Ludolf: How long will it be before the militia has received the necessary training for carrying out a major offensive operation?
Stoloff: From that point of view, we should be able to start within a few weeks. But the most important prerequisite is still that we
must be able to protect ourselves against air attack while the offensive is on.
Ludolf: So you’re saying that we must wait for bad weather.
Stoloff: Yes. As far as I can make out, the best time would be some time during late autumn, in October or November, when the mists come. Whatever happens, we must attack before winter.
Velder: Before that, the harbour in Ludolfsport will have been rebuilt to an extent that they can begin to use it.
Stoloff: All the better for us. I would say that the more people Oswald concentrates in Ludolfsport, the greater are our chances of gaining a swift and decisive victory.
Velder: Yes, we’ll have them like kittens in a sack.
Captain Schmidt
: I should like to draw the presidium’s attention to that last remark.
Lieutenant Brown
: Stoloff went on to give an account of the supplies situation. ‘Plan B,’ he said, amongst other things, ‘must for different reasons be implemented before the turn of the year. Firstly, a winter in our present positions would make large inroads into our fuel stores and power reserves. Secondly, the militia’s winter equipment is so deficient that even a moderately low temperature would make any extensive operations on the ground impossible. Thirdly, we must remember that by a certain time, by October for instance, the militia will have reached the peak of its offensive strength. After that, we cannot reckon on getting any stronger, while on the other hand, Oswald will receive new additions in men and material.’
Joakim Ludolf then summarized the actual strength situation, which in his opinion was about one to three in Oswald’s favour, in men and arms and materials. Most questionable he considered inferiority in the air, which could only be made up for by special circumstances.
Finally it was decided that the militia’s qualitative peak, with reference to training and arms as well as psychic resources, would be reached before the fifteenth of October.
Colonel Pigafetta
: Well, Endicott, how did it go?
Captain Endicott
: The assemblage is all right, sir. There’d been a short-circuit in one of the batteries, that’s all.
Major von Peters
: Can we hear what the wretch says now?
Captain Endicott
: Yes, the strengthener should work.
Major von Peters
: Get weaving, then, Velder. I’ve no desire to sit here all evening.
Velder
: On the fifteenth of November, the intelligence service reported that the transports of Peace Corps reinforcements could be reckoned on coming into Ludolfsport in the afternoon or the evening of the eighteenth. We also knew that the troops on board consisted of heavily equipped storm-troopers, who were to be sent directly to the north-eastern section of the front, which was already our weakest point. On the evening of the fifteenth, we had a decisive meeting in the operations centre at headquarters. On that occasion, the executive commanders who were to lead the four different offensives were also present. We stood in front of the big wall-map all the time. I had stared at this map so often and for so long that I dreamt about it for years afterwards. Schematically, it looked like this: the island like a rectangle lying on its side, one hundred and forty kilometres long and with one short side about fifty kilometres long—in fact the island was sixty-three kilometres at its widest and forty-six at its narrowest. I saw it divided up into six roughly equal rectangular fields, of which one, the farthest down in the right hand corner, belonged to us.
Major von Peters
: Thank you, we know what the map looked like.
Velder
: Uhuh. Uhuh. At that meeting on the evening of the fifteenth and during the night into the sixteenth, we decided that Plan B should be put into action, beginning at one o’clock in the morning of the nineteenth. It was the decision we’d talked about for so long and we all had a feeling of great relief, I think. This was also an opportunity which was unlikely to arise again. From many points of view, the situation was by and large the most favourable we could hope for. It had been raining without ceasing for almost two weeks, the fields were waterlogged and the roads difficult to pass. The nights were long and misty and during the last few days, one rain area after another had driven in from the north, alternating with fog banks. The temperature had varied between forty and fifty degrees centigrade, exactly what our militia could manage with their light equipment. It was normal weather for the time of year and we did not reckon on any surprises. It had been possible for years to
predict the weather on the island with almost a hundred per cent certainty. Planning was what Ludolf called flexible. We would have to strike before the fresh storm-troopers had had time to get into their positions, but if the ships were delayed, the offensive was to be held back until they’d got into harbour and the troops had begun disembarking. Otherwise Oswald’s new reinforcements could only too easily be transferred to another point along the coast.
