The Nixon Defense: What He Knew and When He Knew It (60 page)

“That’s right,” Ehrlichman agreed. “Well, we still don’t know,” Haldeman pointed out. “I will still argue that I think the scenario that was spun out by Dean on Mitchell is basically the right one. I don’t think Mitchell did order
the Watergate bugging, and I don’t think he was specifically aware of the Watergate bugging at the time it was instituted.” The president added, “For your information, here’s what [Mitchell] told Rebozo, who he knows very well.” This conversation occurred either “right after [Mitchell had testified before the grand jury] or a month ago,” Nixon reported. “He told Rebozo, ‘I may have perjured myself on the ITT matter but I sure didn’t on this God damn thing.’ Well, there you go.” And Haldeman agreed that “technically that may be correct.” Ehrlichman added that that was what he had told Dick Moore as well. They discussed who should confront Mitchell, and Nixon thought it should be Ehrlichman, who knew the case, rather than Rogers, whom Mitchell did not like and could “wind him around his finger.”

But the president knew the relationship between Ehrlichman and Mitchell was strained, at best, so he asked Ehrlichman to explain the situation, as he saw it. “Let me put it in a setting,” he began. “Mitchell has felt from the days of Haynsworth and Carswell—” referring to Mitchell’s rejected recommendations while attorney general for seats on the U.S. Supreme Court, which led Nixon to interrupt, “That you were out to get him.” Ehrlichman ignored the president’s characterization and continued, “—that I disapproved of him, And that it fell to my lot to second-guess his operation at the Justice Department, day after day.” In fact, the problem was far deeper and had real consequences, but the fact Ehrlichman acknowledged that it existed was enough to satisfy Nixon.
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The president told Ehrlichman, “You know the case. You’ve conducted the investigation for me. You have reported to me, and I have asked you to go up and lay it on the ground to Mitchell, and to tell Mitchell, look, there is only one thing that could save him. I think John’s got to hear that kind of talk, and I think he’s got to hear it from somebody that doesn’t have—” The president caught himself from absolving Ehrlichman from any involvement, but not missing a beat, continued, “I was thinking of bringing Rogers in and telling him all this stuff, but God damn it, Mitchell will wind him around his finger.”

Ehrlichman said he would do it if Nixon wanted it done but noted, “Bob has a pretty good feel of Mitchell’s attitude toward me that I don’t have.” Haldeman said nothing in response, and after further conversation and speculation about the testimony and problems of others, Nixon returned to the subject of Mitchell. “I don’t think there’s anybody that can talk to Mitchell except somebody that knows this case. Now there’s one or two people, I
mean, I’ve versed myself in it enough to know the God damn thing. But I’m not sure that I want to personally know. I want to say to Mitchell, Now look, I think that the attorney for the committee, O’Brien, found out this, and I found out that, and the grand jury’s going to do this.’ I just don’t know. They talk about my going out [and doing it], but really, I am not trying to duck it. I don’t mind, I’ve done unpleasant things, and I’ll take this in one minute. The thing, John, is that there’s nobody really that can do it except you. And I know how Mitchell feels. But you conducted this investigation. The way I would do it—Bob, you critique this—is, I’d go up and I’d say, ‘The president’s asked me to see you.’ That you have come in today with this report. These are the cold facts indicating, of course, that this does not indicate [guilt], but the grand jury is moving swiftly, Magruder will be indicted, you think. Under the circumstances, time is of the essence.” The president proceeded to outline Mitchell’s problem, suggesting that Ehrlichman point out that the president had assumed responsibility, and nobody in the White House is involved. He then added to the pitch for Ehrlichman to present: “‘We did try to help these defendants afterward, yes.’ [Mitchell] probably would not deny that, anyway. He probably was not asked that at an earlier time. But, just as any, the defendants are entitled to that sort of—”

“Well, now you’re glossing it,” Ehrlichman protested, as it was getting into what he was calling the aftermath, which he did not think he should bring up. The president, understanding, backed off and asked Ehrlichman for his version of his confrontation speech to Mitchell. Ehrlichman’s points were a bit more blunt: The jig is up. Magruder’s going to blow. It’s now time to rethink what best serves the president. You are not going to escape indictment. It would be better if you were prosecuted on an “information” [a voluntary plea] rather than an “indictment [from the grand jury] by fifteen blacks and three whites.” Mitchell would get credit for stepping forward, and it would serve the president’s interests. Both Haldeman and the president occasionally added suggestions to this approach, and when Ehrlichman finished, they all speculated about how Mitchell might or might not react.

