Read The New Nobility of the KGB Online
Authors: Andrei Soldatov
Tags: #History, #Europe, #Russia & the Former Soviet Union, #Political Science, #General, #International Relations, #Security (National & International), #Intelligence & Espionage, #World, #Russian & Former Soviet Union, #Social Science, #Social Classes
The New Nobility of the KGB (15 page)
In 2002, some details of the Ryazan exercise were leaked to the monthly paper
Sovershenno Sekretno
, which has long been closely connected to the security services, but the story went almost unnoticed. The story said that two FSB special operations units, known as Alpha and Vympel, had been sent to Ryazan on September 20, 1999, to prevent a possible attack and check the preparedness of cities in the face of terrorism.
21
Sovershenno Sekretno
, which has long been closely connected to the security services, but the story went almost unnoticed. The story said that two FSB special operations units, known as Alpha and Vympel, had been sent to Ryazan on September 20, 1999, to prevent a possible attack and check the preparedness of cities in the face of terrorism.
21
Instead of providing the public with exhaustive explanations, the FSB did its best to silence questions. Former FSB officer Mikhail Trepashkin, now a lawyer, was invited by Sergei Kovalev, a member of the State Duma and famous dissident, to assist in an independent inquiry of the apartment bombings. Trepashkin had also been hired by two sisters whose mother had been killed in one of the buildings to represent them in the trial of two Russian suspects accused of transporting explosives. Trepashkin began to raise his own questions about the case, suggesting that the FSB might have been involved.
22
On October 22, 2003, Trepashkin was arrested for illegal arms possession, convicted, and sentenced by a closed military court to four years in jail in what appeared to be a setup.
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On October 22, 2003, Trepashkin was arrested for illegal arms possession, convicted, and sentenced by a closed military court to four years in jail in what appeared to be a setup.
23
Shortly thereafter a disgruntled former FSB officer, Aleksander Litvinenko, who had fled Russia, and co-author Yuri Feltshinsky published a book,
Blowing Up Russia: Terror from Within
, in which they directly blamed the FSB for organizing a campaign of terrorism. On December 28, 2003, as the book was being shipped to Russia, 4,376 copies were seized by the FSB.
Blowing Up Russia: Terror from Within
, in which they directly blamed the FSB for organizing a campaign of terrorism. On December 28, 2003, as the book was being shipped to Russia, 4,376 copies were seized by the FSB.
On January 28, 2004, former dissident Aleksander Podrabinek, who had imported the books to Russia, was called to Lefortovo and interrogated by the FSB.
24
In the authors’ opinion, the book contained no new evidence against the FSB, and Trepashkin’s claims of FSB involvement proved to be highly dubious.
25
But the FSB’s response to Trepashkin and their ban of the book only served to strengthen the suspicions that the FSB was somehow complicit in the plot.
24
In the authors’ opinion, the book contained no new evidence against the FSB, and Trepashkin’s claims of FSB involvement proved to be highly dubious.
25
But the FSB’s response to Trepashkin and their ban of the book only served to strengthen the suspicions that the FSB was somehow complicit in the plot.
UNDER YELTSIN THE 1990s were a period of remarkable openness in Russia when journalists were free to explore areas that had long been off-limits. Under Putin, the FSB returned to police state methods to deal with foreign journalists, using the threat of withholding visas and access to the country as leverage in an effort to influence their coverage.
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In May 2002 Nikolai Volobuev, then the chief of the FSB’s counterintelligence department, said thirty-one foreign journalists had had their press passes revoked because they were “conducting illegal journalist activity,” and eighteen among them were refused entry to Russia and had their visas blocked for five years.
27
Since then this method has become common practice. According to the Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations, which is based in Moscow, more than forty journalists were refused entry to Russia between 2000 and 2007.
27
Since then this method has become common practice. According to the Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations, which is based in Moscow, more than forty journalists were refused entry to Russia between 2000 and 2007.
In July 2006 Russian authorities refused an entry visa to the British journalist Thomas de Waal.
28
The Russian Federal Migration Service explained that de Waal’s application had been denied under a 1996 security law. The explanation might be that de Waal wrote extensively on the war in Chechnya: In 1993-1997 he had worked in Russia covering the North Caucasus, and he co-authored the book
Chechnya: A Small Victorious War
. In 2003, he testified as an expert witness for the defense at the extradition trial in Britain of Chechen rebel leader Akhmed Zakayev. In June 2008, British journalist Simon Pirani was refused entry to Russia, although he had a valid visa in his passport. Pirani, who writes about trade union issues, was told by Russian authorities he was deemed a security threat.
