The essential writings of Machiavelli (15 page)

CHAPTER TWO
O
N HOW MANY KINDS OF REPUBLIC THERE ARE, AND WHAT KIND THE
R
OMAN REPUBLIC WAS

I would like to set aside the discussion of cities that had their origin through an outside power, and discuss those that had their origin without any external servitude but were governed from the start by their own free will, either as republics or as principalities. With their varied beginnings, these cities had different laws and institutions. Some were given their laws by a single ruler and all at once, either at the time of their founding or soon thereafter, like the laws given by Lycurgus to the Spartans. Other cities received their laws by chance on different occasions and depending on circumstances, as was the case with Rome. A state can be considered most fortunate if it can bring forth a man who is so wise that he establishes laws organized in such a way that the state can exist securely under them without these laws needing to be revised. It can be seen that Sparta respected her laws for more than eight hundred years without corrupting them, or without dangerous turmoil.

On the other hand, a state can be considered to some degree unfortunate if it does not chance to have a wise organizer and has been obliged to reorganize itself on its own. Of these states, the most unfortunate is the one furthest from order, and the state furthest from order is the one whose institutions stray from the path that could lead the way to a perfect and proper existence. States in this position find it almost impossible to be put in order by some unforeseen event. The other cities, which might not have perfect institutions but have at least made a good start and have acted to become better, can become perfect by a concurrence of events. But it is true that the states will never introduce this order without risk, because most men will never agree to a new law connected with a new order in the state unless necessity makes clear to them that it has to be done, and as such a necessity cannot come without risk, it is easy enough for this state to be destroyed before it can bring its institutions to perfection. The Republic of Florence can bear witness to this: It was reformed by the Arezzo incident in 1502, and destroyed by the Prato incident in 1512.
¹²

As I would like to discuss the institutions of the city of Rome and the incidents that led to its perfection, I say, as have some who have written about republics, that they have one of three forms of government: principality, aristocracy, or democracy. These writers also point out that those who organize a city must turn to one of these three forms, depending on which seems to them most apt. Others who many consider wiser say that there are six different kinds of government, of which three are very bad, while the other three are good in themselves, but so easily corruptible that they, too, become pernicious. The kinds that are good are the three mentioned above, while the ones that are bad are the other three that depend on them, for each of these kinds of government is similar to the one it is linked to, which means that it can easily enough turn into its counterpart: A principality can easily become a tyranny, an aristocratic state a government of the few, and a democracy can easily turn into chaos.
¹³
Thus if the founder of a republic institutes one of these three kinds of government, he cannot hope for it to last long, for no precaution can keep it from lapsing into its opposite because of the similarity in this case between virtue and vice.

These varieties of government arise by chance, since at the beginning of the world, when its inhabitants were few, they lived for a time dispersed like wild beasts. As the generations multiplied, these early inhabitants came together, and in order to defend themselves better began looking among themselves for a man who was stronger and had more courage, making him their leader and obeying him. From this arose man’s understanding that what is good and honest differs from what is destructive and evil: When a man harmed his benefactor, that man inspired hatred and compassion among people, who blamed the ungrateful and honored the grateful, as they realized that the same harm could be done to them. To avoid such evils they felt constrained to make laws, and to set up punishments for those who contravened them. This gave rise to the awareness of the concept of justice. Later, when they had to elect a prince, they did not elect the boldest man, but the one who was most prudent and just. But then as princes began coming to power by succession and not by election, the successors were quick to depart from their forefathers and discard virtuous works, convinced that princes had nothing else to do but surpass others in sumptuousness and dissipation and every other form of licentiousness. The result was that the people began to hate the prince, who grew frightened at this hatred and was quick to proceed from fear to attack, which promptly gave rise to tyranny. This then initiated the conspiracies against the prince and the beginning of his downfall. These conspiracies were not instigated by those who were timid or weak, but by those who surpassed others in generosity, magnanimity, wealth, and nobility, men who could not bear the reprehensible ways of the prince. The populace followed the authority of these powerful men and took up arms against the prince, and when he was eliminated, the populace obeyed these men as their liberators. The new rulers, abominating the very idea of a single leader, formed a government among themselves, and in the beginning, mindful of the past tyranny, kept to the laws they had instituted, putting the common good before their own interests, governing and conserving private and public affairs with the utmost diligence. But then their government passed down to their sons, who did not know how changeable Fortune can be, never having experienced adversity. This new generation of rulers was not content with civil equality and soon turned to covetousness, ruthless ambition, the abducting of women, and turning the government of aristocrats into a government of the few without the slightest regard for civil law. As a result, they soon suffered the fate of the tyrants, because the populace grew weary of their government and became the instrument of whoever designed to attack these rulers. Soon someone would rise who with the help of the populace would destroy this government of the few. As the memory of the former prince and his offences was still fresh, the populace, having destroyed the government of the few and not wanting to recreate that of a principality, turned to democracy, setting it up in such a way that neither a few powerful men nor a single prince would hold power. And because all states at the beginning are to some extent respected, this democracy is maintained for a while, but not for long, at most until the demise of the generation that founded it, because it would invariably fall into disorder, when neither private nor public men were feared. Everyone lived as he pleased and the citizens did each other a thousand injustices every day until necessity, or a single capable man, constrained them to return once more to principality in order to escape such disorder. And from this principality, stage by stage, they returned to disorder in the way and for the reasons I have discussed.

