The Ghost in the Machine (40 page)

Read The Ghost in the Machine Online

Authors: Arthur Koestler

Tags: #Philosophy, #General

 

 

A closed system is a cognitive structure with a distorted, non-Euclidian
geometry in curved space, where parallels intersect and straight lines
form loops. Its canon is based on a central axiom, postulate or dogma,
to which the subject is emotionally committed, and from which the rules
of processing reality are derived. The amount of distortion involved in
the processing is a matter of degrees, and an important criterion of
the value of the system. It ranges from the scientist's involuntary
inclination to juggle with data as a mild form of self-deception,
motivated by his commitment to a theory, to the delusional belief-systems
of clinical paranoia. When Einstein made his famous pronouncement 'if the
facts do not fit the theory, then the facts are wrong', he spoke with his
tongue in his cheek; but he nevertheless expressed a profound feeling of
the scientist committed to his theory. As we have seen, an occasional
suspension of strict logic in favour of a temporary indulgence in the
games of the underground is an important factor in scientific and artistic
creativity. But geniuses are rare. And if geniuses sometimes indulge in
these non-Euclidian games where reasoning is guided by emotional bias,
it is an individual bias, a hunch of their own making; whereas the group
mind receives its emotional beliefs ready-made from its leaders or from
its catechism.

 

 

Let me repeat, however, that the amount of logical distortion needed
to keep the deluded mind happy in its faith is a factor of decisive
importance. Here lies the answer to that ethical relativism which
cynically proclaims that all politicians are corrupt, all ideologies
eyewash, all religion designed to befuddle the masses. The fact that
power corrupts does not mean that all men in power are equally corrupt.

 

 

 

The Group Mind as a Holon

 

 

Earlier in this chapter I referred to the tendency of overexcited organs
to assert themselves to the detriment of the whole, and then went on to
the pathology of cognitive structures getting out of control: the
idée fixe
of the crank, obsessions running riot, closed systems
centred on some part-truth pretending to represent the whole truth. We now
find similar symptoms on a higher level of the hierarchy, as pathological
manifestations of the group mind. The difference between these two kinds
of mental disorder is the same as that between the primary aggressiveness
of the individual and the secondary aggressiveness derived from his
identification with a social holon. The individual crank, enamoured of
his own pet theory, the patient in the mental home convinced that there
is a sinister conspiracy aimed at his person, are disowned by society;
their obsessions serve some unconscious private purpose. In contrast to
this, the collective delusions of the crowd or group are based, not on
individual deviations but on the individual's tendency to conform. Any
single individual who would today assert that he has made a pact with
the Devil and had intercourse with succubi, would promptly be sent to a
mental home. Yet not so long ago, belief in such things was a matter of
course -- and approved by 'commonsense' in the original meaning of the
term, i.e., consensus of opinion.*

 

* 'Philosophy of commonsense: accepting primary beliefs of mankind
as ultimate criterion of truth' (The Concise Oxford Dictionary).

 

I have suggested that the evils of mankind are caused, not by the
primary aggressiveness of individuals, but by their self-transcending
identification with groups whose common denominator is low intelligence
and high emotionality. We now come to the parallel conclusion
that the delusional streak running through history is not due to
individual forms of lunacy, but to the collective delusions generated
by emotion-based belief-systems. We have seen that the cause underlying
these pathological manifestations is the split between reason and belief
-- or more generally, insufficient co-ordination between the emotive and
discriminative faculties of the mind. Our next step will be to inquire
whether we can trace the cause of this faulty co-ordination -- this
disorder in the hierarchy -- to the evolution of the human brain. Should
contemporary neurophysiology, though still in its infancy, be able to
provide some indication of the causes of the trouble, we would have made
a first step towards a frank diagnosis of our predicament and thereby
gain some inkling of the direction in which the search for a remedy
must proceed.

 

 

 

Summary

 

 

The considerations set out in earlier chapters led us to distinguish
three factors in emotion: nature of the drive, hedonic tone, and the
polarity of the self-assertive and self-transcending tendencies.

 

 

Under normal conditions the two tendencies are in dynamic
equilibrium. Under conditions of stress the self-assertive tendency may
get out of control and manifest itself in aggressive behaviour. However,
on the historical scale, the damages wrought by individual violence for
selfish motives are insignificant compared to the holocausts resulting
from self-transcending devotion to collectively shared belief-systems. It
is derived from primitive identification instead of mature social
integration; it entails the partial surrender of personal responsibility
and produces the quasi-hypnotic phenomena of group-psychology. The
egotism of the social holon feeds on the altruism of its members. The
ubiquitous rituals of human sacrifice at the dawn of civilisation are
early symptoms of the split between reason and emotion-based beliefs,
which produces the delusional streak running through history.

 

 

 

 

 

XVI

 

 

THE THREE BRAINS

 

 

I have no inclination to keep the domain of the psychological floating
as it were in the air, without any organic foundation . . . Let the
biologists go as far as they can and let us go as far as we can. Some
day the two will meet.
Freud

 

 

Let me recapitulate: when one contemplates the streak of insanity running
through human history, it appears highly probable that homo sapiens is a
biological freak, the result of some remarkable mistake in the evolutionary
process. The ancient doctrine of original sin, variants of which occur
independently in the mythologies of divene cultures, could be a reflection
of man's awareness of his own inadequacy, of the intuitive hunch that
somewhere along the line of his ascent something has gone wrong.

 

 

 

Mistakes in Brain-Making

 

 

The strategy of evolution, like any other strategy, is subject to trial
and error. There is nothing particularly improbable in the assumption
that man's native equipment, though superior to that of any known animal
species, nevertheless may contain some serious fault in the circuitry of
his most precious and delicate instrument -- the central nervous system.

