Tadeusz Haller
: Otherwise I don’t see what use the presidium can find for the documents and records of proceedings.
Major von Peters
: This is a court martial, not a reading circle. What we have to decide about will be said within these four walls, and it will be said clearly and concisely and in a loud clear voice. Anyhow, I’m not going to waste my time sitting here reading all that rubbish.
Tadeusz Haller
: With all due respect to this court, it is perhaps not quite in keeping to call the results of three years’ investigation rubbish.
Colonel Orbal
: Now, now.
Tadeusz Haller
: I must repeat that the Chief of State demands all possible care in this investigation. We may not avoid any truths or facts. Neither must we forget that Velder as a phenomenon is unique. He is now the only living person who has survived all the phases in our national development from anarchy to model state. He is also the only living person who was close to those three people who at the time were referred to as ‘The Three Generals’.
Major von Peters
: I never expected to hear that filthy expression coming from your mouth.
Tadeusz Haller
: I beg your pardon.
Colonel Pigafetta
: The idea of reading all that stuff doesn’t really appeal to me either.
Colonel Orbal
: No, God forbid.
Major von Peters
: So that’s that. Anyhow, Schmidt, it is also our view that you must do something about the tone of this case. We won’t tolerate any form of meekness towards that filthy swine. I noticed even yesterday that you show certain tendencies to be much too kindly disposed.
Captain Schmidt
: Really?
Major von Peters
: Yes. Now let’s start.
Colonel Orbal
: Bring in the accused.
Major von Peters
: Why isn’t Bratianu here today?
Lieutenant Brown
: According to court martial regulations, only one of the Prosecuting Officers need be present. Captain Schmidt
himself decides whether he requires his assistant.
Major von Peters
: Oh.
Captain Schmidt
: I should now like to draw the presidium’s attention to the complex of charges which comprises Velder’s criminal activities during the time when he was enrolled as what is called a Senior Guard in the militia. That is for us more than a decade ago, in fact at the moment of birth of the republic as an independent national unit. As the gentlemen of the presidium have asked for verbal submission of all material, I suggest that the officer presenting the case should read suitable extracts from the records of the preliminary investigation. I should warn the court that parts of the records are quite comprehensive.
Major von Peters
: Why does it all have to be so bloody long-winded? Corporal Velder, why did you become a soldier?
Velder
: You might say …
Major von Peters
: Stand to attention, man. Captain Endicott.
Captain Endicott
: Yes?
Major von Peters
: You’re responsible for the accused’s appearance and personal behaviour. This is a court martial, not a pub.
Captain Endicott
: Velder, I should like to draw your attention to the fact that technically you’re still a soldier and you should behave according to military regulations.
Major von Peters
: I asked: Why did you become a soldier?
Colonel Orbal
: Damned odd.
Colonel Pigafetta
: What d’you mean?
Colonel Orbal
: What? Oh, that he became a soldier.
Major von Peters
: Well, Velder, it would help if you would deign to answer.
Velder
: You might say that it was due to an unfortunate matter of chance. I’ve never really had much aptitude for soldiering.
Colonel Pigafetta
: There’s scarcely any need for you to point that out.
Velder
: There weren’t many who voluntarily went into the militia at the time. Perhaps I thought it was my duty. I was one of those who had the physical qualifications.
Major von Peters
: With your bearing? I find that very hard to believe. You look like a scarecrow.
Captain Endicott
: Corporal Velder was wounded during … the
disturbances. In addition to that, he has spent three years in prison …
Velder
: To be more precise, fourteen months under interrogation at the Military Police’s Special Department and two years at an interrogation centre. The interrogations …
Major von Peters
: This is not a conversation salon, Captain Endicott. See to it that the accused confines himself to answering the question.
Colonel Pigafetta
: I don’t consider that the question has been exhaustively answered.
Tadeusz Haller
: May I make an interjection?
Colonel Orbal
: Interjection? Yes, by all means.
Tadeusz Haller
: Major von Peters’ question touches on events and circumstances that are of the greatest significance to later developments. Apart from the accused, I think there is only one person in this room who was in the country at the actual time, that is, the time of national liberation.
Commander Kampenmann
: Yourself, in fact?
Tadeusz Haller
: Quite correct. On the other hand, none of the members of the court, as far as I know, had yet come to live here.
Colonel Orbal
: Thank God for that.
Tadeusz Haller
: In accordance with the general directive for this investigation and with the central objective of this session in mind, I find that an account of the so-called philosophy—naturally, it is deeply reprehensible—that led to the national liberation … well, briefly, I consider that such an account is motivated. Not to say necessary.
Captain Schmidt
: These details are dealt with in the appendices to the preliminary investigation. On page three hundred and twelve in the first volume.
Major von Peters
: You’re not going to suggest that we should start reading again now, are you?
Colonel Orbal
: No. No. Refused.
Captain Schmidt
: I didn’t mean that at all. May I suggest to the presidium that the officer presenting the case reads out aloud the extracts I indicate?
Colonel Orbal
: Reads out aloud? That’s not a bad idea.
Captain Schmidt
: First of all I’d like to draw your attention to Appendix V 1/33. This consists of a summary of the reported survey,
drawn up by the National Historical Department of the General Staff. Both the summary and the publication are marked Top Secret. The same applies to most of the other documents and records I will be referring to during the session. Have you found the place, Lieutenant Brown?
Major von Peters
: Loud and clear, now, Brown.
Lieutenant Brown
: Yes, sir.
Major von Peters
: Just a moment. This is directly relevant to my question on the reason for the accused enrolling in the Army, isn’t it?