This is the cycle of all states, regardless of how they are governed. And yet they rarely return to the same form of government because almost no state can exist long enough to go through these changes many times and still remain standing. Turmoil, however, can lead a state lacking resolution and strength into becoming the vassal of a neighboring state that is better governed. Were this not to happen, however, a state might go infinitely through this cycle of governments.

Hence, I propose that all the modes of government I have mentioned are pernicious because of the brief life of the three good forms of government and the malignity of the three bad ones. Prudent rulers setting up laws were aware of this shortcoming, and steered clear of each of these forms in itself, choosing a government that combined them all, judging it steadier and more stable, because one form can keep the other in check when there are a principality, an aristocracy, and a democracy in the same city. Among the men who have deserved the most praise for such a government is Lycurgus, who constituted his laws in Sparta in such a way that the kings, the aristocracy, and the populace all had their function. In doing this, he created a state that lasted for more than eight hundred years, with the utmost glory to him and peace for Sparta. The opposite happened to Solon, who organized the laws of Athens. He only set up a democracy, which had such a short life that he saw the tyranny of Pisistratus arise before he died.
¹⁴
After forty years the heirs of Pisistratus were chased out and Athens returned to liberty, but because the democracy that was reinstated followed Solon’s laws, it did not last more than a hundred years, even though to conserve the democracy, many laws not envisioned by Solon were drawn up to keep the arrogance of the aristocracy and the unruliness of the populace in check. Nonetheless, since in his laws Solon had not combined the power of a principality with that of an aristocracy, Athens prevailed for only a brief time compared to Sparta.

But let us consider Rome, which, despite not having a Lycurgus to give it laws in the beginning in such a way that it could prevail in freedom over a long period, there were nevertheless so many incidents arising from the discord between the plebeians and the Senate that what a founder did not do was subsequently done by chance. If Rome did not have Fortune on her side the first time, she did later, because Rome’s initial laws, though imperfect, nevertheless did follow a straight path that led it to perfection. For Romulus and all the other kings made many good laws that were suitable for living in freedom, but because their aim was to found a kingdom and not a republic, when Rome became free she lacked many things necessary to secure liberty that had not been set up by those kings. These rulers lost their power for the reasons I have already discussed, and yet those who chased them out immediately established two consuls
¹⁵
who took their place, so that what was driven from Rome was only the name of king and not kingly power. As the republic had only the consuls and the Senate, it was a combination of only two of three forms of governments described above, in other words, that of the principality and that of the aristocracy. It remained to the city only to give a place to democracy. But the Roman nobility became arrogant, for reasons I will discuss later, and the populace rose against them. So as not to lose everything, the nobility was constrained to concede to the populace their share, and, on the other hand, the Senate and the consuls kept enough power over the republic that they managed to maintain their positions. This is how the tribunes of the plebeians came to be, after which the republic became more stable since each of the three forms of government had its part. Fortune was so favorable to Rome that although the city passed from a government of kings and aristocrats to one of the populace, through the same stages and for the same reasons discussed above, the kingly qualities were never entirely relinquished to the aristocrats, nor was the authority of the aristocrats ceded to the populace. Rather, the authority remained mixed, creating a perfect republic. Rome reached this perfection through the discord between the plebeians and the Senate, as will be seen in the following two chapters.

