The Nixon Defense: What He Knew and When He Knew It (109 page)

February 3 to 23, 1973

1
E.g., Walter Regaber, “Watergate Judge Wants U.S. to Revive Its Inquiry,”
New York Times
, February 3, 1973, 61.

2
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) Conversation No. 840-9.

3
It was not until the cover-up trial of Mitchell and the others did it become clear why Colson was convinced that Mitchell was involved in Watergate. He was called as a “court witness,” meaning the government would not vouch for his truthfulness. He was cross-examined by Mitchell’s lawyer, an experienced trial attorney, William Hundley, who received a devastating response to a question in the following exchange:

Q. Well, what evidence did you have? You are a lawyer. What evidence did you have that you could pin on Mr. Mitchell?

A. Well, a few days before the Watergate break-in, we had had a meeting in Mr. Mitchell’s law office at 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue to discuss meetings that were taking place between Dwayne Andreas, a supporter of Hubert Humphrey, and Hubert Humphrey, in the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York, and Mr. Mitchell jokingly said at that time, with a half smile, and I didn’t—I took it as a joke—“Tell me what room they are in and I will tell you everything that is said in that room.” And, after the Watergate break-in, I mean, I put these two things together.

Testimony of Charles Colson,
U.S. v. Mitchell et al.
, December 5, 1974, pp. 9378–79.

4
Conversation No. 850-5.

5
Conversation No. 850-11.

6
Conversation No. 852-7.

7
On February 7, 1973, the Senate’s debate on the investigation of Watergate—the resolution to create a Senate Select Committee to investigate Watergate and the 1972 presidential campaign—began in earnest on the Senate floor. Senator Howard Baker offered the first amendment to restructure the committee’s membership to three Democrats and three Republicans. Drawing on the concept of bipartisan fairness in general and a number of historical presidents, he said, “I feel that as we launch into a broad, sweeping inquiry, far broader than any judicial inquiry can be, certainly more comprehensive and broader than any criminal inquiry can be”—noting that they were prescribed by rules of procedure and evidence—“it is incumbent on us that we guard against any question of partisanship in the inquiry on which we are about to embark.” Senator Sam Ervin rose to “strongly oppose this amendment.” Ervin’s staff had done a much more complete research job and found that virtually every select committee established since 1947 had given the majority party control. Senator Ervin recognized the amendment for what it was, and said he opposed it because the provision would make it “difficult, or even impossible, for the select committee to perform its functions.” He thought it the height of folly for the Senate to create a committee that could “easily get bogged down in indecision and chaos.” After a rather lengthy debate, with Republicans making their best case, the amendment was defeated by a vote of 45 to 35, with 20 members not voting. Howard Baker offered another amendment that was remarkably similar to the one voted down, and it too was rejected, by a vote of 44 to 36, with 20 not voting. It was, however, agreed to expand the membership from five to seven, three Republicans and four Democrats. U.S. Senate,
Congressional Record
,
February 7, 1973, 3831–33.

GOP senator Ed Gurney of Florida offered an amendment authorizing the committee to investigate “the last three Presidential elections, or any campaign, canvass, or other activity related thereto.” Senator Ervin rejected this amendment too, telling his colleagues, “This amendment would be about as foolish as the man who went bear hunting and stopped to chase rabbits.” It was rejected by a vote of 44 to 32, with 24 not voting. Senator John Tower offered an amendment to make sure the minority (Republican) members had “not less than thirty-three and one third percent” of the money provided the committee for its investigation. Senator Ervin rejected this amendment as unnecessary and unprecedented. No select committee had ever had such an arrangement; rather, if he were selected to chair the committee, he would make sure the minority had staff to assist them. A modified version of this amendment was agreed upon and added to the resolution without a vote, and the amendment resolution passed by a vote of 77 to 0, with 23 not voting. The committee has often been described as unanimously agreed upon by the Senate, but that is subject to the caveat that 23 members were not present to vote. U.S. Senate, Congressional Record, February 7, 1973, 3842, 3849.

