Read The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany Online
Authors: William L. Shirer
Finally, at 9:35
P.M
. on August 21, Stalin’s reply came over the wires in Berlin.
T
O
THE
C
HANCELLOR OF THE
G
ERMAN
R
EICH
,
A. H
ITLER:
I thank you for the letter. I hope that the German–Soviet nonaggression pact will bring about a decided turn for the better in the political relations between our countries.
The peoples of our countries need peaceful relations with each other. The assent of the German Government to the conclusion of a nonaggression pact provides the foundation for eliminating the political tension and for the establishment of peace and collaboration between our countries.
The Soviet Government have instructed me to inform you that they agree to Herr von Ribbentrop’s arriving in Moscow on August 23.
J. S
TALIN
26
For sheer cynicism the Nazi dictator had met his match in the Soviet despot. The way was now open to them to get together to dot the
i
’s and cross the
t
’s on one of the crudest deals of this shabby epoch.
Stalin’s reply was transmitted to the Fuehrer at the Berghof at 10:30
P.M
. A few minutes later, this writer remembers—shortly after 11
P.M.—
a musical program on the German radio was suddenly interrupted and a voice came on to announce, “The Reich government and the Soviet government have agreed to conclude a pact of nonaggression with each other. The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs will arrive in Moscow on Wednesday, August 23, for the conclusion of the negotiations.”
The next day, August 22, 1939, Hitler, having been assured by Stalin himself that Russia would be a friendly neutral, once more convoked his top military commanders to the Obersalzberg, lectured them on his own greatness and on the need for them to wage war brutally and without pity and apprised them that he probably would order the attack on Poland to begin four days hence, on Saturday, August 26—six days ahead of schedule. Stalin, the Fuehrer’s mortal enemy, had made this possible.
The generals found Hitler in one of his most arrogant and uncompromising moods.
*
“I have called you together,” he told them, “to give you a picture of the political situation in order that you may have some insight into the individual factors on which I have based my irrevocable decision to act and in order to strengthen your confidence. After that we shall discuss military details.” First of all, he said, there were two personal considerations.
My own personality and that of Mussolini.
Essentially, all depends on me, on my existence, because of my political talents. Furthermore, the fact that probably no one will ever again have the confidence of the whole German people as 1 have. There will probably never again in the future be a man with more authority than I have. My existence is therefore a factor of great value. But I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or a lunatic.
The second personal factor is the Duce. His existence is also decisive. If something happens to him,
Italy
’s loyalty to the alliance will no longer be certain. The Italian Court is fundamentally opposed to the Duce.
Franco too was a help. He would assure Spain’s “benevolent neutrality.” As for “the other side,” he assured his listeners, “there is no outstanding personality in England or France.”
For what must have been a period of several hours, broken only by a late lunch, the demonic dictator rambled on, and there is no evidence from the records that a single general, admiral or Air Force commander dared
to interrupt him to question his judgment or even to challenge his lies. He had made his decision in the spring, he said, that a conflict with Poland was inevitable, but he had thought that first he would turn against the West. In that case, however, it became “clear” to him that Poland would attack Germany. Therefore she must be liquidated now.
The time to fight a war, anyway, had come.
For us it is easy to make the decision. We have nothing to lose; we can only gain. Our economic situation is such that we cannot hold out more than a few years. Goering can confirm this. We have no other choice, we must act …
Besides the personal factor, the political situation is favorable to us; in the
Mediterranean
, rivalry among
Italy
, France and England; in the Orient, tension …
England is in great danger. France’s position has also deteriorated. Decline in birth rate …
Yugoslavia
carries the germ of collapse …
Rumania
is weaker than before … Since Kemal’s death,
Turkey
has been ruled by small minds, unsteady, weak men.
All these fortunate circumstances will not prevail in two to three years. No one knows how long I shall live. Therefore a showdown, which it would not be safe to put off for four to five years, had better take place now.
Such was the Nazi Leader’s fervid reasoning.
He thought it “highly probable” that the West would not fight, but the risk nevertheless had to be accepted. Had he not taken risks—in occupying the Rhineland when the generals wanted to pull back, in taking Austria, the
Sudetenland
and the rest of Czechoslovakia? “Hannibal at Cannae, Frederick the Great at Leuthen, and
Hindenburg
and Ludendorff at
Tannenberg
,” he said, “took chances. So now we also must take risks which can only be mastered by iron determination.” There must be no weakening.
It has done much damage that many reluctant Germans in high places spoke and wrote to Englishmen after the solution of the Czech question. The Fuehrer carried his point when you lost your nerve and capitulated too soon.
Halder, Witzleben and Thomas and perhaps other generals who had been in on the Munich conspiracy must have winced at this. Hitler obviously knew more than they had realized.
At any rate, it was now time for them all to show their fighting qualities. Hitler had created Greater Germany, he reminded them, “by political bluff.” It had now become necessary to “test the military machine. The Army must experience actual battle before the big final showdown in the West.” Poland offered such an opportunity.
Coming back to England and France:
The West has only two possibilities to fight against us:
1. Blockade: It will not be effective because of our self-sufficiency and our sources of aid in the East.
2. Attack from the West from the
Maginot Line
. I consider this impossible.
Another possibility is the violation of Dutch,
Belgium
and Swiss neutrality.
England and France will not violate the neutrality of these countries. Actually they cannot help Poland.
Would it be a long war?
No one is counting on a long war. If Herr von Brauchitsch had told me that I would need four years to conquer Poland I would have replied, It cannot be done. It is nonsense to say that England wants to wage a long war.
Having disposed, to his own satisfaction, at least, of Poland, Britain and France, Hitler pulled out his ace card. He turned to Russia.
