The Gathering Storm: The Second World War (77 page)

December
17, 1939.

If the
Spee
breaks out, as she may do tonight, we hope to renew the action of the thirteenth with the
Cumberland,
an
eight
eight-inch-gun ship, in the place of the six-gun
Exeter.
The
Spee
knows now that
Renown
and
Ark Royal
are oiling at Rio, so this is her best chance. The
Dorsetshire
and
Shropshire,
who are coming across from the Cape, are still three and four days away respectively. It is fortunate that the
Cumberland
was handy at the Falklands, as
Exeter
was heavily damaged. She was hit over a hundred times, one turret smashed, three guns knocked out, and sixty officers and men killed and twenty wounded. Indeed the
Exeter
fought one of the finest and most resolute actions against superior range and metal on record. Every conceivable precaution has been taken to prevent the
Spee
slipping out unobserved, and I have told Harwood (who is now an Admiral and a K.C.B.) that he is free to attack her anywhere outside the three-mile limit. We should prefer, however, that she should be interned, as this will be less creditable to the German Navy than being sunk in action. Moreover, a battle of this kind is full of hazard, and needless bloodshed must never be sought.

The whole of the Canadians came in safely this morning under the protection of the main fleet and [are] being welcomed by Anthony, Massey, and I trust a good part of the people of Greenock and Glasgow. We plan to give them a cordial reception. They are to go to Aldershot, where no doubt you will go and see them presently.

There have been ten air attacks today on individual ships along the east coast from Wick to Dover, and some of the merchant ships have been machine-gunned out of pure spite, some of our people being hit on their decks.

I am sure you must be having a most interesting time at the Front, and I expect you will find that change is the best kind of rest.

From the moment when we heard that action was joined, we instantly ordered powerful forces to concentrate off Montevideo, but our hunting groups were naturally widely dispersed and none was within two thousand miles of the scene. In the north, Force K, comprising the
Renown
and
Ark Royal,
was completing a sweep which had begun at Capetown ten days before and was now six hundred miles east of Pernambuco, and twenty-five hundred miles from Montevideo. Farther north still, the cruiser
Neptune
with three destroyers had just parted company with the French Force X and were coming south to join Force K. All these were ordered to Montevideo; they had first to fuel at Rio. However, we succeeded in creating the impression that they had already left Rio and were approaching Montevideo at thirty knots.

On the other side of the Atlantic, Force H was returning to the Cape for fuel after an extended sweep up the African coast. Only the
Dorsetshire
was immediately available at Capetown and was ordered at once to join Admiral Harwood, but she had over four thousand miles to travel. She was followed later by the
Shropshire.
In addition, to guard against the possible escape of the
Spee
to the eastward, Force I, comprising the
Cornwall, Gloucester,
and the aircraft carrier
Eagle
from the East Indies station, which at this time was at Durban, was placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic.

* * * * *

Meanwhile, Captain Langsdorff telegraphed on December 16 to the German Admiralty as follows:

Strategic position off Montevideo. Besides the cruisers and destroyers,
Ark Royal
and
Renown.
Close blockade at night; escape into open sea and break-through to home waters hopeless…. Request decision on whether the ship should be scuttled in spite of insufficient depth in the Estuary of the Plate, or whether internment is to be preferred.

At a conference presided over by the Fuehrer, at which Raeder and Jodl were present, the following answer was decided on:

Attempt by all means to extend the time in neutral waters…. Fight your way through to Buenos Aires if possible. No internment in Uruguay. Attempt effective destruction, if ship is scuttled.

As the German envoy in Montevideo reported later that further attempts to extend the time limit of seventy-two hours were fruitless, these orders were confirmed by the German Supreme Command.

Accordingly, during the afternoon of the seventeenth the
Spee
transferred more than seven hundred men, with baggage and provisions, to the German merchant ship in the harbour. Shortly afterwards Admiral Harwood learnt that she was weighing anchor. At 6.15
P.M
., Watched by immense crowds, she left harbour and steamed slowly seaward, awaited hungrily by the British cruisers. At 8.54
P.M
., as the sun sank, the
Ajax’s
aircraft reported:
“Graf Spee
has blown herself up.” The
Renown
and
Ark Royal
were still a thousand miles away.

Langsdorff was broken-hearted by the loss of his ship. In spite of the full authority he had received from his Government, he wrote on December 19:

I can now only prove by my death that the fighting services of the Third Reich are ready to die for the honour of the flag. I alone bear the responsibility for scuttling the pocket battleship
Admiral Graf Spee.
I am happy to pay with my life for any possible reflection on the honour of the flag. I shall face my fate with firm faith in the cause and the future of the nation and of my Fuehrer.

That night he shot himself.

Thus ended the first surface challenge to British trade on the oceans. No other raider appeared until the spring of 1940, when a new campaign opened, utilising disguised merchant ships. These could more easily avoid detection, but on the other hand could be mastered by lesser forces than those required to destroy a pocket battleship.

* * * * *

As soon as the news arrived of the end of the
Spee, I
was impatient to bring our widely scattered hunting groups home. The
Spee’s
auxiliary, the
Altmark,
was, however, still afloat, and it was believed that she had on board the crews of the nine ships which had been sunk by the raider.

