The Road to Berlin (106 page)

The President spoke up to support the Prime Minister in his plea for early free elections in Poland, adding his own hope that there might be elections before the end of the year. Now came Stalin’s turn, an intervention which he exploited neatly by reversing Molotov’s arguments in an even more powerful negativistic sense—if Molotov had argued that any settlement must be on Soviet terms, Stalin threatened that there might be no agreement at all. But first he challenged the Prime Minister on his information about the state of affairs in Poland: British and American information clearly differed from that available to the Soviet government, whereupon he launched into a lengthy speech. The men of the Lublin government were indubitably popular, with a special place for Bierut, Osobka-Morawski and Rola-Zymierski who had not left the country during its occupation, who had lived in Warsaw and worked through the underground movement. There might be clever men in the London government, but they had not lived under the German occupation and were not liked—a peculiar and even primitive view, but occupation nurtured such feelings.

The liberation of Poland by the Red Army had almost certainly revolutionized the old antagonistic Russo–Polish relations, where Russia had formerly taken part in three partitions of the country. ‘Now there is goodwill towards Russia.…’ The Poles had seen members of the provisional government, but where, they asked, were the London Poles? The Lublin government was not composed of great men, but they did enjoy great popularity. Certainly, the Lublin government had not been elected—but then De Gaulle’s government had not been elected; it was unreasonable to demand more of Poland than was asked of France, and it should be noted that while the French government had done nothing to generate enthusiasm in France, the provisional government in Poland had embarked on land reforms which had evoked a popular response. In Stalin’s view, the situation was not so tragic—the Prime Minister pressed for a settlement, so let there be concentration on essentials rather than on secondary matters: take up Molotov’s suggestion, reconstruct the present provisional government rather than create a wholly new government. As for the presidential committee, the Poles might or might not agree with it.

The dissension died away and the discussions flickered out. Seemingly much wearied, the President asked how long it might be before elections took place in Poland: barring some military catastrophe, Stalin submitted that they might be only a month away, a statement which capped all the discussion about interim arrangements, for the elections were intended to decide Poland’s future government. The Prime Minister found this more reassuring and in placatory mood assured Stalin that Great Britain would not seek steps which might interfere with Soviet military operations. On the President’s suggestion, the Polish problem was turned over to the foreign ministers, who should consult Sir Archibald Clark Kerr and Mr Harriman.

However, Stalin was not quite done. In informal fashion, he raised two issues, Yugoslavia and Greece. On Yugoslavia he was anxious to know why the United Government (already agreed by the British) had not yet materialized, and on Greece he was simply asking for information. He had no criticism of British policy in Greece, he simply wanted news of the situation. After the wrangle over information about conditions in Poland, the hint was broad and crude: if the British did not break the rules, the situation in Greece would continue, and likewise there would be no accusation of British bad faith over Yugoslavia if there was no such charge levelled against the Soviet Union
vis-à-vis
Poland.

Thus far the President and his delegation could feel a certain satisfaction with the course of the conference. For all the friction over Poland there had been no actual breach with the Soviet Union, the President and Stalin seemed to see eye to eye over Germany, and no doubt the same reasonableness would prevail over the issue of the United Nations. The United Nations embodied one of the President’s major objectives, totally overshadowing parochial and pettifogging European politics. Now a second major objective—Soviet commitment to the war against Japan—came close to realization. At Teheran in 1943 Stalin had skirted the question warily, but in December 1944 he had already begun to deploy his arguments about Soviet claims by outlining them to Harriman. Eden remained sceptical, and in suggesting before the Yalta conference that Britain and the United States pursue a joint negotiating strategy he emphasized that the Soviet Union would scarcely wish to stand by idly while Japan was vanquished, so that there was no need to meet every stiff concession demanded by Stalin as the price for his own self-interested entry into the Pacific war; concessions to Stalin over the Far East must be balanced by Soviet moderation in other areas.

