THE GARUD STRIKES (2 page)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I
t would have been impossible to complete this book without the unstinted help and support of Mrs Jane Himmeth Singh, who not only provided the resources and material but also constant encouragement. The manner in which she so diligently gathered and safeguarded all the materials and photographs used here amply highlight that this book is a labour of love, and her way of acknowledging her husband.

My special thanks also to the following:

M
ajor Chandrakant, whose amazing, almost photographic, memory was able to provide minute details of the battalion’s action. His insights as the then acting second-in-command were especially invaluable. He was remarkably diligent in locating and recording interviews of veterans and widows of the martyrs. In several places he even carried out interviews on my behalf, and so I ended up seeing the war and the people through his eyes.

Ms Bhawna Adhikari, wife of Colonel Rajesh Adhikari, of 4 Guards, who was not only a great source of encouragement but also an active participant in this project. She even made the trip to Bangladesh with Mrs Himmeth and Major Chandrakant and travelled the route that the battalion had taken during the war of liberation.

The veterans of 4 Guards (1 Rajput) who helped me restructure the confusing mass of information in the two years that it took to put this book together. I would like to especially commend the war widows, who took out the time and made the effort to travel long distances at such short notices to provide forgotten details that enrich this book.

Th
ough I never had the pleasure of meeting him, Late Colonel Pyarelal, the Secretary of USI (United Service Institution of India), Delhi, also deserves a special mention. The recordings he had made of his conversations with General Himmeth Singh provided invaluable insights into the thoughts, considerations and fears that occupied Himmeth’s mind during those tumultuous days when he led his men through the 1971 Indo-Pak war. They helped to generate a more complete and clearer picture of this enigmatic man. This wealth of information was very nearly lost. In fact, it only saw the light of day when the ever-perseverant Major Chandrakant went looking for them after the demise of Colonel Pyarelal. He found them in an old, abandoned briefcase. These recordings, which Himmeth’s son, Mrityunja, later painstakingly transcribed, provided not just a detailed account of the strike of the Garud across Bangladesh, but also a bird’s eye view of Himmeth’s own thoughts and feelings.

Lieutenant General Shamsher Mehta (Retd.) for the war photos that he had, and those he obtained from the ever-obliging Mr Jayant Ulal, war correspondent of Stern magazine, Germany. Meeting the General, who, despite the passage of years, has lost none of the elan and josh that makes an Indian Army officer stand apart, was inspiring, to say the least.

Major Rajendra Mohan for introducing us to his Bangladeshi friends, like Mr Amin Bhai, who not only organized our trip to Bangladesh, but also provided constant support.

Major General J.P. Singh of the 31 Armoured Division, Brigadiers Bhanot and P. K. Singh of the Rajput Regimental Centre, and Honorary Captain Patiram Pal of 4 Guards for helping us gather the war veterans and widows, and interviewing them.

M
ajor General Ravi Nair, Military Attache at the Indian High Commission in Dacca, who organized an evening at his home for us to meet the Bangladeshi citizens who had been victimised during the war.

Last, but not the least, to Gautam Padmanabhan, Vipin Vijay, Karthik Venkatesh, Shatrughan Pandey and Rahul Tanwar at Westland India for making this book possible.

AUTHOR’S NOTE

T
his book is not the story of the 1971 Indo-Pak War — of who won or who lost. It is the story of a few good men. The men of the 4th battalion of The Brigade of Guards, which was originally raised as the 2/15 BNI (Bengal Native Infantry) on 15 September 1798 at Sasaram, Bihar, and then re-designated on 26 January 1950 by General K.M. Cariappa, the then Commander–in-Chief of the Indian Army, as 4 Guards (1 Rajput).

These were not extraordinary men; they were simple, ordinary men like you and me. Men who laugh when happy, cry when sad, and bleed when hurt. But, like soldiers the world over, more often than not, their cries go unheard. These were and are men with families, which wait for them when they leave home for distant frontiers. And very often, wait in vain.

These were men who, when caught up in extraordinary circumstances, displayed exemplary courage and unfaltering devotion to duty. When the push came to a shove, they unfailingly rose to the occasion, with complete disregard for life and limb. That is what made them extraordinary, and inspired me to tell this tale.

It is hard for someone who has not been in battle, who has not seen blood and mangled bones, who has not been assaulted by the stench of death, who has not had a comrade die in their arms, to understand what wars can do to a man. Hence this book — to let you know what these brave men endure … for you … so that the nation stays secure.

While narrating this story, I have at all times maintained factual accuracy, and have not taken any artistic liberties. However, since I was not present at the actual scene, and four decades have gone by, at times reality may have been clouded in the fog of battle, and in the fading memories of those who narrated these stories to me.