Now that the South Atlantic is practically clear except for the
Altmark,
it seems of high importance to bring home the
Renown
and
Ark Royal
together with at least one of the eight-inch-gun cruisers. This will give us more easement in convoy work and enable refits and leave to be accomplished. I like your plan of the two small ships anchoring tomorrow in Montevideo inner harbour, but I do not think it would be right to send Force K so far south. Moreover, perhaps so many warships would not be allowed in at one time. It would be very convenient if, as you proposed,
Neptune
relieved
Ajax
as soon as the triumphal entry [into Montevideo harbour] is over; and it would be very good if all the returning forces could scrub and search the South Atlantic on their way home for the
Altmark.
I feel that we ought to bring home all that are not absolutely needed. The Northern Patrol will require constant support in two, or better still three, reliefs from the Clyde as long as we stay there. I agree with Captain Tennant that the German Admiralty will be most anxious to do something to get their name back.

Perhaps you will let me know what you think about these ideas.

I was also most anxious about the
Exeter,
and could not accept the proposals made to me to leave her unrepaired in the Falkland Islands till the end of the war.

This preliminary report of damage to
Exeter
shows the tremendous fire to which she was exposed and the determination with which she was fought. It also reflects high credit on the Constructors’ Department that she should have been able to stand up to such a prolonged and severe battering. This story will have to be told as soon as possible, omitting anything undesirable [i.e., what the enemy should not know].

What is proposed about repair? What can be done at the Falklands? I presume she will be patched up sufficiently to come home for long refit.

We ought not readily to accept the non-repair during the war of
Exeter.
She should be strengthened and strutted internally as far as possible, and should transfer her ammunition, or the bulk of it, to some merchant ship or tender. Perhaps she might be filled up in part with barrels or empty oil drums, and come home with reduced crew under escort either to the Mediterranean or to one of our dockyards. If nothing can be done with her then, she should be stripped of all useful guns and appliances, which can be transferred to new construction.

The above indicates only my general view. Perhaps you will let me know how it can be implemented.

I have not seen the answer to the telegram from the Rear Admiral, South America, about it not being worth while to repair
Exeter,
on which I minuted in the contrary sense. How does this matter now stand? I gathered from you verbally that we were all in agreement she should come home and be thoroughly repaired, and that this need not take so long as the R.A. thought.

What is going to happen to
Exeter
now? How is she going to be brought home, in what condition, and when? We cannot leave her at the Falklands, where either she will be in danger or some valuable ship will be tethered to look after her. I shall be glad to know what is proposed.

My view prevailed. The Exeter reached this country safely. I had the honour to pay my tribute to her brave officers and men from her shattered deck in Plymouth Harbour. She was preserved for over two years of distinguished service, until she perished under Japanese guns in the forlorn battle of the Straits of Sunda in 1942.

* * * * *

The effects of the action off the Plate gave intense joy to the British nation and enhanced our prestige throughout the world. The spectacle of the three smaller British ships unhesitatingly attacking and putting to flight their far more heavily gunned and armoured antagonist was everywhere admired. It was contrasted with the disastrous episode of the escape of the
Goeben
in the Straits of Otranto in August, 1914. In justice to the admiral of those days it must be remembered that all Commodore Harwood’s ships were faster than the
Spee,
and all except one of Admiral Troubridge’s squadron in 1914 were slower than the
Goeben.
Nevertheless, the impression was exhilarating, and lightened the dreary and oppressive winter through which we were passing.

The Soviet Government were not pleased with us at this time, and their comment on December 31, 1939, in the
Red Fleet
is an example of their factual reporting:

Nobody would dare to say that the loss of a German battleship is a brilliant victory for the British Fleet. This is rather a demonstration, unprecedented in history, of the impotence of the British. Upon the morning of December 13, the battleship started an artillery duel with the
Exeter,
and within a few minutes obliged the cruiser to withdraw from the action. According to the latest information the
Exeter
sank near the Argentine coast, en route for the Falkland Islands.

* * * * *

On December 23, the American Republics made a formal protest to Britain, France, and Germany about the action off the River Plate, which they claimed to be a violation of the American security zone. It also happened about this time that two German merchant ships were intercepted by our cruisers near the coast of the United States. One of these, the liner
Columbus
of thirty-two thousand tons, was scuttled and survivors were rescued by an American cruiser; the other escaped into territorial waters in Florida. President Roosevelt reluctantly complained about these vexations near the coasts of the Western Hemisphere; and in my reply I took the opportunity of stressing the advantages which our action off the Plate had brought to all the South American Republics. Their trade had been hampered by the activities of the German raider and their ports had been used for his supply ships and information centres. By the laws of war the raider had been entitled to capture all merchant ships trading with us in the South Atlantic, or to sink them after providing for their crews; and this had inflicted grave injury on American commercial interests, particularly in the Argentine. The South American Republics should greet the action off the Plate as a deliverance from all this annoyance. The whole of the South Atlantic was now clear, and might perhaps remain clear, of warlike operations. This relief should be highly valued by the South American States, who might now in practice enjoy for a long period the advantages of a security zone of three thousand, rather than three hundred, miles.

I could not forbear to add that the Royal Navy was carrying a very heavy burden in enforcing respect for international law at sea. The presence of even a single raider in the North Atlantic called for the employment of half our battle-fleet to give sure protection to the world’s commerce. The unlimited laying of magnetic mines by the enemy was adding to the strain upon our flotillas and small craft. If we should break under this strain, the South American Republics would soon have many worse worries than the sound of one day’s distant seaward cannonade; and in quite a short time the United States would also face more direct cares. I therefore felt entitled to ask that full consideration should be given to the burden which we were carrying at this crucial period, and that the best construction should be placed on action which was indispensable if the war was to be ended within reasonable time and in the right way.