The Nixon Defense: What He Knew and When He Knew It (83 page)

After breakfast on the porch of Aspen Lodge, where he read the morning newspapers, the president called Ziegler from his study.
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“That’s quite a collection of headlines this morning, isn’t it?” he observed.
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Ziegler responded, “Oh, boy.” Nixon asked after Ziegler’s morale, and Ziegler assured him it was fine. Nixon said he was delighted with the timing of all this, for
if they had gone sooner, “all this shit” would not have been incorporated in his statement. Mistakenly, the president thought he was through the worst of it. Nixon, a skilled poker player, advised, “You’ve got to let others play their hand a little bit, and then you crack. This is a time for strong me, Ron. You don’t get panicky, and so forth. And our day is going to come. Because we’re going to clean a lot of things up.” Ziegler asked when Haldeman and Ehrlichman would arrive at Camp David, but Nixon did not know. “As you know,” he said, “this is going to be a painful session. And God, I don’t—” he started but then went in a different direction, “—Jesus, I mean, with all this, the Congress or, I mean, everybody else saying, Jesus Christ, do something, should they really hang on? What’s your feeling on that?” When Ziegler said he favored their leaving, Nixon said, “We’ve got a lot of big things left to be done,” and they could not be addressed until he dealt with this problem, noting, “We can’t start that, really, Ron, until after the grand jury indicts.” Nixon figured, “Two or three weeks away, I guess, depending on Dean. Dean is the key to the whole thing.” But the mere mention of my name caused him to worry aloud, until he finally signed off, telling Ziegler, “I just wanted to cheer you up a little, you know.” Ziegler thanked him, and Nixon continued on to spend the day making telephone calls.

8:43
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to 9:01
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telephone call with Haldeman:
After asking Haldeman about his and Ehrlichman’s arrival time, Nixon observed that the timing for his speech would be good, for more had unfolded for him to deal with in the talk. “Now on Dean,” Nixon said, “I’ve been doing some thinking about it. I’ve got a very tough plan for him. It will be handled properly. It’s going to be very preemptory, you know. I’m not going to see him, that’s my point. He can’t come dicker with me.” Nixon said he was merely going to tell me I was out. Haldeman cautioned Nixon not to “antagonize him any more than you have to.” As the call ended Nixon said, “Remember, the decision is made,” regarding Haldeman’s and Ehrlichman’s taking leaves of absence, “and I am going to write [my speech] on that assumption.” Haldeman said, “Okay.”
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9:02
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telephone call with Rogers:
The president asked Rogers if he “might have time to drop up and we could have a little talk.” Nixon said he would arrange a helicopter, but Rogers was fine with driving up. The president said his aides were going to make their move, as “I worked it out with them, finally.” Nixon said he was preparing to deal with me “in a preemptory way, but the same way,” and he was going to do a broadcast Monday night.
He told Rogers his speech would cover “everything that happened,” because he wanted the country to know “that I am in charge, and we’re getting to the bottom of it.” He closed by telling Rogers, “Frankly, Bill, I’m glad to get it all out. I want to get it done.”
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9:13
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telephone call with Petersen:
Nixon told Petersen that he was at Camp David (“I don’t come here to look at the Easter lilies”) and that things were going to work out, but he did not want any information leaking about people he was seeing. But, he added, “I am not going to see Dean, because I cannot be in a position where he will want to come in and talk to me about how he’s going to plea.” Petersen approved. When they got onto a tangent regarding the immunity law, Petersen explained, “As a practical matter, when we, as the sovereign, extend immunity it would be almost an impossible situation to prosecute [Dean], even if we came in with evidence from an independent source. Technically, I think that’s possible, but a Supreme Court decision has indicated—” Nixon interrupted to say, “In other words, if you give him even use immunity, he gets [full immunity]?” Petersen affirmed, “That’s right. Yes, sir.” No one understood this body of law better than Shaffer, and this reality was integral to his thinking.
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Nixon asked about Judge Byrne, and Petersen said he was going to have an evidentiary hearing in open court. Petersen reported that Ehrlichman had spoken to the FBI and told them that “he heard of the incident but had no independent knowledge of it.” The conversation ended with Nixon expressing exaggerated disgust that Shaffer had told them, “‘Look, we’re going to try the president on other things than the Watergate,’ Jesus Christ, and then without being specific.” They agreed it was evidence of my desperation.
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11:10
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telephone call with Ziegler:
Ziegler said he had spoken with Haldeman, and he wanted to reassure the president that John and Bob were comfortable about taking a leave of absence, but he suggested that the real “master stroke of all this” and a truly “dramatic action” would be if “Rogers is named as the attorney general,” and “if Rogers is then in a position to name a special prosecutor.” Ziegler said, “That action in itself will then allow the presidency to totally remove itself from the whole process.” Ziegler reported that Bob Woodward had information about Henry Petersen’s running of the investigation of a fairly recent previous case in which “he can come under some criticism.” “The difficulty with a special prosecutor,” Nixon noted, was that “it’ll be months before they could ever learn the case.” Nixon explained that he was going to handle my being placed on leave of
absence by having Garment notify me. Returning to Ziegler’s master stroke, Nixon said, “I don’t think Rogers would ever do it,” but that he did have another plan, which he shared with Ziegler: “Maybe I may get Richardson to do it.” Elliot Richardson was then serving as secretary of defense and had earlier served as Nixon’s undersecretary of state, as well as having been the attorney general of Massachusetts and the United States attorney of Massachusetts. Nixon said he would get back to Ziegler when he knew more. The call ended with Nixon reporting that his daughter Tricia had come to Camp David to tell him that the family had discussed the matter, and “they felt strongly that Haldeman and Ehrlichman should resign.”
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Bill Rogers arrived at Camp David while the president was speaking with Ziegler. He spent the day with Nixon, talking, having lunch on the patio of Aspen Lodge, and walking the grounds. Nixon later recorded that Rogers, too, felt strongly that Haldeman and Ehrlichman should resign. Nixon asked Rogers to share that assessment with them, but Rogers declined, saying he did not have a good relationship with either.
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While Rogers had no interest in becoming attorney general, he did agree to try to persuade Elliot Richardson to take the post.