This counsel went unheeded. On the afternoon of 8 February the President and Stalin met privately to discuss Soviet entry into the war against Japan; here was collaboration at its closest, so close as to assume well-nigh conspiratorial form. Already prodded by the American chiefs of staff, the President at once broached the question of military co-operation, agreed in principle but dragging woefully in practice. The Kamchatka survey, approved in December 1944, stood stalled. Although the Americans had assembled their men and measured them for the Russian uniforms the Soviet government insisted they must wear, the whole project was now subject to indefinite delay. General Antonov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, had agreed in December to nominate four Soviet officers to work with the American planning group. Six weeks passed without any development, only to have the first meeting virtually collide with the Yalta conference. General Slavin from the General Staff, Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov (Chief of Staff to Novikov, Air Force C-in-C), Rear-Admiral Kucherov and General Semichastnov made up this Soviet military delegation, who busied themselves with procedure rather than planning in any real sense.

The President came armed with a list of questions, seven specific points upon which the American Chiefs of Staff required answers to facilitate their own planning. While the substance of this list took up a further day of discussion, Stalin in a show of immediate amiability and prompt willingness agreed to the establishment of American air bases in the Nikolayevsk–Komsomolsk area and the Pacific supply line running into Siberia; by way of emphasis, Stalin stressed the importance of the first, the forward bases, which General Antonov had been unable to authorize on his own, though he had from the first shown keen interest in the supply question. In the same spirit Stalin agreed to the establishment of bases for US bombers in the Budapest area, thus eliminating the dangerous run from Italy to Germany, and he readily acceded to the request for American experts to investigate bomb damage in those areas of south-eastern Europe now in the hands of the Red Army.

To start the trading, Stalin asked about the possibility of buying shipping after the war. The President, anxious to encourage any Soviet initiative which would bring them out into the wide world—in this case, international trade—responded by saying that he hoped to transfer shipping on interest-free credit terms, whereas the British, imbued with crude commercialism, would simply sell. All this pleased Stalin enormously, who lavished praise on the President’s handling of economic problems of this kind: Lend-Lease itself had been a spectacular contribution to the common cause. There was nothing, however, interest-free in Stalin’s terms for Soviet entry into the war against Japan. Fully cognizant of these claims, the President made no demur over the Soviet acquisition of the Kuriles and the southern reaches of Sakhalin, but on the two ports (Port Arthur and Darien) and the two railways, the Chinese–Eastern and the South Manchurian, he was reluctant to commit himself without some reference to the Chinese. Several possibilities suggested themselves: for example, the Soviet Union could lease Port Arthur, as it could also lease the railways or even operate a joint Sino–Soviet commission; as for Darien, the President made it plain that he preferred an internationalized status for the port, more or less on the lines of his proposals for Hong Kong. At this Stalin made his first, faint but firm protest: summoning up Soviet ‘public opinion’ as sudden and subtle reinforcement, he pointed out that he could scarcely call for war against Japan without holding out the promise of Port Arthur and Darien. Given these political pre-conditions, there should be no difficulties. The President countered by referring to the need to consult Chiang Kai-shek, but this step might mean compromising vital secrecy; Stalin agreed with this point, but insisted that the Soviet Union must have its claims formally set down in writing before the end of the conference. To this the President made no objection.

On the question of China, Stalin went out of his way to assure the President that the Soviet Union would in no way overturn the prevailing situation; after all, had not he, Stalin, always supported a united front between the
Kuomintang
and the Communists? The only pity was that the
Kuomintang
seemed to ignore
the best men in its ranks. President Roosevelt paid little heed to this or to any praise of Chiang Kai-shek, implying that it was Chiang Kai-shek who was impeding his own efforts to build up this united front. Stalin murmured that this, a united front, echoed his own sentiments exactly. Scanning the future face of Asia, the President let Stalin deeper into his thoughts. Over Korea he proposed, not the quadripartite body (Russian, American, Chinese and British) recommended by his own State Department, but an American–Soviet–Chinese trusteeship; in mock tragic tones Stalin pleaded for the British, but he was more concerned to discover whether there would be foreign troops in Korea, to which the President returned a resolute no. The President also proposed extending the idea of trusteeship into Indochina, thus prising France out of Asia and displacing the colonial presence even further; Soviet–American co-operation in the Far East would fill the vacuum brought on by the defeat of Japan and the eradication of the colonial powers.

