The Grand Alliance (128 page)

In the second conversation, on December 17, M.

Stalin pressed for the immediate recognition by His
Majesty’s Government of the future frontiers of the U.S.

S.R., more particularly in regard to the inclusion within
the U.S.S.R. of the Baltic States and the restoration of
the 1941 Finnish-Soviet frontier. He made the conclusion of any Anglo-Soviet Agreement dependent on
agreement on this point. I, for my part, explained to M.

Stalin that in view of our prior undertakings to the
United States Government it was quite impossible for
His Majesty’s Government to commit themselves at this
stage to any post-war frontiers in Europe, although I
undertook to consult His Majesty’s Government in the
United Kingdom, the United States Government, and
His Majesty’s Governments in the Dominions on my
return. This question, to which M. Stalin attached
fundamental importance, was further discussed at the
third meeting on December 18.

In the forefront of the Russian claims was the request that the Baltic States, which Russia had subjugated at the beginning of the war, should be finally incorporated in the Soviet Union. There were many other conditions about The Grand Alliance

770

Russian imperial expansion, coupled with fierce appeals for unlimited supplies and impossible military action. As soon as I read the telegrams I reacted violently against the absorption of the Baltic States.

Prime

Minister

to

20 Dec. 41

Lord Privy Seal

Stalin’s demand about Finland, Baltic States, and
Rumania are directly contrary to the first, second, and
third articles of the Atlantic Charter, to which Stalin has
subscribed. There can be no question whatever of our
making such an agreement, secret or public, direct or
implied, without prior agreement with the U.S. The time
has not yet come to settle frontier questions, which can
only be resolved at the Peace Conference when we
have won the war.

2. The mere desire to have an agreement which can
be published should never lead us into making wrongful
promises. Foreign Secretary has acquitted himself
admirably, and should not be downhearted if he has to
leave Moscow without any flourish of trumpets. The
Russians have got to go on fighting for their lives
anyway, and are dependent upon us for very large
supplies, which we have most painfully gathered, and
which we shall faithfully deliver.

3. I hope the Cabinet will agree to communicate the
above to the Foreign Secretary. He will no doubt act
with the necessary tact and discretion, but he should
know decisively where we stand.

The Cabinet shared my view, and telegraphed accordingly.

To Mr. Eden I replied as follows:

Prime Minister (at

20 Dec. 41

sea)

to

Foreign

Secretary

(at

Moscow)

Naturally you will not be rough with Stalin. We are
bound to United States not to enter into secret and
The Grand Alliance

771

special pacts. To approach President Roosevelt with
these proposals would be to court a blank refusal, and
might cause lasting trouble on both sides.

2. The strategic security of Russia on her western
border will be one of the objects of Peace Conference.

The position of Leningrad has been proved by events
to be of particular danger. The first object will be the
prevention of any new outbreak by Germany. The
separation of Prussia from South Germany, and actual
definition of Prussia itself, will be one of the greatest
issues to be decided. But all this lies in a future which is
uncertain and probably remote. We have now to win
the war by a hard and prolonged struggle. To raise
such issues publicly now would only be to rally all
Germans round Hitler.

3. Even to raise them informally with President
Roosevelt at this time would, in my opinion, be inexpedient. This is the sort of line I should take, thus avoiding
any abrupt or final closing of interviews. Do not be
disappointed if you are not able to bring home a joint
public declaration on lines set forth in your Cabinet
paper. I am sure your visit has done utmost good and
your attitude will win general approval.

This voyage seems very long.

Mr. Eden’s account gives in his own words the ending of his talks with Stalin in Moscow:

We took leave of one another in a very friendly
atmosphere. After my explanations M. Stalin seemed
fully to understand our inability to create a second front
in Europe at the present time. He showed considerable
interest in the progress of our Libyan offensive, and
regarded it as most desirable to knock out Italy, on the
principle that the Axis would collapse with the destruction of its weakest link.

He did not consider that he was yet strong enough
to continue the campaign against Germany and also to
provoke hostilities with Japan. He hoped by next spring
to have restored his Far Eastern army to the strength
which it had before he had been obliged to draw upon it
for the West. He did not undertake to declare war on

The Grand Alliance

772

Japan next spring, but only to reconsider the matter
then, although he would prefer that hostilities should be
opened by the Japanese, as he seemed to expect
might be the case.