8
H. R. Haldeman,
The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House
(New York: G. P. Putnam’s, 1993), 575.

9
The summons followed Haldeman’s meeting with the president at his office in the San Clemente compound at 9:25
A.M.
, before the president spent the rest of his day at his pool and private golf course with daughter Julie and her husband, David Eisenhower. Haldeman later noted the gist of the meeting in his diary: “He got into Watergate strategy. He wants to get our people to put out that foreign or Communist money came in in support of the demonstrations in the campaign, tie all the ’72 demonstrations to McGovern and thus the Democrats movement and its leader, McGovern and Teddy Kennedy.” Nixon had told Haldeman to leak to syndicated columnists Evans and Novak the fact that his campaign had been proper and circumspect while the Democrats had used libel and violence. He also wanted Gray to get going on the investigation of who tapped him in 1968. Haldeman,
Diaries
, 577.

10
Haldeman,
Diaries
, 577–78. Conspicuously absent from Haldeman’s notes and diary was the fact that Dick Moore had been dispatched to New York to see if he could get John Mitchell moving on raising money for the Watergate defendants, who were making new demands for more money as their sentencing approached.
Final Report
, Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (SSC), 76–78. “Ehrlichman also confirms that Moore was sent
to New York to see Mitchell about raising money for the Watergate defendants.” Final Report, SSC, 77. Mitchell testified he told Moore to “get lost.” Ibid. Moore confirmed he went to New York and spoke with Mitchell about money for the defendants “for support and legal fees” for the Watergate defendants. Ibid.

11
Conversation No. 854-17.

12
Conversation No. 410-14.

13
Conversation No. 855-10.

14
Conversation No. 856-4.

15
Ehrlichman failed to mention that I told him I thought Pat Gray’s confirmation hearing could be a disaster because I had worked with Gray at the Justice Department when I was the associate deputy attorney general and had to arrange witnesses for Justice Department legislation; Gray had consistently been a poor or bad witness, often ignoring the president’s or Justice Department’s stated policies to promote his own notions. In addition, I gave Ehrlichman far more detail than he chose to share with the president about how Gray had incurred the wrath of much of the FBI, both the old Hoover cronies as well as much of the rank and file, who could be counted on to back channel information to the Senate Judiciary Committee in an attempt to defeat Gray’s confirmation. None of my assessments would prove wrong.

16
Conversation No. 858-3.

17
Conversation No. 859-38.

18
Ibid.

19
Conversation No. 411-18.

20
Conversation. No. 43-177.

21
Conversation No. 411-19.

22
Conversation No. 862-4.

23
Conversation No. 862-6.

24
Kleindienst knew more than he was sharing with the president, as noted in the prologue. Liddy had tracked him down on June 18, 1972, at Burning Tree Country Club, where he was golfing, with a message from Mitchell to have him get the men arrested at the DNC out of jail. As Liddy later wrote, he “spelled it out for Kleindienst.” G. Gordon Liddy,
Will: The Autobiography of G. Gordon Liddy
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 252. Liddy says, “I told him that the break-in was an operation of the intelligence arm of the Committee to Re-elect the President; that I was running it for the committee and the men arrested were our people working under my direction when they were caught. I told him that they were good men who would keep their mouths shut,” etc.