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The Russian Federal Migration Service explained that de Waal’s application had been denied under a 1996 security law. The explanation might be that de Waal wrote extensively on the war in Chechnya: In 1993-1997 he had worked in Russia covering the North Caucasus, and he co-authored the book
Chechnya: A Small Victorious War
. In 2003, he testified as an expert witness for the defense at the extradition trial in Britain of Chechen rebel leader Akhmed Zakayev. In June 2008, British journalist Simon Pirani was refused entry to Russia, although he had a valid visa in his passport. Pirani, who writes about trade union issues, was told by Russian authorities he was deemed a security threat.
29
Natalia Morar, a Moldovan citizen who works for the independent Russian weekly newsmagazine
New Times
, and who had lived in Moscow for six years, was refused re-entry to Russia in December 2007 after a business trip to Israel. Morar had covered corruption and written articles critical of high-level FSB officials. She was forced to fly to the capital of Moldova, where she was told by Russian embassy officials that she posed a threat to Russian national security. In February 2008 she arrived at Domodedovo airport in Moscow with her Russian husband, Ilya Barabanov (who also works with
New Times
), whom she had married since she had last been refused entry. But she was stopped at passport control at Domodedovo airport and told that her status had not changed despite her marriage.
30
Although she has continued to work for
New Times
covering corruption issues, her job has become increasingly difficult without access to Russian sources of information.
New Times
, and who had lived in Moscow for six years, was refused re-entry to Russia in December 2007 after a business trip to Israel. Morar had covered corruption and written articles critical of high-level FSB officials. She was forced to fly to the capital of Moldova, where she was told by Russian embassy officials that she posed a threat to Russian national security. In February 2008 she arrived at Domodedovo airport in Moscow with her Russian husband, Ilya Barabanov (who also works with
New Times
), whom she had married since she had last been refused entry. But she was stopped at passport control at Domodedovo airport and told that her status had not changed despite her marriage.
30
Although she has continued to work for
New Times
covering corruption issues, her job has become increasingly difficult without access to Russian sources of information.
Meanwhile, the security services closed the doors of their press offices. By the mid-2000s the Federal Protective Service responded only to requests for filming or photographing inside the Kremlin. Military intelligence has no press office at all, the foreign intelligence service refuses to comment on anything that happened after 1961, and the FSB’s Center for Public Communications has tended not to answer media requests even under the threat of legal prosecution.
In 2009 the Directorate of Assistance Programs (which includes the Center for Public Communications) was given new powers. On July 15 Alexander Bortnikov, then director of the FSB, expanded the list of FSB generals allowed to “initiate petitions to conduct counterintelligence measures that restrict the constitutional rights of citizens” (in other words, that compromise the right to privacy of correspondence and communications, as well as the inviolability of the home).
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Under Bortnikov’s direction, these generals now have the authority to order wiretapping, surveillance, and the searching of premises.
31
Under Bortnikov’s direction, these generals now have the authority to order wiretapping, surveillance, and the searching of premises.
The list, first established in 2007, was originally limited to heads of counterintelligence sections, the department of economic security, and the border guards, as well as FSB leadership. The order signed by Bortnikov in 2009 significantly expanded it to include the FSB Directorate for Assistance Programs.
According to the law, the FSB may carry out counterintelligence measures under the following conditions: There is information regarding signs of intelligence and other activity by foreign states’ secret services or by individuals aimed at damaging Russia’s security; there is a need to gather information about the activities posing a threat to Russia, protect state secrets, or monitor people who provide or have provided the FSB with confidential assistance; or it is necessary to ensure the FSB’s own security or fulfill the requests of the secret services of other countries with which it is on good terms.
Russia’s journalists obviously are not “clients” of the list—no bearers of state secrets, they might divulge secrets or names of agents only if they are told this information by FSB officers or other officials with access to such material. But to protect well-guarded secrets, the FSB has special units, from its main Counter-intelligence Service to the Military Counterintelligence unit, which typically initiate prosecutions after journalists divulge sensitive information in print.
The lawyers and FSB officers the authors questioned related that the Directorate of Assistance Programs might have asked for a surveillance permit not to initiate criminal proceedings but to keep a closer eye on journalists. (Previously the chief of the directorate had to request permission from the head of the counterintelligence department to intercept journalists’ correspondence. Now the head of the FSB’s directorate in charge of dealing with journalists is able to carry out an order on his own.)
Bortnikov’s order raises another question. FSB units are divided into operational and support units. The first (for instance, counter-intelligence or counterterrorism) consist of operatives who recruit agents. Support units include, for example, the FSB’s capital construction directorate, department of medicine, human resources, and (it was long believed) its directorate in charge of dealing with journalists.