When inquiring about when I might be going to the grand jury, the president obviously recalled our March 21 conversation. “How does Dean, incidentally, what is the liability, or Hunt, or I’m thinking of the payoff thing, in this business,” he began, juggling his thoughts over how much information he wanted to share; the following passage is reprinted verbatim to indicate Nixon’s concern about this subject: “Dean, Dean, ah, Dean asked, told me about
the problem of Hunt’s lawyer wanted, had gotten, this was a few weeks ago, needed sixty thousand or forty thousand dollars or something like that. You remember? He asked me about it, and I said I don’t know where you can get it. I said I would, I mean, I frankly felt he might try to get it, but I didn’t know where. And then he left it up with Mitchell, and Mitchell then said it was taken care of, am I correct? Is my recollection?” Ehrlichman answered, “Yes, sir.” Nixon asked Ehrlichman, “Is that approximately correct? Did he talk to you about that?” Ehrlichman answered, “He talked to me about it. I said, John, I wouldn’t have the vaguest notion where to get it. I saw Mitchell later in the day, Wednesday, [I think],” Ehrlichman recalled.
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“What happened?” Nixon asked. “And he just said, it’s taken care of,” Ehrlichman reported.

Haldeman added his own recollection: “Mitchell raised the topic. He turned to Dean and said, ‘What have you done about that other problem?’ And Dean kind of looked at us and then said, ‘Well, you know, I don’t know.’ And Mitchell said, ‘Oh, I guess that’s been taken care of.’” Haldeman then reported I had told them later that it had been taken care of by LaRue, who, I advised them, was going to cooperate with the prosecutors. Haldeman added, “Oh, Dean told us he had a long talk with LaRue, and LaRue said, ‘This whole thing is ridiculous now,’ and [added] ‘If I were in charge of this now, what I would do is, I’d get a large bus, and I’d put the president at the wheel, and I’d throw everybody we’ve got around here in it, and I’d drive up to the Senate, and I’d have the president open the door, and I’d say, you all get out and tell everything you know, and I’ll be back to pick you up when you’re through.’ He said, ‘It’s all out now, and there’s nothing we can do about it.’ And LaRue also said, you know, ‘I can’t figure out how I got into this to begin with, but it seems to me all of us have been drawn in here in trying to cover up for John.’”

“For Mitchell?” the president asked. “Yeah, which is exactly what’s happened,” Haldeman added. The discussion of LaRue ended when Haldeman pointed out that LaRue was going to tell the truth and take responsibility for his actions: “I think LaRue’s figured that the jig is up.”

After the president clarified that no one had ever discussed clemency for Liddy, or for anyone other than Hunt, with him, he returned to the hush money and offered his version of our March 21 conversation: “Dean told me an interesting thing; when I said [to] Dean, ‘John, where’s it all lead?’ I said, ‘What’s it going to cost, if you continue on this course? He said about a
million dollars. I said facetiously, ‘[That’s a lot]. I know where you can get that.’ That’s the point. That’s the foul-up in the whole Mitchell argument. Unless I could just up and say, ‘Look, fellows, it’s too bad,’ and I could give you executive clemency, like tomorrow, what the hell do you think, Dean, I mean, do you think Hunt and the Cubans are going to sit on their ass in jail for four years and their families not [be] taken care of? That’s the point. Now where the hell do you get the money for that? That’s the reason this whole thing falls. I mean, that astonishes me about Mitchell and the rest. It’s not only improbable, there’s no way to get the money, is there? Who was it, Tom Pappas they had to see me?”

Haldeman confirmed that it was Pappas but remained very vague. The president recalled that Haldeman had told him that Pappas “was helping on the money,” but Haldeman reminded the president that he was seeing a number of contributors, and Pappas “was Mitchell’s contact.” The president recalled that he was careful with “good old Tom” when thanking him for raising money “for the purpose of helping the poor bastards through the jail.” But when Nixon asked Ehrlichman how long this financial support could be provided, Ehrlichman said he had no idea, although he and the president acknowledged that the Berrigan brothers had funds.

They briefly discussed how long I should remain at the White House, and when the president said he was ready to let me go, Ehrlichman cautioned that that might not be the right decision. He said he felt that I might receive better treatment by the grand jury and the U.S. attorney if I were kept on, which he thought important. Haldeman concurred that they would treat me differently as “the dismissed president’s counsel” and Ehrlichman added that dismissal was “a very heavy psychological factor.” The president agreed to keep me on, since there was no reason not to do so, and noted, “Dean is not like Mitchell now, let’s face it. Dean is not like Mitchell in the sense that Dean only tried to do what he could to pick up the God damn pieces, and everybody else around here knew it had to be done.”

