The Gathering Storm: The Second World War (98 page)
Read The Gathering Storm: The Second World War Online
Authors: Winston S. Churchill
Tags: #History, #Military, #World War II, #Europe, #Great Britain, #Western, #Fiction
| Contents |
APPENDICES TO BOOK ONE
A. A Conversation with Count Grandi
B. My Note on the Fleet Air Arm
C. A Note on Supply Organisation
E. Comparative Output of First-Line Aircraft
APPENDICES TO BOOK TWO
PART I
A. Tables of Naval Strength, September 3, 1939
B. Plan “Catherine,” Minute of September 12, 1939
C. New Construction and Reconstruction, October 8 and 21, 1939
D. New Construction Programmes, 1939–1940
E. Fleet Bases, November 1, 1939
F. Naval Aid to Turkey, November 1, 1939
G. The Black-Out, November 20, 1939
H. The Magnetic Mine, 1939–1940
I. Extract from War Diary of U–47, November 28, 1939
J. Cultivator Number 6, November, 1939
K. British Merchant Vessels Lost by Enemy Action, During the First Eight Months of the War
L. Operation “Royal Marine,” March 4, 1940
M. Naval Losses in Norwegian Campaign, April–June, 1940
PART II
Some Questions About Personnel
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Appendix A, Book I
A CONVERSATION WITH COUNT GRANDI
September
28, 1935.
Mr. Churchill to Sir Robert Vansittart.
Though he pleaded the Italian cause with much address, he of course realises the whole position….
I told him that since Parliament rose, there had been a strong development of public opinion. England, and indeed the British Empire, could act unitedly on the basis of the League of Nations, and all parties thought that that instrument was the most powerful protection against future dangers wherever they might arise. He pointed out the injury to the League of Nations by the loss of Italy. The fall of the régime in Italy would inevitably produce a pro-German Italy. He seemed prepared for economic sanctions. They were quite ready to accept life upon a communal basis. However poor they were, they could endure. He spoke of the difficulty of following the movements of British public opinion. I said that no foreign ambassador could be blamed for that, but the fact of the change must be realised. Moreover, if fighting began in Abyssinia, cannons fired, blood was shed, villages were bombed, etc., an almost measureless rise in the temperature must be expected. He seemed to contemplate the imposition of economic sanctions which would at first be ineffective, but gradually increase until at some moment or other an event of war would occur.
I said the British Fleet was very strong, and, although it had to be rebuilt in the near future, it was good and efficient at the present moment, and it was now completely ready to defend itself; but I repeated that this was a purely defensive measure in view of our Mediterranean interests, and did not in any way differentiate our position from that of other members of the League of Nations. He accepted this with a sad smile.
I then talked of the importance of finding a way out: “He that ruleth his spirit is greater than he that taketh a city.” He replied that they would feel that everywhere except in Italy. They had to deal with two hundred thousand men with rifles in their hands. Mussolini’s dictatorship was a popular dictatorship, and success was the essence of its strength. Finally, I said that I was in favour of a meeting between the political chiefs of the three countries…. The three men together could carry off something that one could never do by himself. After all, the claims of Italy to primacy in the Abyssinian sphere and the imperative need of internal reform [in Abyssinia] had been fully recognised by England and France. I told him I should support such an idea if it were agreeable. The British public would be willing to try all roads to an honourable peace. I think there should be a meeting of three. Any agreement they reached would of course be submitted to the League of Nations. It seems to me the only chance of avoiding the destruction of Italy as a powerful and friendly factor in Europe. Even if it failed, no harm would have been done, and at present we are heading for an absolute smash.
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Appendix B, Book I
MY NOTE ON THE FLEET AIR ARM
W
RITTEN FOR
S
IR
T
HOMAS
I
NSKIP
, M
INISTER FOR THE
C
O-ORDINATION OF
D
EFENCE
,
IN
1936
1. It is impossible to resist an admiral’s claim that he must have complete control of, and confidence in, the aircraft of the battle fleet, whether used for reconnaissance, gun-fire or air attack on a hostile fleet. These are his very eyes. Therefore the Admiralty view must prevail in all that is required to secure this result.