5:35
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telephone call with Ziegler:
Ziegler reported press interest was running toward the plumbers operations, the Ellsberg break-in, and the bogus cable regarding the overthrow of Diem. Nixon wanted to know how this information had gotten out, suggesting maybe I had leaked it, and Ziegler (incorrectly) assumed that had been the case. Nixon shared what Bill Rogers had said regarding the Ellsberg break-in: “If they did this, and if Ehrlichman knew they did it, and then they were weren’t fired, and then went over to the committee, this is going to be very, very tough. Not in a legal way, for Ehrlichman, but in terms of coming back.” Nixon said, “Now we’ve got to make it go, Ron. You’re not losing it, are you?” “Absolutely not,” Ziegler assured him.
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6:33
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telephone call with Ehrlichman:
Nixon began this call to Ehrlichman by citing Rogers on how the Eisenhower administration handled anyone who took the Fifth or sought immunity: They had to resign. Ehrlichman reported that it was all over that day’s newspapers that I would testify, with or without immunity, and he speculated, “Now that means the jig is up. He wasn’t able to make his deal, and he’s trying to put the best face on it that he can.” This caught Nixon by surprise, and they discussed its meaning. In a friendly but pointed tone Ehrlichman said, “Sometime during
the time we’re there, I would very much appreciate having a few minutes alone with you.” Nixon agreed to that, and Ehrlichman continued, “I know that we’re sort of coupled like Siamese twins in this, Bob and I, but I do have a couple of things I would like to—”