Colonel Orbal
: I say, Pigafetta, that man Niblack, wasn’t he runner-up in the golf championship a couple of years ago?
Colonel Pigafetta
: Yes, that’s right.
Colonel Orbal
: Yes, I thought I’d seen the man before. Oh, excuse the interruption. Just carry on.
Velder
: General Ludolf, Colonel Stoloff and I were jointly responsible for Plan B. Everything had been ready for a long time and now we’d decided on the day. At midnight exactly, the two diversionary forces were to be shipped out, and for that purpose all available patrol-ships and motor-boats we had were needed. It was to take them exactly an hour to reach their respective targets, the lighthouse on the north-eastern point and that fishing village …
Commander Kampenmann
: Melora, wasn’t it?
Captain Endicott
: Yes, that’s it. The place was called Melora.
Velder
: To that fishing village on the south coast, then. At the same time, the first strike-force was to break through the autostrad line and advance north of the town, just north of the airfield. With that, both main communication lines, the old road and the northern coast road, were cut off, and Ludolfsport surrounded. At best, the first units would reach the coast between four and five o’clock in the morning.
At the same moment as the first groups reached the sea north of Ludolfsport, the second strike-force was to launch the main offensive. The grouping area for the second strike-force lay up in the north-west corner of our territory. The second strike-force’s assignment was to break through the actual angle between the northern and western fronts, and advance into the area which Oswald had taken in May and which was still insufficientlv fortified. Then the militia were to cross the river and the motorway and advance into the village of Brock, which lay on the old road between Oswaldsburg and Ludolfsport, only four kilometres from the capital. When Brock had
been captured and the main road between Oswaldsburg and the eastern parts of the country cut oft, fast motorised units would then continue the attack due north over the plain and cut off the northern coast road, too. With that, the part of the country controlled by the Fascists would be cut into two. Ludolfsport was surrounded from the land side and the road to Oswaldsburg would lie open. It was essential for the fulfilment of this plan that the enemy was kept in ignorance all the time of what our next step was to be. We reckoned with Oswald first thinking that the diversions against the point and the fishing village were attacks against primary targets. Not until the enemy began regrouping to meet these threats would the second strike-force start the offensive against Brock. Of all forces at our disposal, thirty per cent were left behind to hold the old positions. Five per cent were used for the two amphibious operations against the lighthouse and the fishing village.
Twenty-five per cent were used in the first strike-force, which was to fight its way to the east coast and cut off Ludolfsport. The remaining forty per cent were sent into the main thrust towards Brock. Practically all our wheeled vehicles, mostly small tracked armoured cars, were divided between the two strike-forces. The most important things—apart from determination to win, of course—were mobility and speed and the militia’s light equipment and arms. The Fascists were to be made to believe as long as possible that it was the old raid-system according to Plan A which had begun to be used again, but on a larger scale.
Colonel Orbal
: Fearfully boring all this. One knows already what happened.
Velder
: Our greatest problem was the Air Force.
Colonel Pigafetta
: I can quite believe that.
Velder
: We had no Air Force, except a few hydroplanes in the cliff cave, and the only airfield in the southern sector had been destroyed by bombing and shelling. As far as we knew, there were three fully equipped airfields in Oswald’s area. The best one lay just west of Oswaldsburg, the two others immediately north of Ludolfsport and Marbella. Stoloff had spent a lot of time on this question, and he came to the conclusion that if the first strike-force fulfilled its tasks according to plan, then the airfield in Ludolfsport would be in our hands well before dawn, i.e. seven o’clock in the
morning. But the worst threat, of course, came from Oswaldsburg, where the majority of the Fascists’ Air Force was concentrated. However, for a long time Stoloff had been infiltrating specialists among the workers in the retraining camps round Oswaldsburg and he’d also smuggled in a number of people into the town itself. We had a lot of comrades there too, of course, and among them there were some who were prepared to be activists. The specialists I mentioned were almost all ex-building workers, people who already knew the art of handling explosives and who had then been given a special training as saboteurs.
