The Grand Alliance (52 page)

We must not put our standards too low in relation to the
enemy.

Soon General Wavell sent us more disquieting information about Rommel’s approaching reinforcements. The disembarkation of the 15th German Armoured Division, less its losses in crossing the Mediterranean, would probably be completed by April 21. Several units had already been identified opposite Tobruk or in the Capuzzo area.

Prisoners of war stated that the division was still short of supply transport. From our observation of shipping arriving in Tripoli, it seemed that twenty-one shipments, averaging five thousand or six thousand tons, were still required to complete the division. The question of its maintenance eastward depended on the use of Benghazi and other small ports in Cyrenaica. There were signs that Benghazi was being regularly used. At least fifteen days would be required for the gathering of supplies. On this assumption the 15th Armoured Division, the 5th Light Motorised Division, and

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the Ariete and Trento divisions would be able to move forward after the middle of June, instead of only from July onward – an acceleration of a fortnight upon the previous estimate.

Wavell added that he must confess that German performance so often exceeded calculations that he was not confident that they would not improve on his estimate of their abilities. They had, for instance, begun an advance the previous evening from the Sollum area which would not be justified by what was believed to be their supply situation.

It seemed very unsatisfactory to us at home that Benghazi, which we had failed to make a useful base, was already playing so important a part now that it had passed into German hands.

During the next fortnight my keen attention and anxieties were riveted upon the fortunes of operation “Tiger.” I did not underrate the risks which the First Sea Lord had been willing to accept, and I knew that there were many misgivings in the Admiralty. The convoy, consisting of five fifteen-knot ships, escorted by Admiral Somerville’s Force H

(Renown, Malaya, Ark Royal,
and
Sheffield),
passed Gibraltar on May 6. With it also were the reinforcements for the Mediterranean Fleet, comprising the
Queen Elizabeth
and the cruisers
Naiad
and
Fiji.
Air attacks on May 8 were beaten off without damage, seven enemy aircraft being destroyed. During that night, however, two ships of the convoy struck mines when approaching the Narrows. One, the
Empire Song,
caught fire and sank after an explosion; the other, the
New Zealand Star,
was able to continue with the convoy. On reaching the entrance to the Skerki Channel, Admiral Somerville parted company and returned The Grand Alliance

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to Gibraltar. He detached six of his destroyers, with the cruiser
Gloucester,
to reinforce the convoy escort. In the afternoon of the ninth Admiral Cunningham, having seized the opportunity to pass a convoy into Malta, met the “Tiger”

convoy with the fleet fifty miles south of Malta. All his forces then shaped their course for Alexandria, which they reached without further loss or damage. The opportunity was also taken during these operations to carry out two night bombardments of Benghazi with light naval forces on May 7 and 10.

I was delighted to learn that this vital convoy, on which my hopes were set, had come safely through the Narrows and was now protected by the whole strength of the reinforced Mediterranean Fleet. While this hung in the balance, my thoughts turned to Crete, upon which we were now sure a heavy airborne attack impended. It seemed to me that if the Germans could seize and use the airfields on the island, they would have the power of reinforcing almost indefinitely, and that even a dozen “I” tanks might play a decisive part in preventing their doing so. I, therefore, asked the Chiefs of Staff to consider turning one ship of “Tiger” to unload a few

“I” tanks in Crete on their way through. My expert colleagues, while agreeing that tanks would be of special value for the purpose I had in mind, deemed it inadvisable to endanger the rest of the ship’s valuable cargo by such a diversion. Accordingly, I suggested to them on May 9 that if it were “thought too dangerous to take the
Clan Lamont
into Suda, she should take twelve tanks, or some other ship should take them, immediately after she has discharged her cargo at Alexandria.” Orders were sent accordingly. Wavell replied on May 10 that he “had already arranged to send six infantry tanks and fifteen light tanks to Crete,” and that they

“should arrive within next few days if all goes well.”

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Naturally I was eager to repeat the brilliant success of

“Tiger.” I had not perhaps realised what a strain it had been on all concerned, although clearly I had borne the main responsibility. I considered my judgment about the dangers of the Mediterranean passage was at last vindicated. My naval friends, on the other hand, declared we had enjoyed a stroke of good luck and weather which might never recur.