“I understand, Bob, ah, John. Fine. Of course, you can have some moments alone. Now let me ask one thing. Ron said that today is sort of moving toward the California plumbers operation. Is that right?” When Ehrlichman said he had not been following the news, Nixon asked, “Do you have any thought about it at the moment?” “I really don’t,” Ehrlichman replied. Nixon then asked, “I suppose that the question was, who was in charge, huh? Now, was Dean in charge?” “No, I was,” Ehrlichman acknowledged. “And Krogh and Young, of course, ran the operation.” Nixon inquired about its purpose and what happened to Hunt and Liddy after the Ellsberg break-in.“I never saw them again,” Ehrlichman said. When the president questioned how the operation had been turned off, Ehrlichman explained, “I talked to either Krogh or Young.” However much the president pressed, Ehrlichman would volunteer little other than that the undertaking “got nothing” and that he had given a “negative” when they wanted to go back again. “Well, that’s a solid position, isn’t it?” Nixon asked, to which Ehrlichman replied, “Well, it’s what actually happened.” “I’m just trying to put it in terms of saying as far as your part of it was concerned, this was something you never authorized,” Nixon clarified, and Ehrlichman (falsely) assured him that was the situation.
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The president next shared Ziegler’s information about press interest in the fake material prepared by Hunt regarding “Kennedy on the Diem thing.” Had Ehrlichman ever heard about this? “Yes, sir, and it leads directly to your friend Colson,” Ehrlichman told a startled Nixon, explaining that it was a fake cable allegedly involving President John F. Kennedy. “Oh, my God. I just can’t believe that,” Nixon exclaimed, as he tried to recall what had occurred, remembering that Ehrlichman and David Young were conducting a study of “the whole Diem thing, and the Bay of Pigs thing.” Ehrlichman confirmed that they had done so, and Nixon remarked that he had only asked for the facts. “Well, I don’t know where Colson got this inspiration,” Ehrlichman replied, “but he was very busy at it.” After listening to further explanations from Ehrlichman, Nixon can be heard sighing, and then saying, “I should have been told about that, shouldn’t I?” “Well,” Ehrlichman said, “I’m not so sure that you weren’t.”

“But by whom?” Nixon demanded, and Ehrlichman could only concede,
“I don’t know. I don’t know.” The only thing the president could recall was an article being prepared for
Life
magazine, but he had not been informed that it was based on a fake cable. “My recollection is that this was discussed with you,” Ehrlichman said, although he admitted he might be wrong. He said he would check his notes when Nixon ordered, “I’ve got to know about that.” Ehrlichman then recalled that it had been Colson, which may have refreshed Nixon’s memory, for he decided he did not want to hear any more about the matter, explaining, “Well, it’s maybe better I wouldn’t know if you told me. Because Chuck didn’t.”

Nixon then turned to the subject of his Monday speech, which he wanted to keep short. When Ehrlichman observed, “There’s no virtue in brevity, I don’t think,” the president said he was thinking twenty to twenty-five minutes rather than thirty-five or forty. “I gather from Bob that this leave [of absence] business is a closed subject, as far as you’re concerned?” Ehrlichman asked. “Yes, it has to be,” Nixon replied. “I can’t see any way to handle it otherwise.” Ehrlichman then questioned, “Do you have anything from Petersen at all that we don’t know about?” He did not and would not, which prompted Ehrlichman to tell him that John Wilson had all but fallen out of his chair when he learned that Petersen was refusing to keep the president informed. Nixon did not want to get into a debate with Ehrlichman and returned to the leave of absence: “Well, this is the way I feel I have to move, John. I mean, you know, one of the prerogatives of the president is to make mistakes, and sometimes you have to make some. I’ve made my share, but on this one, I just feel it’s the right thing to do.”
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7:06
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telephone call with Petersen:
Nixon called Petersen in response to Ehrlichman’s report about my willingness to testify without immunity, wondering if I had been granted some sort of informal or equitable immunity. Petersen said I had not (forgetting that I had been granted informal immunity for my initial meetings with the prosecutors).
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The president slept in on Sunday morning. When Kissinger called midmorning, Nixon told him, “Now I’ve got something to tell you in the greatest of confidence, that I’ve decided I’ve got to get a new attorney general.”
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He was going to move Elliot Richardson from Defense to Justice, he said, and filled Kissinger in on Richardson’s background. Nixon then added, “I am going to
get the most mean son of a bitch I can find and put him in the FBI, and let all hell break loose.” He also reminded Kissinger, “As you know, Henry, we did do some surveillance with the FBI on these leaks, you remember?” Kissinger answered, “Oh yes.” Nixon said they were approved by the attorney general in 1969 and 1970. But when the FBI had failed to investigate Ellsberg, the White House got involved, and “that’s why some of that crap was done in the White House. But that’s too bad. That’s just one of those things. But I just wanted you to know when that comes out, don’t back off. Anything that’s national security, we’re going to fight like hell for.” Kissinger agreed, “Absolutely. No, I will certainly not back off.”