The Descent of Air India (19 page)

1.  My decision to roster new cabin crew on our flights, after providing them inflight service training, but awaiting flight safety training, after obtaining due approval of the DGCA for doing this. This decision has naturally affected the earnings of the members of the AICCA. It is worth noting that because Air India was operating short of the agreed cabin crew complement, the company has been paying compensation of the order of approximately USD 700–1000 to each cabin crew per flight for operating on the India/USA/India sector, in addition to their normal earnings of USD 700 per crew for each flight on this sector. My decision to roster inflight-service trained, but flight safety untrained crew, after ensuring that all doors are manned by safety trained crew and obtaining approval of the DGCA, has naturally enabled Air India to roster the crew close to the agreed crew complement, thereby saving the company huge sums. If helping save crores of rupees for the company is anti-labour and anti-union, I stand by my decision. Further, if this decision had been taken by the head of inflight Service Department in company’s interest, as per existing management practices, instead of me, I would not have become the devil in the eyes of AICCA though I maintain it is essentially an HR function.

2.  The corporate decision of not conceding to AICCA’s demand for payment of USD362 per crew for operating the Frankfurt-Los Angeles-Frankfurt sector because it exceeded ten hours of flight time has also not endeared them to me, particularly because we have been able to successfully operate these flights by rostering executive crew for these flights following their refusal to operate on this sector. Though they believe that I was the stumbling block for not allowing the payment, you are aware that it was a considered decision of the management as a whole. (Interestingly the AICCA’s demand was met soon after my transfer.)

3.  I have acted as a catalyst for ensuring that we induct manpower in our subsidiaries viz Air India Charters Limited (AICL)/Air India Air Transport Services Limited (AIATSL) at various airports, so that customer service, which has suffered immensely due to lack of adequate manpower, can be improved. Induction of additional manpower will affect some employees owing allegiance to the Air India Employees Guild (AIEG), who are earning huge amount of overtime, on many occasions even without working. The total overtime bill at Mumbai Airport alone is close to Rs 25 crore per annum. If my decision, intended to help improve customer service and reduce overtime payments, is viewed as anti-labour and anti-union by any union, I reiterate that I have done no wrong.’ (See
Appendix 9
)

Around the same time, another letter was sent out to the chairman by four general managers of the HR department. They, too, sought my removal on the grounds that I was not from within the HR department and hence should not be allowed to head it. The timing of the letters was suspect, but even more intriguing was the fact that neither the chairman nor the minister asked me for an explanation.

Unfortunately, on the afternoon of 5 August 2004, Mr Thulasidas called me up to say that I had been relieved of the HR portfolio. It upset me, but when I look back on the sequence of events, I am shocked that even when it was clear to everyone concerned that the changes were justified and unavoidable, none stood up for the airline. The logical course of action on the joint petition of HR general managers would have been to nip such suggestions in the bud by pointing out that the appointment of a director was not dependent on the wishes of a few people. Alternatively he should have made sure that if I were being removed for not being a part of the department, the same rule should have applied to those protesting my appointment. Instead, all the four general managers who had signed the letter against me were appointed as executive directors—three of them in functional areas outside HR making me suspect his motives.

I protested against my removal in a letter dated 7 August 2004 to Mr Thulasidas where in addition to the points that I had raised in my previous letter, I wrote:

‘The Company has saved several crores since these decisions were put into effect. I can understand the anger of the Unions against me … but what I fail to understand is as to why is the management not supporting me against their crusade when the company is reaping the benefits arising out of my decisions.’I also pointed out that if the leadership did believe that the decisions that I had taken were harmful to the company, these should have been rescinded, but this was not the case I concluded by listing what had been achieved by me as Director, HRD, and then added that I had done my best by being innovative, working long hours and by working in company’s interest. It was sad that the work was not appreciated and those conspiring had been allowed to succeed. This was a small price for me individually, but I felt that it would turn out to be a bigger tragedy if the HRD officials, given their past record, failed to get good agreements with unions during the wage negotiations on which hinged the future of Air India. I was quite sure that they would not be able to do that since they had compromised their positions with the unions only to get me out. (Appendix 10)

INTERNAL ALLIANCES AND INTRIGUES

The decision to move me out of the HR department was shortsighted when one considers the manner in which the interests of a few employees were protected at significant cost to the company. I felt let down, especially because I had been asked to withdraw my application for voluntary retirement by Mr Thulasidas on the promise that the airline would be steered in a more professional manner.

Finally, when the agreements that were being negotiated since 2004 were signed, the unions held sway and the airline failed to even keep its word to the ministry. Before embarking on the exercise, a team from Air India had made a presentation to the ministry, assuring the ministry that the liability arising out of the new pay-and-emoluments package in the agreement would be limited to
101 crore per annum, which would be recovered through improved productivity and cost rationalisation measures. However, the airline incurred an additional cost of
400 crore per annum as was to be expected from the way in which the management had compromised the airline’s position.

The unions and a handful of HR department officials scuppered the plans to bring Air India on par with market realities. All wage agreements were approved by Mr Thulasidas, and interestingly enough, no consultant was appointed to guide the negotiations, thus violating the understanding on which the ministry had accorded its approval for a new wage agreement.

The 2004–05 agreement has imposed a huge burden on the airline, one from which it has still not been able to pull itself out. So reckless was the management team assigned the role of negotiating the agreements that they conceded demands far beyond the airline’s ability to bear.

Spare a moment to reflect on what Air India would have possibly been if the 2004 wage negotiations had been allowed to be conducted in a more equitable manner without union leaders bludgeoning all dissent and a few members of the HR department behaving in the obstructive fashion that they did. The airline would have had a more efficient work force and its expenditure bill would have been under control. It would have been better equipped to face up to competition from around the world.

Ironically, what V. Thulasidas prevented me from doing in 2004 is exactly what is being prescribed in the 2012 turnaround plan that has been linked to the
30,000-crore infusion that the government has approved. The plan asks the airline to improve work practices, reduce costs and hive off ground handling and engineering services. This is what we had planned nine years ago!

Interestingly, if I fast forward to the present situation when the management finally transferred employees working in Engineering and Ground Handling to new subsidiaries, effective 1 February 2013, the unions called it not only arbitrary and illegal but also a violation of service conditions as specified in the agreements signed between them and the management unions in the past. The unions approached the Bombay High Court, which justifiably dismissed the clutch of petitions. The current management put up a spirited defence, stating inter alia in its affidavit that the decision was part of the turnaround plan and taken in public interest to ‘ensure that it capitalises on the growth of the aviation sector in and around India’. Air India also informed the court that ‘it was incurring operating losses of
15–16 crore per day and that cumulative losses as on September 2012 were of about
30,000 crore. The government has infused funds to the extent of
7,200 crore between 2009 and 2012. The very survival of Air India is a matter of serious concern for all stakeholders. While this scenario is exceedingly bleak and the task ahead seems much more dauntingly painted than it was in 2004, the signs of decay were more than apparent at the time. If the airline’s then management had acted as the present one has done, Air India would have perhaps been spared this fate.