2. The argument that similar conditions obtain in respect of Army co-operation aircraft cannot be countenanced. In one case the aircraft take flight from aerodromes and operate under precisely similar conditions to those of normal independent air force action. Flight from warships and action in connection with naval operations is a totally different matter. One is truly an affair of cooperation only; the other an integral part of modern naval operations.
3. A division must therefore be made between the air force controlled by the Admiralty and that controlled by the Air Ministry. This division does not depend upon the type of the undercarriage of the aircraft, nor necessarily the base from which it is flown. It depends upon the function. Is it predominantly a naval function or not?
4. Most of these defence functions can clearly be assigned. For instance, all functions which require aircraft of any description (whether with wheels, floats, or boats; whether reconnaissance, spotters or fighters, bombers or torpedo seaplanes) to be carried regularly in warships or in aircraft carriers, naturally fall to the naval sphere.
5. The question thus reduces itself to the assignment of any type operating over the sea from shore bases. This again can only be decided in relation to the functions and responsibilities placed upon the Navy. Aircraft borne afloat could discharge a considerable function of trade protection. This would be especially true in the broad waters, where a squadron of cruisers with their own scouting planes or a pair of small aircraft carriers could search upon a front of a thousand miles. But the Navy could never be required – nor has it ever claimed – to maintain an air strength sufficient to cope with a concentrated attack upon merchant shipping in the Narrow Waters by a large hostile air force of great power. In fact, the maxim must be applied of air force
versus
air force and Navy
versus
Navy. When the main hostile air force or any definite detachment from it is to be encountered, it must be by the British Royal Air Force.
6. In this connection it should not be forgotten that a ship or ships may have to be selected and adapted for purely air-force operations, like a raid on some deep-seated enemy base, or vital centre. This is an air-force operation and necessitates the use of types of aircraft not normally associated with the Fleet. In this case the rôles of the Admiralty and the Air Ministry will be reversed, and the Navy would swim the ship in accordance with the tactical or strategic wishes of the Air Ministry. Far from becoming a baffle, this special case exemplifies the logic of the “division of command according to function.”
7. What is conceded to the Navy should, within the limits assigned, be fully given. The Admiralty should have plenary control and provide the entire personnel of the Fleet air arm. Officers, cadets, petty officers, artificers, etc., for this force would be selected from the Royal Navy by the Admiralty. They would then acquire the art of flying and the management of aircraft in the Royal Air Force training-schools – to which perhaps naval officers should be attached – but after acquiring the necessary degree of proficiency as air chauffeurs and mechanics they would pass to shore establishments under the Admiralty for their training in Fleet air arm duties, just as the pilots of the Royal Air Force do to their squadrons at armament schools to learn air fighting. Thus, the personnel employed upon fleet air functions will be an integral part of the Navy, dependent for discipline and advancement as well as for their careers and pensions solely upon the Admiralty. This would apply to every rank and every trade involved, whether afloat or ashore.
8. Coincident with this arrangement whereby the Fleet air arm becomes wholly a naval Service, a further rearrangement of functions should be made, whereby the Air Ministry becomes responsible for active anti-aircraft defence. This implies, in so far as the Navy is concerned, that, at every naval port, shore anti-aircraft batteries, lights, aircraft, balloons and other devices will be combined under one operational control, though the officer commanding would, of course, with his command be subordinate to the fortress commander.
9. In the same way, the control of the air defences of London and of such other vulnerable areas as it may be necessary to equip with anti-air defences on a considerable scale should also be unified under one command and placed under the Air Ministry. The consequent control should cover not only the operations, but as far as may conveniently be arranged, the training, the raising and administration of the entire personnel for active air defence.
10. The Air Ministry have as clear a title to control active anti-air defence as have the Navy to their own “eyes.” For this purpose a new department should be brought into being in the Air Ministry, to be called “Anti-Air,” to control all guns, searchlights, balloons and personnel of every kind connected with this function, as well as such portion of the Royal Air Force as may from time to time be assigned to it for this duty. Under this department there will be air force officers, assisted by appropriate staffs, in command of all active air defences in specified localities and areas.