They next discussed my involvement in “the aftermath,” the now-accepted euphemism for the cover-up. Haldeman noted, “The known involvement in the aftermath was for what was understood here to be the proper purpose.” The president said, “The question of motive.” “That’s number one,” Ehrlichman said, and his second reason was based on his investigation. “There were eight or ten people around here who knew about this, knew it was going on,” Ehrlichman said, regarding the aftermath. “Bob knew, I knew, all kinds of people knew.” Nixon added, “Well, I knew it, I
knew it.” Realizing what he had just confessed, and possibly realizing that it had been recorded, the president immediately tried, rather awkwardly to retract it. “I knew, I must say though, I didn’t know it. But I must have assumed it, though, but, you know, fortunately, and I thank you both for arranging it that way, and it does show why the isolation of the president is a bad position to be in.” Ehrlichman, apparently unable to contain his disbelief at Nixon’s sudden reversal and claims of ignorance, punctuated the president’s comments with several guttural “humpf” sounds. These seemed to invoke a bit of candor from Nixon; he continued: “But the first time that I knew that they had to have money was the time when Dean told me that they needed forty thousand dollars.” Nixon then gave a confused description of what he did not know and added, “But others did know.”

“The point is,” Ehrlichman said, “that if the wrongdoing which justifies Dean’s dismissal is his knowledge that that operation was going on, then you can’t stop with him. You’ve got to go through this whole place wholesale.” This got the president’s attention: “Fire the whole staff?” “That’s right,” Ehrlichman answered. “It’s a question of motive. It’s a question of role, and I don’t think Dean’s role in the aftermath, at least from the facts that I know now, achieves a level of wrongdoing that requires you terminate him.” Nixon thought that a powerful point and added, “You can be pragmatic and say, well, Christ, cut your losses and get rid of him. I mean, give them an hors d’oeuvre, and maybe they won’t come back for the main course. Go out, John Dean. On the other hand, it is true others did know.” The president instructed Ehrlichman to have a talk with me, particularly about motive. He said he had, and explained that I became involved because Mitchell had kept turning to me for help, and I would come back to Ehrlichman and Haldeman at his request. Mitchell would send the message, “These guys, Hunt’s getting jittery, and says that he’s got to have umpty-ump thousand dollars, and Mitchell’s terribly worried about it, and it was never expressed, but it was certainly understood.” When the president pressed as to whether I had ever discussed the motive, Ehrlichman could not recall, although both he and Haldeman did remember that they had referred me to Kalmbach to raise money, which soon led into another discussion of the $350,000 being returned to the reelection committee.
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This conversation ended with Ehrlichman’s again selling the president on his investigation, which was supposedly broader than my nonexistent report. He said he had examined the full picture of what had happened while I had only probed to determine if there was any White House involvement. When the subject turned to bracing Magruder, the president said that Ehrlichman should start by telling him “of the president’s own great affection for” him and his family. Haldeman recommended taking the same stance with Mitchell, and the president agreed. The president said he was doing to Ehrlichman what President Eisenhower had done to him as vice president when he sent Nixon to deal with Eisenhower’s chief of staff, Sherman Adams.
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When referring to the impact of my testimony on Mitchell, not to mention others, Haldeman noted, “If Dean testifies, it’s going to unscramble the whole omelet.” And after further discussion about Mitchell and Magruder, Haldeman and Ehrlichman departed for Ehrlichman’s office, with the president requesting they report when they had further information.

I had spent Saturday morning in my office with my attorney, Charles Shaffer. Over the prior week I had given him general information about the cover-up, still excluding any discussion of the president’s role. I had only incidentally described Mitchell’s, Haldeman’s and Ehrlichman’s roles in the affair, as it had been necessary to do so to explain my own actions. Shaffer had little doubt that those who would likely be indicted for what we called “pre” activities (relating to the planning and execution of the Watergate break-in) would include at least, in addition to the original defendants, Mitchell and Magruder, but we placed a question mark by Strachan. I took out a yellow note pad, and we added those for whom we thought my testimony might result in “post” indictments for what I called the “post” activities—the events after the arrests on June 17, 1972. For the post candidates I listed: “H” (Haldeman), “E” (Ehrlichman), “JWD” (me), “LaRue,” “Mardian?” “O’Brien,” “Parkinson?” “Colson?” “Bittman?” “Kalmbach/Tony (Ulasewicz)?/source [thinking of Pappas and others who had provided funds]” and “Stans?” Beside the names of those on this later list I added the statutes and their penalties: “Potential O/J” (obstruction of justice), “§371 5/$10” (five years and ten-thousand-dollar fine) and “§1503 5/$5” (five years and five-thousand-dollar fine).
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