The most acute issue however that lay in our minds in foreign relations at this moment was France. What would be the effect on Vichy France of the American declaration of war between the United States and Germany? In Britain we had our relations with de Gaulle. The United States Government – and particularly the State Department – were in close and helpful touch with Vichy. Pétain, held in the German grip, was ailing. Some said he must undergo an operation for enlarged prostate gland. Weygand had been recalled from North Africa to Vichy and dismissed from his command. Admiral Darlan was, it seemed, on the crest of the wave. Moreover, Auchinleck’s success in Libya and beyond opened on the highest level all questions about French North Africa. Would Hitler, rebuffed in the Desert and halted in Russia, insist upon sending German forces, not now through Spain, but by sea and air into Tunis, Algeria, Morocco, and Dakar? Would this, or some of it, be his rejoinder to the entry of America into the war?

There were indications that Admiral Darlan might succeed or supersede Pétaini, and the Foreign Office had received surreptitious inquiries as to how he would stand with us and our great Ally. These baffling possibilities involved our whole naval position – the Toulon fleet, the two unfinished battleships at Casablanca and Dakar, the blockade, and much else. On our journey in the train from Chequers to the Clyde, I had sent a minute on the naval aspects to the First Sea Lord in his adjoining compartment.

The Grand Alliance

773

Prime

Minister

to

13 Dec. 41

First Sea Lord

I hope we may make together a joint offer of
blessing or cursing to Vichy, or, failing Vichy, to French
North Africa.

We cannot tell yet how France will have been
affected by the American entry. There are also the
hopes of favourable reactions from a Libyan victory.

Above all, the growing disaster of the German armies in
Russia will influence all minds. It may well be that an
American offer to land an American Expeditionary
Force at Casablanca, added to the aid we can give
under “Gymnast,” would decide the action of French
North Africa (and incidentally Madagascar). At any rate,
it is worth trying. I don’t want any changes in our
dispositions about “Gymnast” or “Truncheon” until we
know what the reply of Vichy will be.

It must be borne in mind that the United States
would be generally in favour of North and West Africa
as a major theatre for Anglo-American operations.

To General Smuts I said:

Prime

Minister

to

20 Dec. 41

General Smuts

I thought it my duty to cross the Atlantic again, and
hope in a few days to confer with President Roosevelt
on the whole conduct of the war. I hope of course to
procure from him assistance in a forward policy in
French North Africa and in West Africa. This is in
accordance with American ideas, but they may well be
too much preoccupied with the war with Japan. I will
keep you informed.

Meanwhile the fighting proceeded in all the theatres, old and new. I had no illusions about the fate of Hong Kong The Grand Alliance

774

under the overwhelming impact of Japanese power. But the finer the British resistance, the better for all. Hong Kong had been attacked by Japan at nearly the same moment of time as Pearl Harbour. The garrison, under Major-General Maltby, were faced with a task that from the outset was beyond their powers. The Japanese employed a force of three divisions, against which we could muster six battalions, of which two were Canadian. In addition there was a handful of mobile artillery, the Volunteer Defence Corps of civilians, two thousand strong, and the coast and anti-aircraft guns defending the port. Throughout the siege the Japanese enjoyed undisputed mastery of the air. An active fifth column among the native inhabitants was no small help to the enemy.

Three battalions of the garrison, with sixteen guns, were deployed on the mainland in order to delay the assailants until demolitions had been carried out in the port of Kowloon. They were soon heavily attacked, and on December 11 were ordered to withdraw to the island. This was skilfully accomplished during the ensuing two nights under conditions of much difficulty.

Prime

Minister

to

12 Dec. 41

Governor

and

Defenders of Hong

Kong.

We are all watching day by day and hour by hour
your stubborn defence of the port and fortress of Hong
Kong. You guard a link between the Far East and
Europe long famous in world civilisation. We are sure
that the defence of Hong Kong against barbarous and
unprovoked attack will add a glorious page to British
annals.

All our hearts are with you in your ordeal. Every day
of your resistance brings nearer our certain final victory.

The Grand Alliance

775

The enemy’s preparations for crossing the mile-wide
stretch of water between the mainland and the island
took some days, during which they systematically
shelled, bombed, and mortared our positions. On the
night of December 18 they made their first landing, and
successive reinforcements pushed actively inland. The
defenders were forced back step by step by attacks of
ever-growing strength, their own numbers diminished
by heavy casualties. They had no hope of reinforcement or succour, but they fought on.