February 27 to March 15, 1973

1
In addition to the September 15, 1972, conversation, based on the president’s daily diary it appears I had conversations with him on the following days, either alone or with others in the meetings: February 27, 1973 (Oval Office, 3:55–4:20
P.M.
); February 28, 1973 (Oval Office, 9:12–10:23
A.M.
); March 1, 1973 (Oval Office, 9:18–9:46
A.M.
), (Oval Office, 10:36–10:44
A.M.
), (Oval Office, 1:06–1:14
P.M.
); March 6, 1973 (Oval Office, 11:49
A.M.
– 12:00
P.M.
); March 7, 1973 (Oval Office, 8:53–9:16
A.M.
); March 8, 1973 (Oval Office, 9:51–9:54
A.M.
); March 10, 1973 (Camp David phone, not recorded, 9:20–9:44
A.M.
); March 13, 1973 (Oval Office, 12:42–2:00
P.M.
); March 14, 1973 (White House telephone, 8:55–8:59
A.M.
), (EOB office, 9:50–10:50
A.M.
), (White House telephone, 12:27–12:28
P.M.
), (EOB office, 12:47–1:30
P.M.
), (White House telephone, 4:25–4:26
P.M.
), (White House telephone, 4:34–4:36
P.M.
); March 15, 1973 (Oval Office, 5:36–6:24
P.M.
); March 16, 1973 (Oval Office, 5:36–6:24
P.M.
), (White House telephone, 8:14–8:23
P.M.
); March 17, 1973 (Oval Office, 1:25–2:10
P.M.
); March 19, 1973 (EOB office, 5:20–6:01
P.M.
); March 20, 1973 (White House telephone, 10:46–10:47
A.M.
), (White House telephone, 12:59–1:00
P.M.
), (Oval Office, 1:42–2:31
P.M.
), (White House telephone, 7:29–7:43
P.M.
); March 21, 1973 (Oval Office, 10:12–11:55
A.M.
), (EOB office, 5:20–6:01
P.M.
); March 22, 1973 (EOB office, 1:57–3:43
P.M.
); March 23, 1973 (Key Biscayne
telephone, not recorded, 12:44–1:02
P.M.
), (Key Biscayne telephone, not recorded, 3:28–3:44
P.M.
); April 15, 1973 (EOB office, not recorded, 9:17–10:12
P.M.
); April 16, 1973 (Oval Office, 10:00–10:40
A.M.
), (White House telephone, 4:04–4:05
P.M.
), (EOB office, 4:07–4:35
P.M.
); April 17, 1973 (White House telephone, 9:19–9:25
A.M.
); and April 22, 1973 (Key Biscayne telephone, not recorded, 8:24–8:39
A.M.
).

2
They were found in either the
Submission of Presidential Conversations to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representative by Richard Nixon
(April 30, 1974), which became known as the “Bluebook” for its cover, or the
Transcripts of Eight Recorded Presidential Conversations (May–June 1974) Prepared by the House Judiciary Committee
, which were more accurate drafts of many of the same conversations as found in the Bluebook. The ten conversations to which I had access were: September 15, 1972 (Oval Office, 5:27–6:17
P.M.
); February 28, 1973 (Oval Office, 9:12–10:23
A.M.
); March 13, 1973 (Oval Office, 12:42–2:00
P.M.
); March 17, 1973 (Oval Office, 1:25–2:10
P.M.
); March 21, 1973 (10:12–11:55
A.M.
); March 21, 1973 (Oval Office, 5:20–6:01
P.M.
); March 22, 1972 (EOB office, 1:57–3:43
P.M.
); April 16, 1973 (Oval Office, 10:00–10:40
A.M.
); and April 16, 1973 (EOB office, 4:07–4:35
P.M.
). Not all of these transcripts were complete, however, for the White House had withheld information.

3
John W. Dean,
Blind Ambition: The White House Years
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1976), 186.

4
As one psychologist who studied my memory vis-à-vis the tapes reported, “Analysis of Dean’s testimony does indeed reveal some instances of memory for the gist of what was said on a particular occasion. Elsewhere in his testimony, however, there is surprising little correspondence between the course of the conversation and his account of it. Even in those cases, however, there is usually a deeper level at which he is right. He gave an accurate portrayal of the real situation, of the actual character and commitments of the people he knew, and of the events that lay behind the conversation he was trying to remember.” Ulric Neisser, “Memory Observed, Remembering in Natural Contexts,”
Cognition: The International Journal of Cognitive Psychology
(February 1981):1–22. This study does not mention that everything in my testimony did, in fact, occur but that I conflated events or had them on the wrong date. None of my testimony, however, was really date sensitive.

5
Dean Senate testimony, 4 Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (SSC) 1513. Nor was it a tape recorder. Dean Senate testimony, 4 SSC 1373.

6
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) Conversation No. 864-4.

7
Richard Nixon,
RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon
(New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 779.

8
Conversation No. 865-14.

9
Nixon,
RN
, 779.

10
Conversation No. 866-3.

11
Gray testified that “any Member of the U.S. Senate, this committee or any Member of the U.S. Senate, who wishes to examine the investigative file of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in this matter [relating to the Watergate break-in and bugging] may do so, and I will provide knowledgeable, experienced, special agents to sit down with that Member and respond to any question that Member has.” U.S. Senate,
Louis Patrick Gray, III, Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary
(February 28 to March 22, 1973), 28.