squadron of the Auxiliary Air Force, with which Sergeant J. H. ‘Ginger' Lacey was serving.