The Nixon Defense: What He Knew and When He Knew It (12 page)

“Yeah. They’re not making any fuss about it. Nobody will ask why they fired him unless he becomes identified. The FBI [does] have a line to him. They have questioned him, and he didn’t cooperate. He answered certain questions, and then they got into other areas, and he said, ‘If you’re going to get into that kind of area, then I request to have an attorney here.’ The FBI said, ‘Well, if you have an attorney, he’ll tell you not to answer the question.’ Liddy said, ‘Well then, I’ve got to take that advice,’ and the FBI dropped it.”

“What were the questions?” Nixon asked.

“Name what other people [were] involved,” Haldeman answered. “The thing that bothers me about [the FBI’s investigation] is that it’s a time bomb. They can investigate until they get something else, and then lob it out whenever they feel like it.”

“Yeah. Well, what do we do, then?” Nixon asked.

“I don’t know. I don’t think there’s a damn thing we can do, except follow it.” In a very soft voice the president again inquired about Mitchell’s role, and Haldeman had no additional information to share. But he did speculate that if Mitchell confessed, it might end the investigation, but it would require that Mitchell make an unequivocal statement to the effect, “I was running the thing at the time, and I should have known what was happening, I’m sorry I didn’t.”

“But he didn’t know it,” Nixon said, and Haldeman continued with his assessment of what Mitchell would have to say, something to the effect that he “was diverted by some personal problems,” which was also why he resigned from the campaign. Nixon next asked, “How do you think the resignation goes in terms of timing?”

“The resignation is going to be a positive story,” Haldeman advised. As for timing, “It’s going to hang totally on Martha.” The conversation turned to the mechanics of Mitchell’s departure from the reelection campaign. The president wanted to send both Clark MacGregor and Fred Malek from the White House to run the day-to-day operations, but because MacGregor had a heavy load with his White House congressional relations office, there would be a slight delay, so he could finish up those assignments.

“A great load will be lifted” for Mitchell, the president thought aloud. “Then he’ll come in as an adviser, something like Connally,” referring to John Connally, the former secretary of the treasury. Except, the president noted, “Connally’s likely to be better than Mitchell.”

At 8:55
P.M.
, Nixon and Ron Ziegler went to the East Room for the live radio and television press conference. From 9:01
P.M.
until 9:44
P.M.
the president took questions from the press but was not asked a single question about Watergate or the Mitchells. Afterward the president spent two hours in the Lincoln Sitting Room of the residence in his post–press conference ritual—taking calls from his cabinet, staff, family and friends offering their congratulations. In his diary Haldeman reported that Nixon had been effective, because while he was well prepared, “he wasn’t so completely programmed. More relaxed, some good quips, no nervousness.”
¹⁷

The president invited John Mitchell and Bob Haldeman to lunch in his EOB office, where they discussed the Martha situation from 12:55
P.M.
to 2:10
P.M.
*
Mitchell and Haldeman had crab soufflé, while the president had his usual pineapple and cottage cheese.
¹⁸
Nixon later described this lunch as “a painful session” and observed that “Mitchell looked worn out, and his hand shook so much that he had to put his soup spoon down after the first taste.”
¹⁹
There had always been an awkward distance in Nixon and Mitchell’s relationship, even though, as former law partners, they had spent almost six years working closely together. Nixon, I was once told by Haldeman, believed that he owed his election as president to Mitchell’s work in 1967 and 1968. Mitchell himself once said to me that the only reason he took the post of attorney general was because Nixon had insisted, and Nixon made him one of his closest advisers during the first term. During the few meetings in which I witnessed them together, I noticed a stiffness in their working relationship that is present in their recorded conversations as well.
²⁰

The president welcomed Mitchell with comments about Iran’s gray caviar, which he was not serving but that had been served to him on his last trip to Iran, when visiting the shah. He continued with some familiar topics, including the Supreme Court (with a negative comment about Justice Potter Stewart, one of Nixon’s least favorites justices), and then proceeded to the reason for their meeting, telling Mitchell with empathy that he understood that Martha’s problems had created an impossible situation for him.