The question of military co-operation took up much of the talk on 8–9 February. General Antonov found his position easier now that Stalin had spoken, agreeing to the establishment of American bomber bases and to the establishment of the Pacific supply line, keeping it open even after Soviet–Japanese hostilities had begun, largely for petrol. To the seven leading questions presented by the Americans, Antonov—prompted by Stalin—returned his best answers. The Chief of the Soviet General Staff made it clear that there had been no change in Soviet operational plans since October 1944: the Soviet command expected heavy resistance to the Red Army by the Japanese and a sea-air route would be necessary to secure supplies in view of the vulnerability of the Trans-Siberian Railway to attack. As yet no redeployment of Soviet troops to the Far Eastern theatre had been set in motion, owing to the weight of the fighting on the Soviet–German front.

General Antonov confirmed Stalin’s ruling on bomber bases: the Soviet Union would, therefore, handle the initial construction work necessary to prepare bases in the Nikolayevsk–Komsomolsk area. On 8 February he affirmed that American help in the defence of Kamchatka ‘would be useful’ and he repeated this the following day, adding an authorization for American survey parties to proceed to the Amur area but excluding them—for reasons of secrecy—from Kamchatka. General Marshall learned on 8 February that the capture of southern Sakhalin came high on the list of Soviet operational priorities, a point confirmed on the 9th, though General Antonov added that while La Perouse Strait was denied to Japanese ships Allied vessels would have to wait upon the construction of a suitable base. On the question of additional weather stations, General Antonov could satisfy the Americans that these would be available, a decision endorsed by Stalin. But one American question, more by way of a pointed rejoinder and reminder, stung General Antonov to the quick: how effective and ‘vigorous’ would be this joint planning? With Soviet troops not as yet on the move to or deployed in the Far East, General Antonov asserted with some heat, joint planning must be necessarily limited. The Red Army needed to establish its own bases.
General Marshall failed to find satisfaction in this argument and stressed the needs of American planners. A ruffled Antonov calmed himself on being told that none of this impugned either Soviet competence or good faith, and he undertook to ensure nothing less than ‘vigorous’ combined planning in Moscow.

On 10 February, after some final adjustments, the Soviet–American compact was formally sealed. Over the signatures of President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister (who signed against the advice of Eden), the Soviet Union agreed to enter the war against Japan two or three months after the defeat of Germany, subject to the following conditions: the preservation of the
status quo
in Outer Mongolia, the restoration to Russia of ‘former rights violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904’ (the recovery of southern Sakhalin, the internationalization of Darien and the restoration of the lease of Port Arthur as a Soviet naval base, joint Sino-Soviet operation of the two railways subject to recognition of the pre-eminence of Soviet interests and Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria), and Soviet acquisition of the Kuriles. Ambassador Harriman had been obliged to clarify certain points with Molotov before the draft agreement could be accepted: the Soviet draft mentioned leases on the two ports and the two railways, which the Ambassador modified to confirm the status of Port Arthur and Darien as free ports, simultaneously bringing the railways under the joint commission and stipulating prior Chinese agreement. Stalin objected over Port Arthur, which he bluntly demanded as a naval base, after which he fell in with the plan for joint control of the railways and even suggested obtaining the Chinese view on the status of Outer Mongolia. Whatever Eden’s protestations, supported by Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Prime Minister could only put the best face on the compact, disclaiming it as a necessary American initiative; to Stalin he affirmed the justice of making good Russia’s historical losses and extended a welcome to Russian ships in the Pacific.