ory was founded. It was this experimental basis that finally persuaded Mather to concede more probability to Sinclair's views than to any other. 35
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Obviously, a natural theologue could not accept both Whiston and Sinclair; and Mather, probably around 1715, rejected Whiston's cometary explanation, admitting that it was "engenious," but giving it up because it was "Arbitrary." 36 Discarding a theory because it is arbitrary, and choosing another because it is verified experimentally, seems to place Mather securely in the camp of the natural theology and, in fact, he belongs there, though only in one of its outposts. He did not mean to imply that nature must always work without caprice or that physical events must always fall out reasonably. What was arbitrary in Whiston's theory was its disregard of Scripture, which did not hint that a comet passed near the earth before the onset of the deluge. If one wished to follow Whiston's method of reasoning, he asked, why not argue that the flood was "altogether Miraculous"? 37 Some did, of coursebut only by embroidering Scripture. These writers suggested that God created waters especially for flooding the earth which, once accomplished, were destroyed. This explanation, Mather observed, "cutt the Knott.'' And surely there was ''no Absurdity" in attributing such a power to God; but His account, inscribed by Moses, did not cut the knot: "Wherefore wee will rather consider the causes of the flood, which are there more expressly mentioned." 38
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By itself Mather's respect for Scripture did not limit his enlistment in the army of natural theology; many better members professed a similar attachment to God's literal Word. But his assumptions about the trinity that natural theologians admired so highlyGod, nature, and reasondid set him apart. Like the first covenant theorists, the natural theologians urged the reasonableness of the Christian religion. They professed to believe that the ancient conundrum of whether a thing commanded by God is good because He enjoins it or is commanded by God because is inherently good, if not exactly solved, was no longer puzzling. There was in the constitution of the universe, as Samuel Clarke, a writer Mather studied closely, said, an "eternal Reason of Things" in which the law of nature was founded. 39 In some ultimate sense, this reason might represent the positive will of God, but in another, some implied, it might even be ante-
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