“Let me say this,” Nixon continued. “I’ve always had a theory about politics. I covered the situation somewhat in
Six Crises
. I dedicated that book, on the flyleaf, you may recall, to Pat—‘she also ran’—and it’s always seemed to me, and it’s true for Martha as well, that for a woman, being the wife of a politician is infinitely more difficult than probably being one.”

“I think you’re right on,” Mitchell said.

“And Martha’s been a great asset to us,” the president continued. “I mean, she’s a star, she has star quality, she always will, but I can see what happens here, the reason she’s damaged after three years as wife of the attorney
general, that’s over, all of a sudden you’re out of that, in a new area, you’re in the line of fire, and kicked around, and you’re not home, and this, that and the other thing, she’s wondering what the hell is this all about? And as time goes on, it doesn’t get better, and so forth and so on. Until finally she reached the breaking point. My own view is that . . .” Nixon cleared his throat. “Probably, I say this with the greatest reluctance, but understanding of your desire and the situation, probably [your decision is] correct. I think the real problem is how to handle the timing. What’s going to happen in the campaign, the pressures are never going to get less, they’re going to get a hell of a lot worse, and I would never want to put her through all that. So take her back home. I just wanted to give you a little background. I totally understand. I, the affection, you know, I feel about her—”

Mitchell had a barely audible question about timing, and Nixon responded, “You’re the best judge of that.” He added, “But the only thing I would say, of course, [is that] you can’t put amateurs in running the campaign, for example, California, or New Jersey, also some of the Southern strategy.”

“Well, Mr. President, Martha’s around the point where she understands it’s crucial that you get reelected president,” Mitchell assured Nixon. Haldeman, who genuinely liked John Mitchell, felt he should resign sooner rather than later. He noted, “Well, there’s another practical point: If you wait, you run the risk of more stuff, valid or invalid, surfacing on the Watergate caper type of thing.” The president picked up on that point. “That’s the other thing. If there is something that does come out, we hope nothing will, it may not, but there’s always the risk.” Haldeman added, “As of now there’s no problem there,” but at any moment in the future there could be one. “Nope, I’d cut the loss fast,” Nixon agreed. “That’s my view, generally speaking. And I think the story is positive rather than negative,” he assured Mitchell.

As the lunch was ending, the president shared, “in confidence,” the fact that he had spoken with Billy Graham, “a great admirer of Martha’s,” who offered to help if it was sought. Nixon said he’d told Graham it was a personal problem, but he thought Graham’s sympathetic reaction was typical. Mitchell agreed, and the session ended with the president saying, “Well, anyway, we’ll try to work it out.”

After a nap, Nixon went to the Oval Office, where he had a brief meeting with Clark MacGregor on legislative matters.
²¹
Not until later that day did Nixon formally ask MacGregor to take the assignment to head his campaign, although Haldeman had already made sure he would do so.

After MacGregor departed the Oval Office at 3:18
P.M.
, Ziegler said he
needed to talk with the president before he met with newly confirmed attorney general Dick Kleindienst. Kleindienst was scheduled to go to the press room to explain the administration’s request to add the death penalty to federal cases involving kidnapping, hijacking and the killing of police officers.
²²
Ziegler, however, had been bombarded with Watergate questions at his 12:50
P.M.
press briefing, because of a report that the FBI had found a “bugging device, maps and a loaded pistol” in Howard Hunt’s White House office.
²³
He was now worried that Kleindienst, who as attorney general was in charge of the FBI and the criminal investigation of Watergate, would face a Watergate feeding frenzy from the press.