Captain Schmidt
: Yes, in my view.
Major von Peters
: Then there’s no real reason why the accused should not stand to attention during the report.
Colonel Orbal
: Exactly. Yes. Stand to attention, Velder.
Lieutenant Brown
: Appendix V 1/33. Reference to National Liberation. Compiled from Volume Six, prepared by National Historical Department, General Staff. Marked Secret according to paragraphs …
Major von Peters
: We’ve heard all that before. Get to the point.
Lieutenant Brown
: … paragraphs eight, eleven and twenty-two. National Liberation was an historical necessity, which over the centuries was delayed by the systematic oppression and exploitation of the extant colonial power. In an account from the period of time shortly before the liberation, the island was described as ‘a calm and idyllic out-of-the-way spot, forgotten and thinly populated’. It lacked industries and modern buildings almost completely, and the few communities that existed were what might be best described as villages. Despite the favourable climate, especially during the six summer months, the tourist trade was not developed, mainly due to lack of good roads, poor communications with the mainland and lack of initiative on the part of the local government—the political majority was moderate socialist.
The principle activity of the island was agriculture and—in the coastal communities—fishing. The arable land, which consisted of more than ninety per cent of the island’s total area, was divided into large farming units. These were well mechanised and gave good crops; the result was a marked over-production of food, which was then transported to the mainland in barges. The neglect of industrialisation and consequent lack of employment opportunities led to considerable
emigration to the colonial power or—as the terminology of the day stated—the mother country. This emigration caused an increasing decline in population, which at the time of national liberation had gone so far that the number of inhabitants had fallen to a fiftieth of the population figure considered to be reasonably relative to the area of the island.
Military installations on the island consisted of a chain of unmanned coastal defence installations, and military stores of arms and ammunition in eight underground concrete casemates. For protection and maintaining guard over these, there was a minor force, mainly composed of national servicemen whose homes were on the island. Maintenance of law and order was in the hands of the local police organisation. This was built up on the principle of one policeman per six hundred inhabitants, and both its personnel and material resources were extremely limited. Such was the situation immediately prior to the action which finally led to the country’s autonomy.
Round the great thought that lay hidden in the concept of national liberation gathered people of all kinds; the fact that by no means all of them—not even the leaders—had sufficient moral and spiritual qualities to be able to take the responsibility of liberators was soon apparent. The plans for the take-over of power were worked out with the greatest care and during the last two-year period of time, they entered, as far as can be established, into an intensive stage. The leaders of the operation, which went under the cover name of the Project, included men of the noblest elevation and moral qualities, as well as people less well qualified for national leadership. These people were united by two powerful motives: the will to throw off the yoke and give the island independence, and a feeling of repugnance and contempt for the circumstances in the mother country. For these reasons they sought each other’s support, a fact which later on certain historians found hard to explain. Through skilful and thorough preparations on diplomatic and financial levels, the Liberation Committee—on which, besides Paul Oswald and Tadeusz Haller, were also the notorious herofied traitors Joakim Ludolf and Janos Edner and a woman called Aranca Peterson—was, however, without causing suspicion, quickly able to achieve a favourable psychological and economic starting point.
Military preparations, however, were far less satisfactory—the
majority of committee members were wholly ignorant of technical defence matters—and the organising genius and tactical brilliance of a General Oswald was needed to lead the revolution to victory. The majority of the Liberation Committee had opposed the creation of a regular armed force, which undoubtedly would have given the only possible guarantee that the liberation would not be frustrated at the last moment. In this position, General Oswald had no other choice, and that was a compromise. He created the national militia and made it effective with the help of available resources.
But the economic part of the preparations was dealt with in quite a different manner. Via diplomatic by-ways, amongst others through secret discussions with several of the nation’s natural arch-enemies, and agreements with capitalist private interests, they succeeded in procuring sums in millions. By eighteen months before the liberation, through proxy purchases, they had acquired more than eighty per cent of the island’s properties and nearly two-thirds of its arable land for the so-called Project. In this way they could render innocuous long beforehand several possible enemies, resident inhabitants who might join those in opposition to the liberation idea, sabotage its realisation, or, at a critical military stage, disturb calm and internal order. This humane way of achieving peaceful national consolidation can also be ascribed to General Oswald’s foresight and genius.
Unfortunately, his ideas were corrupted almost immediately. After the take-over of power, it appeared that the majority of members of the committee had by no means been guided by idealistic and national motives, but had acted from motives of private profit and had been poisoned by confused and deeply reprehensible thoughts, based on immorality, ungodliness and anarchy. This naive but dangerous philosophy was soon to lead to tragic national complications which were hard to overcome. One of the earliest and most grotesque expressions of this was in a preposterous doctrine, according to information prepared by Janos Edner and Aranca Peterson several years before the national liberation. This was the so-called Method, a phenomenon which was cynical and against all human values, which led not only its originators but also the whole nation into self-debasement and defeat. I will now go over to …
Major von Peters
: Are you going to stand there and read the whole blasted volume to us, Brown?
Colonel Orbal
: Books are the devil. It’s no better when someone else does the reading.
Captain Schmidt
: I would now like to draw the President’s attention to Appendices V 1/24 and V 1/42xx, page three hundred and eighty-six in the first volume.
Colonel Orbal
: Do we have to take them now?
Captain Schmidt
: I have been asked to answer the question of how the accused came to be a soldier and the circumstances surrounding the formation of the militia. As I understand it, this material I am referring to from the preliminary investigation is of vital importance, in this case, the matter of recruitment.