The enemy had another hope, that Russia would become our enemy after the conquest of Poland. The enemy did not count on my great power of resolution. Our enemies are little worms. I saw them at Munich.
I was convinced that Stalin would never accept the English offer. Only a blind optimist could believe that Stalin would be so crazy as not to see through England’s intentions. Russia has no interest in maintaining Poland … Litvinov’s dismissal was decisive. It came to me like a cannon shot as a sign of a change in Moscow toward the Western Powers.
I brought about the change toward Russia gradually. In connection with the commercial treaty we got into political conversations. Finally a proposition came from the Russians for a nonaggression treaty. Four days ago I took a special step which brought it about that Russia announced yesterday that she is ready to sign. The personal contact with Stalin is established. The day after tomorrow Ribbentrop will conclude the treaty. Now Poland is in the position in which I wanted her … A beginning has been made for the destruction of England’s hegemony. The way is open for the soldier, now that I have made the political preparations.
The way would be open for the soldiers, that is, if Chamberlain didn’t pull another Munich. “I am only afraid,” Hitler told his warriors, “that some
Schweinehund
*
will make a proposal for mediation.”
At this point the meeting broke up for lunch, but not until Goering had expressed thanks to the Fuehrer for pointing the way and had assured him that the armed services would do their duty.
†
The afternoon lecture was devoted by Hitler mainly to bucking up his military chiefs and trying to steel them for the task ahead. The rough jottings of all three records of the talk indicate its nature.
The most iron determination on our part. No shrinking back from anything. Everyone must hold the view that we have been determined to fight the Western powers right from the start. A life-and-death struggle…. A long period of peace would not do us any good … A manly bearing … We have the better men … On the opposite side they are weaker … In 1918 the nation collapsed because the spiritual prerequisites were insufficient. Frederick the Great endured only because of his fortitude.
The destruction of Poland has priority. The aim is to eliminate active forces, not to reach a definite line. Even if war breaks out in the West, the destruction of Poland remains the primary objective. A quick decision, in view of the season.
I shall give a propagandist reason for starting the war—never mind whether it is plausible or not. The victor will not be asked afterward whether he told the truth or not. In starting and waging a war it is not right that matters, but victory.
Close your hearts to pity! Act brutally! Eighty million people must obtain what is their right … The stronger man is right … Be harsh and remorseless! Be steeled against all signs of compassion! … Whoever has pondered over this world order knows that its meaning lies in the success of the best by means of force…
Having thundered such Nietzschean exhortations, the Fuehrer, who had worked himself up to a fine fit of Teutonic fury, calmed down and delivered a few directives for the campaign ahead. Speed was essential. He had “unshakable faith” in the German soldier. If any crises developed they would be due solely to the commanders’ losing their nerve. The first aim was to drive wedges from the southeast to the Vistula, and from the north to the Narew and the Vistula. Military operations, he insisted, must not be influenced by what he might do with Poland after her defeat. As to that he was vague. The new German frontier, he said, would be based on “sound principles.” Possibly he would set up a small Polish buffer state between Germany and Russia.
The order for the start of hostilities, Hitler concluded, would be given later, probably for Saturday morning, August 26.
The next day, the twenty-third, after a meeting of the OKW section chiefs, General Halder noted in his diary: “Y Day definitely set for the 26th (Saturday).”
By the middle of August the military conversations in Moscow between the Western democracies and the Soviet Union had come to a virtual standstill—and for this the intransigence of the Poles was largely to blame. The Anglo–French military missions, it will be remembered, after taking a slow boat to Leningrad, had arrived in Moscow on August 11, exactly one week after the frustrated Mr. Strang had left the Russian capital, obviously relieved to be able to turn over to the generals and admirals the difficult and unpleasant job of trying to negotiate with the Russians.
*
What now had to be worked out hurriedly was a military convention which would spell out in detail just how and where, and with what, Nazi armed force could be met. But as the confidential British minutes of the day-to-day military conversations and the reports of the British negotiators reveal
29
the Anglo–French military team had been sent to Moscow to discuss not details but rather “general principles.” The Russians, however, insisted on getting down at once to hard, specific and—in the Allied view—awkward facts, and Voroshilov’s response to the Allied declaration of principles made at the first meeting by General Doumenc was that they were “too abstract and immaterial and do not oblige anyone to do anything … We are not gathered here,” he declared coolly, “to make abstract declarations, but to work out a complete military convention.”
The Soviet Marshal posed some very definite questions: Was there any treaty which defined what action Poland would take? How many British troops could reinforce the French Army on the outbreak of the war? What would
Belgium
do? The answers he got were not very reassuring. Doumenc said he had no knowledge of Polish plans. General
Heywood
answered that the British envisaged “a first contingent of sixteen divisions, ready for service in the early stages of a war, followed later by a second contingent of sixteen divisions.” Pressed by Voroshilov to reveal how many British troops there would be immediately on the outbreak of war, Heywood replied, “At the moment there are five regular divisions and one mechanized division in England.” These paltry figures came as an unpleasant surprise to the Russians, who were prepared, they said, to deploy 120 infantry divisions against an aggressor in the west at the very outbreak of hostilities.
As for Belgium, General Doumenc answered the Russian question by saying that “French troops cannot enter unless and until they are asked to, but France is ready to answer any call.”
This reply led to the crucial question before the military negotiators in Moscow and one which the British and French had been anxious to avoid. During the very first meeting and again at a critical session on August 14, Marshal Voroshilov insisted that the essential question was whether Poland was willing to permit Soviet troops to enter her territory to meet
the Germans. If not, how could the Allies prevent the German Army from quickly overrunning Poland? Specifically—on the fourteenth—he asked, “Do the British and French general staffs think that the Red Army can move across Poland, and in particular through the
Vilna
gap and across Galicia in order to make contact with the enemy?”