As Ziegler departed, Kleindienst arrived with Haldeman. This meeting, which lasted almost an hour, was remarkable not for what was said but rather for what was not said. Without explaining the reason, the president advised Kleindienst that his press briefing on death penalty cases would be rescheduled for the following week. Twelve days earlier, the day after the arrest of his bugging and burglary team at the Watergate, G. Gordon Liddy had met with Kleindienst, revealed that his men were in jail and asked Kleindienst to get them out. Kleindienst, who had no such power, had sent Liddy packing. Yet Kleindienst’s visit turned out to be little more than a shoot-the-breeze conversation, one in which Watergate was never mentioned.
²⁴

As Kleindienst departed, Haldeman and the president turned to the subjects they had been avoiding until others had departed: Watergate and Mitchell’s resignation. Haldeman told Nixon that Mitchell had accompanied him back to his office after lunch.
²⁵

Nixon had not known Hunt had an office in the White House complex and was curious about what had been found in it. Haldeman explained that there had been no map of the DNC, contrary to the press reports, but there was a handgun. The president was surprised that the FBI was still pursuing Hunt. “But I understood, though, that on that Bureau thing, that they were to keep off of this guy, you know what I mean?” the president asked, thinking about his approval of Haldeman’s meeting with the CIA regarding the Mexican money that he had expanded to include Hunt.

“That’s what they were told. They aren’t,” Haldeman reported. “We’re having problems here with the Bureau. That’s what we were talking about with Dean and Mitchell before our meeting with you.”

“I see. You mean, despite Walters going over there?” the president asked, recalling their conversation.

“Gray doesn’t know how to turn them off, and neither does Felt, I guess,” Haldeman replied. “They’re concerned about how to do it, get the record clear on the completeness of the investigation, and all this sort of stuff. Kleindienst hasn’t turned Justice off either, which is another problem. The U.S. attorney and his criminal head [Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen] are both pushing the Bureau, and forward, now. We’ll work it out. We’ve got to somehow get Kleindienst to tell them.”

“Well, I’d have Walters go see them, too,” Nixon suggested, to further exploit the CIA ties to the situation. “The gun and the wiretapping doesn’t bother me a bit with this fellow [referring to Hunt]. He’s in the Cuban thing, the whole Cuban business. He’s out of the country now, I assume?”

“He never went out, but it doesn’t matter. They say his main stock in trade is, he’s a master of disguise,” Haldeman said, chuckling. “He’s someplace under some disguise, although he’s supposed to go abroad.”

The president stopped to think about the situation, then continued, “Was Colson aware he had stuff in his safe and all that sort of thing?” “Colson wasn’t there when they opened the safe,” Haldeman explained, “I don’t think he knows what was in it. In fact, I’m sure he doesn’t. They haven’t told him what was in it.”

Haldeman said that Ziegler had basically given no comment on the report, which had appeared in
The Washington Daily News
, although he did try to suggest that it had not been totally accurate, explaining, “The story says they found a Spanish-made gun. The reason that’s not true is, they did not find a Spanish-made gun.”

“They didn’t find a map?” Nixon inquired.

“John Dean’s the one who knows about this, and he says there wasn’t any map. He says there was a road map, but it had nothing to do with the Democratic National Committee, and there was no map of the committee headquarters.”

Nixon noted, “Sort of adds up that he has wiretapping stuff, of course.”

“Dean hasn’t discounted the possibility that we’re dealing with a double agent in this thing somewhere,” Haldeman reported. (Because neither Ehrlichman nor anyone else was sharing details of Hunt, Liddy and the plumbers’ earlier activities with me, I was truly confused for several weeks about how all the relevant details fit together.)

“Meaning this fellow Hunt?” Nixon asked.

“Probably not this guy. Probably one of the other guys, or several of them,” Haldeman advised.

“A double agent who is putting out this information, giving leads, or what?” Nixon asked.

“Well, who purposely moved this thing. It’s complex, it’s so ridiculous, it’s still kind of hard to figure the whole thing out,” which accurately described the situation for Haldeman. We were all trying to understand the situation, but Haldeman was making it difficult for the president because he was withholding information about his role in allowing Liddy’s operation to proceed at the CRP, for Haldeman was way ahead of the president in figuring it all out but not sharing his knowledge.

“Well, I wonder, then,” Nixon said, “in view of this break today, if that means whether Mitchell’s going tomorrow is a good idea after all.”

“Yes. This thing doesn’t tie back to that,” Haldeman assured him. “Why not?” Nixon asked, and Haldeman explained, “Because Hunt’s work leads to the White House, not to Mitchell and the reelection committee. They haven’t tied Hunt to the reelection committee. They’re tying him to Colson.”