The ability to order eavesdropping is obviously a method of operational units. Responding to Soldatov’s question as to whether the Directorate of Assistance Programs is an operational unit, the officer on duty at the FSB Center for Public Communications replied, “It is defined by our internal regulatory documents, and nobody will [tell] you.”
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While under Yeltsin journalists had experienced a certain breadth of freedom, Putin’s desire to portray the security services in a positive light and to maintain strict control over what could and could not be investigated (or published) renewed Soviet-era policies of closed-door operations and no questions asked.
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THE SECRET UNDERGROUND
M
UCH ABOUT THE security services in Russia has been kept well cloaked, either locked in impenetrable archives, quite literally hidden in plain sight, or stashed below the very streets. A secret rabbit warren of tunnels, constructed during the Cold War years, continues to serve the security services today. When the KGB spread out through the Lubyanka Square neighborhood of Moscow, the buildings were often hidden. Passersby were confused by the absence of signs and the unusually high fences throughout the city that served to hide KGB and military facilities. But such obfuscations told only part of the story. The most secret sites were hidden beneath Moscow’s streets.
UCH ABOUT THE security services in Russia has been kept well cloaked, either locked in impenetrable archives, quite literally hidden in plain sight, or stashed below the very streets. A secret rabbit warren of tunnels, constructed during the Cold War years, continues to serve the security services today. When the KGB spread out through the Lubyanka Square neighborhood of Moscow, the buildings were often hidden. Passersby were confused by the absence of signs and the unusually high fences throughout the city that served to hide KGB and military facilities. But such obfuscations told only part of the story. The most secret sites were hidden beneath Moscow’s streets.
From a hill near Moscow State University, Michurinsky Prospect runs southwest from the city center. A large part of Michurinsky Prospect—a tree-lined avenue in a desirable residential area—is occupied by an important secret services facility, the FSB Academy. A short distance from the academy are several empty fields. Underneath these open expanses is a maze of tunnels, rails, chambers, and secret entryways.
During the Cold War, in anticipation of nuclear conflict, Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union built special underground bunkers where their respective leadership could seek refuge in the event of a nuclear attack. The Soviet Union built up its underground system far beyond those of the United States or England. Bunkers, underground factories, and tank tunnels turned Moscow’s subsoil into Swiss cheese: According to independent experts, twelve levels of underground tunnels lie beneath the Russian capital. The largest of all is an underground subway system, known informally as Metro-2 and officially as D-6.
1
Running parallel to the public Moscow Metro, D-6 is used only by high-ranking officials. D-6 has been an ongoing project since the 1940s; its construction has never stopped. Although no official records are available, it is estimated that when the Soviet Union collapsed, D-6 consisted of four lines, seven stories below ground level. A special section in the KGB, the 15th Directorate, established in 1977, was placed in charge of its safety.
2
But in 1991, when the KGB was disbanded, the 15th Directorate was not included in the FSB or in the Federal Protective Service, responsible for the protection of senior state officials.
1
Running parallel to the public Moscow Metro, D-6 is used only by high-ranking officials. D-6 has been an ongoing project since the 1940s; its construction has never stopped. Although no official records are available, it is estimated that when the Soviet Union collapsed, D-6 consisted of four lines, seven stories below ground level. A special section in the KGB, the 15th Directorate, established in 1977, was placed in charge of its safety.
2
But in 1991, when the KGB was disbanded, the 15th Directorate was not included in the FSB or in the Federal Protective Service, responsible for the protection of senior state officials.
For three years, the 15th Directorate appeared to be nowhere. Finally, in 1994, came the first open document to mention the directorate’s new title: the Main Directorate of Special Programs of the President (GUSP). This was a separate security service with a peculiar status; it was not given the status of an independent agency like most of the secret services, but rather was included in the Administration of the President. GUSP’s guidelines were not established until 1996, and were promulgated by presidential decree.
3
GUSP was not sanctioned by any act of Parliament and came into existence without being subject to parliamentary scrutiny.
3
GUSP was not sanctioned by any act of Parliament and came into existence without being subject to parliamentary scrutiny.
The leadership of GUSP was so determined to maintain maximum secrecy that it sometimes created problems for itself. Because it was not included in the list of Russian special services, GUSP’s personnel did not have the right to carry weapons. Only in 1999 was this obstacle resolved. By the end of the 1990s GUSP followed the example of the FSB and started to expand its activity and resources. In 2000 it was reported that GUSP staff totaled 20,000 people.
4
To date, GUSP leaders have never made public statements; GUSP has no press office, and its Web site offers only official documents and its insignia.
4
To date, GUSP leaders have never made public statements; GUSP has no press office, and its Web site offers only official documents and its insignia.
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