The Admiralty certainly did not wish to be led into a succession of these hazardous operations, and I encountered resistance which I found serious. I should not have been deterred from seeking and obtaining a Cabinet decision upon the issue but for the fact that General Wavell himself did not press the point, and indeed took the other side. This cut the ground from under my feet. Accordingly fifty cruiser and fifty infantry tanks went round the Cape in a later convoy, which did not anchor off Suez till July 15.

Many things had happened by then. However, not all were bad.

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14

The Revolt in Iraq

The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of
1930 —
“The Golden
Square” — Reinforcements from India — The
Attack upon Habbaniya — Spirited Assistance
from the Flying School — Wavell’s Reluctance —

His Many Cares — Firm Attitude at Home —

Better News from Habbaniya — Collapse and
Flight of the Iraqi Army — My Telegram to Wavell
of May
9 —
His Reply — Arrival of the “Habforce”

— Hitler’s Belated Directive, May
23 —
The
Advance on Baghdad — Flight of Rashid Ali —

Iraq Effectively Occupied — The Regent Returns
to Baghdad — Serious Dangers Narrowly Averted
at Small Cost
—
Divergence Between London and
Cairo.

T
HE ANGLO-IRAQI TREATY of 1930 provided that in time of peace we should, among other things, maintain air bases near Basra and at Habbaniya, and have the right of transit for military forces and supplies at all times. The treaty also provided that in war we should have all possible facilities, including the use of railways, rivers, ports, and airfields, for the passage of our armed forces. When war came Iraq broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, but did not declare war; and when Italy came into the war, the Iraq Government did not even sever relations. Thus the Italian Legation in Baghdad became the chief centre for Axis propaganda and for fomenting anti-British feeling. In this The Grand Alliance

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they were aided by the Mufti of Jerusalem, who had fled from Palestine shortly before the outbreak of war and later received asylum in Baghdad.

With the collapse of France and the arrival of the Axis Armistice Commission in Syria, British prestige sank very low and the situation gave us much anxiety. But with our preoccupations elsewhere military action was out of the question, and we had to carry on as best we could. In March, 1941, there was a turn for the worse. Rashid AH, who was working with the Germans, became Prime Minister, and began a conspiracy with three prominent Iraqi officers, who were styled “the Golden Square.” At the end of March the pro-British Regent, Emir Abdul Illa, fled from Baghdad.

It was now more than ever important to make sure of Basra, the main port of Iraq on the Persian Gulf, and I minuted to the Secretary of State for India:
Prime

Minister

to

8 April 41

Secretary of State for

India

Some time ago you suggested that you might be
able to spare another division taken from the frontier
troops for the Middle East. The situation in Iraq has
turned sour. We must make sure of Basra, as the
Americans are increasingly keen on a great air assembling base being formed there to which they could
deliver direct. This plan seems of high importance in
view of the un doubted Eastern trend of the war.

I am telling the Chiefs of Staff that you will look into
these possibilities. General Auchinleck also had ideas
that an additional force could be spared.

Mr. Amery telegraphed in this sense to the Viceroy on the same day, and Lord Linlithgow and the Commander-in-Chief, General Auchinleck, promptly offered to divert to The Grand Alliance

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Basra an infantry brigade and a regiment of field artillery, most of which was already on board ship for Malaya. Other troops were to follow as quickly as possible. The brigade group disembarked without opposition at Basra on April 18, under cover of an airborne British battalion which had alighted at Shaiba the day before. The Government of India was requested to follow them up as quickly as possible with two more brigades also assigned to Malaya.

Prime

Minister

to

20 April 41

General Ismay, for C.

O.S.

Committee,

and all concerned

Troops should be sent to Basra as fast as possible.

At least the three brigades originally promised should
be hurried there.

And also:

Prime

Minister

to

20 April 41

Foreign Secretary

It should be made clear to Sir Kinahan Cornwallis
1

that our chief interest in sending troops to Iraq is the
covering and establishment of a great assembly base
at Basra, and that what happens up-country, except at
Habbaniya, is at the present time on an altogether
lower priority. Our rights under the treaty were invoked
to cover this disembarkation and to avoid bloodshed,
but force would have been used to the utmost limit to
secure the disembarkation, if necessary. Our position at
Basra, therefore, does not rest solely on the treaty, but
also on a new event arising out of the war. No undertakings can be given that troops will be sent to Baghdad or
moved through to Palestine, and the right to require
such undertakings should not be recognised in respect
of a Government which has in itself usurped power by a
coup d’état, or in a country where our treaty rights have
so long been frustrated in the spirit. Sir Kinahan Corn-The Grand Alliance