The Garud Strikes is my humble tribute to the forgotten brave hearts of 4 Guards (1 Rajput). To dwell on the lives of those who were martyred and those (parents, widows and orphans) they left behind; whose pain and loss is often not recognized. I would like them to know that they are alive in our hearts, that their sacrifice matters, and that the nation cares. And to remind India that it needs to care.

This book is also my humble tribute to the Indian Army, the organization that nurtured me and reinforced the values that my mother had bred in me. That gave me the discipline, focus and adaptability one needs to succeed. That taught me to keep going, no matter how adverse the situation, or how grim the odds. That conditioned me to make success a habit.

I must also stress that neither have any classified or official records been used in the writing of this book, nor have any serving officers, JCOs (Junior Commissioned Officers) or ORs (Other Ranks) been interviewed. I have relied solely on material available in the public domain (the Internet, books, newspaper and magazine articles), and the interviews of the veterans who took part in this campaign, their widows and orphans.

I have tried to use only those stories that have been verified by at least two independent sources, and have used the best known and most clearly remembered facts.

Despite that, or perhaps because of that, there may be instances and incidents where the purist military historian may take issue or find fault with. To my mind, that is okay, since my endeavour is not to delve into strategy, tactics, who was right and who was wrong, but merely to tell the story of a battalion of men at war. A war that none of them wanted. A war thrust upon India by our ever-so-friendly (and oh-so-shortsighted) neighbour to the northwest. A war fought for the sake of yet another neighbour in distress. None of these brave hearts of the Indian Armed Forces were there of their own free will or for personal fame or glory. Many of them did not come back. Many came back, but maimed or with a limb missing. All of them returned with emotional baggage and trauma that they carry to this day, though most would deny that vociferously. I could sense this deep-seated turmoil and see the scars as they narrated their stories. Not many had healed. It took just a few questions for the scab of time to be torn away and the pain to erupt.

And they did all this merely for regimental honour, for the Garud that adorns the flag that they marched under. And for India, of course.

Mukul Deva

PREFACE

I
ndians, Pakistanis and a host of other military scholars of various hues have written much about the 1971 war. And I am sure much will continue to be written about it. After all, the Lightning Campaign, as the Indo-Pak war of 1971 came to be known, was a landmark in the history of warfare.

Few campaigns in history have caused as much surprise and speculation as the liberation of Bangladesh by the Indian Armed Forces, in 1971. In a mere twelve days, operating over one of the world’s most difficult riverine terrains, the Indian Armed Forces brought a formidable, well-equipped and well-entrenched enemy to its knees, took ninety-three thousand Pakistani prisoners and gave the seventy-five million tormented people of Bangladesh their independence.

Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman and Lieutenant Colonel Himmeth – A Farewell to Arms -- Dacca, 12 March 1972 Front page of Bangla Bani dated 13 March 1972

On 12 December 1971, London’s
Sunday Times
wrote, ‘
It took only 12 days for the Indian Army to smash its way to Dacca, an achievement reminiscent of the German blitzkrieg across France in 1940. The strategy was the same: speed, ferocity and flexibility.’

This is perhaps the only instance where a nation won a war without winning a single major battle. In fact, the war was over before the battles were won. Just as the pride of the German Army stood waiting behind the Defence Wall at Calais when the Allies invaded Normandy and were still intact when the war ended, the bulk of the Pakistani Eastern Army was captured unbloodied.

The Indian aim for this campaign was to install a Bangladeshi interim government in East Pakistani territory before the cessation of hostilities. The problems facing the Indian Army Chief, Sam Manekshaw, were as follows:

1. On the eastern front, enough territory had to be captured to enable the establishment of the Bangladeshi government

2. On the western front, Pakistan had to be denied the capture of any Indian territory, and whatever Pakistani territory could be captured here would help at the negotiating table when the war ended

3. On the Sino-Indian borders, adequate forces had to be maintained. The Chinese were firm allies of Pakistan and had been making threatening noises ever since India was compelled (by the flood of refugees) to intervene in the East Pakistan issue

4. For the campaign to be successful, it had to be swift. India was well aware that the United Nations and the world community, especially America, would mount great pressure, and the Russians had indicated that they did not want to exercise their veto any longer

Pakistani commanders were keenly aware of this basic dynamic. The Pakistanis knew India had been preparing for war for some months, but they were not perturbed. On the contrary, they were confident that a stalemate was all India would be able to achieve. Thus they decided to do the following:

1. Delay the Indian advance into East Pakistan: Hence, the Pakistani Army Commander in the East, Lieutenant General Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi, heavily fortified the towns and approaches to the East Pakistani heartland. He even boasted that should hostilities begin, he would take the battle inside India.