 

 

Whether a skylark is happier than a rainbow trout is a nice debating
point; both are stagnant species, but well adapted to their ways of
life, and to call them evolutionary mistakes because they have not
got the brains to write poetry would be the height of hubris. When
the biologist talks of evolutionary mistakes, he means something more
tangible and precise: some obvious deviation from Nature's own standards
of engineering efficiency, a construction fault which deprives an organ
of its survival value -- like the monstrous antlers of the Irish elk. Some
turtles and insects are so top-heavy that if in combat or by misadventure
they fall on their back, they cannot get up again, and starve to death
-- a grotesque error in construction which Kafka turned into a symbol of
the human predicament. But before talking of man, I must discuss briefly
two earlier evolutionary mistakes in brain-building, both of which had
momentous consequences.

 

 

The first concerns the brain development of the arthropods which, with
more than seven hundred thousand known species, constitute by far the
largest phylum of the animal kingdom. They range from microscopic mites
through centipedes, insects and spiders to ten-foot giant crabs; but
they all have this in common, that
their brains* are built around
their gullets
. In vertebrates, the brain and spinal cord are both
dorsal -- at the back of the alimentary canal. In invertebrates, however,
the main nerve chain runs
ventrally
-- on the belly side of the
animal. The chain terminates in a ganglionic mass
beneath
the
mouth. This is the phylogenetically older part of the brain; whereas
the newer and more sophisticated part of it developed
above
the
mouth, in the vicinity of the eyes or other distance-receptors. Thus
the alimentary tube passes through the midst of the evolving brain-mass,
and this is very bad evolutionary strategy because, if the brain is to
grow and expand, the alimentary tube will be more and more compressed
(see Figure 11). To quote Gaskell's
The Origin of Vertebrates
:

 

Progress on these lines must result in a crisis, owing to the
inevitable squeezing out of the food-channel by the increasing
nerve-mass. . . . Truly, at the time when vertebrates first appeared,
the direction and progress of variation in the Arthropoda was leading,
owing to the manner in which the brain was pierced by the oesophagus,
to a terrible dilemma -- either the capacity for taking in food
without sufficient intelligence to capture it, or intelligence
sufficient to capture food and no power to consume it. [1]
* In lower forms the ganglionic masses which are precursors of
the brain.

 

 

 

Top: relation between the alimentary canal (A) and nervous system
(B) of an invertebrate. The upper brain mass (c) and the lower
brain mass (d) constrict the alimentary canal (after Wood Jones
and Porteus). Bottom: section across the brain of a scorpion-like
invertebrate. The upper and lower brain masses (c and d) constrict the
narrow alimentary tube (A) in the centre of the brain (after Gaskell).

 

 

The dilemma seems to have been particularly acute for 'the highest
scorpion and spider-like animals, whose brain-mass has grown round
and compressed the food-tube so that nothing but fluid pabulum can pass
through into the stomach; the whole group have become blood-suckers. These
kinds of animals -- the sea-scorpions -- were the dominant race when
the vertebrates first appeared. . . . Further upward evolution demanded
a larger and larger brain with the ensuing consequence of a greater and
greater difficulty of food supply.' [2] Another authority, Wood Jones,
comments:

 

To become a blood-sucker is to become a failure. Phylogenetic senility
comes with the specialisation of blood-sucking. Phylogenetic death
is sure to follow. Here, then, is an end to the progress in brain
building among the invertebrates. Faced with the awful problem of the
alternatives of intellectual advance accompanied by the certainty of
starvation, and intellectual stagnation accompanied by the inability
of enjoying a good square meal, they must perforce elect the latter
if they are to live. The invertebrates made a fatal mistake when
they started to build their brains around the oesophagus. Their
attempt to develop big brains was a failure. . . . Another start
must be made. [3]

 

The failure is reflected by the fact that even in the highest forms of
invertebrates -- the social insects behaviour is almost entirely governed
by instinct; learning by experience plays a relatively small part. And
since all members of the beehive are descended from the same pair of
parents with no discernible varieties in heredity, they have little
individuality: insects are not persons. Admiration for the marvellous
organisation of the beehive should not blind us to this fact. In
vertebrates, on the other hand, as we ascend the evolutionary ladder,
individual learning plays an increasing role compared to instinct --
thanks to the increase in size and complexity of the brain, which was
free to grow without imposing on us a diet of porridge.

 

 

The second cautionary tale concerns our old friends, the marsupials.
I have called them the poor cousins of us piacentals, because each species
of pouched animal, from mouse to wolf, is of an inferior 'make' compared
to its opposite number in the placental series. Wood Jones (himself an
Australian) comments regretfully: '. . . They are failures. Wherever
marsupial meets higher mammal, it is the marsupial that is circumvented
by superior cunning and forced to retreat or to succumb. The fox, the
cat, the dog, the rabbit, the rat and the mouse are all ousting their
parallels in the marsupial phylum.' [4]

 

 

The reason is simple: the brains of the marsupials are not only smaller,
but of a vastly inferior construction. The ring-tailed opossum and the
bush-baby lemur are both arboreal and nocturnal animals with certain
similarities in size, appearance and habits. But in the opossum, a
marsupial, about one-third of the cerebral hemispheres is given to the
sense of smell -- sight, hearing and all higher functions are crowded
together in the remaining two-thirds. The placental lemur, on the other
hand, has not only a larger brain, though its body is smaller than the
opossum's, but the area devoted to smell in the lemur's brain has shrunk
to relative insignificance, giving way, as it should, to areas serving
functions that are more vital to an arboreal creature.

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