12.
The crisis provoked by the revolt of Arezzo drove the Florentine Republic to sweeping constitutional reform. See also “On How to Treat the Populace of Valdichiana After Their Rebellion.” In the Prato incident of 1512, the Pope demanded that Florence dismiss its current leaders and allow the exiled Medici to return. Florence was forced to submit by a Spanish army that sacked Prato, one of its cities.

13.
In this paragraph Machiavelli closely follows Polybius in
Histories
(Book VI, chapter 3): “Most of those who profess to give us authoritative instruction on this subject distinguish three kinds of constitutions, the first of which they call kingship, the second aristocracy, and the third democracy. […] Therefore we must mention six types of government—the three that everyone talks about that I have just mentioned, and three others that are related to them, by which I mean despotism, oligarchy, and rule of the crowd.”

14.
Solon (c. 630—c. 560
BCE
) was an Athenian statesman who introduced sweeping economic, political, and legal reforms that ended the aristocrats’ control of the Athenian government. Pisistratus (d. 527
BCE
) was tyrant of Athens three times. After his death, his sons Hippias and Hipparchus succeeded him. See also Book II, chapter 2 below.

15.
After the expulsion of the Tarquin kings (509
BCE
), the Romans replaced the kingship with two annually elected chief magistrates called consuls.

CHAPTER THREE
O
N THE INCIDENTS THAT LED TO THE CREATION OF THE PLEBEIAN TRIBUNES IN
R
OME, WHICH MADE THE REPUBLIC MORE PERFECT

Those who reason about civic life argue—and the history books are filled with examples—that it is necessary for a ruler who is setting up a republic and organizing its laws to presuppose that all men are evil, and that whenever they have the opportunity they will act according to the malignity of their nature. When such malignity is concealed for a while, it is linked to a hidden cause which, not being visible, is not recognized. But time, which people call the father of all truth, will in the end expose this malignity.

In Rome after the Tarquins
¹⁶
were expelled there seemed to exist a wonderful accord between the plebeians and the Senate. The nobles seemed to have laid down their pride and taken up the popular cause and were supported by everyone, even the lowliest. But this was a ruse, and the motivation of the nobles remained hidden, nor was the reason for it apparent as long as the Tarquins, whom the nobles feared, were alive. The nobles felt that mistreating the plebeians would draw the plebeians closer to the Tarquins, and so the nobles conducted themselves toward the plebeians outward with respect. But no sooner were the Tarquins dead than the nobles’ fear vanished and they began spewing at the plebeians all the venom concealed in their hearts, attacking them in every way they could.
¹⁷
This bears testimony to what I said before, that men never do good except out of necessity.

But where choice is overabundant and one has recourse to every freedom, everything is soon beset by confusion and disorder. It is said that hunger and poverty make man industrious, and that laws make him good, but that laws are not necessary when things work well on their own accord without them. When these good customs are missing, however, then laws become vital. With the Tarquins gone—the fear of whom had kept the nobility in check—it was necessary to find a new order that would have the same effect that the Tarquins had had while they were alive. Thus, after many uproars, and clashes between the plebeians and the nobility, the tribunes were created for the security of the plebeians. These tribunes were of such standing and reputation that they were always able to act as mediators between the plebeians and the Senate, and to curb the arrogance of the nobles.

16.
Tarquin the Proud, who according to tradition reigned from 534 to 510
BCE
, was the last of the seven legendary kings of Rome.

17.
Livy (Book II, chapter 21) writes: “This year is notable for the news of Tarquin’s death. […] The news delighted the patricians and delighted the plebeians. But the patricians’ happiness went out of control. Up to that time they had treated the plebeians with great deference, but now their leaders began to inflict injustice upon them.”