2. Seize strategically important Indian territory on the western front: Hence, Pakistan concentrated virtually all its forces in the West. Their Air Force was equipped with Starfighters, new Chinese F-6s and newer versions of the F-86 Sabre. Their Army had a lot of firepower in the form of heavy artillery, new Chinese built T-59 tanks and US-built Patton tanks.

Keeping in view the geography and terrain of East Pakistan, the brief given by General Manekshaw to the Indian Army Eastern Command was very limited: occupy the Chittagong and Khulna areas of East Pakistan so that an interim Bangladeshi government could be established there. This aim may have been limited; the task confronting the Indian commanders was not.

Three major rivers — the Brahmaputra, the Ganga and the Meghna — divided the then East Pakistan into four natural regions. Each of these rivers was wider than any European river. Each subregion was further divided into several pockets cut by smaller rivers and their tributaries. The idea that an attacking army could bridge these, get its war machinery across, fight the enemy and then capture territory — all within a couple of weeks — was ludicrous.

The Pakistani Eastern Army was well-entrenched and adequately supplied to fight a defensive battle for months. As was the usual practice with Pakistan, it had diverted the millions of dollars received as aid and for development activity towards building and reinforcing massive defence fortifications on both fronts.

Although the Indian Army headquarters felt they were too ambitious, the Eastern Command went ahead with its plans for a lightning thrust into the then East Pakistan. In November 1971, the Indian Army and the Mukti Bahini guerrillas were ready for battle with the Pakistanis, who were well dug-in and awaiting the Indian assault. The Indian forces outnumbered the Pakistanis by a ratio of about 2:1, although conventional infantry wisdom dictates that an attacking army should have a 3:1 superiority. This, however, was all that could be spared by the Indian Army, considering its other strategic and tactical compulsions.

When all other attempts by India to convince Pakistani to remedy the situation in East Pakistan failed, and India was no longer able to sustain the millions of refugees from the area, war was finally waged on 1 December 1971. Within six days, against all odds, troops of 57 Division (of 4 Corps of the Indian Army) had raced deep into East Pakistan territory. By the seventh day of the war, the Pakistani Army High Command in Rawalpindi was in complete panic. Their border garrisons stood intact and unbloodied as Lieutenant General Sagat, the 4 Corps Commander, spotted an opportunity and decided to exploit it.

The capture of Dacca, which had never been part of the plan, became an irresistible possibility as soon as the Meghna was crossed. Soon, the Indian Army had either bypassed Pakistani strong holds or contained them with small forces, and was racing forward towards Dacca at an incredible speed, rivers and terrain notwithstanding.

Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman and Lieutenant Colonel Himmeth reviewing the farewell
parade given by 4 Guards

The day Dacca fell to Indian troops, almost all the heavily fortified Pakistani strong holds in East Pakistan stood intact. Pakistanis were stunned by the speed and momentum of the Indian offensive. They had been beaten: strategically, tactically and psychologically. Their capability to fight had been degraded, and their will to fight decimated.

One of the less remarked upon aspects of the 1971 war was the varied character of the men planning and executing the operations. The best known, of course, was the flamboyant Indian Army Chief, General Sam Manekshaw, who had earlier won the Military Cross in World War II. To the Indian public, Sam, with his twirled moustache, Gurkha cap and baton, was the symbolic hero.

Sam Bahadur with the troops

Yet, below him, there were a few good men who planned and executed their own battles. The Western Army was commanded by Lieutenant General K.P. Candeth, and the Eastern Army by Lieutenant General J.S. Aurora. Lieutenant General Aurora’s Chief of Staff was Major General J.F.R. Jacob. Each of them had a major role to play as history unfolded.

However, it was Lieutenant
General Sagat Singh, General
Officer Commanding, 4 Corps,
who led the charge and created
panic in Pakistani minds by using
the forces available to him with
ingenuity and courage.

It was Sagat who pulled the
plug on the Pakistanis by breaching
the Meghna. He made it impossible
for General Niazi, the Pakistani
Eastern Army Commander, to even
consider continuing the battle.

Lieutenant General Sagat Singh,
PVSM, AVSM, Padma Bhushan.
GOC 4 Corps

Even less remarked upon is the role played by thousands of
unknown Indian soldiers, many of who did not return home to
enjoy the fruits of this stupendous victory. Some returned, but
not intact. Almost all of them live on or have passed on, unsung
and unheard of.

The Garud Strikes
acknowledges each and every Indian soldier who took part in this war. However it focusses only on the stories of some of these men—those of the 4 Guards (1 Rajput), and their families.

This book does not, in any manner, wish to undermine the
efforts of the other units that took part in this war; nor does it
claim that it was 4 Guards alone that turned the tide and won the
war. In fact, the story told in these pages could well be that of any
of the other Indian Army units that took part in this campaign.
Every unit and every man in these units was just one more cog in
the wheel that won the war and helped free a nation.