From these, a number of sabotage groups were crystallized out, and they were given orders to go into action ten minutes before the raiding units reached the fishing village, Melora, it’s name was, by the way, and the lighthouse on the north-eastern point. The saboteurs would make a co-ordinated attack on the airfield, beginning at ten to one. We couldn’t do much about the airfield at Marbella. Our party hadn’t all that number of adherents in that area and also we knew that the airfield was well protected.
Major von Peters
: Haven’t we had enough now?
Velder
: Otherwise we relied on the weather. The new military reserve airfields weren’t usable as they had no concrete runways and the markings were washed out by the rain. And anyhow, as usual at this time of year, it was so misty and cloud levels were so low that it would be impossible to operate with aeroplanes. And anyhow, Oswald hadn’t that many. The situation hitherto had not been very inviting for air warfare, as Stoloff expressed it. Neither did we believe that Oswald’s protector among the imperialistic powers would dare to start raids from aircraft carriers, for fear of the international row that would start. The aeroplanes …
Colonel Pigafetta
: It is possible that I may be thought excessively sensitive, but is there really no means whatsoever of persuading the accused to avoid that word. I would be grateful if that were possible, Endicott.
Velder
: On the sixteenth, we received information which seemed to improve our starting position. A well-known foreign commentator had been to Oswaldsburg and had also visited the fronts. He had obviously been allowed to meet some prisoners, too. He had written an article which was published all over the world and which …
Captain Schmidt
: The document is contained in the preliminary investigation. Appendix V X/49xx. If you please, Lieutenant Brown.
Velder
: … explained that we …
Captain Endicott
: Ssh, Velder.
Colonel Orbal
: What on earth are you doing, Endicott?
Major von Peters
: Captain Endicott thinks that perhaps he might try to get that monstrous swine to shut up.
Colonel Orbal
: It sounded as if he were enticing a cat.
Lieutenant Brown
: Appendix V X/49xx, concerning the disturbances. Extract from an article published in the international press about the tenth of November. The text is as follows:
There is no question or likelihood of it being a game between the great powers. The remainder of the communist guerillas, after their severe defeats of the spring, have entrenched themselves in the south-western part of the island. This is an inaccessible and barren area, apparently thoroughly fortified. The guerillas’ supplies have, however, been used up at approximately the same rate as their hopes have faded. Their strength has now run out and their courage definitely ebbed away.
Since the signing of the non-intervention pact, their distance from the Communist part of the world has become immeasurable and their isolation complete. With good reason, one expects that the guerillas will admit that the battle is lost and will capitulate within a few weeks. In all probability, this is also what will happen.
The moment of defeat is not difficult to predict either. The rebels, who are led by a certain Joakim Ludolf, will have to surrender before the winter, as their chances of surviving the cold season at all are almost non-existent.
During my visit to Oswaldsburg, I was given the opportunity of speaking to Major-General Henry Winckelman, who is Commander-in-Chief of the National Freedom Army—this army and the Peace Corps, are of course, under the direct command of the Chief of State, General Oswald.
Major-General Winckelman considered that a forceful offensive operation would enable them to clear the rebel area in less than twenty-four hours, which does not seem unlikely. That this has not already happened is obviously due to the Chief of State’s unwillingness to use any more force than the situation demands. The war, so
loudly shouted about in certain quarters, is no war. And the ‘Communist minority’ which some sources continue to pity, consists largely of starving groups of bandits. A member of the government, Tadeusz Haller, said in a public statement a few days ago ‘that it is only general lack of will to work and fear of punishment that has hitherto stopped the rebels from creeping out of their holes.’